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POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS

ESSAYS

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ESSAYS

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS

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BY

RICHARD CONGREVE

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1874

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS WORK is in the main a reprint, with two or three exceptions. Without any exception, all its component parts are printed or reprinted as they were originally published or spoken.

Extending over a period of nearly twenty years, and touching on difficult questions of present interest, there will be found in the essays, here and there, incidental opinions which in the shifting course of European politics have become untenable. Some of the judgments, too, I might wish softened in statement—occasionally, perhaps, strengthened. But as I abide by the leading principles and general tone, I have preferred leaving all the pieces as they stood originally, though by alterations I might in some cases have obviated objections or avoided attack. Even the two French discourses are left as they were delivered.

The arrangement is in two series, each in chronological order; the more directly political writings forming one series, the more social and religious the

other. Throughout, my aim has been to apply the system of Auguste Comte to our actual state, and by so doing, as far as in me lay, to spread the Religion of Humanity, which I hold, with an ever-deepening conviction, to be the sole remedy for the evils under which we are labouring.

Cæsar 21, 86 (*May* 20, 1874).

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Erratum.

Page 257, *for* Winter *read* Summer Palace.

GIBRALTAR

OR

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND.

'Dévouement des forts aux faibles.'

AUGUSTE COMTE

I dedicate these Pages

TO

JOHN BURGOYNE BLACKETT,

LATE M.P. FOR NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.

I CLAIM not hereby any sanction for the views I have expressed. The Dedication is rather a simple memorial of a friendship of more than fifteen years, which his untimely death has placed beyond the liability to diminution or interruption.

Had he lived, no one would have taken a keener interest in the work. His death need not render the act which connects him with it inappropriate.

R. C.

PREFACE.

Qui s'excuse, s'accuse. Mindful of this truth, I enter on no apology for either the tone or the substance of the following pamphlet. It must answer for itself.

If, as is generally felt, England is at present without any definite foreign policy, drifting onwards under the dictation of circumstances, without any real prevision, the time is not ill chosen for speaking. If any one has convictions, it is as well he should state them. All that can be required of such an one is, that he should give the only guarantee a private citizen can give—that he shall refuse to shelter himself in an anonymous publication. He should be ready, by giving his name, to meet any ridicule or odium that may attach to his views.

I have abstained from any quotations in support of my positions. Such quotations would have shown how little original they are; at the same time, they might have lent them weight. But it seemed an object not to increase the size of the work.

One general acknowledgment I feel bound to make. I feel bound, that is, to acknowledge the large obligations I am under to the works of M. Auguste Comte. Students of the 'Philosophie' and 'Politique Positive' will appreciate the amount of my obligations. I have no care to limit their extent. It is in those writings, and there only, so far as I can see, that

is to be found the proper key to the study of history—the proper clue to the solution of our present difficulties.

What I have written is not addressed to the directly political classes, but rather to those who stand, or have hitherto stood, aloof from all direct political action. Of course, I assume that their so doing has not been the result of indifference, but that they would wish to co-operate in the formation of a sound public opinion. The actual governing classes would have no sympathy with any such views, apart from any question of the manner in which they are set forth. The class which I would wish to reach is the more political part of our artisan population. For there alone, I conceive, is to be found, in any numbers, the requisite generality of views, the requisite moral emancipation from all the dominant prejudices, and the requisite strength of conviction that a policy of peace, as the basis of large social improvement, is the great necessity of our time.

In pleading for full liberty of exposition and for free discussion, I am aware that discussion, on the part of those unqualified, is a waste of time. As definite a qualification is required in the department of political or social science, as in that of chemistry or biology. The qualification, in both cases equally, is to be given by a sound education. Till we have that, the only method of working a large change is the one which has hitherto prevailed. Such change must be elaborated by the speculations of individual minds, and be spread by the methods above indicated.

WANDSWORTH:
December 6, 1856.

PART I.

THE political aggregate, to which we give the name of Western Europe, or the Western European State-system, is a combination of two distinct elements. There is, first, the Southern and more distinctly Roman element, represented by the three great nations, France, Italy, Spain—with their natural adjuncts, which it were superfluous here to specify. There is, secondly, the Northern or Teutonic element, represented by England and Germany, with the minor states, which naturally group themselves around those two larger ones.

By their incorporation into the Roman Empire, the three first-mentioned nations were early brought into peaceful connexion with each other, and into a common subordination to one political head. The memory of that connexion with each other, and with the common centre, Rome, has never been lost. In common, they have preserved the language of Rome, as the basis of their languages; and though not in an equal degree, they have yet all kept unbroken their historical tradition. Their conquerors, Moorish or Teutonic, have never succeeded in breaking that tradition.

Britain was, if somewhat later, yet equally with France or Spain, incorporated into the Roman Empire. But the continuity of her historical tradition suffered an interruption which the others escaped. This was owing to the circumstances of the Saxon conquest. The greater completeness of that conquest, the more entire destruction of the previous state of society which it effected, left Britain very widely separated from the neighbouring states with which she had so long been immediately connected. There may, I think, be traced even

in the Anglo-Saxon period, under the more eminent of her kings, a tendency to re-enter the European confederacy,—a wish to repair in that respect the work of the conquest, and to free her from the disadvantages of her isolation. But it was not till the Norman Conquest that the tendency became fact, and that, by the changes that conquest introduced in her political, social, and ecclesiastical organisation, England was replaced in her right position as an integral part of Western Europe.

The settlement of the German tribes, as auxiliaries, within the limits of the Roman Empire; their subsequent settlement, as conquerors, within the same limits; the reaction of those who had so settled, whether as auxiliaries or conquerors, on the nations of Central Germany; the conquest of those nations effected by the princes of the Carlovingian House; and the revival of the traditions of Imperial Rome in the person of the greatest of those princes, Charlemagne; all this—coming in aid of that which must not be forgotten, the direct action of Rome on the nations beyond the Rhine and the Danube—brought the other or German branch of the Teutonic element within the influence of the Roman incorporation.

From the period of Charlemagne to the present day, and by virtue of the long wars of himself and his predecessors, not only has Western Europe been free from any further conquest on a scale sufficient to disturb her organisation, but it has been clear that she has acted as a whole, with the instinctive sense that she was for all purposes united into one community.

So much was immediately necessary for my object. So much was necessary, that is, to indicate, at the outset, the point of view taken in the following remarks. Throughout them this union of Western Europe is never lost sight of. Throughout them England is considered as an integral part, a member of the State-system, whose limits or constituent elements I have been enumerating. And by the foreign policy of England is here meant, her action as such integral part, her action from the point of view of her membership in that system, her relations with the other states, who are, equally with herself, members of that system, and her share

in the united action, in their joint co-operation towards the common end.

It is not difficult to see the consequences of the position assigned by this view to England. Membership in a system precludes all isolation, all separate action on the part of each single member. The action of each member must in all cases be brought into harmony with that of the rest, and be determined by the common end in view. Such is the general law of any system. In the particular case before us, if we admit the position, that England is a member of a certain state-system, her action is at once limited by the obligations such membership involves. She may at times act with a separate action; but such separate action must be brought within the ken of those obligations, and judged with reference to them. That is, it may be separate, but its being so must be reconciled with this condition—that it be harmonious. Not only, then, is she a member of Western Europe in a loose sense, as from her geographical position more particularly concerned with the nations so denominated; but she is, in the strictest sense, only capable of acting as such member. Whether she have to act towards the other members of the system, or with them in a joint action towards the states which stand outside of that aggregate—whether they be the states of Eastern Europe or the Mahometan powers of Western Asia, or still more distant branches of the great human family—she is only capable, I say, of such political action from the point of view of such membership. She cannot plead her peculiar national interests. She cannot isolate her policy.

A question may be raised here which I have no wish to shirk. It is this:—You have not given the full account of a system. Over and above the several parts of which a system is formed, and the idea of a relation between those parts, there is involved in the word something further. It conveys the notion of subordination to one supreme part. In your European State-system, which is the supreme part?—in which of the members resides the presidency? The question is a fair one, and I answer, without hesitation, that I accept the primacy of France. It would be to reject the whole teaching of previous European history, were I to seek to avoid this conclusion. Since the fall of the Roman Empire, the initia-

tive has ever lain in France. More completely in France than in any other country has the chain of historical tradition remained unbroken. Her Merovingian kings were glad to throw over their power the shadow of Roman greatness which was yet available; and the more eminent amongst them laboured, though in vain, to restore the Roman system of government and administration. The great Frank monarchy restored the empire of the West, and that not merely in name, for it resumed the task to which that Empire had not been equal, and secured Europe finally from the inroads of new barbarous tribes. In the feudal system, France is the representative country in which that system finds its purest type. She, too, is the eldest daughter of the Roman Catholic church. She was the bulwark of Europe against Mohammedanism when the Arabs, in their first fresh vigour, poured over the Pyrenees. Three centuries later she headed the Crusade against the Turks. France was at the head of the movement which, within the sphere of Catholicism, broke its hold on the nations as a spiritual power; and the consolidation of her monarchy was, in temporal matters, the type of the new order of things, which consisted in the substitution throughout Europe of the monarchical, in place of the feudal, power.

In the great contest between Protestantism and Catholicism, it was the adhesion of France to the elder form that determined the equal balance in which the two faiths have ever since rested. The most popular of her kings, Henry IV., at that early period of dissolution, conceived the restitution of the unity of Europe, and shared that conception with our own Elizabeth. The greatest of her statesmen, the Cardinal de Richelieu, was the first to form the conception of an Europe, in which the natural boundaries of states should be scrupulously respected. If, in the seventeenth century, for a time, the social initiative seemed vested in England, in the eighteenth, France recovered it without a question. In the reported words of Frederic II., 'Were I king of France, not a gun should be fired in Europe without my consent,' we may read a recognition, by the greatest of European statesmen of his time, of the political supremacy of France. Finally, in the revolution which is still convulsing Europe, every eye is turned on France, with the growing conviction that she is

again the representative of Europe; that there must the problems which agitate us receive their primary solution.

Our intellectual acquiescence in this priority of France cannot, I think, be refused. If, morally, Englishmen recoil from it, I have no wish to share in the national feeling. The constant effort to be first, the strong repugnance to own oneself second,—these are no signs of strength, but of weakness; and England would both benefit herself, and escape at the same time the ridicule her absurd pretensions draw down upon her, if she could frankly accept whatever position a just review of her past history and present condition may end in assigning to her. No national policy based on the assumption that she is the first of European powers, can be sound. Her statesmen, if they think the assumption true, are at once disqualified for their office. If they do not feel it to be true, but yet have to hold language in accordance with it, in order to gratify the national feeling, whilst they are aware that it is false, they are involved in an hypocrisy which is detrimental to their dignity, and has a tendency to make their bearing in presence of other nations inconsistent;—all their acts become concessions, all their policy wears an impress of hollowness.

If the further question be asked, What is the common end which such a state-system can propose to itself, and for the attainment of which this co-operation of all its members is desirable? I answer, in the first place, granting the system duly brought into play, there is the organisation, within its own limits, of society, whether international or national, whose disorganisation is now patent to every reflecting mind. In the second place, there is the joint determination of the kind and degree of action to be exercised by them on the other nations outside their aggregate. They are the most advanced portion of the human race, the vanguard of civilization. Those other nations are at various stages, yet all lower. They are, however, in spite of any such difference, not less than the Western nations, essential portions of the human race. It is for their benefit, as well as for our own, that any advance made has been made. And it is the ultimate object of our endeavours, that by judicious guidance, and by the influence of the example held out to them, they may—without mutual collision, without the oscillations of progress and retrogression,

without the inevitable delays which have impeded the advance of Western Europe—be gradually raised to a level with the Western nations, and reap the benefit of their long and painful elaboration.

The idea of tutelage, of a guardianship vested in one portion of humanity on behalf of the other,—vested of course in those who have reached their intellectual and social majority on behalf of those who are still minors—in the White Race, on behalf of the Yellow and the Black,—is, at the present time, neither new nor uncommon. It has nothing chimerical in it. It affords a legitimate field for the co-operation I have advocated. It opens wide horizons for the future of our race. It offers a noble sphere, in which all the energies, hitherto wasted in international contests, may find a healthy exercise, beneficial in its direct action to the races on whom it is brought to bear, beneficial in its reaction to those who are called by their advanced position to take a part in it.

Such a guardianship will be seen, on reflection, to be too difficult and important a trust to be safely committed to one nation. There would be imminent danger of its degenerating into an oppressive constraint as regards the nations submitting to it, or of its being wielded in the interest of the one guardian nation exclusively. For the avoidance of all such dangers, for the checking of national caprice, it is desirable that the joint energies of all the nations of Western Europe should be combined. It is desirable, also, for the further object of effectually employing all that the past has handed down to us of political and moral wisdom, that no one of those nations should be omitted. For each has its own proper contribution to bring to the common result. Each has been modified in the past by peculiar influences. Each has preserved a full individuality, and remains a separate member of the organisation which the whole of them together constitute, but in which no single one is merged.

Turning from such wider considerations, which are naturally connected with the idea of a system, the general statement of the position of England would be accepted by all. All would admit that she is a member of the European system—all would proudly claim for her a preponderating influence in that system. Her action upon Europe, not merely commercial,

but political and moral, is the constant theme of exultation. She does not wish to isolate herself, I should be answered; never has she less wished it: on the contrary, she seeks for all legitimate means of extending her influence, and heartily wishes that by the force of a wise policy, and by the higher power of example, those unhappy nations of the Continent may, both rulers and subjects, learn the just admixture of order and progress, the due method of conciliating government and liberty.

With all such language one is sufficiently familiar. But there is a wide interval between such language and the language I should wish held—a wider interval still between the spirit of which such language is the expression, and that spirit in which I would wish to see the foreign policy of England conceived. There breathes in such language no sense of the real social view; nothing, in short, but a sense that we mix in European politics as superior,—as a matter of free grace and condescension, not as ourselves bound by a high social obligation. The truth is, our international relations are impregnated with the same spirit that rules so triumphant in English social life. The bearing of the nation towards other nations is but a faithful reflexion of the bearing of Englishmen of the upper classes to all below them in the social scale, and of the bearing of all Englishmen towards foreigners generally. There is stamped upon us as a nation and as individuals the same peculiar impress. The aristocratic Englishman can perfectly conceive a relation to exist between himself and others; but, then, it must be the particular relation of superiority on his side. And this feeling, by way of imitation, extends itself down the various gradations of society. So England, as a nation, can act on the principle that there exist relations between herself and other nations, but always under this proviso, that her own consciousness of superiority be no way impaired. This it is which, as I understand the criticisms of foreigners, makes our national bearing, no less than our bearing as individuals, so unattractive, if not worse. It is this haughty demeanour, *cet orgueil granitique et solidifié*, to borrow an expression quoted in the 'Times,' which excludes us from the sympathies of Europe, even when our policy may be for the time just and conciliatory, or really directed to the promotion

of the common interest. We hold it beneath us to feel real sympathy. Pity is the nearest approach we can make. We have not the art to feign what we do not feel. Here is the better side of our national character. It is only genuine sympathy that can command a return of kindly feeling. Naturally, then, as we neither have nor feign sympathy, we are shut out from the sympathies of others.

Such misconceptions of our relation to all other states, such misinterpretation of the idea of membership, must give way to the more social interpretation. If this is admitted, which has been assumed, viz., that there do exist, for states as for individuals, social obligations, the further admission must follow, that such social obligations, for the state no less than for the individual, ought, within due bounds, to override the personal—that is, to adapt the language to the case of states, the international is paramount to the national. As a formal statement, this will not be denied, I imagine; but though not denied, its legitimate consequences are not in the least the nearer acceptance. Such is the curious illogicality of the national mind, that acceptance of the premises in no way involves the acceptance of a conclusion, which on other grounds is distasteful.

Nor, though I dwell not on them here, are there wanting signs that a better conception of our position in regard to other nations is gradually spreading. The growing intercourse between the nations is acting powerfully on us as individuals: it is acting no less powerfully on our national policy. If the sense of social obligations be yet weak, when we would appeal to it for any exertion; on the other hand, any action directly contrary to such sense, is day by day becoming more impossible. The instinct is strengthening, but it is yet in the stage of instinct. It will take time to pass from that stage to the higher and much safer one of a sound, well-reasoned conviction; not till it has reached that, can it be considered secure against any retrogression.

Up to this point my object has been to make clear in what sense I use the term Western Europe; what I conceive to be the obligations resting on its several parts; what I consider to be the end assignable to it as a system; lastly, from what point of view I estimate those obligations, and more

especially those of England. I proceed to a general survey of the state of Western Europe in the present, and thence to that which is a necessary accompaniment of such survey—an explanation of the various stages through which the present state has been reached.

Whichever way we look, whether to the combined action of Western Europe, or the questions that concern its more immediate neighbour, Eastern Europe; or to the relations of its several states towards one another; or, lastly, to the internal condition of each of those several states, it is manifest to the most superficial observation, that in each of these three directions there is, almost equally, serious cause for the uneasiness which, as a fact, is felt.

On the first order of questions I shall touch but lightly, and at once, in order to clear it out of the way. The recent Peace of Paris may have settled some points of difficulty; but no one seems to look on it as a final or satisfactory settlement of all the questions at issue between Western and Eastern Europe—between the higher civilization of the West and the lower stage of civilization in which rest at present Russia and Turkey, the two great powers of the East. I omit Turkey, as a power which does not call for active interference, whereas the attitude of Russia commands attention. The difficulties with regard to her have been long accumulating. This is the consequence of the want of courage and foresight on the part of Western statesmen, to say nothing of actual mistakes in the way of encouraging Russia's advance. These difficulties met with no real attention from the Congress at Paris. Under the circumstances in which that Congress met, perhaps the omission was inevitable. But there is an evil really felt, which, as it has not been prevented, should be remedied—this is, the predominance of Russia in the councils of Europe, and more especially in those of her German neighbours, penetrating even into Italian affairs through this intermedium. The danger of an actual, material conquest by Russia of the West of Europe I look on as the simplest chimera; but the evils of Russian dictation are palpable. It is easy to distinguish the idea of an actual conquest from that of dictation. The positive support of an army, which she was unwisely, and to the dishonour of the Western

Powers, allowed to give in the case of Hungary, is one thing. The moral support which her prestige has long given to the absolute Courts of Europe, and still continues, though somewhat shaken, to give, is another. But, though distinguishable, both are evils. The one as little as the other should be permitted, only the latter is far more difficult to meet than the former. It is to be hoped that the late war may have opened the eyes of Russia, and that in the powerlessness of Austria and Prussia to give her direct aid, nay, in the alienation of their policy from hers, she may see an indication of her truer policy, and be led to confine herself more within her own legitimate sphere. Such would be an even more desirable change than any that could be produced by the union against her of the nations of the West.

For Russia has her own proper work to do. Like other nations, she has clearly a legitimate sphere of action. It were desirable that both Western Europe and herself were agreed in this. Putting for a moment aside that which is the great source of difficulty in such matters, warping all our judgment on every Eastern question—our Indian Empire—there remains in Northern and Central Asia a large field for the operations of Russia. And whilst we may be glad that the experience of the last war confirmed the calm conclusions of reasoners as to the weakness of Russia for aggression, we may, at the same time, be glad that it proved no less convincingly her great defensive strength. Under the shelter of that vast empire, wisely governed, Central and Western Europe may, for the future, rest secure. Its armies and fortresses are a sufficient guard. If less advanced than ourselves, it is sufficiently in advance of the tribes on its eastern frontier to make its cause, and that of western civilization, as against those tribes, identical. But the very language I have just used implies that Russia should have no preponderant power in the West. She is half Eastern, half Western —more advanced than the former, less advanced than the latter. She should be the channel between the two, giving to the East what it is capable of receiving from the West. But in no sense can she take the guidance of the West. Any attempt to do so is disastrous to herself and disastrous to the West. No accidental superiority, such as that enjoyed

by the late Czar Nicholas over the feebler statesmen of the Western world, should mislead Russia as to her true policy. If she is misled, the object of these statesmen should be, by united action, to repel her encroachments.

Whatever we may think of the position and claims of Russia, every discussion of them seems to proceed on the assumption that, to a certain extent, she stands apart from the peculiar state-system with which we are dealing. Her very recent admission into European politics is a proof of her distinctness, and the reason why her proper relation to other states is so little ascertained. And every discussion of that relation also implies, that the states of Western Europe are a system capable of carrying out a definite policy towards any state not within their number; capable, consequently, of exerting an influence on their less advanced neighbours. Such discussion supposes the system to exist and to act.

Let us now change the point of view, and limit ourselves to the treatment of the other two points indicated—the relations of the several states with one another, and the internal condition of each state or member of the system. These two should be kept as distinct as possible; and we shall see that two series of difficulties demand the attention of the political observer and the statesman.

The first series concerns the states of Western Europe more exclusively as separate members, constituting in the aggregate a larger body. It concerns them in their relations to one another: it is the international difficulty.

The second series is, not less than the first, common to them all in kind, but concerns them each primarily, as they are separate, not as they are related to one another.

It is common to them in kind, but in degree it varies according to the variety of their political and social development. It requires a solution modified by the peculiar circumstances of each, and determinable, at least in the commencement, within the limits of each separate nationality, and by the independent exertion of the national reason and will.

This last order of questions, though not the main object, I will treat first. My reason for so doing will be clear in the sequel, as will be the connexion that necessarily exists between

this, the national difficulty, and the international. Ultimately, no doubt, this second series may be viewed as being as completely of international interest as the first. For similarity of national organisation, if only due allowance be made for the free play of national differences, based as it would be on a community of sentiments and belief, is the only sure guarantee of European unity. So regarded, the second series of questions is far the more important of the two. But, for my present object, it may be kept subordinate. In dealing with it, all I aim at is a clear, unexaggerated statement, in outline, of the present condition of Europe—a statement such as might be allowed by those who should differ very widely both as to the appropriate remedies, and as to the account of its origin.

The most outward and prominent form of the difficulty in which all the nations of Western Europe, without exception, find themselves, is the social one. It may be stated as the industrial problem: How are we to meet the existing embarrassments in the relations between Capital and Labour—between the Masters (*les Entrepreneurs*) and the Workmen? What is the industrial organization in which the at present conflicting claims of these two bodies may find their respective and harmonious satisfaction? This social or industrial problem—it is indifferent which we call it—is, after all, but the more outward and prominent part of a much larger one; for industry is but the basis of society. The organisation of industry, however perfect, is consequently but the laying soundly the basis of society. True it is, that unless that basis be soundly laid, the social superstructure is unsafe. The sense of insecurity now so prevalent, is but due to the consciousness of the unsound condition of the social foundation. Still, no amount of security as to that foundation will of itself raise the superstructure. So that industrial organisation, if we could suppose it absolutely perfect, would still leave open the far larger part of the question of social organisation. Nor is this all. Neither the one nor the other—neither the wider nor the narrower question can be approached directly. They are both connected with, and essentially subordinate to, another order of problems. They can receive their ultimate proper treatment only when those other problems shall have

received theirs. I mean—and I believe that, putting aside all reference to any particular answer, all reflecting minds will acquiesce in the statement—that there are intellectual, moral, and religious difficulties besetting European society in all its national ramifications. These difficulties, by their very nature, are more general than the former class. They must be met and solved before any adequate solution of the social difficulties above indicated can be attempted. All previous solutions can only be partial and provisional, even when not positively an evil in the way of hindrance. They are to be rejected as over-hasty attempts to reach an end indistinctly conceived. Whilst the conception of the end is indistinct, the means for attaining it would be premature to discuss. In short, social organisation can be but the expression of some degree of intellectual and moral agreement. Where this essential condition is wanting—as all must see that it is wanting throughout Europe—it is vain to hope for that of which it is the condition.

The first point for consideration is, then, this:—What are the necessary conditions for the successful solution of their intellectual and moral difficulties? I have not felt called upon to give instances of them here, as I shall be led to a general statement of them later; and in no case within my present limits could I attempt an enumeration. Neither, again, could I attempt any solution. It is not within my present scope. So far as my immediate object is concerned, I might have contented myself with the simple enunciation of the social difficulty. If it were granted me that such difficulty existed, that had been enough for the strict argument. But at the same time, the statement would have been incomplete and unsatisfactory. It was to guard against such deficiency that I entered on the other points, and, having guarded myself, I leave the subject for the present.

The second series of difficulties remains, that which concerns the international relations of the European states, affecting them all in common. That there is great cause for uneasiness on this point is allowed by all. It is evident that here, again, however high the value we attach to the late peace—however final we may consider its settlement of the questions which were brought before the Congress at Paris—

there were other questions which it did not settle. These are left as elements of disturbance in Europe, and from day to day threaten her peace. In the North, there is the Danish succession; in the South-east, the question of the Danubian Principalities. And, far before these in gravity and complication, there is the Italian question, in all its numerous ramifications. The diplomatic rupture with Naples; the Papal States and French occupation; the Austrian intervention in Tuscany; the military occupation of North Italy by Austria, and its consequent attitude as against Sardinia; the relations of Sardinia with France and England; Lombard discontent, and the Austrian tenure of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; any one of these points might give occasion to an European war. And, as I said above, Italy is but the most prominent cause of disquiet. It throws, from its importance, others into the shade; but it does not remove them. And, independently of any definite points, such as the above-mentioned, the predominant feeling of Europe is one of mutual distrust—a feeling which makes isolated points so formidable. This feeling is in accordance with all the traditional policy, and is the unpleasant inheritance of the five troubled centuries of preceding history. Were it not for this atmosphere of distrust, no single point would present any really serious difficulty. And that in the existence of this distrust lies the real danger, is seen from the circumstance that the settlement of one point, however important, seems to lead to no result. Another is immediately started, equally embarrassing. Here is the disease, of which all isolated points are but the symptoms. No remedy can be effectual, except such as shall address itself to the disease, not to the symptoms. An effectual remedy, then, it may be said here in passing, would involve a thoroughly new policy.

Such, then, is the view I take of the internal condition of Europe. Such is the view I take of the state of its international relations. The last is less disputable ground than the former, as the scale of events is larger, and as there are not the same causes at work to cloud the judgment. But it is not enough to content ourselves with a mere analysis of the present state. Any real knowledge requires more than such an analysis. It requires, beyond this, that we should be able

to explain the origin of the state analysed, that we should be able to show, that is, from the past history of Europe, how its present has come to be such as it is,—what is the connexion of the phenomena we see around us with those of preceding centuries. Such an explanation consists in a retrospect of the past. This is sufficient apology for entering on such retrospect. It shall be as short as possible. I will content myself with summary indications of the main points. Whatever may be thought of the execution of such a review, in principle its utility will not be denied, or denied only by those to whom I should deny the possession of the primary qualifications requisite for the formation of any historical judgment.

The point from which I commence my review is the Roman Empire. For, after all that has been said against it, I remain convinced, that it is but to vitiate our whole conception of the history of the past, as a connected series of events, if we disallow the claim of Imperial Rome to our gratitude and veneration, for the signal benefits she conferred on mankind. And if I allow, as an intellectual conclusion, those benefits, I feel no disposition to undervalue them. I would rather err on the side of admiration. Indeed, it were but little in the interest of humanity to prove against each successive epoch of its past that it has been evil—to prove that its great men have been devoid of any just claim to our admiration—its great actions the fruit of unworthy impulses; that, whatever benefits each of such epochs has evolved as a contribution to the progress of humanity, have been but incidental, whilst their essential character has been corruption. Read history so, and its whole moral continuity vanishes. The nineteenth century disclaims the eighteenth; the eighteenth sneers at the Catholicism of the Middle Ages; that, in its turn, sets itself adrift by the wholesale condemnation of all heathen antiquity. The process is not a consolatory one. If the connexion with the past is wholly broken, it seems to me but a natural and logical consequence to think any interest in the future a foolish weakness. I pass to the point whence I digressed.

The Roman Empire first succeeded in overcoming the feelings of mutual repulsion—the determined spirit of national independence—which till then had been the law of all political co-existence. It bound within its vast frame, by the

strong bond of administrative unity and political organisation, the many discordant kingdoms of the civilized world. It enforced on those kingdoms a peace previously unknown. By its long duration of more than four centuries, the peace, which it at first had to enforce, became a habit and a want. The impression of that long peace, *pax Romana*, has remained ineffaceable. It was worked into the very constitution of our minds. This was distinctly the benefit of the Empire, not of the Republic; and for it that empire merits a large gratitude. It thereby satisfied, whilst it appeared to create, one unconscious want of the human race. What other benefits it conferred I need not repeat here. But there were wants it could not satisfy, intellectual, moral, and religious: and its failure in reference to these wants accounts for its fall.

The nations who first occupied its provinces had an instinct of that, which in their leaders, such as Adolphus the Visigoth, and Theodoric the Ostrogoth, ripened into consciousness—namely, that in occupying those provinces they need not necessarily break with the traditions of Rome. They were but settlers on a large scale within the pale of Rome, and they would accept its government, and mould themselves into conformity with its civilization. And in the whole system of the Merovingian kings, the second generation of conquerors, we see the same idea prevailing, the same tendency to adoption of the remnants of Roman order in its broken and fragmentary state. And under both alike, Visigoth and Merovingian, we see the tendency drawn out into more distinctness, and aided by the clergy of the Christian church.

But the nation which the Merovingian kings wished to train, discipline, and govern, as the inheritor of Roman civilization, proved but reluctant materials in their hands. In the elevation of the House of Pepin, we now read, by the light of fuller historical investigation, the triumph for a time of the genuine Frank tradition over the Roman, of the German conquerors over their Merovingian princes. Yet so indelibly had Rome associated her name with the idea of law and government, that the chiefs of the Carlovingian family, elevated as they had been as the representatives of a more German feeling, soon stepped forward to vindicate for

themselves, in alliance with the Papal power, the task, the power, and the name of Emperor of the West.

It was in alliance with the Papal power, I said. For in the spiritual, as well as in the temporal order, the change which had long been working became now clearly visible. By a slow process, the government of the Christian church had become monarchical instead of aristocratic. The episcopate had merged its powers in the Papacy. And it was in alliance with this government, so reduced to unity and intensified, that the Carlovingian princes acted. The government of the church was no longer a mere branch of the imperial administration, but it treated with the Frank monarch of the West as an equal. It offered its moral sanction as the spiritual head of Christendom. The emperor, as the temporal head, lent the material and political support of his empire. We are already far from the false unity, in this respect, of the Roman Empire. We are clear of that flaw in the imperial organisation, which made its spiritual and temporal forces centre in one man. We are in contact with a wholly different range of ideas. We are within the peculiar sphere of Latin or Western Christianity. We are in presence of the great fact of the mediæval civilization,—that important modification which gives to the mediæval system its originality and value, the co-ordinate existence of the spiritual and temporal power. If, in the system of Charlemagne, we still see the temporal dominant; if we still see it using the spiritual as an instrument of government, such a transitional state need not surprise us. We may wait patiently for the period when the increased vigour of the Papacy, due to the accession of really great men to the Papal throne, shall cause it to assume its more legitimate position. From co-ordinate it shall pass to be superior; it shall become the controlling power, checking the rude exercise of mere material force, bridling the licentiousness of the temporal governors, whether regal or aristocratic, and interposing to guide wisely to unity and peace the nations of Western Europe—to peace in their international relations, to unity in their external action and in their internal organisation.

The unity of external action found its expression in the Crusades, those expeditions conceived by the genius of Gregory VII., and carried into execution by his successors

But under the Papal system in its best days Europe felt that it was one, not merely in its external relations,—it was also one in its moral and religious sentiments. Without this internal unity, the other, the outward and material, whether it were the unity of joint external action, or that of organisation, as in the Roman period, must be hollow and unsatisfactory. So Catholicism supplied exactly what had been wanting to Imperial Rome. It gave an unity, not the result of outward and material, but of moral and spiritual, compression.

Catholicism too, in its turn, proved inadequate. The Crusades could be but a temporary necessity. When, by a species of mutual consent, the powers of Mahommedanism and Christendom rested quiet in presence of one another, abandoning all projects of conquest at each other's expense, there ceased to be any bond of external union. There was left no object which all the states of Western Europe could propose to themselves in common as a sufficient motive for united exertion. The absence of such bond of itself created a great difficulty. But there was a greater inherent in Catholicism, relative not to the outward, but to the inward union of Europe. It was not sufficiently comprehensive—not sufficiently expansive. It has always claimed an indefinite power in these respects, but when the trial came it did not prove its claim. There were new powers coming into existence. There were new centres of human industry forming. These new centres were outside the circle embraced by Catholicism. The new powers were not amenable to its control. The rising power of industry escaped it: so also did the intellectual movement in many directions. The first was alien: the second was antagonistic to its doctrine. It looked on the first with coldness, if not with aversion. It looked on the intellectual movement, so far as it was not Catholic, with a suspicion ready to become hatred. This inherent defect in Catholicism—its want of expansiveness—is sufficient to account for its fall. Other defects, more on the surface of history, hastened that fall. The power entrusted to it was abused, and its monarchical centre, the Papacy, became national, temporal, and degraded. This is matter of ordinary history. As a consequence of this combination of weaknesses,

Catholicism, though in outward appearance it continued strong, ceased to have any real power. The nations of Europe seemed to repose under its sway, but they were silently emancipating themselves. In every department of human activity—industrial, political, intellectual, or religious—Catholicism was daily losing its hold upon the minds of men; daily becoming more inadequate to the task which it once had, if in imperfect measure, yet visibly fulfilled—the task of organizing the nations into a whole, and of harmonizing their internal existence.

It is during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that we may trace the gradual, silent process of disorganisation of the Catholic system; at the same time, we may also trace the gradual, silent substitution of new powers, regal or aristocratic. We may trace in the international sphere the gradual alienation of the states of Western Europe from each other, and the development of the tendency to isolation, to independent and hostile action, which has so long characterized their system. The check on them of the spiritual power gradually grows weaker, till at last it ceases altogether. In its decay and extinction some provisional substitute, such as may meet the immediate want, must be adopted. Anarchy must be avoided at all costs; and in the consolidation of the different European nations, and in the simultaneous strengthening of the royal power throughout Europe, we read the expression of this conviction.

These two processes had been fortunately in some measure completed at the time when the Reformation of the sixteenth century took place. That event was not the cause but the effect of the disruption of the Catholic system of the Middle Ages. Its reaction has been to give an increased and intensified vigour to the system it endeavoured to supplant. Catholicism has been dying by decay: opposition rallied its waning energies, called forth what latent strength it possessed, and gave it a stronger hold on existence. In itself, too, apart from its reaction, Protestantism is now seen to have been incompetent, both in theory and practice, to replace that which it aimed at destroying. It protested against the half-truths of Catholicism, and it offered half-truths in exchange. Its solution was evidently inadequate to meet the wants of

Europe—evidently, I say, for the essential feature of the Protestant doctrine is its isolating tendency—isolating as regards nationalities, isolating as regards individuals—when, both for the one and the other, combination was needed. Protestantism abdicated at once all pretension to regulate the international life of Europe; and it gloried in that abdication, for therein lay its attraction for its most powerful supporters. It mistook for an absolute solution what was only relatively true. It proclaimed desirable as an end, that, the only recommendation of which was, that it was a means—a means unfortunately made necessary by former errors. And within the sphere of each national existence Protestantism has seldom claimed or offered a power of control, socially and politically. In its larger national developments it has been the creature of the temporal, not the controller. There have been apparent exceptions: it has worn at times the semblance of a social or political power. In the case of the English episcopacy, the Protestantism that aspired to power was really in heart Romish; a Protestantism of convention, of state necessity, with an illogical abhorrence of itself, constantly haunted by the craving for a past which was irrecoverably lost; it was the Protestantism of such Protestants as Whitgift or Laud. Or, quite in the opposite direction, and true to its name in this case, it was exceptionally the religious faith of a man like Cromwell, whose high genius for government could not be obscured even by the anarchic tendencies of pure Protestantism, though his success might be, and was, impaired.

As Catholicism, then, and Protestantism both, had been found inefficient, a provisional *régime* came into play. The object was to control the destructive agencies of international jealousy, of regal and national ambition; to confine within the narrowest possible limits the evil consequences of the disorganisation of the past order. To effect this object, diplomacy came into existence, and, under the powerful impulse of Richelieu, assumed the guidance of Europe. It claimed as its peculiar department the international relations, and, with more or less of wisdom, it succeeded in provisionally organizing those relations. Its work has been instinctively provisional, if outwardly and avowedly final: for diplomacy,

too, has at times committed the common error of supposing itself final. It may have at times trespassed beyond its sphere; but in general it has not attempted to interfere with the internal condition of the several states whose co-existence alone was within its competence. All distinctly national questions have been left to take their course, much more would all intellectual and religious questions escape its control.

In this last department the work of destruction has been going on uninterruptedly. The velocity has varied with the different states of opinion in different countries. But the movement has been common to the whole of Western Europe. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the completion of the work commenced in their predecessors. The state of alienation to Catholicism, natural to the industrial movement, and which had spread to the social and political, ended by an extension to the moral and intellectual. The human intellect, from earliest times an object of suspicion to the spiritual power, assumed a position of open hostility. At the close of the eighteenth century it proclaimed its solution, a purely negative one, and ventured to hope that it would supplant its earlier rivals. This was the state of opinion and belief, which, superadded to political and social disorganisation, found its crisis in the great French Revolution, whose long preparation and course is seen to be susceptible of explanation.

In the dissolution of the Roman Empire, amidst the crash of a society perishing by internal decay and external violence, the new Christian society found the means of organizing itself, and of constituting a strong frame of polity, in which the terrified witnesses and survivors of the ruin might find shelter and the supply of their wants. In the dissolution of Catholic and feudal society—in the revolution of which we are the witnesses, and can hardly hope to be the survivors, has there been no similar work of organisation?

The diplomatic *régime* still constitutes the controlling power in the international relations. In the other department, that of the internal condition of Europe, there has been growing a power alien to the older society. It is at present disorganized and unavailable for the wants of the new society. But it is highly susceptible of organisation. And

though by its very idea it never can be capable of supplying all the wants of social man, it is the indispensable basis of a polity which shall be adequate to that task. And its disorganisation is so clear, and involves such dangers, that it must call out the energies of man to meet them. The power I mean is found in the great industrial development—in the natural social influence of the free working classes.

This is one of the legacies of the past. A second is found in the results of the intellectual movement of modern times, continuing and enlarging the scientific acquisitions of antiquity. In the various sciences that have been elaborated we find the basis for a doctrine which may guide us in the future—the basis of the social science. Over and above these two, the period of destruction, not less than that of the previous order, has handed down to us many valuable, if at present isolated, lessons. These may be combined and harmonized, and so be made to serve in the work of reconstruction, now so imperatively demanded. So, behind the ruins of the past, as in the Roman times, the new society may shape itself, and the Western European Republic may receive an organisation in which all the substantive ideas that have been evolved throughout the course of its history may find a final and adequate expression—an organisation more binding even than that of Rome, resting, as it should do, on a sounder foundation of internal unity even than that offered by Catholicism.

PART II.

IN the preceding Part my object has been threefold. I wished, first, to sketch out the social position and obligations of England as a member of a particular state-system. I wished, in the second place, to present a brief, clear view of the actual condition of affairs in Europe; and, lastly, to trace the steps by which that condition has been brought about. In such an historical explanation of the present will always be found the best guide to the discovery of the remedy for its evils. So that hitherto all has been preliminary to the real subject of these remarks. And I trust that it will appear that I approach the question in no hasty spirit, unprepared for its discussion, and shown to be unprepared by my treating it as an isolated point of easy solution,—as a difficulty, arisen as of yesterday, and to be remedied to-morrow. On the contrary, the result of such a review as I have given of the history of Europe since the Roman Empire, should be to create the impression, that any real remedies must be slow in their operation. Ripe as we may conceive the time to be for the application of some remedies, it would be over-sanguine to expect that they will be either speedily applied or rapidly effectual. The chronic disease of centuries may require centuries for its cure. Meanwhile, there is abundance of room for action; only, let that action be the patient action that springs from scientific knowledge, not the rash action of empiricism.

It results from what I have said, that the problem of the present is, to find a policy which shall be able to grapple with the difficulties which the survey of the actual state of Europe, and the retrospect of the past, have pointed out.

In the times when Catholicism united Europe, the evils which have always accompanied the social condition of man,

at whatever stage of his progress—the evils which threatened the international relations of the several states—and their own internal evils, were met by a twofold remedy. There stood ever against the several national governments, distinct from them, and recognised by them not only as distinct, but as vested with a right to speak to them and to check their mutual destructive or hostile action,—the power of the Papacy. All questions of European interest were within its competence. Its sanction was sought for undertakings such as the Norman invasion of England, or Henry the Second's attack on Ireland. Its arbitration was called in, as in the disputes between John and his Barons.

And the power which the Papacy then possessed to control and harmonize the jarring action of the several states, it possessed by virtue of another power—that which it exercised within the limits of those several states. It spoke to the governments with a voice they could not help listening to; it exercised over them a moral compression which they could not shake off, because it spoke to them in the name of a belief common to the classes they governed, and with all the authority that resulted from the identity of organisation due to the action of the Catholic doctrine and worship.

The remedy, then, under the Papal system was twofold—it was primarily and essentially internal; and, by the force of its success in the internal relations, it was enabled successfully to interfere in the external.

In the present day, no less than in mediæval Europe, a twofold remedy is required—an external and an internal one; and, as the evils to be met are the same in kind, though more aggravated in degree, in consequence of the greater complications of modern society, in consequence also of the long neglect of the last five centuries, so the full and sufficient remedy must be the same in kind as that afforded to mediæval Europe. The partial solution offered by the diplomatic *régime* under which Europe is now constituted, is seen to be inadequate. Diplomacy ran riot at the Congress of Vienna, and effectually discouraged any real trust in it from that time forwards. Its recent efforts, whether at Vienna in 1854 or 1855, or at Paris in 1856, are such as to increase the discredit which had attached to it from 1815. Whatever the hands

in which it is placed, its failure is so evident, as to make it probable that it is not simply a question of diplomatic ability or weakness in the agents, but that the whole state of European affairs has outgrown the period at which the action of diplomacy could meet its difficulties. In our own country, certainly, the distrust in ordinary diplomacy, if not deeper than elsewhere, is at least more loudly expressed. Everywhere we hear the same language, indicating that the diplomatic *régime* is looked on as quite incompetent. But at present there is nothing to be substituted for it; and so, like many other European institutions, though worn out, it holds on, waiting till a substitute be found to which it may resign its functions.

Where, then, shall we find this substitute? I have already given by implication the answer to this question. The true substitute for the diplomatic *régime* of the last two centuries can only be found in the institution of a power similar to that whose loss diplomacy tried, after its measure, to supply. There must be once more constituted a spiritual power, analogous in position and authority to mediæval Papacy in its best days—in those days in which any historian worthy of the name now recognises the fact that it was of immense utility to Europe—that it performed invaluable services in the cause of humanity.

This new spiritual power, analogous to the Papacy, must rest its claims to a right of authoritative interference and control of the temporal on the same ground as that occupied by the Papacy. It must rest on a community of belief, and an identical organisation, the result of that common belief. The mere enunciation of such a condition shows that its realization is yet distant—shows, also, that it would be altogether beyond the limits of a work like the present to discuss the question fully. It was necessary to touch upon it, in order that any subsequent remark should be seen to be really that which it is meant to be—a suggestion for the provisional modifying of the present state, not mistaken for an attempt at a final answer to problems so vast as those indicated by what I have said. The full answer of the future must be left for the future.

For the present and more immediate want, a slighter answer may suffice; only the remedy should have this in it, that it

should be capable of being an initial and preparatory step to the fuller remedy of the future. Over and above this quality, it would be desirable that in remedying the bad results of the past it should address itself to remedy them in that particular point in which those evils first showed themselves. If we discover this point, we find a clue at once to the natural remedy.

It was, then, in reference to the international relations of Europe that the powerlessness of the Papacy any longer to control the evils of the time first became manifest. When, in the thirteenth century, the real power in this respect became, by the accident of his superior goodness, vested in the person of St. Louis; when he was the arbiter chosen, in competition with at least, though not to the exclusion of the popes, there was a clear sign given which way the current was setting. When Edward III. advanced what Hume justly calls his fatal pretensions to the throne of France, the Pontiff interfered; but his interference proved ineffectual. In the still more profligate invasion in the early part of the fourteenth, under Henry V., I find no remonstrance on the part of Rome, then scarcely monarchical in its government. We may see that the Papacy had completely abdicated its functions. It was evident that regal or aristocratic caprice and international jealousies had free scope. There was no arbiter in Europe.

With this clue in our hands it will be safe, then, to assume, that it is in the department of international relations that the work of reconstruction must begin—that the policy which I stated at the outset of this Part was required, is a foreign policy. And to enforce such a policy, the power needed may be found provisionally in public opinion, wisely guided, in the formation of such a body of conviction on foreign affairs, common to such numbers, as may enable the statesmen of Western Europe to feel confidence in the adoption of measures calculated to secure to her the blessings of peace and order.

The simultaneous presence in large numbers of the required convictions—in other words, the existence of a public opinion—depends, so far as the conscious exertions of individuals to produce it are concerned, on the existence of a perfect liberty to state the problem and its solution; and, as a secondary means, on the free and temperate discussion of such exposition. But of course the clearest statement and the most temperate dis-

cussion are wasted, if they are addressed to minds incapable of appreciating them, either by their want of the requisite intellectual training, or by their being preoccupied. In the present day, in England, there are two sources of preoccupation, which, their existence granted, are calculated to extinguish any discussion. The first is a period of great commercial prosperity, in which the energy of the nation is working at a high pressure, and in which the din of national advance deafens us to all lower and quieter sounds. The second is a state of war. In this respect, as in others, the Russian war has not been an unmixed evil. It has taught us how exclusive war is; how it absorbs all the available powers of government, and, whilst it lasts, prevents the discussion of every social question. It may have taught us other valuable lessons, but none more directly than this. Even the most ardent advocates of war have by this time their eyes opened to its value as a useful remedy for our internal evils.

And if war, as an internal remedy, has fallen into discredit, I know not that the late contest has any tendency to raise our estimation of it as a remedy for international discord. The settlement that has resulted from it is so evidently precarious, that it may well be a question whether it could not have been attained without the aid of so costly and clumsy a process. Further attention to this part of the objections to war I adjourn for the present.

The most indispensable requisite as a preliminary for the existence of a right public opinion is, then, peace. As we all feel that, if we are to perform any ordinary intellectual process, we need as the first condition a quiet, undivided attention, so it is with nations. The external activity interferes with the internal; and any quiet concentration of a nation on its own internal state must be adjourned in presence of war. That concentration demands peace in the first place, then; and it requires for the carrying out of its objects the application of all the material accumulations of industry, and the absence of that tension, not to say that bitterness of feeling, which any considerable increase in the weight of taxation makes almost inevitable.

The right direction of public opinion is the immediate end in view. Full exposition, and the consequent discussion, are the

social means which can alone attain this end. And the range of this public opinion, when formed, will be co-extensive with the international relations and international obligations of England. One by one it will judge all the positions we have successively taken up as against foreign nations, for hitherto the action of England has been in the main antagonistic. In the main, I say, for in the Free-trade legislation of 1846 we meet the first great instance of renunciation of the dogma, till then avowedly acted on, that the interests of nations are conflicting, not harmonious. And in the recent Peace of Paris we have made a concession which is even more important in principle, as testifying that we are prepared to discuss international questions from a social, not from an isolated point of view; for it was the concession of a so-called right, which could be claimed and exercised in no sense as a gain to all, but as the simple assertion of our maritime supremacy: it was a right dangerous to the peace of Europe, and as such wisely given up; but, at the same time, it was a right bound up with many of England's historical associations, with feelings of which the nation has been peculiarly jealous. The acquiescence of the nation—even when its attention was called to the fact by a retrograde statesman—in this renunciation, is a sure index of the advance on such questions of international policy, and it affords a solid ground of hope for the future. There are many other similar points to be revised; a similar spirit must be brought to the revision. There must be infused into the whole foreign policy of England the same spirit that dictated this concession; there must be awakened throughout it a consciousness of her obligations, as a substitute for the dogged assertion of her rights—the more usual manifestation of our national spirit, as it is called—and that consciousness must be expressed in all her outward actions.

In the survey I took of the international relations of Western Europe at the present time, the point that is most striking is, not so much the absence of all really friendly co-operation, as the presence of mutual jealousy, and the existence of numerous occasions for actual war. It is not so much a negative as a positive evil, that characterises our whole condition. It were much to remove this positive evil; it were more to meet the negative evil—to supply the want felt—to

recal into existence the sense of union, which is but latent, not extinct—to make friendly co-operation, not mere secure isolation, the law of European politics. But the more crying want must be first satisfied. The positive evil must be removed. Its removal, in very many cases, would lead, by a rapid course to the satisfaction of the want. In this respect, as in others, the analogy between states and individuals holds good. Such is the strength of the principle of benevolence in man, such the propension which unites man to his fellow, that the mere extinction of causes of quarrel is practically equivalent to the establishment of friendly relations. Such, on the other hand, is the strength of the propension between nations, that in their case also, extinguish the grounds of quarrel, and they settle with a rapid movement into harmony. So that a right judgment of human nature, as seen in the individual or in the society, in both equally acquiesces in the ancient formula, that man is by nature a social being. And, therefore, the two remedies for existing evils will be substantially at times coincident; the second, or positive remedy, following on the first as a simple prolongation or development of it. But though they may be so viewed, not less is it absolutely necessary to treat them as distinct, more especially for this reason, that so we may avoid any inversion of the legitimate order—may not be led to anticipate prematurely a state of feeling which cannot exist at the initial stage of our proceedings, which can be but the consequence, never the antecedent; which, in fact, can only then rest on a secure footing when it is the natural, fair consequence of the removal of all legitimate grounds of discontent.

The policy of the European Powers as a body, and consequently of England as a member of that body, should be directed primarily to the removal of all positive causes of discord between its members—the removal of all points of hostile contact. These are sufficiently numerous, as I have stated in my former part. Were there any recognised method of ascertaining, and expressing when ascertained, the common will, then it would be an imperative obligation on each state within its own several domain to carry out that will. As there is no such method, it becomes the duty of each state to ascertain for itself in what it can forward this object; by what

sacrifice it can conduce to the common good of all. It must ascertain what obstacles there are, bequeathed to the present by the errors of the past, which may be taken away, and it must be prepared, by taking them away, to guarantee its own sincerity, and to secure influence to its voice when raised in favour of similar concessions on the part of other governments.

The era of conquest, it has been said, is past; and the saying has been widely echoed from the personal position and associations of its author. But it is doubtful whether he or those who have echoed it have seen its full import,—have traced the principle to its legitimate consequences. For what is a conquest, in any sense worthy of the name? It is the acquisition and incorporation by one state of another, in such manner that the two shall feel themselves parts of a new whole, and shall conspire together for the common good. The settlement that is the result of such acquisition and incorporation must bring, as has been seen by many, a definite overbalance of advantages to the nation conquered, at once as the sole justification of the act and as a compensation to the sufferers. A conquest which does not lead to political unity is, some time or other, destined to be set aside. This view of conquest may throw some light on the existing state of Europe. And when I speak of the full import of the expression—the era of conquests is ended—I would construe it in this extent:—That all those aggregations in Europe which, whether the result of force or fraud, are still in the state of an imperfect conquest—elements of disunion, not of union—are doomed to a more or less proximate disruption. And, to express at once my full idea, it were the highest object of Western European statesmanship to aim at accomplishing that disruption by the speediest possible means, so only that the means were peaceful. It is to this consummation that we are undoubtedly tending: it is in this that alone can be found the adequate satisfaction of so many national wants. This consummation is the indispensable basis for the reconstruction, in an analogous form, of the Roman and mediæval unity of Western Europe.

But whilst I think the attainment of this end ultimately certain, and more near perhaps than one is authorised by

primâ facie historical analogies in supposing, I allow, as of course, that its immediate attainment would be chimerical in the last degree to expect. The passions and interests of the rulers of mankind, and in some cases of the nations, are so bound up with the existing order, that only by a slow process can they be overborne. Any joint action in this direction of Western Europe is at present out of the question. Several of its states would admit, as states, no question of their right to maintain their present possessions by every means in their power. All discussion of the moral obligation that rests on them would be superfluous. Nor would it much mend matters, so far as I can judge, if the states which have shown signs of a nobler moral feeling on such points were, by virtue of that relative superiority, in its present extremely imperfect state, to venture to enforce on the less advanced members of the body their own imperfect views in this respect. In plain language, France and England would do, not good, but harm, by calling upon Austria to leave Italy or Hungary.

And this for two very simple reasons. Grant that their united power, resolutely exercised, could aid the national spirit in Italy to throw off Austria, such a result would, in the present state of German and Austrian feeling, leave a rankling sense of having been overborne—the germ of future contests. The second reason is, that both France and England lack that moral requisite which alone could give them any justification for such action. They would bring to the contest the enfeebling consciousness, that not on Austria alone rested the full force of the claim, but that it was one that, in the name of the common good of Europe, might be urged on both of them, that they are not clear in this matter.

The application of this to France is not within my present subject. I have mentioned her for the purpose of anticipating some objections. So far is clear, that the assumption of a superior tone of moral interference must be based, in the state, as in the individual, on the prior eradication, so far as is possible, of all flaws in our own conduct. And, therefore, as no joint action of the whole is possible, for reasons above given; and no combined action of even two is any more possible; the primary step to be taken is, to set clear from all

moral difficulty the position of England in presence of the rest.

A dispassionate review of the aggregate of imperial England offers numerous points for consideration. But to enumerate them, and discuss them one by one, would be a mere unnecessary embarrassment—an obscuring of the simple principle by a cloud of details. More than this, it would raise on each separate point a host of objectors, such as I would avoid if necessary, all differing from one another, but all bringing their different objections to an union against the principle. On the other hand, to leave the simple principle in its generality would be to expose myself to the charge of vagueness. Something more definite would be demanded. Nor is the demand unreasonable: nor shall it be without such an answer as I can find it. I will endeavour to embody my principle, as it were, in an instance, which shall be important enough to justify discussion, at the same time that it shall be definite enough to enclose that discussion within reasonable limits. If it answer these conditions, the simpler the case chosen, the more available is it for my object. Each additional complication affords additional loopholes for evasion—a clear field is a great advantage for the assailant.

The case required, and the statement of that case;—such is the substance of the following remarks:—

On the southern coast of the Spanish Peninsula stands the fortress of Gibraltar. It is by its position an integral part of that peninsula. For the last hundred and fifty years, it has been occupied by England. It has been the most cherished of the advanced posts which have symbolized to England and to the world her maritime supremacy. It is interwoven with the national records by the triumph of its seizure, by the triumph of its successful maintenance against the combined power of France and Spain. It has been guaranteed to us by many treaties: our possession of it may be said to be part of the public law of Europe. We have valued it both for its real value, and for many factitious advantages. Through many succeeding generations it has been a centre for our historical associations,—an accession, if not to our material wealth, yet to our national self-respect; the fond object of our pride, if not the bulwark of our power. Into

the history of the acquisition of Gibraltar I have no wish to inquire. I waive all such considerations. I find no fault with our title to it. I have no object to answer in underrating its importance as a fortress. My argument rather leads me the other way. It would lead me to be glad that the title is valid by the international law of Europe against all the world; it would lead me to wish the fortress still more important, the history of its acquisition absolutely without flaw.

Let us turn now to the two Powers who are concerned in its occupation, Spain and England. And, first, for Spain. Once the terror and arbiter of Europe, Spain has fallen into the lowest rank of European Powers. Her voice is no longer heard in European councils; her material and aggressive strength is at a minimum. She remains a great nation, an important constituent of the Western European Republic, but she remains so in spite, as it were, of her present condition. She remains so by virtue of her past history, with its long record of glory; by virtue of that to which all testify—her undiminished self-respect, and the undegraded character of the majority of the nation; by virtue, lastly, of her hopes of the future, of which no present depression can rob her. But in the present she is powerless, the result of many sad fatalities, of misgovernment and misdirection of the national energies, of false economical theories, of long and exhausting wars, in which her fortunes have been interwoven with those of France, the result in the immediate present of internal dissensions and dynastic quarrels. In her more powerful period she failed in wresting from us Gibraltar. She can hardly now entertain the vision of attempting a second attack. Such is her weakness, she must acquiesce in the standing insult which the foreign occupation of one of her towns cannot but constitute. She has no choice left her but a dignified submission to her destiny. And, if all else fails, in dignity the Spaniard is never wanting.

And now for England. With the Athenian statesman I might say—*μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω.* To dwell on a subject familiar to all,—for this I have no taste, and will therefore pass on. For the most distrustful of England's future will not deny her present strength. And yet, for the purposes of my argument, I must dwell briefly on her

position. I must, in some measure, avoiding so far as may be any pandering to our national arrogance, express the consciousness which I share with all around me of the great name and great power of England. If her officers have justly incurred the national dislike and the contempt of all competent foreign observers; if her rulers are no less the just object of the national distrust and of the ill-concealed sneers of foreign statesmen; if her policy is by all foreign nations considered as Machiavellian, and by a large and increasing minority at home stigmatized as at once weak, pretentious, and unjust; if her institutions are somewhat overworn; if her social fabric is shaken by the extreme separation and alienation of the different classes; if her wide empire bears many a stain on its origin, and some few also on the spirit in which it is wielded; still, when the process of subtraction is complete, there is left legitimate and solid ground for a high estimate of England's power. They who despise her officers must admire the patient and majestic valour of her soldiers. They who sneer at her statesmen feel that the nation those statesmen represent is no object for a sneer. The foreign nations who condemn our policy distinguish between its authors and the English people. And all alike are alive to the fact, that behind those time-worn institutions, behind that tottering social fabric, ill-represented and but partially concealed by an effete church and aristocracy, there stands the strong English nation, with a will and an energy which in the hour of danger would shake off its actual guides, whether in the field or in council, and, under new and more competent guidance, prove itself adequate to any emergency. This strength of will, the indomitable energy, the real union of all her parties amid much apparent disunion, her wealth, her commercial influence, her colonial empire, her command of India, her powerful navy, her power of calling into existence under any disadvantages, of conveying and of feeding an army—all these combined seem to make her formidable both for defence and aggression. In enterprise and vigour, and the consciousness of vigour and enterprise, she is the very opposite of Spain. She, as Spain, has a glorious past. She, as Spain, may look forward with confidence to the future. Unlike Spain, she is in the present,

in extent of dominion and in material power, the first of European states: in moral and political influence she is in the very foremost rank.

Such is the contrast between Spain and England. And it is to Spain in her weakness that I would urge on England to restore Gibraltar, and to restore it unconditionally. There should be no dismantling—no paltry claim for indemnity. In the full pride of its impregnable defences, with all the labour and skill invested in it during so many generations, would I wish to see it restored. This would make it clear that it is no economical spirit that dictates the act, but that it is the act of inauguration of the new policy which shall henceforth characterise the dealings of England in her relations with other nations. It should be an act symbolical of our recognition of the feelings and fair claims of others; of our recognition of the truth, that no mere insular or national interests, but our obligations to Europe and to the whole of mankind, ought to be our guiding principle for the future.

To throw light on the general bearings of the proposal—to show that a diminution of an outward might be a real increase of our moral strength—to show also that the lapse of time changes our views on such questions, and makes that appear a gain which was considered most detrimental—I would direct attention to the case of Calais.

It is three centuries since the recovery of Calais by the French, its natural owners, was felt by the nation as a disgrace, by its Queen as her death-warrant. At the time of its loss, we had held it for two hundred years. It was, even more than Gibraltar, connected with the traditional glory of the England of that day. Its associations were those of Crecy and Poitiers, of the victors on those fields of national glory, of the long subsequent wars between England and France. Step by step we had been driven from France; but whilst Calais remained ours, there seemed some ground for the proud title our sovereigns claimed, some encouragement for the popular feeling which always cherished hopes of a restoration of our power. Mary was not blind to the strength of this feeling. And even under her successor, the wise policy which acquiesced in the loss of Calais was forced to conciliate by special stipulations the prejudices of the nation, and Elizabeth and her statesmen appeared

to yield with reluctance what their sagacity told them it was neither possible nor desirable to regain.

But let us put the supposition that Calais had remained till now a dependency of the English crown; that during these three last centuries that additional element of discord had been in existence to aggravate all the bitter feeling that has estranged England and France; and that now, when the troubled waters were becoming calm, there was left between the two nations this standing cause for dissension. Equally in the past, as in the present, we can see the magnitude of the evil. We can see that the loss of Calais was most fortunate; that its retention now would be morally impossible; that no material advantages could compensate for the moral weakening of our position such retention would involve. We can see that the policy which should have urged its immediate restitution would meet with unanimous assent. It is now also evident that its value was in all respects overrated—so evident, that we can hardly sympathise with the misconception of our forefathers. Time has cleared away all the delusions on the subject, and good sense reasserts its empire.

But, in the reign of Mary, what would have been thought of a proposal to restore Calais? Undoubtedly it would have been thought the wildest Quixotism, possibly might have been construed into treason. This should throw light on the present proposal; for what would then have been deemed almost insanity to propose, it would be clear insanity now to wish undone. Every argument of sound policy was then in favour of the restitution of Calais; but no argument would have been listened to. The national prejudices were against it. Every argument of sound policy is, I believe, now equally in favour of the restitution of Gibraltar. Are we sufficiently strong to rise above our prejudices, or has the experience of the past been lost upon us?

And there is one argument in the case of Gibraltar, not applicable in the supposed case of Calais, which should be conciliatory to a nation so proud as the English. There could not rest on the restitution of Gibraltar to Spain any imputation that it was dictated by self-interest. To disarm the enmity of France might be a great inducement to us; to disarm the enmity of Spain—so changed is that noble country!—would

be an unappreciable motive. It might excite an ill-placed ridicule.

With this remark I leave the parallel of Calais to the judgment of the reader. I need scarcely add, what is implied in all I have said, that the concession of Gibraltar is not a final settlement; that the principle on which we concede it is one of wide application—wide application by England, applicable also by other members of Western Europe. Upon the obligations that rest on them I forbear to dwell. It seems better that they should be pointed out by themselves, and that England's obligations should be sought out and expressed by Englishmen. All appearance of dictation is avoided by such a course; all unnecessary irritation of the spirit of independent nationality is equally avoided; and each nation is left to take of its own impulse the initiative, so far as it is concerned. So far only may such a concession be useful to us in regard to the conduct of other nations, that it may enlighten us on the true object to be pursued in all international questions, and may give a definite consistency to our immediate views on foreign policy, in the place of the lamentable incoherence which at present is the prevailing characteristic.

Such a concession would have a direct and an indirect action. The direct action on the European world could hardly fail to be strikingly beneficial. No such pledge of a determination to enter on a new spirit in our foreign policy could be given; none so directly appreciable by the whole European public. There are other reparations of the past which might really be a greater sacrifice to England to make; but there is no one so tangible, no one so evidently embodying the sense of obligation which membership involves: no act also could be so symbolical of the change in the condition of Europe which I have above hinted at as desirable. Spain would thereby recover her full nationality; and its recovery by Spain would be an earnest of its recovery by Italy. It is a concession which would be worth all our preaching about liberal and just government; preaching which, when brought into contrast with the present and past policy of England, is seen to be glaringly hollow—to be nothing else than a repetition, in the international relations, of the peculiar vice which characterises us as a nation, our propensity to cant. And

such a concession, made in the right spirit, would have an indirect action on all our own views of foreign policy,—an appreciable result. A course of action on the principle of sacrificing our own good to that of others is first of all right in itself for the person who performs it; then it reacts on his whole view of his conduct. It gives him great clearness of vision—for self-interest is the great source of darkness. Its tendency to act beneficially on others is self-evident. So with nations and national morality. One such act of clear renunciation in the face of Europe would raise the national consciousness, clear its clouded vision of its obligations, and be a manly breaking with whatever of evil there has been embodied in our past policy. All subsequent similar questions might be brought to the same standard, and the theory of our own peculiar, private, national interests would be inadmissible. The noble action, once done, has a constraining power for all future time—*Noblesse oblige.*

But it were vain to expect that, if listened to at all, such a proposal should not meet with serious objections, more or less argumentative. All objections I could not hope to obviate or even anticipate. I have selected some four or five of the principal ones—those most likely to be felt and urged, or felt, if not urged. I would gladly make my case as strong as I can. It is, as may now be seen, in need of all possible advantages and treatment.

OBJECTION I.—Nations have no such obligations as you speak of in their conduct one towards another. They have, by the existence of an international law, certain rights which they can claim, and which, if denied them, they are justified in enforcing by war. They have also their own interests to protect. This is to them the ultimate end. To consult the interests of others were mere Quixotism. All that can be claimed of them in regard to others is, that they should carefully abstain from doing harm. But this, indeed, is no more than an enlightened view of their separate interest would dictate to them.

Such an objection as this I do not attempt to answer. It rests on a morality diametrically opposite to that which I advocate. Consistently held, it is impregnable in point of logic. It is, in its naked expression, a theory not often main-

tained ; but it is a theory which, though not openly avowed, is yet substantially at the bottom of much of our language, largely influencing our political views. It must be so. For, in our private social relations, it is, with the mass of those we meet, absolutely dominant, engrained into our whole system of education, colouring all our language and practice, largely preached from the pulpit as the sum and substance of Christian duty. It could not be expected that it should confine itself to our private faith and practice. It naturally spreads further. I have not hesitated to express it in its crude form, for on all occasions it deserves an attentive examination. But I repeat that he who should advance it would be unassailable in logic, or at least I should think time lost in assailing him. I appeal not to those who hold it, but to those who hold its exact opposite.

OBJECTION II.—The obligation in the way of concession and restitution is not peculiar to England. It is binding on others who are, equally with her, members of Western Europe, and equally open to the charge of unjust possession. Why then should England be the first to begin a new policy? Why should it not be inaugurated by a decision common to the whole state-system? Reciprocity is desirable between states, and it might happen that our concession elicited no corresponding action on the part of others, and that so we stood the object of the world's ridicule, as having set an example which nobody would follow.

This objection appeals to that which has a strong hold on all of us, stepping in often to check our more generous impulses—the dread of their failure, of their meeting no return, and the consequent sense of our having placed ourselves in a ridiculous position. It were a sufficient answer to say, that if the obligation be admitted at all, it can hardly allow of any hesitation, or be made conditional on the conduct of others. This were a sufficient answer. But I would add that the position and strength of England, even when estimated at the lowest point conceivable, constitute an obligation on her to take the initiative. They make her amenable to the operation of the noble principle embodied in my motto. It is because she is so eminently wealthy and strong that it falls on her to begin the policy of concession. It is for the strong to

bear the burdens of the weak. It is for the strong to yield to the weak. It is the strong who should be able to meet with coolness any sneers directed against the line of action adopted. So that, as you exalt England in the rank of nations, you are but strengthening the argument against her. The higher the estimate you form of her strength, the stronger you make her obligations.

OBJECTION III.—All this is very well; but there is a difference between the power of England and that of the other great States with which she is connected. She is smaller in extent. She maintains a military force numerically very inferior to theirs. She holds her high place by virtue of the prestige attached to her name. To threaten that prestige is to threaten the whole edifice of her power. Destroy it, and she sinks into the second rank. The cession of Gibraltar would be a heavy blow struck at this foundation of her greatness.

I will not dwell on the feeling latent in such an objection. It betrays a distrust of the solidity of England's power. It gives a key to the real value of much of our vapouring. I do not share in such feeling of distrust; and if I did share it, I should not allow that it constituted a sound argument. I should prefer for England another kind of prestige. I should prefer the prestige she would gain by the noble initiation of a fresh policy in Europe. I should think that such initiation would guarantee to Europe her consciousness of real strength, though somewhat less than had been thought; and I should think that we were well rid of the prestige derived from wide empire, without any consideration of the method of its acquisition or retention. But I have no sympathy with any such language as that of the objection. It is immoral; it is essentially distrustful; it evinces no faith in justice, but a strong faith in material power—a stronger faith in the show of material power. It is, besides, based on a total misconception, in my opinion, of the tendencies of the time. In the concession I advocate, England would make no appeal to the older and more corrupt political sentiments of Europe. It would be a concession alien to the sentiments of the courts and cabinets, whether absolutist or aristocratic. It would appeal to that which exists outside of those courts and

cabinets, wanting at times the power of expressing itself, but, to the eye rightly trained to watch the course of events, giving sufficient evidence of its existence and its growth. It would appeal, that is, to the feeling of the nations of Europe. It would appeal to sentiments, which are those of an overwhelming majority of those nations, which are making themselves felt, and will every day assume a greater power. Any European history of the last forty years speaks of the shock that ran through popular Europe when, under the impulse of Canning, England broke with the absolutist, and proclaimed her adhesion to a freer policy. Not dissimilar, but stronger, would be the effect of an act by which England should break, not with absolutism in other courts, but with her own traditional maxims of an aggressive domination. The effect would be stronger; for the act in itself would be sounder, more absolutely clear from misconception, more indisputably a step which could not be retraced, the sure pledge of a future dissevered from the evils of the past. If every noble sentiment uttered in England is said to find its echo on the Continent, we may be certain that the response to a noble action, symbolical of future conduct, would be, not ridicule, but the deepest respect.

In fact, the time is rapidly passing, if not past, when we should speak or act for the Courts of Europe. Both our speech and action should be calculated for the nationalities. It is the vice of our ambiguous institutions, that they make any straightforward speech or action well-nigh impossible.

OBJECTION IV.—*Salus populi suprema lex.* Not that it would be contended that the possession of Gibraltar is, in the strictest sense, a question of self-defence. But it would be urged that its possession gives us the command of the Mediterranean, or prevents that sea being closed against us. That the closing of that sea would be of the greatest detriment to the maritime interests of Great Britain,—that, in fact, the concession is too great a one to make—involves too great a sacrifice. No nation can be expected to carry its theory of social obligation so far.

I believe this objection to rest on an unsound basis in fact. Were it not so, it would be no sufficient ground for retaining a possession to which we, morally, are not entitled, because

it is convenient for the nation to do so. But I believe that it is an error to look on Gibraltar as in any degree a material accession to England's strength. It could not have been looked on as such by those who, some years ago, proposed its abandonment on economical grounds. In time of war its possession may be occasionally a convenience. But no policy is defensible which is based on a constant probability of war. Such a policy is now antiquated. It is worn out, with its whole system of balances, checks, and its constant appeals to international rivalry. Such a policy is the very opposite of that which the present requires, and which the immediate future will unquestionably see embodied in action. The closing of the Mediterranean against our commerce by a combination of France and Spain does not depend on the Spanish occupation of Gibraltar, if it were worth while to waste any words on so laughable a supposition.

But, apart from all definite objections capable of an argumentative expression, there remains a much more real difficulty. It is the difficulty raised by a national feeling which is the fruitful source of objections, but cannot be embodied in any single one. It is a Proteus with which it is hard to grapple. The genuine English feeling, it is said, stands up for its rights,—asks no more and no less. We have won Gibraltar; we have held it; we have had our right to it acknowledged repeatedly. Why should we be called on to give up that which is our right?

With such a feeling it is vain to argue. It can only be met indirectly,—by an appeal, that is, to other higher and better feelings, such as may be called out by the thoughtful estimate of our duties and obligations, the question of our rights being put aside. From their discussion no good will ensue. But if we can put ourselves on the ground of obligations, there is hope of a good result. The feeling instanced above, and the language in which it finds expression, are equally unsound. They evince, in the sphere of private life, an ignorance of the true position of each man in this world,—an ignorance of the primary conditions of social existence. They are an index of the same ignorance in the sphere of international relations. But those who so speak and feel cannot see the flaw. All that can be hoped is, that the spirit is becoming less preva-

lent,—that the due appreciation of the claims of others is spreading. An appeal based on such appreciation may then have some chance of not being borne down without a hearing by the simple weight of an impatient majority.

And if to any the whole proposal seems a mere chimera, any such policy a dream which the sober common sense of mankind at once would repudiate; if any urge that no nation has ever made, or ever will make, such concessions—that the utmost that can be expected is acquiescence in such concessions when wrung from it by the force of circumstances; that any voluntary initiative it is vain to expect;—to all such I again attempt no direct answer. To my view, the state of Europe requires other remedies than any which common sense is likely to apply. It is high time that governments should begin to justify their claim to obedience on the part of the governed by a manifest exercise of forethought, the essential condition of government.

I put aside, therefore, as alien to our present need, all such language as that above quoted, and declare my conviction that the guidance of Europe is an affair, not of common sense, but of the maturest and most patient wisdom; a wisdom which shall embrace in one comprehensive view the whole of the past history of mankind, shall read aright the lessons it conveys, and be able to combine them rightly, and draw from them right deductions; a wisdom which, availing itself of the aid of the imagination, shall by its assistance penetrate the wants of the future,—which, thus keeping ever in view the future, and instructed by the experience of the past, shall be able with perfect calmness to rise above and to estimate the present, discern clearly its wants, and the modifications of which it is susceptible. Such wisdom, based upon knowledge and disciplined by social morality, shall in its large conclusions be applicable, so far as is compatible with man's intellectual limits, to all his political, social, and religious demands.

PART III.

BRIEFLY to recapitulate.

The first part of these remarks was occupied in laying the basis on which might rest a certain scheme of foreign policy. I attempted, with that object in view, to make clear the extent of the aggregate to which such policy should be applicable. That settled, I proceeded to consider the position of England as a member of that aggregate, with the social obligations such membership involved, to the exclusion of merely national interests. I then analysed the complications of the actual state of Europe, both national and international. This led to a review of past European history, as an elucidation of the origin of those complications indispensable to a right judgment.

The basis thus laid, the Second Part was occupied with the statement of the remedies needed for the present emergency—remedies to which the experience of mediæval Europe was taken as a guide. Such remedies were twofold, final and provisional; the latter alone within the scope of the present treatment, the other only to be indicated. The provisional, again, were twofold, according as they aimed at removing causes of quarrel, or as they aimed at the creation of a positive good feeling. It was the former more especially that were within the range of a discussion of foreign policy. And, as an instance of the removal of causes of quarrel, I took the simplest case open to me, and as an Englishman, endeavoured to show that the cession of Gibraltar to Spain would be the commencement of a really sound policy, meeting, one by one, the objections as they occurred to me.

There remain for this Third Part some more general considerations.

The policy of peace and mutual concession which has been advocated, implies the expectation of a moral solution of

the difficulties of Europe. It looks on all violent disturbance of the *status quo* as an adjournment, not a furtherance, of that solution. I do not undervalue the obstacles to its adoption, but they are losing their force under the pressure of experience. Even the most natural, most legitimate obstacle, that which lies in the just impatience of oppression felt by the nations who are oppressed,—even this is losing its force.

But I feel that there is a *primâ facie* difficulty in my case. It may be said:—An Englishman finds it easy to urge peace and patient expectation; for the evils from which his country suffers admit— nay, imperatively demand—such remedies, and no others. So the healthy preach endurance to the sick. But countries such as Italy and Hungary, writhing under the dominion of a foreign Power, or under intolerable oppression at home, need a speedier relief. If once delivered from that foreign power and domestic oppression, they too could look to a moral solution for their evils, and patiently work at that solution. Nay more, we in this country see amongst us as exiles, men whose whole character and bearing is a constant refutation of every calumny, once so freely heaped on the popular party in Europe,—a convincing proof of the hopeless nature of the governments, with whose existence their presence in their native country is deemed incompatible. We have, many of us, had the privilege of knowing such men, and those who have enjoyed that privilege can sympathize with me in feeling alarm, lest anything said may appear to evince an indifference to their sufferings, or to that which they feel far more keenly—the unhappy condition of their country.

Patience to the exile means, too often, a life lost to the direct service of his country. But not, therefore, is it wholly lost to her. For such men are involuntary missionaries, spreading through Western Europe, and more especially in this insular England, a more thorough and a more just sympathy for their country, helping to form public opinion, and to direct it aright. In this they may find some compensation for the bitterness of exile;—so bitter even to Dante under the sky of Italy;—how much more bitter in a distant and northern land, and amidst the sounds of a strange language?

We can offer to such men a silent and respectful sympathy; and we can prove that sympathy in act, by diligently

studying the problems of European policy, and by learning from them more accurately the particular relation of their peculiar national wants to the wants of the whole system. From any more direct expression of our regret, it were well perhaps to abstain,—only in abstaining, I would not be thought indifferent. I will content myself with urging that, if I reprobate the policy of England as oppressive and unjust, I am not likely to approve of the conduct of Austria. If I can sympathize with all who are suffering under the dominion of England, I shall probably feel sympathy at least as keen for those similarly suffering under any other Power. Indeed, apart from any feeling, it is my conviction that there is no solid peace possible for Europe, nor, if possible, would it be to me desirable, so long as Italy remains under the government of a foreign Power. It is simply a question of the best means of freeing her. And it is in reference to this question that I would venture on the following remarks, which aim at showing, on reasonable grounds, that there is no external help to be looked for by the 'oppressed nationalities' under the actual political combinations of Europe.

The only possible source of external help is either France or England separately, or the two acting in concert. The general objection to the active intervention of either of these Powers, or of both combined, has been already stated. Here I may take into consideration more special objections, applicable to the present and more immediate future. The two great Western Powers, considered singly, have each their own impediments to a consistent and decided action. In combination they do not lose those impediments; on the contrary, they rather add fresh ones. If no good can be hoped from their independent action, none could be hoped from their concert. So that an examination of them individually will suffice. If that lead us to see that their interference could not be for any really valuable result, we may dismiss any further question as to their combined action.

The policy of France under its present ruler must be largely coloured by the peculiarities of his position. Not that I think he could enter on a policy adverse to the views of the French nation. He is, more than our own government, responsible to the nation, and his tenure is more directly contingent on the

degree in which he is found to serve it. Still, in presence of foreign governments, he must have a great influence on the political action of France. And the position of Louis Napoleon, estimated calmly, is so ambiguous, so imperialist in outward form, so republican in essential character, as seriously to compromise any power of straightforward action. His imperial dignity and state, and his dynastic aspirations, embarrass him far more than they aid him. They identify him in the face of Europe with its older order. They alienate from him in Europe, as in France, all republican sympathies. They strip him of what strength there might have been for him in the democratic origin which he assigns to his power, while sufficient of that democratic origin clings to him to render him an object of suspicion to the absolutist courts. Whatever his policy in the internal administration of France, he remains, from the point of view of foreign policy, part and parcel of the established system of European government, and incapable of rising above it, so long as he wavers between two distinct positions, from an inability to see clearly the weakness consequent on his adhesion to the traditions of Imperialism.

The same objections in substance apply to England. And if it be desirable for an Englishman to speak with caution and with a certain reticence when criticising the French government, more openness may be allowed him when speaking of his own. A careful review of the action of England in Europe for the last two centuries, since the death of Cromwell and the fall of his power closed all hope of wise and noble government, and left her aristocracy free to follow its own impulses,—such a review would force on all the conviction that the interference of England in her present state is worse than useless. If against this statement were quoted the policy of William III., the answer is clear. That monarch's plans were curbed, as far as they could be curbed, by the most narrow and jealous supervision. He was hampered and fettered in every direction. He was to be the doge of an oligarchy, which has not unhappily been compared to that of Venice.

Return we, then, to the former statement. The past history of England, taken in the general, is sufficient to prove that the popular cause in Europe has nothing to hope from her. Her aristocracy,—and I need not stop to argue the point, that

the aristocracy in foreign as in home questions is England—has no sympathy with any nation, as distinct from its government. It is itself, as the present government of France, essentially bound up with the older order—part and parcel of the established system of European government. And it has never acted in the past—it is not capable of acting in the present—of its own impulse, that is, otherwise than as part of that system. It would welcome now, as it welcomed in 1849—and its welcome would find an echo, as it then did, in the middle classes—another victory over the national party in Italy and Hungary. It might, perhaps, however impassive it appears, wish that victory less stained with fraud and bloodshed. It might wish, in the interests of common humanity and order, the power secured by such victory more moderately and more wisely exercised. But sympathy for the vanquished cause it could not feel. Once only on a large scale has the aristocracy of England assumed the position of the defender of liberty. It struggled long and successfully against Napoleon, for his ambition threatened the national existence, and the ideas on which his power rested were antipathetic in the extreme to the aristocratic element in that existence. But the conduct of the English aristocracy after the close of that struggle proved how little any genuine sense of liberty, any real wish for good government, any popular sympathies, had been amongst its motives. It turned its back coldly on all the hopes it had evoked. It saw with complacency the governments of Europe resume their former methods and violate their promises. Its treatment of Sicily was but the most flagrant instance of a general system. It was not its fault if any failed to learn the lesson, that the hopes placed in aristocratic England were a delusion of the most dangerous order. Yet, so sanguine is man's nature, that, forgetful of the lessons of the past, forgetful of the evils fairly traceable to the policy of England under her aristocratic government during the last two centuries, in the hour of revolution and danger, in 1848, foreign nations turned to England with the expectation of help. I will not dwell on the way in which they were then met. All alike blame the line of conduct then adopted, as exciting hopes that must inevitably be disappointed. The only good result from it would be the conviction that, in any

future crisis of the same kind, as well as under the pressure of existing evils, England, so long as she continues what she is in government, may be powerful for evil, but is entirely powerless for good.

There is a large and increasing body of Englishmen who feel that this is in substance true. They take a lively interest in foreign affairs. Their general tendency is in favour of a different conduct on the part of England—a conduct which they would look upon as some atonement for the past. They hold the cause of the nations of Europe to be just, and they would exert the strength of England in support of its justice. With these opinions, they are naturally impatient of a quieter policy.

And yet a calm judgment, both of the past and of the present, should make them hesitate. The grounds urged above are quite as applicable here. No rapid change in the government of their country is probable; and if that remains unchanged, in the interest of the nations with which they sympathize, complete abstinence from exertion on the part of England is the only wise course. And to Englishmen there are other grounds that may be urged. The closer they examine the history of their country, the more, I feel no question, they will convince themselves that the real clue to the evils, under which it is now suffering at home, is to be found in the aggressive policy which has long characterized the rule of their oligarchy. The constant direction of the energies of the nation abroad and to war—whether war had political supremacy, extended dominion, or commercial advantages as its object—has been the result of combined calculation and instinct; and the unvarying aim has been to secure the power of the aristocracy at home. It did not wish a close attention directed on its own government. Such close attention on the part of a people in any degree invested with political liberty must have been fatal to its power. The real remedy lay in effecting a diversion, and that diversion was found in an unscrupulous foreign policy.

Passing over all more doubtful instances, and clearing away all the sophistries that for years have obscured the national perception, I ask, What was the real object of the aristocracy in plunging into the great war of 1793 with revolutionary France? Was not the true policy of England as alien to

such a war then as in 1830 or 1848, when France again broke up the established order? Or was the motive a real sympathy with the French Court? Any such pretence is now hopeless. The real motive was, to keep out French principles—Jacobinical was the name given them: in other words, to prevent any searching inquiry into the fabric of our own government. It was to adjourn, and the plan was successful, all questions of internal improvement to some distant day. And the policy then pursued was one which our aristocracy would not be averse to repeat. I have heard quoted the remark of an acute political observer on hearing the news of the victory of the Alma—'It has given the aristocracy fifty years longer of power.' The subsequent blunders in the management of the war, not within the range of calculation, made the event but little correspond to the prediction. The whole result has, in fact, been seriously to impair the stability of our rulers' position. So alive were they to this, that at one period they were bent on terminating the war on any terms. But though false in this particular case, the remark has a general truth; and it is an index to the danger we ran. For the tenure of power by the aristocracy, as at present constituted and animated, is equivalent to the adjournment of all real social amelioration. Were it not so, were it consistent with that amelioration, I for one should have no care to attack it. In time its tenure must come to an end, and, meanwhile, it would be no source of danger. But if there came a strong demand for internal reforms and social changes, our aristocracy—which, whatever our judgment of its system of government, and of its results, has not been wanting in ability, even if that ability has been specially concentrated on its own preservation of power—would not be slow again to seek a diversion, much less would it be slow to accept one that should be pressed on it by the inadvertence of the more liberal party. Provided as it is with a naval and military force, well organised and anxious to retrieve its prestige, it would not be slow to accept foreign action as a safety-valve for the national discontent, or an escape from that which is yet more formidable—the searching and intelligent, if moderate, scrutiny of its whole method of government, and of the social principles which that method embodies. So,

whilst from the earlier point of view the consequence of England's active intervention would be an evil, as regards the nations for whose benefit it was apparently designed, its bearing on all home politics would be no less prejudicial. When the diversion was over, and the day was come when further adjournment was impossible, we should but find ourselves with increased burdens and an accumulation of difficulties.

It is at once for the interest of England and the interest of Europe that no false step be taken in this matter—that no opportunity be given to our aristocracy to play over again the game it has played but too successfully. It is essential for the welfare of Europe that no scope should be allowed for its propensity to arrest its danger by a policy similar to that which led Henry V. to invade France. It is essential for the welfare of England that the peaceful and gradual process of removing it from power be not interrupted. It will doubtless struggle hard against the change which is necessary to bring it into harmony with the different social ideas of an industrial community. But its struggle must be unsuccessful if we remain at peace. Unquestionably, its own true interest, equally with the true interest of England, requires peace. But the aristocracy has shown but few signs of being awake to its true interests. Entrenched behind the delusive scheme of parliamentary government, the democratic fiction under which it consents to veil its power—using the institutions of the country (if I may be allowed to borrow a railway expression) as the buffer to break the force of any assault on it—it will continue, so long as it is able, to evade the real requirements of the times. Its ability on many points cannot but command some admiration. In the great art of leading a nation to believe it has got the substance, when it is really left to play with the shadow, I believe the aristocratic government of England absolutely unrivalled. The means adopted, the secret of its art, the *arcanum imperii*, the long history of parliamentary corruption, I leave for the present, with the simple indication.

All calls to action, then, whether addressed to us from foreign sufferers or from the sympathizing party at home, must be disregarded. The latter are the more likely to be

frequent and troublesome; for, if I mistake not, there are evident signs of a growing conviction on the part of the oppressed nations and their exiled representatives, that no foreign aid can be of use—that peaceful and moral remedies are the only sure ones. So a policy, such as I have advocated, would be more likely to meet with acceptance abroad than in England. Its disclaimer of any appeal to arms, as at once uncertain, and unsatisfactory if successful, would be more likely to gain assent. True, it wears an air of length and of tediousnesss; but it is not difficult to see that, whilst discarding the attractions which a more energetic conduct offers, it has more powerful ones of its own—that it rests on a sounder appreciation of the actual facts, and, by its completeness and finality, overbalances any inconveniences resulting from its slowness of movement.

Of Western Europe generally it is true, that the governments are at issue with their respective nations. The degrees of dissidence will differ; but it exists everywhere in some degree, not merely on questions of national regulations, but also on those of the external relations. The ideas of the two constituents of each state, the government and the governed, are, in fact, at variance; there cannot be agreement, then, as to the conduct based on those ideas. The governments look too exclusively to the immediate past, or to existing institutions. They represent by their position order, but they represent it somewhat blindly, unconscious that for a government merely to aim at the conservation of order is a most dangerous policy—that to bind the future too closely to the present and past is to risk the stifling in the germ of the growing life. The governments, in a word, are conservative in excess, and forget that order is valuable as the condition of progress.

On the other hand, the ideas of the governed are too exclusively drawn from the opposite point of view. They are too much alienated from the past—too eager to change the existing institutions: they are too impregnated with the notions of the future. They represent also, somewhat blindly, the idea of progress, unconscious that to pursue progress alone is dangerous, for that by so doing they ignore the legitimate influence of the past on the present and future.

They become revolutionary by virtue of being progressive in excess, and they forget that progress is but the development of order.

In the divorce between these two ideas, and the consequent disunion of their respective representatives, may be found the philosophic explanation of the peculiar paralysis that prevents any effective action of any one nation with reference to its neighbours. When there is not unity within, it is not probable that there should be a direct, decided, straightforward action without. In the singular policy of Austria and Prussia during the war between the Western Powers and Russia, we may see, by a lively instance, the results of a situation wholly devoid of any basis of internal union. Those two powers were perfectly paralysed because their governments could not speak as the real representatives of the nations they governed. Nor is this less the case in England than in the other states. In fact, the disagreement between the nation and its rulers, owing to the greater freedom allowed to expression on political matters, is more manifest here, though not really wider. The political writing of the day is almost unanimous in condemnation of our secret diplomacy. This would not be the case with so practical a nation, where there is such indifference to any general prinoiples, were it not felt that the course of our diplomacy lands us in conclusions not desired by the nation. All thinking men, not actually within the action of the government, look with uneasiness on our foreign policy, and the only difference traceable is on the question of the proper remedy to be applied. I have no wish to say that the foreign policy is always, or generally, wrong. In the measures adopted, and the adoption of which is blamed—in the measures urged and not adopted—it often happens that the government is seen eventually to have been in the right, and the obedience to the general feeling of the moment would have been an evil. But the contrary is also true; and, in any case, the disagreement is equally a fact.

Again, there is in such matters another complication, due to our system of government. It is a government by double action, and, as such, has great difficulty in being brought within the influence of public opinion. The theory is, that the ministers, the executive government, feel the pulse of the

nation by the intermedium of parliament. But parliaments are, after all, but an unsafe test. They would often completely mislead, as is now seen to have been the case with regard to the Corn-laws, when the sagacity of the First Minister set aside their verdict. What other means have the ministers, parliament failing, to ascertain the national feeling amid the currents of opinion shifting hither and thither? It is, as it was in 1846, a question of individual ability, and there is no general confidence in the ministerial ability. It must be added, that on questions of foreign policy there is no sufficient agreement to constitute a national will. Any decided action in favour of either of the two great parties which divide Continental Europe would be dangerous to any government. If in favour of the so-called party of order, it would shock a widely-spread national instinct. If in favour of the revolutionary party, such action would alienate immediately all support of the more directly political, probably also of the mercantile, classes.

So that the Foreign Minister of England, had he even the genius and resolution of Cromwell, would, under the present conditions of his tenure of power, find but little scope for his action. If he interfered at all, it must be with hesitation. He would be aware that he ran a double risk, from the dissent of his colleagues, and from the interference of the House of Commons, which might at any moment interrupt or reverse his ablest plans. What can be the fruit of such a position, but a policy either of complete inaction, or of weakness and tergiversation, more irritating far than useful? What should we see as the result of any interference, but that which we have seen and been sick of seeing—the name of England prostituted—her influence paraded, and found in the hour of trial to be absolutely unavailing, luring on foreign parties to their destruction—the stamp of treachery impressed upon her actions in the eyes of other nations, though the intentions of her people, and even of her government, has been anything but treacherous?

The policy I have been advocating has no such disadvantages. It is free from all febrile agitation. It encourages no false hopes. It does not make advances, from which it must recede at the approach of danger. It is intelligible to all. By

it England retires from all active intervention. She is bent on reorganising, *proprio motu*, her own foreign relations. She assumes a dignified attitude of repose, and has no longer any need of occasional compromises to enable her to conciliate now the courts, now the popular party in Europe. But such repose could not be mistaken for the isolation of indifference. It is the repose of retirement for purposes of revision and amendment. She proclaims a new policy, one animated by a sense of her social duty. She offers to all nations suffering under oppression, foreign or domestic, her sympathy, and guarantees by a striking act the sincerity of her offer. She lends to their cause the weight of her example. In the denial of her past, in the reconstruction of her future policy, she reads to the powers who keep other nations in subjection, a lesson not wanting in impressiveness.

Not unreasonably, then, may the policy herein advocated ask for a hearing. It does not try to supersede any definite scheme; for there is no such scheme visible, here or in Europe. Everywhere we see a government of the hour, a government by expedients; at one time successful, at another leading to the most embarrassing checks, as in the case of our Neapolitan interference. The conception and the will are both deficient. Whereas, the policy I have sketched is definite—not inadequate to the wants of the times—and at the same time it is no mere temporary expedient; it is the symbol and commencement of a systematic course. It meets the universal demand for peace. It meets the equally universal feeling of international distrust. It meets the demand of the mercantile classes in England for non-interference. It gratifies the nobler demand of the national instinct for an active expression of our sympathy. It frees our statesmen from their ambiguous and difficult situation, when they would fain preserve the *status quo*, but find themselves goaded into action. It obviates at once the two opposite evils, to which attention to the course of political events exposes us, impatience, and the resignation which is but a synonym for indifference.

Adopt it, and the national action becomes at once clear and dignified. From the vantage ground such an initiative would give us, we might proceed at leisure to review our whole position, external and internal, in the full consciousness of

perfect security. Such, at least, is the view I take of our situation in presence of foreign nations. I am aware that it is very different from that of large numbers of my countrymen, and therefore I will enter into some discussion in its support.

Everywhere throughout Europe is heard the tread of soldiers. And the English tourist, who sees the vast military preparations and establishments of the Continental Powers, on his return home remarks with alarm the absence of any corresponding display. Fear spreads rapidly. Those who have not seen, hear or read, and are even more alarmed, perhaps, than those who have seen, and have seen at the same time that there is something in the state of opinion abroad to counterbalance the large military force. The cry is raised, that in the face of armed Europe it is not safe for England to remain unarmed. It is a cry raised by some in simplicity, echoed by others from professional prejudices, by a third party from interested motives. Now, so far as the cry is interpretable in the very modified sense of a demand for an improved military system—an improved arrangement of the forces we do maintain, whether small or great—an improved education for our officers—so far it is open to no objections. It is certainly most desirable that the army maintained should be efficient. It is no less to be wished that the discreditable disclosures as to the state of the English officer in home quarters should not be repeated. Nor is it less to be wished that the discreditable incompetence, in regard to all the higher qualities of the officer on active service, should cease, so that those who profess war as a business should understand the rudiments of their business. No time should be lost in raising the ordinary level of the English officer. It has long been so low as to be a real social evil. Recent occurrences have but been examples of what all interested in the subject knew before, only connivance at the evil was deemed better than its extirpation. So far as remedying such evils is concerned, there need be but one opinion.

But the cry is susceptible of another interpretation, and really bears that interpretation with the military part of the community. It means more officers, more soldiers, a larger expenditure; or, at least, it means a war establishment in full

peace. We are to become a military nation. Such a cry I might leave to the instinct of our statesmen, and to the determination of the mass of tax-payers. Without any sympathy with the views of either the one or the other, I could confidently accept the result they would arrive at. But I prefer arguing the case briefly, as it bears on our whole judgment in matters of foreign policy, and is not confinable to the question of the national balance-sheet.

I would say, then, to the honest alarmist, Count up the soldiers of Western Europe (I put the Russian army out of the question), and you may make a grand total of near two millions and a half. Minute accuracy is not an object. Of that total a very large proportion belongs to Austria and Prussia. I would then have you ask yourself the question: Of the soldiers of those two powers, what is the number available for purposes of aggression? Can either Austria or Prussia put its army in motion for any purpose but self-defence? And if either of them, or both, could move their whole force, their aggressive power, as against England, is absolutely null. That must depend on their maritime power and their means of transport, and they neither of them have any navy. I waste no further words on them.

Of the other military powers that contribute to the total, the secondary states of Germany need not detain us—as little as the Neapolitan army.

The truth is, that when Englishmen talk of armed Europe, they mean France. In France alone is the army they think formidable, and in France alone is the combination possible of the will and the power to attack us, for there alone are to be found the two indispensable requisites—an army and a fleet to transport it. And underneath the satisfaction expressed in the French alliance, underneath the hollow servility of the nation towards Louis Napoleon, there has lain hidden an uneasy suspicion. They distrust the man they have been base enough to court. They distrust the French nation. The sense of the long jealousy that has existed between England and France is not yet sufficiently eradicated to make Englishmen feel at home in their new policy. I state what appears to me a fact. From what I have already said, it will be clear I in no degree share in the feeling. If France con-

tinues armed, not the less would I wish England to disarm. Far from adding soldiers, I would largely reduce the army, maintaining not one more than is requisite for the preservation of internal tranquillity. For, disguise the fact as we may in our language, soldiers are required in England as a police force for the maintenance of internal order. The limit of such a force it is for others to determine; but, the limit once determined from the domestic point of view, there should be no other military force maintained at the charge of England. If the colonies and dependencies of England need defence, they must maintain the force that defends them.

On this military question I venture but one further remark. It may require some faith in France to disarm in presence of the great military monarchies: it requires in England only an exertion of average good sense.

I have already stated my opinion that in the European state-system the presidency is vested in France, and is so as the legitimate conclusion from the whole course of European history. But this might remain, and will remain to the many, a theoretic question which they will not care to settle. The attitude to be assumed towards France by England is of more immediate practical interest. The relations between our government and the French must depend largely on the general feeling of the English nation. It is useless to deny that considerable difficulties beset the mutual future of the two countries. It is felt that the alliance between them is of a very delicate nature, and that their co-operation in war is more than delicate, being at least as likely to develop alienation as agreement. So that great confidence cannot be felt in the union of the two on general European questions. Again, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that the wide differences of national character must, for some time to come, at any rate, create a difficulty. This is heightened by the very little care we feel as a nation really to enter into the study and appreciation of the political changes in France; and the consequence of this neglect is seen in the hasty judgments we form, equally to be regretted whether they take the form of condemnation or approval. In the midst of much that tends to draw the two nations together, it is useless to conceal that there is much also of an opposite tendency.

Yet, after a fair estimate of the grounds that might lead to disunion, there are solid reasons for the conviction that no danger threatens us on the side of France. Evidently the mere cessation of the alliance, in its present form, would not of itself be a danger, and more than this there is no reason to fear. Doubtless our government might so insult France, that war could be the only result; but the English Government that provoked such war would have a hard task to clear itself with the people of England, even supposing the present inattention to such points likely to continue. And without such definite provocation there is no ground whatever for fearing war. Neither under her quasi-imperialism, nor under a republican government, would France have any wish to attack us. If, as I think, there is good ground for the opinion that no nation in Europe is so decidedly averse to war as the French—beyond comparison more so than our own—it is clear that under a republican government there would be no danger from them, for on that supposition there is an identity of interest between the nation and its leaders. The second case is left.

It has evidently been hitherto the real interest and strength of Louis Napoleon to keep on good terms with us. But, it is urged, such need not be the case always. It is conceivable that a conjuncture might arise, in which his interest might appear to him to lie in the direction of war. It is conceivable. I do not deny it. But what is not to me conceivable is, that he would be permitted by the nation he governs to consult his own separate interests in such a matter when the true policy of the country, and its wishes in accordance with that policy, were decidedly peaceful. It is our total misconception of the strength and nature of his tenure of office that makes us feel the alarm we do at times feel at Louis Napoleon, as distinct from France.

I have heard not unfrequently language of quite a different complexion. In it all reference to any particular form of government is avoided, and the French nation is regarded, much as the barbarians were, we may suppose, regarded by the unwarlike provincials of Rome, as watching with greedy hostility the rich treasures accumulated in this land by the peaceful industry of centuries, and ready on the shortest notice, and on any provocation, to make a dash at

them. Such language is, perhaps, but the dying utterance of the ferocious spirit of animosity carefully instilled into the generations which witnessed the beginning of the French Revolution and the struggle with Napoleon. I do not mention it for the purpose of arguing with it. I turn from it to the statement of my own feelings on the subject of our relations with France, which seems to me justified by the general prevalence of opposite views, though of views of far greater moderation both in feeling and expression.

If France continue armed as now, it is a subject of regret that such burdens on her finances should be deemed necessary. It is no ground for England's remaining armed. It would be well if our disarming could be taken as a sign of our confidence in her. But if not so interpreted, it is not the less our policy to disarm. Let us at once dismiss on our side our jealousy of her power, our suspicions of her intentions. Let it be our aim to bury all the memory of the long rivalry of centuries. Let it be our hope that France will be willing to meet us in this; for it is with her the forgiveness must rest, as in the sum total of mutual wrongs the balance is, I think, strongly against us. We have been more often the injuring party: France the injured. Let us cancel this balance in the future by the frank acknowledgement of the wrong on our side, and by a totally different policy. We should recognise her leadership, and evince by all suitable means our high value for her friendship.

Such conduct on our part would meet with the most cordial response from France. On both sides of the Channel, in the condition of both nations, there is much to regret. Both have been exposed, though in different degrees, to the same noxious influences in the course of the long revolutionary movement of modern Europe. It should be as little our object to overrate one nation as the other. But as, between nation and nation, it is the nobler part of the nation that should govern, so it is the better side that we should take into account when estimating them. Judge, then, the French feelings, policy, and intentions towards us, by our present national feeling, policy, and intentions towards France. If we would consent to any sacrifice short of our honour to preserve peace, we may be sure that France would do so no

less. She is jealous of her honour; so is England. She is highly sensitive to all fair treatment; we may not claim less for our own country. In all the arts and graces of civilized life; in the domain of thought and science; in all that constitutes a highly-developed national existence, she is at least our peer. In the experience given by a more advanced political state, she is our superior. She has been the laboratory of Europe. We should be wise to avail ourselves of the political lessons her experience can teach us; but, so availing ourselves of them, we should not be ungrateful to the country from which we draw them, which has been, and that not without the consciousness of the functions she was discharging, the school of Europe. Between two such nations, high mutual honour is the right basis of conduct.

In conclusion, to resume.—European society is in a state of disquiet and disorganisation. I venture to offer a remedial policy of peace and renunciation, as the first indispensable condition of the work of reconstruction. As a symbol of such policy, I advocate the restitution of Gibraltar to Spain. There is nothing to prevent such an act, were public opinion prepared to sanction it. To prepare public opinion will be the work of time. But, however slow the preparation, it is the only course open. For such acts must in all cases be spontaneous, or at least perfectly voluntary, on the part of each separate nation.

So that we meet the evils of Europe, moral and political with mere convictions and ideas. Yes, so it is. But the history of the past is there, to guarantee us the victory, if our convictions and ideas are sound; and their soundness must not be tested by the existing morality on international questions; for they appeal to a different and a higher standard,—a standard, however, the adoption of which is gradually and not slowly spreading.

The policy is not revolutionary, for it accepts frankly the existing order. It is not retrograde, for in accepting that order it avows the necessity of large and, practically, incessant change, to adapt it to the requirements of the present and the future. It appeals, therefore, to the conservative not less than the progressive party. It combines order and progress.

INDIA.

'Fais ce que dois, advienne que pourra.'

'Do thy duty, come what may.'

Old Knightly Motto

PREFACE.

'GIBRALTAR' was undertaken at the suggestion, and when written had the sanction, of Auguste Comte. The present work appears under different circumstances: for I, in common with his other disciples, am left to mourn the loss of our guide and master. Still it is in the confidence that what he dissuaded last year, would this year be judged by him opportune, that I venture on its publication. I offer it as a tribute to his memory, and as a pledge that his noble example of self-devotion to the cause of Humanity shall not be lost. His voice is no longer heard, but his spirit lives amongst us; and the increased energy of our mutual action will, I hope, show that we, his disciples, are determined to carry on his work. I offer it, next, as a mark of sympathy to those who share my faith. I offer it, lastly, to the service of Humanity.

Il faut payer de sa personne. When I attack so openly, I have no wish to guard myself. As little as any can I be liable to illusion as to the reception of such sentiments as these pages contain. Yet I have not written in any spirit of contempt for the ideas which are yet believed in, or of reckless opposition to the feelings of the majority.

> 'Io parlo per ver dire,
> Non per odio d' altrui, nè per disprezzo.'

Rather would I ask fair readers to judge of me by the motto on my title page. That expresses the spirit of my work. For

consider that the time is come when the doctrines of Positivism must be proclaimed; when the moral solution offered by that system of the great questions which agitate society in all its parts, must be put forward in no hesitating manner, nor in implicit statements, but most firmly and most explicitly. I may not decline the perilous honour of the vanguard.

It is not here the place to enter on any development of the doctrinal basis or religious system of Positivism. As in the case of 'Gibraltar,' it is to the special application of its principles that I confine myself. This is the point of view from which I would wish my work to be judged, in order to a fair appreciation of my reasons for introducing certain statements not at first sight essential to my argument; otherwise, I might seem to some unnecessarily to run counter to existing belief. I have really, in what I have said of religion, only obeyed the strictest necessity. The careful working out of one's opinions on such subjects, leaves a temper but little disposed to shock or to irritate others. The effort should give the courage requisite for open expression; it should inspire at the same time respect and conciliation.

SOUTH FIELDS, WANDSWORTH:
November 9, 1857.

PART I

To subordinate politics to morals—in other words, to test political action and speculation by moral considerations—such is the aim of Positivism, viewed as a philosophy. It would reverse the relation which has so long existed between the two sciences, a relation equally disastrous to both. It would no longer allow policy to set aside morality, and state-necessity to be a bar against bringing political questions before a higher tribunal. It would (and this is the simplest form of stating its object) lay down the principle, that, for States as for individuals, it is the question of duties, not of rights, that must henceforth take precedence. To set forth and enforce this principle, seems to me the only worthy object of any political writing on the questions of the present day.

With these views, in the winter of last year, I published a pamphlet entitled 'Gibraltar; or, the Foreign Policy of England.' In it I aimed at showing, in the simplest case I could find, how England might introduce into her political action this new principle. She might, in reference to a weaker member of Western Europe, ask herself, not what she had a right to do, nor what she had the power to retain, but what she ought to do, looking at her social position among the nations and the claims of other nations upon her. She might inquire how best to contribute not to her own isolated self-aggrandisement, but to the general well-being of the system of which she is essentially a part.

I had hoped that I had done my part. I had hoped that the publication of such views would have been enough for the present, and that I might devote myself to other occupations. The principle stated, it is easy to be seen, is one of wide

application. It was expressly shown to be so. It involved a revision of the whole position and international relations of England; a revision of her national bearing, whether in the West or the East. But when I wrote, it seemed enough to limit myself to one special case in which the application was easy. There was at that time no urgent reason for explaining how it might bear on the most important of all the cases to which it could be applied—that of India. By right means or by wrong, we had won our Indian Empire. We held it apparently unquestioned. Recent acts of arbitrary aggrandisement had seemed to meet with acquiescence. To the distant political observer there seemed no probability of an immediate agitation of the Indian question.

Such an observer might be convinced, as I had long been, that there was no moral justification for our retaining our dominion in the East. On general principles he might conclude that such dominion, lacking such justification, was unsafe, and at any moment liable to attack. But the general feeling was, that our rule was for the present likely to continue. For myself, I had gone further. Contented with protesting against our Indian Empire, I had accepted it as a fact. Not blind to the wrong means by which it was acquired, not blind to the inherent evil of its ultimate retention—evil both to England and to India—I had yet hoped that the hour of its fall might be adjourned for some time. And I had rested my hope on the conviction that the English Government, by the enforcement of order, the furtherance of material improvements, and by the lessons of Western punctuality and honour, was in some measure redeeming its origin, and, if not in principle justified, was in its practical results offering to its Eastern subjects some perceptible compensation for the conquest. In this feeling I waited patiently for the day when either the energies of the native population should make our further hold impossible, or, what was more desirable, the spread of a purer moral feeling on such subjects should lead the English nation voluntarily to abandon that hold, and of itself retire from India, after having done everything possible to secure for the country it had so long ruled, order, good government, and external security.

But the course of events has been rapid. The recent revolt has dispelled all such ideas of patient acquiescence in a recog-

nized evil. The Indian question has become the prominent, absorbing topic. Its immediate solution, or the more distant future of India, largely occupy the thoughts of all.

Discussion is rife on the subject; but the basis of assumption on which the discussion rests is in general the same. As I differ from that basis, I feel that I should be wanting to the cause I have in hand—failing to the inner consciousness of duty—if I were to shrink, whatever the consequences, from openly avowing the opinions I have formed and the grounds on which I have formed them; if I were to shrink, in the face of solutions which to me are incoherent and immoral, and generally the more immoral in proportion as they are less incoherent, from putting forward the solution which Positive Philosophy can offer as at once coherent and moral. That philosophy avows its claim to universal applicability; I may not admit that such claim is ill-founded, I may not silently see it abdicate.

In the case of India, just as in that of Gibraltar, it were dreaming to suppose that, in the present state of opinion, a policy such as mine could meet with immediate assent. But there is a difference in the two cases. Gibraltar is not likely to be soon an object of contention. Whereas in India the question is raised. It is possible, nay even highly probable, that the struggle with some mutinous regiments, which has already assumed the dimensions of a revolt, may pass from a revolt to that stage in which the question for our Government and nation shall be: Shall we set to work to re-conquer India? When such a question is, if not formally stated, at least instinctively felt to be the question, then is my time; then considerations of apparently no weight now, may assume weight; then, brought face to face with so formidable a juncture, pregnant with such great issues to itself and its subjects, the English nation may ask, Are there no means of avoiding this evident evil? Are we so certainly in our right that we can justify to ourselves the great sacrifices we and our posterity must make? Is India a lawful object for our arms? Is its re-conquest a duty? Is there any obligation on us, for presumed advantages to it or to ourselves, to inflict on it and on ourselves the horrors of a deliberate war?

I am not called on to trace the vicissitudes of the contest

in India, though, as a man, I cannot but feel a painful interest in them. I look on the whole with strong reprobation. So mild a term as regret would not express my judgment on our bearing in India previous to the revolt. That bearing has been singularly concentrated by an Indian statesman in the bold expression, 'We have stalked as conquerors.' I see no reason to doubt the justice of this concentration. As little reason do I see to doubt that the horrors of the outbreak, as distinct from the outbreak itself, are attributable to the long sense of humiliation consequent on that stalking as conquerors.

'Men must reap the things they sow;
Force from force must ever flow,
Or worse.'

I reprobate these horrors as much as any one, whilst I feel that it is easy to account for them, most easy to parallel them. Not less strongly would I reprobate the retaliation, the spirit of vengeance, which has seized our civilians and soldiers: not less, but more strongly, as in more glaring contrast to our position and professions. To me the war in India has every repulsive feature, none of the palliations that ordinarily attend on war. I recall the words of the Latin poet:

'Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos.'

Again, as an Englishman, I cannot but take interest in the manifestations of English feeling. It is clear that a large, though comparatively quiet body of sentiment throughout the nation condemns the blind ferocity with which the first blow was received. Yet I am but anticipating the judgment of after-times, when I say that the English Government has merited the gravest disapprobation. Either it sympathized with, or it tolerated as useful, or it had not the courage to resist, the spirit of bloodthirstiness. It has degraded England by such conduct. And yet in this, as in other cases, no line of absolute demarcation can be drawn between the Government and the nation. The condemnation which rests on the former, must be shared by the latter as a whole; for only by virtue of an absence of right moral feeling, or the courage to express it, could the sentiments we have heard been allowed free scope for so long a time.

With regard to the cry for justice on the perpetrators of outrages, it is a legitimate one; and it may perhaps receive a fair satisfaction, though it will hardly do so, if the plan of giving no quarter is adopted, and the Sepoy falls in fair fight, life for life. Such a policy defeats itself. But granting that with all due solemnity just retribution be exacted, and not military vengeance, then all I have to say is, Let it be even-handed. Let justice be done on the Sepoy, but let it be done also on the European, whether civil or military, who shall have committed excesses. In both cases it should be not unmixed with mercy. But if the feeling of the governing classes, indorsed by our Commander-in-chief, is too strong for this, then in both cases alike it must be stern. If for the Sepoys there is no mercy, there should be none for the European offender. Not alone the white woman, or the child of English parents, but Hindoo women and children, should be fearfully avenged. Not British ladies and gentlemen, but the innocent sufferer of whatever nation or whatever rank—such is the real statement for any who are capable of estimating moral obligations, when not blinded by an overweening sentiment of outraged pride—outraged in its feeling of national superiority, or the still intenser feeling of superiority of race.

As to the expression of our own feelings at home, I am aware that a great change has taken place. At the outset, men were so shocked that they let themselves be hurried farther than their deliberate judgment would sanction, and the recoil has come. Besides, the question once forcibly brought home to us, the uneasy consciousness of the weakness of our cause has been aroused from its dormant state. This consciousness betrays itself in the seeking for, and the production of, higher reasons than those which have been in vogue for retaining our hold on India. Looking at our past history, I own that much even of the better language now adopted revolts me. We occupied India under the impulse of commercial and political motives; we have governed it as a valuable appendage, commercially and politically. This is the broad truth. When our Empire is tottering to its fall, then to step forward with moral or Christian motives for holding it, which have never influenced our previous policy,

is a very questionable course. Still I am aware that, in the consciousness of many, the language they hold is genuine, and others who have not used it hitherto, nor are likely to use it henceforth, will for the present adopt it. As used by its truest advocates, I accept it as a valuable indication, whilst I feel with sorrow that I have no hope of their support. My conclusion, I well believe it, some of them might adopt. If intellectually convinced, they would have no moral repugnance to it. But the premises on which it rests will keep them from me. I can only, therefore, treat their language as a valuable indication that they, as I, allow moral considerations to precede political; that not for the pride, not for the honour, not for the power of England would they force India into subjection, but in the interest of India—her highest interest, and as the duty of England.. When the interest of the weaker, as viewed by the stronger, so entirely coincides with the power and pride of the stronger; when the duty of the stronger so entirely coincides with his own views of his interest; in the case of individuals, it would be clearly right to call in some third judgment, not for the stronger to act at once as judge and party. As between nations, I believe the same rule holds good, and that no other conduct can clear us in the matter.

This leads me by a natural transition to my main object. I proceed to state the policy which I think it is the duty of England to adopt towards India. It is simple in the extreme. It is, that we withdraw from our occupation of India without any unnecessary delay, within the shortest period compatible with due arrangements for the security of European life and property, and with such measures as shall be deemed advisable in the interest of Indian independence and good government.

This is the shortest statement of the result which I think desirable. I put it thus nakedly forward, that it may be clear and intelligible to all. The great object is our withdrawal, the cessation of our dominion. The means of effecting that object are not within my province. The means of securing to the Empire we abandon, all advantages that we have it in our power to secure, these are matters for mature consideration, and on them I would say a few words.

It seems to me, that in such a case we should not act

alone. Though we have neglected it, our best claim to our position in India has always been, as the representatives of the civilization of the West, and as invested with somewhat of the character of a Protectorate. Let us fall back on this in the hour of our withdrawal. Let us, in the spirit of this claim, secure, as we may easily do, a guarantee on the part of all the great European Powers that the empire we retire from shall not be considered open to the ambition of any of them, and that no extra-European Power shall have a right which we renounce ourselves.

Then, in the settlement of the relations of Western Europe and India, including in Western Europe all European populations, whether American or Australian, it would be well, in the present state of things, to associate with ourselves some other nations. Three seem marked out—the three which, beside ourselves, have East Indian settlements. They are France, Portugal, Denmark. To these I would add Sardinia, as a representative of the fifth great nationality, the Italian. And as in India we have to deal with Islamism and Brahminism, I would appeal to the natural head of Islamism, the Sultan of Turkey, for his co-operation in this great work; whilst in India itself I would have some eminent Brahmin selected as the fitting complement to the mixed commission thus formed.

Such a commission of seven would, in principle, not be different from that named to investigate the question of the Danubian Principalities. It would have to act in concert with any Government established, or to be established, in India. It would have to settle the terms on which the intercourse of the Western World with India could be carried on. It might fairly constitute the germ of a European protectorate, and in the meantime it might, on the strength of a policy of renunciation on the part of England, speak in persuasive language to the various Indian Governments on their own internal affairs. So might immediate interests be fairly dealt with, and a just satisfaction be given to whatever there is of truth in the feeling, that the cause of England is the common cause of civilization, and that to sympathize with her immediate overthrow, were in fact to sympathize with a retrograde movement towards disorder and barbarism.

Whatever may be the judgment formed of any such plan, the objects of any legitimate policy are not affected by such judgment. They are threefold :—The withdrawal of English occupation; the securing the independence of India; the retaining a wholesome commercial and moral connection between the West and the East. If I dwell not on the more distant object of a Protectorate on the part of Western Europe, it is because under present circumstances such protectorate might awaken national susceptibilities in India.

Such a proposal will perhaps appear startling; yet it is the natural policy to adopt. So much is the presumption in its favour, that I might content myself with its statement, and throw on my opponents the burden of disproving its reasonableness, or the burden of proving that it is England's duty to exert herself to retain India. But I am met at the outset by an argument, or rather a statement, which takes somewhat different shapes, but which remains in principle the same. The Bishop of Oxford tells us boldly, 'that God has entrusted India to us to hold it for Him, and we have no right to give it up.' I answer: The evidence of such commission can only be read in the facts of history, and they are not in its favour. On the contrary, were I to place myself for a moment at the theological point of view—that at which my opponent stands,—I should be tempted, after a careful survey of the origin of our acquisitions and the series of subsequent additions, to suggest a commission from a totally different power, and the words rise before me—'All these will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me.'

Less familiar with the designs of Heaven than the Bishop, with less, at the same time, of his imposing confidence, and perhaps, under all the circumstances of the case, less politic, Mr. Gladstone cannot wholly keep himself from mooting the question of our mode of acquisition. But he determines conveniently that such is not now the question for us. 'The question is, not whether we were justified in the acquisition or not; the question is not whether our hands were clean or not in those acquisitions; the question is, what obligations have we contracted towards the nearly 200 millions of people under our rule in India, and towards the God who cares for that people as much as for us? Perhaps rashly and presumptuously

we have placed ourselves in the condition of trustees, standing between Almighty God on the one hand, and 200 millions of his creatures on the other hand: it is our absolute duty to discharge the trust we so undertook,' &c.

I answer, in the first place: The language is somewhat late. This trusteeship has not hitherto been recognized—that is confessed. Secondly, let us distinguish a little: of course if we hold India, we are under solemn obligations to govern it well; indeed, under such obligations (and the government required of us is such, that, were they rightly understood, I much doubt whether our Government or nation would in the least covet a possesssion which involved such complicated and serious responsibilities) we should not be casting about for reasons to retain India, but for such as might justify us in our own sight in abandoning it. Nor, in abandoning it, do I fail to recognize one solemn obligation which rests on us. In rashness and self-confidence we occupied it; but the spirit we should bring to its relinquishment is that of the calmest judgment, of the most absolute self-denial. The one permanent consideration should be—what is the interest of India. Let us act as men, not as angry children. Let the sense of wrong done be powerful to prevent more wrong. Like an unskilful physician, we interfered with the course of nature, and suspended its healing action. The confession of this error constitutes a demand for the highest exertion of skill in meeting its consequences. If the recognition of such obligation be deemed visionary, at any rate it is not I who despair of my countrymen. I freely censure the conduct of its Government and the acquiescence of its people; but I would not for a moment unjustly under-estimate that people. I believe that an appeal to its highest moral feeling may yet be listened to, if heard. The nation that produced Milton and Cromwell, and the soldiers of Cromwell, has within its grasp whatever is noble, or great, or self-devoted in action. Would that, with Milton, I might see her 'rousing herself like a strong man after sleep!' Would that across the last two painful centuries we could catch some echoes of Milton's mighty voice, strong to express his own noble feelings, strong to give utterance to those of his nation! Would that on us might rest a portion of that spirit which, in the poet, worked itself into all forms of

beauty,—in the great statesman and ruler, into all noblest actions!

To return. To Statesman and Bishop alike, I answer, that the language is, after all, but solemn trifling; such a commission, such trusteeship, are valid only with those who accept them; they offer no ground for argument; they remove the question out of the simple domain of human morality and human policy into an arbitrary region where it becomes wholly insoluble. The moralist and statesman alike require a more common ground, a more available line of argument. They cannot follow the one proposed. Who is, in the last resort, to judge whether this trusteeship has the sanction of God? It has no presumption, I repeat, in its favour; and its palpable coincidence with our wishes, feelings, and supposed interests, should make us feel the full indelicacy of ourselves putting it forward. I do not enter more on the subject, as I wish to avoid, when possible, everything that may irritate.

I repeat it, the policy I advocate is the natural policy, with such presumptions in its favour as to throw the burden of disproof on my opponents. What I mean is this. Open any map of the world, and see the relative position of the two countries: it constitutes a strong presumption against their union. Then estimate their relative population, their differences of climate, language, religion,[1] manners and customs, and have you not so many additional presumptions? Ask yourself under what conditions a conquest is either justifiable or admissible; and then ask yourself whether, in the case of India, any one of those conditions is realized. Treat the question either on moral or political grounds, I have no fear of the answer. Simply assume, by a slight effort of abstraction, that you are standing at the point when the English commercial intercourse with India is to pass into a political one—one of conquest and of occupation. It is no difficult task to put ourselves so far back in time. Then what would

[1] I borrow from the *Spectator* of Saturday, November 7, a journal unfriendly to my cause, the following passage:—'With these essential differences in feelings, views, and even in the use of language, how impossible it is for the two races to come to a clear mutual understanding! We can scarcely measure the amount of moral culpability in our adversaries; for with their training, religion approves their treachery and destructive fanaticism, and justifies the criminality of their most barbarous conduct. To them the brutal slaughter of women and children is justified by some religious sanction.'

be your judgment as to the duty of England? Was there a moral obligation resting upon her to seize that great Empire?

The motives which led to the enterprise at the outset are well known, and need not now be too severely judged. They were, rivalry with France and the desire of aggrandisement. The real interests of the vast populations thus made the stake of the game between two Western Powers, were never for a moment considered; nor have they been so since that game was decided in favour of England, and our conquest consummated. The substantial truth of these statements cannot, I believe, be disputed.

There was no danger, real or pretended, to Western or Eastern civilization from India. No historical record speaks of that great territory as sending forth armies of invaders for the conquest of neighbouring States. All history testifies to the contrary,—India has been, like Italy of later days, the prey, not the spoiler.

Again, it was no case of a vast extent of land insufficiently occupied, with its wealth misunderstood, its advantages lost to the race. This is the ground on which rests the occupation by more civilized nations of such countries as America and Australia.

In fact, we may task imagination to the utmost, and not find any ground on which, before the event, the seizure of India by a European Power could be justified. The break-up of the Mogul Empire had, it is true, disorganized all its internal relations, and given occasion to great and deplorable confusion. But that would not, now at least, be accepted as adequate justification. All the nations of modern Europe have passed through such a stage, and all would equally repel the thought of any violent interference to check the action of natural remedies. Such a state of things explains the success of our enterprise, but does not justify it. Bad government and constant internal war are no grounds for interference. Naples has a government proverbially bad. Mexico is in constant disturbance. In neither do we think it our duty to interfere.

It is my conviction that all principles of international law are against our occupation; or must we slightly vary the question drawn from Heeren by our conduct in Ceylon?—

must we ask, Is there in the East Indies a different international law from what exists in England? If openly it is avowed that there is such a difference, that what holds good of independent States in Europe is not binding in the East; then what are the limits of this difference, and on what rational basis does it rest? Is it on the evident assumption of superiority of race in the European, or is it on the plea of the comparative barbarism of the Hindoo population? On this subject listen for a few moments to Burke. 'This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace, much less of gangs of savages, like the Guaranies and Chiquitos, who wander on the waste borders of the river of Amazons or the Plate; but a people for ages civilized and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we were yet in the woods. There, have been (and still the skeletons remain) princes once of great dignity, authority, and opulence. There, are to be found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There, is to be found an ancient and venerable priesthood, the depository of their laws, learning, and history, the guides of the people whilst living, and their consolation in death; a nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities not exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in Europe; merchants and bankers, individual houses of whom have once vied in capital with the Bank of England; whose credit had often supported a tottering State, and preserved their Governments in the midst of war and desolation; millions of ingenious manufacturers and mechanics; millions of the most diligent, and not the least intelligent tillers of the earth. There are to be found almost all the religions professed by men, the Brahminical, the Mussulman, the Eastern and Western Christian.'—Burke, *Speech on the East India Bill*, vol. iv. p. 18.

If, on the contrary, the principles that govern the intercourse of nations, the result of experience and reason, are as valid in the East as in the West; if the only difference is one of mere form, rendered necessary by the different manners of the East, then I confidently assert that no English statesman can give an adequate justification for our forcible retention of our hold in India.

True, it may be said, but the thing is done. We are not

here to justify what has been done, but to make the best of it. We cannot be always opening up such questions. I may admit that there is some force in this language. But then it must be shown that what has been done has been ratified by time. It must be shown that the conquest is in some sense a genuine one,—that the conquered have amalgamated with the conquerors,[1] or that they are evidently in the way of amalgamating; or it must be shown that the sense of a common interest has overcome the sense of national humiliation, or is gradually overcoming it;—so far may I go,—that there is a probability, in short, of a genuine union being at last effected. This is to concede much, to place my opponents in as favourable a position as possible. But even so, I am in no danger. A few months ago, and this last position was apparently a tenable one. It was then possible, not more than possible, even to a comparatively superficial inquirer, to suppose that the English power in India was gaining strength. But recent events have made it impossible. They have shown that it is impossible, alike to those who object to our dominion and to those who, with almost fanatical vehemence, cling to its retention. A despotic Government, resting on the sword, such, if the Indian population succumb in the present struggle, is their only perspective for long generations to come; and a despotic Government resting on the sword, should jar on the ear of Englishmen.

I asked my readers to abstract themselves from the actual condition of things for a moment, and to place themselves at the point of time when the English had as yet no hold on India as conquerors. But for all purposes of argument we may, I believe, fairly drop this abstraction, and consider ourselves now, as much as a century ago, face to face with the

[1] I should not notice Lord Shaftesbury's speech, but for some valuable materials it contains. It has its interest, as the manifesto of one of the lay leaders of an important religious party. I can only express my sorrow that such a speech should be thought peculiarly English. My present object is, to borrow what the speaker calls 'these emphatic and valuable words;' they will be seen to illustrate the position in the text. 'Of all the evils produced by this state of things in India, there is not one so great, not one so difficult to overcome, as the feeling of intense and dreadful execration that has arisen on the part of the Europeans towards every man of a coloured skin. It will be next to impossible for many years to come, that we, in the government of India, shall be able to do anything for the benefit of the nation. I maintain,' he says, 'that it will be absolutely impossible to elevate their position by placing them in any situation of trust, so great is the feeling of detestation towards them on the part of the Europeans.'

question, Ought we to conquer India? For the century has passed, and we have made no way. Indeed, a century ago, whilst smarting from the evils consequent on the break-up of the Mogul Empire, whilst English or French rule was yet untried, the intervention of some European Power might hold out no unwelcome prospect. But stained as our conquest was, and clearly seen, as it is now, to be incompatible with any independence in any part of the Peninsula, the native races may fairly reject what they then welcomed, and prefer the chances of settled government to the certainty of an alien despotism.

I may, then, call on those who advocate the continuance of our Indian power, to produce a principle which, if the thing were to be done again, would justify the occupation of India. Equally with justice may I, on the strength of passing events, call on them to produce a principle of international law which warrants our persisting in that occupation. The principle produced must be one which, in the case of any State of European origin, either in the Old or in the New World, would justify our adopting the same conduct as we adopt towards the East Indies. If they refuse to meet me with such a principle, on what ground do they rest such refusal?

We enforce on Persia the observance of treaties, as we should enforce it on any equal European State. We require China to acknowledge even the punctilios, as well as the principles, of European international law. The great Peninsula which stands geographically between China and Persia, is equally one of the community of nations, and has an equal claim on us that we should, in respect to it, obey our own principles.

Very shortly, then, to resume what I have said. I conceive we did wrong in seizing India. No subsequent experience warrants our considering that wrong as condoned. There remains but one alternative,—restitution, reparation to the utmost of our power, of the wrong done. This is the sum of my argument. The first part of it I really believe granted by the majority of reasoners on the subject. It is the latter part which, if I am to judge by the utterances on the question, is no less generally denied.

The reasons for this denial I will take one by one, and

answer them to the best of my ability. If we put aside the ultimate one of superior power, the immoral statement that we will keep what we have won till a greater power can take it from us, as admitting of no appeal, amenable to no argument, there are four reasons which are producible, on which, with more or less of colour, we may rest our retention of India. They are :—

(1.) The Commercial.
(2.) The Political.
(3.) The Ground of Civilization.
(4.) That of Religion.

As a matter of mere argument, I have but little difficulty with the two first. Not that I therefore ignore or undervalue their practical influence ; but when a ground has been abandoned by the higher and more conscientious reasoners among one's opponents, its abandonment constitutes a sufficient plea for not pressing it. It is allowed, then, by the class of reasoners to which I have alluded, that the self-interest of England would not justify her in keeping India in subjection, whether that self-interest be viewed politically or commercially.

Our commercial intercourse with India existed before, it will continue to exist after, our empire. Previous to our conquest, it can have excited no very unfavourable feeling against us, or our first steps would have been met with more suspicion. When we have ceased to hold India by conquest, there is not a shadow of a probability, however the separation may be effected, that her people will wish to shut themselves up and exclude the commerce either of ourselves or any other Western nation. For, either they expel us, or we retire. If they expel us, they will have little reason to fear any other nation's playing again the game we have played there. If we retire of our own will, the conviction must force itself upon them, that what we have renounced no other nation will be bold enough morally to attempt. Setting aside all guarantees by treaty, the act would have an irresistible power to exclude any such design. And if the commerce of England is admitted, it may be as profitable, or even more so, with a nation that is independent or actually hostile in feeling, as with one that is dependent. The United States of America are a case in point.

For the political reason; by which I mean the position, that India is essential to our power, still more essential to what we call our prestige, the false front of our power—that in the interest of our imperial rank amongst the nations, we may not recede on any point; on this, too, I need not argue at length. For it, too, is allowed to be insufficient. Yet, in regard to it, I may say, that India is, when all has been said, a source of political weakness, not of strength. Conceive the present outbreak to have come on us when engaged in the Russian war. The pressure would have been beyond our strength. Or, without any such supposition, in quite ordinary times, it is clear, that with our military force engaged as it is at present, England weighs not more, but less in the councils of Europe. No! the cry for colonies or dependencies is at any rate a delusion, so far as it is thought that they increase our strength. They are incumbrances on our finances, and a drain on our military power. We are great, not by virtue of them, but in spite of them; they are burdensome outworks, from which we should retire for concentration. We were great when no dream of Indian acquisitions had occupied any adventurer. We shall be great again, when the energies of the nation shall have a great government to give them a wholesome direction, a noble expression.

The third reason alleged for our retention of India is, the interests of Civilization. It is urged that, released from our hold, she would fall into disorder and barbarism. I frankly own that such a plea has no weight with me. I am not deeply versed in the literature and religious antiquities of India; but something I have read on the subject, and from that reading, and from the principles on which I base all historical judgments, I can sympathize fully with such language as that quoted from Burke. I have gained a respect for that ancient polytheistic organization, compared with which our own social order is but a child in point of duration. I am convinced that it were unwise prematurely to hasten the decay of that long-established society (for it is in decay); that it were unwise to press on it the premature adoption of the progressive, yet still anarchical civilization of the West. Let us wait with patience. When the fabric of our own society shall have assumed something like harmonious

proportions, it will be ample time to propose it as a model to others. Doubt it not, a just organization of the Western World would tell rapidly enough on the older, and yet younger, civilizations of Asia.

Should then the retirement of England from India have the effect of checking for a time the influx of European ideas and European mechanical improvements, should railroads and the electric telegraph be suspended, I should acquiesce in such result. The extant means of communication, we have found to our cost, are rapid and secret enough, and the decomposition of their whole mental framework which all mechanical changes have a tendency to produce in nations at a lower stage of religious ideas than our own, seems most undesirable in the present state of the world.[1] Whatever organization exists should be allowed to exist as long as it has the power to do so. The energies of the statesman and political philosopher have ample scope elsewhere. Indeed, there is something absurd, or worse, in the part we play in India in this matter. No Government is more tenacious than our own of the actual order, none piques itself more on its attachment to precedent. None is more proud of the 'slow broadening down of freedom.' Yet this same Government acts as a most active revolutionary agent when brought into contact with such societies as the Indian. The contrast of conservative policy in England with the subversive action advocated by the same men in India, suggests the idea of self-interest as in both cases the determining motive.

On this question of civilization we should be careful to keep clear of illusions. Strong in the sense of their superiority in religious light and higher civilization, the Spaniards of the sixteenth century broke in on the Empires of Mexico and Peru. At the point of the sword they enforced their Christianity and social order, and gratified their more real motives, the lust of power and of gold. The calm reason of our own day is unanimous in its judgment on this point. It

[1] I again borrow from Lord Shaftesbury's speech. Mr. Kennedy, missionary at Benares, writes in these remarkable words :—'What can be the cause of all this frenzy against us? Surely our Government has most grievously oppressed them? All I can say is, the people themselves give no such reply. What I have heard asserted by scores of individuals is, that our whole system, missions, schools, railways, electric telegraphs, &c., is taking away and destroying their religion; they can stand it no longer.'

condemns, too, not merely the cruelty or avarice of the Spanish invaders, but their crusading spirit, their reckless want of sympathy with the state of things they found, their destruction of such instructive forms of civilization. Perhaps even it looks with contempt on the substitute they offered. Is it certain that in the judgment of a distant future, say three centuries from the present time, our enforcement of our civilization on India, supposing us successful, would not be as unanimously condemned?

There remains the fourth point, the question of Religion. Whatever there is of really respectable in the general wish of the upper classes, centres itself here. But whilst I can respect much that is said, I cannot agree with it.

I will not dwell long on the fact that this consideration of Christianizing India has never hitherto had a perceptible influence on our policy, nor a perceptible hold on English ideas. Missionary societies create a certain demand, and men more or less qualified meet that demand. But I appeal to the experience of those interested in Missionary Societies, whether the result is not quite disproportioned to the effort made and the machinery set in motion. I am sure it used to be so when I took an interest in such matters. Throughout the nation there is no original impulse calling out its energies in this direction. Nor is there much reason to believe that future experience on this point will belie the past. A great temporary effort may be made, but it will be temporary, for it will rest on no deep popular conviction; and the final result will be that when the calm hour of reflection and judgment shall come, those to whom the task of governing India shall be entrusted, will shrink, as they have ever shrunk, from coming into collision with the religious systems of the natives, whether Mahometan or Hindoo.

Nor will I do more than state the facts of past experience as to the result hitherto obtained by missionary labour. For a considerable period, whether as traders or as governors, the Christian nations of the West have been in contact with the Eastern populations. The ideas which are embodied in Christianity have been presented to those populations in various shapes, as a mode of life, a system of worship, and a religious doctrine, by various agents, Catholic or Protestant.

Have they, in any shape, or through whatever agency, made much progress? I believe I am but stating the conviction of most competent observers, when I say that the acceptance of Christianity by the people of India, is, on grounds of experience, not to be expected within any appreciable time.

I might in this matter of religion take up another position, a negative one. On a consideration of the state of our own country, from the religious point of view, I might, with Coleridge, say that we ought to look coldly on all Missionary enterprise, for the mere extension of Christianity is of small value when its interior action is so weak, its central part so hollow. I might point to the state of religious belief and feeling at home, and ask, without fear of a convincing answer, Can it be anything but self-delusion in a nation to think itself competent as a nation—I am not speaking of individual zeal, of the possible case of one endowed with the spirit of St. Paul, —but competent as a nation and a Government to carry religion and morality to others, when neither one nor the other is sound? The mere fact that we tolerate the existing Press, is to my mind a sufficient answer to my question.

We have two religious systems to deal with in India, the Mahometan and the Brahminical. Both are yet powerful,—on neither can we make any impression. If in his contest with Brahminism the Missionary puts forward the philosophical side of Christianity, the subtle mind of the Brahmin delights in the combat, and meets him with a counter-philosophy. There is matter for endless dispute, but there is no result. If more wisely advised, the Missionary rests on the simple statements of Christianity, on the facts of its history and its appeals to the conscience of men; he spares himself personally the annoyance of defeat in argument, or the pain of seeing his arguments make no impression, but for his cause the effect is the same. For the religious system of India leaves its worshippers no sense of want, that primary condition of the acceptance of a new religion. The contest is not such as it was with the polytheistic systems of Greece and Rome, which were profoundly undermined by the philosophic culture of the educated, by the moral dissatisfaction of the multitude. In India such would not seem to be the case; and when you add to the absence of this the force of traditional associations

and long organization, the power of which was tested in the case of the Greek and Roman world, and not broken but by four centuries and a barbarian conquest, you have then the measure of the Missionary's difficulties in dealing with Brahminism; you may form an estimate of the hopelessness of his task.

For the second great religious system with which we are in contact, little need be said. The verdict of history is definitive and unimpeachable. On Mahometanism Christianity has made no impression, has tacitly renounced the attempt to make any. The rival Monotheisms met in the Middle Ages. The issue of the struggle is not doubtful. Greek Christianity succumbed. Latin Christianity waged successfully a defensive war. More than this it was unable to accomplish. Each of the rivals claims for itself an exclusive possession of the religious belief of mankind. Both alike are rejected. They rest side by side, convincing monuments of the exaggeration of their respective claims.

In fact, whether the object be the spread of civilization or religion, there are but three methods available for securing that object. You may spread them by driving out or exterminating those who hold to the forms you wish to supersede: this method is evidently inapplicable in the case before us. Or you may spread them by the gradual process of assimilation and incorporation, as the consequence of conquest. This was the method adopted by Rome, and under the actual conditions of social existence, in the western half of her dominions it was successful. It was not so even with Rome in her eastern dominions, or at best very partially so. It is dreaming to think of it in India. Or there is the third method, that of simple persuasion. But the success of this last is hardly possible, unless it is tried pure. If there is attempted a combination of it with the second, such combination is an almost certain element of failure, so many and such powerful feelings are then enlisted against you. Yet this last is the only course open to us, in the event of our holding the country.

But when all such considerations had had their due weight, I could not rest in them. I feel there is something more to be said, a something which I might well wish to leave unsaid. But at all risks I feel bound to make my position quite clear,

to leave no opening for any misunderstanding. Not merely then do I differ from the language to which I have already alluded, and reject the solemn obligation which is said to rest on us, as a Church and people, the solemn obligation to preach Christianity; this many would reject from political motives, or convinced of its inutility. I see the force of these political considerations, and I feel convinced also of the inutility. But I hold further, that it would be, not a gain, but a loss to the Hindoo nation, were it persuaded to accept Christianity. Throughout Christendom, faith in the Christian system is, as a fact, extremely weak,—I had nearly said, dead. I say, faith in it as a system. Much individual belief exists yet, much acceptance of it as a system of worship; but as a system influencing the feeling, the thought, and the action of large masses, and combining them on the ground of such influence, it is gone. Once, Catholicism gathered the nations under it, and united them one with another. From its own weakness it ceased to do so. No external causes are sufficient to account for its decline and fall. No other form of Christianity has arisen to take the place left vacant by Catholicism. And whatever the form it may assume, I am bound to own that I hold it incompetent ever again to act as the centre of all life, individual or social, incompetent ever again to perform the functions of a Church. I would not depreciate,—on the contrary, I would draw out into the fullest light, its great benefits on the past; but I look on it as an idea of the past. It is yet tenacious of life. It will continue to live and influence individuals largely, till the new doctrine which shall replace it shall be worked out and accepted.

Believing no longer in Christianity, not accepting it either as a guide for personal life, or as a regulator of social or international conduct, I of course deprecate most earnestly any attempt to force it on other nations, or to spread it even by persuasion, whenever and in however decaying a form there yet lives a religious organization. I deprecate it in such cases as calculated to do harm, not good; to be an element of disturbance, not of order; of retrogression, not of progress. Let us leave the Brahminical system to its natural course. So may the people which yet finds shelter in it, clinging to its rites and worship, even though it may not rest on its doctrinal

system, be spared the unnecessary phase of religious belief which Christianity represents. So may we hope that, without passing through the agitation which has accompanied the religious development of the Western world, the inhabitants of India may accept gladly the new religion which shall offer itself to them, a religion unsullied by any associations such as those which are connected with Christianity in their minds, associations of contempt for their previous state, associations with a foreign and insulting domination.

I have taken, then, one by one, the grounds on which the advocates of our Indian Empire may be supposed to rest their claims. Each, singly, is insufficient, so far as I can see. And I do not think that in combination they will repair the defect of their individual weakness. There is yet one position which I have left unexamined. Our original title is allowed to be bad. Our subsequent government is not defended as a whole. Our ultimate tenure is considered uncertain at the best. But it is urged that if we abandon the country now, India would relapse into the state in which we found it, and would suffer infinitely more than it would by remaining under our power. I cannot think this a sufficient plea. First of all, is it to justify our permanent or our temporary hold? If, as I suppose, the last, then what is the limit to be fixed? At what probable date shall we be able, if they accept this view, to leave it? We absorb its government into ourselves; we shall do so still more, if we succeed in quelling the present revolt. More distant than ever will be the day of our leaving, if it is left to us to judge of the proper moment. We cannot constitute ourselves judges in such a case; we cannot take into account, in our action, such future contingencies. The plain moral conclusion overrides all others, and the consequences predicted are not so distinctly shown to be necessary as even to make us hesitate. In the contact of a century with Europeans, India has learnt much. In retiring we might aid her to meet her more immediate difficulties. We might soften the necessary evils of any such transition state. But we cannot lay it down as a principle that we may step in anywhere we like, to remedy misgovernment. There are numerous cases in which we tolerate it.

After all argument, the real obstacles to our abandoning

India lie in the undefined impression of the advantages resulting from its possession, and in the feeling of national pride which will not submit to failure. What! after a century, to give way, and confess that we have been in the wrong; that it was a conquest we should never have made, for it was made under conditions fatal to its duration? What a strange discrepancy there is in our national judgment! We sit down quietly under, nay there is visible in many quarters a satisfaction, in our Irish failure, though the truth is, it is infinitely more disgraceful to us than that in India. 1,500,000 of the Irish nation are said to have died by famine, and that famine directly, and by no obscure chain of reasoning, traceable to a neglectful government. Large numbers of the survivors leave their country; in the popular writings of the day it is spoken of as the Irish Exodus. But Ireland is now tranquil and prosperous, and the remedies are forgotten in the result.

I am ambitious for my country, but not with the common ambition. Her policy hitherto has placed her in the first rank in the conflict of interests. She has been led far in a course of aggression, and, as a consequence of success, of oppression. I would have her in the first rank in a new and nobler policy of repentance, restitution, and disinterested moderation. We are told, it is a glory to have conquered India. But looking back on that conquest even now, it sheds but an ambiguous lustre on our arms and on our counsels. What will be the case when, as is sooner or later certain, it shall be torn from us, and our possession of India shall be an episode in our history? I put aside the gloomy celebrity of such men as Clive and Warren Hastings, and take the better instances of our successful generals: lasting glory will not be their meed; for the cause is much, nay all for the soldier, and the English soldier in India is the instrument of a nation's servitude.[1] Noble deeds may be done in that service, but

[1] Our position relative to India reminds me of the judgment of Napier on that of the French in Spain. 'With a strange accent he called from the midst of foreign lands upon a fierce and haughty race to accept a constitution which they did not understand; his hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claim upon the consent of an imbecile monarch and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise, this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch.—Napier's *Pen. War.* vol. i. p. 10. We could sympathize with the Spanish rising against Napoleon.

the service itself stands condemned. And for our Indian statesmen, there have been men of eminent ability and virtue among them, greater than their contemporaries at home, greater in themselves, and greater by virtue of the greater stimulus of their position. Yet theirs has been a depressing mission. In proportion to their greatness was their clear sight of the hollowness of our power, a conviction that no efforts could make it otherwise; that they were there to palliate, not with the happier task of conceiving, or guiding the application of, measures which should permanently contribute to the welfare of their subjects. That they kept themselves clear from illusion, and worked on at their appointed work, is matter of high honour for them. But with the honour pity is mingled. Neither for statesman nor for general does India offer a legitimate field.

And for the country of which they are the servants—to return to England—the only real glory she can hope to gain by India is by its voluntary restitution to its inhabitants. That glory she may yet gain. I write with the feeling that the opportunity of gaining it is probably passing away, and that she is destined to be expelled, or, worse evil, to attempt to reconquer India; or, worst of all, to succeed in that attempt.

Thus far I have argued in support of a line of policy alien in conception and results to the thoughts and wishes of the upper classes of England. I am aware that I stand in comparative isolation. But I believe (it were wrong to doubt it) that there are large numbers in England who, if my opinions could reach them, would sympathize with them in spirit at least, if they could not wholly accept them. I believe that these opinions are such as would be sanctioned by the majority of thoughtful men in the other European nations; that they are in keeping with the general moral sentiments of the great mass of mankind and with the conclusions of the master spirits of political philosophy. But as I hope for no immediate acceptance, in my own country or time, of such political doctrines as I have expressed, so in the future I am confident of their prevalence. And even in my own country I turn, in the remaining pages of this pamphlet, to two classes in whom I place some hopes. I appeal to the women of England, and to her working men. If both fail entirely or in great measure,

still my confidence will not be shaken. In this confidence I have been bold, as the avowed servant of Humanity, to raise my voice against any longer continuance of the enforced unnatural union of India and England; I have been bold to come forward on behalf of one of the great constituents of the race, hitherto unjustly borne down, and now struggling to free itself, as the champion of what I conceive to be reason and justice, against error and interest and passion.

PART II. (1.)

IT is a very prevalent feeling, prevalent amongst women as well as men, that women should abstain from politics. In one sense such feeling is just. If by politics are meant the details of government, the strife of parties, the more or less ignoble questions of personal ambition, from such, women cannot too completely hold aloof. But there is a sense of the word politics which does not require their abstention. There are large political questions on which they are perfectly competent to form a judgment, and on which their judgment would be most valuable. In proportion as politics assume their right place and become more and more subordinate to morals, in proportion as moral considerations prevail over purely political ones, the value of women's interference will rise, the desirableness, nay necessity of it, be more allowed. It is for them to estimate rightly the extent of their influence, and the best way of bringing it to bear on those with whom they are in contact. In all the relations of life, as mother, wife, sister, or daughter, woman has large opportunities of exercising a moderating power over the colder and more selfish conclusions of the son, the husband, the brother, or the father. Such moderating power it is high time she should worthily assume.

Therefore to the women of England I say: This question of India is one on which you should make your voice heard. Brush aside the sophisms of interest or passion, and appeal to the nobler feelings. You listened with horror to the tale of outrage. You would acquiesce, though with closed eyes, in the infliction of just punishment. In the cry for vengeance you could not join: you should loudly condemn it. You should turn with aversion from those who appeal to the

feeling of revenge, and condemn the efforts made to urge on England the commission of outrages upon humanity as a reparation for those already committed.

And for India generally; not entering into the question of advantages, you can appreciate the claims of justice. The statistical, political, commercial bearings of the case, give up without a struggle. Bring the question into the court of moral feeling, and keep it there. Listen not to those who would deny your competence within such limits. Moral questions are yours even more than ours, by virtue of your superior moral organization. Ask, and be satisfied with no evasive answer: What is the English title to India? Is it one of force, or does it rest on any ground of right? Is there any duty binding on us to hold India? Is it with the consent of its people that we persist in trying to rule it, or solely by virtue of a favourable judgment on our claim pronounced by none but ourselves? More sensible than we are of moral wrong, less willing to allow that material advantages can compensate for such wrong, you can estimate more justly the repugnance of the Indian population to the rule of the stranger, even though beneficial in some respects. More sympathetic than we are, all the domestic life of the Hindoo would meet with a keener appreciation from you. Even the blinder religious instincts of another faith would excite in you naturally no cold sneer. You could be touched with the beauty of the idea, veiled though it is under a repulsive outward form. Even in the Suttee you could recognize the true instinct, perverted in its mode of expression, which would make the marriage union triumph over death.

If the interest of civilization be pleaded, you can estimate at its true value our material, mechanical civilization, with its neglect of all moral and spiritual elements. And so estimating it, you can see why I wish not for its spread. You can estimate also, by reflecting on your keen associations with all that is familiar, the duty of dealing gently with the associations of others. No rude importation of Western ideas will meet with favour from you.

If the interest of Christianity be pleaded, I ask you not to abandon your convictions, I ask you not to adopt mine, but I

ask you to wake up within you the pure ideal of the faith you cherish, and by which you live. Draw it out into even fuller life and vigour; and side by side with it, in its full power as you see it, place the English dominion in India, its origin, its history, its consequences as seen in the past and present, its probable consequences in the future. Then ask yourselves, Is it in the interest of that faith to present it to India connected with such associations? Would it not be better that it should offer itself, as it offered itself of old, unsupported by any worldly power, unsullied by any possible union with worldly interests? I should have no fear of your answer.

Lastly, if by any chance the Christianity which is made the plea of dominion, has lost or is losing its hold on you, then acquiesce not in the mere absence of religious faith. Recognize its necessity, and listen to the claims of a system which offers satisfaction to all woman's best feelings; which, without undue exaggeration, estimates more highly than any other her position and influence; which, turning from all the evils produced by the long process of dissolution of the ancient order, recalls our thoughts to the graceful and pure ideal of our chivalrous ancestors; which shall gratify your love of beauty by the prominent cultivation of art; which shall afford ample satisfaction to your intellect by an education the same in kind, if not in degree, with that of the highest intellect of the philosopher; which shall satisfy all your moral feelings of justice and social order; which shall cultivate and develope in you your religious sentiments, and afford them a more ample means of expression than the gorgeous ritual of Catholicism.

PART II. (2.)

My second appeal is addressed to the Working Men of England. Their direct political competence is not generally denied, though the limits within which it should be exercised are a difficult question. Without presuming to assign accurately such limits, I conceive that in a rightly constituted political order, whilst abstaining from any share in the details of Government, its general principles, its spirit and tendencies would be peculiarly matter for their judgment. If so, all questions such as this present one of India, the settlement of which either way involves a modification of the whole political action of England, are within their province, and in them their influence should be felt. None are more interested than they in such settlement; none are more intimately bound up with the question in all its aspects, viewed in relation to the political condition and interests either of India or of England; none, I venture to say it, more qualified to judge it in its moral bearings. They are the only class of my countrymen to which I can turn with any immediate hope. Whether that hope be answered or not, they constitute my natural support. He who advocates, though in no revolutionary spirit, a reconstruction of society, naturally looks to those who most feel the necessity of such reconstruction, and are least interested in the maintenance of the older form. And when the transition is over, when the new society has taken shape, still it is between the philosopher and the great working class, or proletariate, that there must ever exist the keenest political sympathy, the most ready contact, in order to control the working of the social machinery. Such are the considerations on which my second appeal is based.

To the working classes I would say, the question is two-

fold. It is an Indian one, but it is also an English one. The interests of both countries are at stake. You may take them apart for convenience, but you cannot really separate them. Let us take India first, and then England. You ask, and you get no answer, What right have we to India—what business have we there? As merchants we have business; as missionaries even, if our impulse lead us that way; but as conquerors or governors, none. You are not blinded by that which blinds so many—personal connections in India. You have no Indian interests to warp your judgment. You derive no advantages from its possession; you can therefore bring fairly to the question the simple moral judgment of man. Will such judgment sanction our holding India by force? The arguments used you will value aright. You will not be deceived by the assertions that the mass of the Hindoo nation wishes us to continue its ruler.[1] Such assertion will have light thrown on it by similar ones, made at home about your own state of feelings. You well know that submission is different from acceptance; that men may endure known and great evils to avoid greater, but that such endurance does not mean that they are blind to the evil. You know that your own state of feeling is misinterpreted or entirely neglected by those who administer your Government; is it likely that they would be successful in interpreting that of the distant and alien populations of India? You ask for justice yourselves. You give strong marks of sympathy with those who, in other countries, in Italy or Hungary, ask for independence and justice. Extend your sympathy yet further; sympathize with the Hindoo in his struggle for the same objects. You, as men, may call for justice on the criminal amongst the revolted

[1] Once again, to make what use I can of Lord Shaftesbury. He asks, 'Have you found in any instance a national, or even the symptom of a national, rising? Has not the whole country, with very few exceptions, been perfectly tranquil and quiescent? Have not the greater part of the villagers assisted the royal troops, and attempted to discomfit the mutineers? Whenever an exception occurred, it may be traced o the brigands, and those wild, lawless hordes that will always be found on the Continent of India, wandering from one village to another. The villagers themselves in no instance have risen against the British power; on the contrary, they have known that their security consisted in the vigour and permanence of her Majesty's dominion.'

If this is true, then what means the proposal of the *Times*, which I get in the same paper, the *Spectator* of Saturday, November 7, 'that the rebel *districts*, at least, pay for their own pacification'?

soldiery, but you would not involve guilty and innocent in one indiscriminate sacrifice to the pride and vengeance of England. In calling for justice, then, you should call also for mercy. None better than you can judge that much provocation may have been given. Such provocation cannot be pleaded as an excuse for crimes, but it may be pleaded in palliation of that state of feeling which, in the more violent, turned to outrage. You can judge of the bearing of the English in India by the bearing of the same classes at home, by the bearing of your aristocracy, whether commercial or landed, by the bearing of your middle classes. The hard indifference of the latter, the haughty neglect of the former, the reckless way in which both satisfy all their personal tastes and feelings, and take no care of yours, the strange display of almost fabulous wealth and luxury, in vivid contrast with the extreme of poverty and suffering, all these you can appreciate at home. You watch them with mingled feelings, for those who so act are your countrymen, and have some points in common with yourself, some points of friendly contact, some common feelings. Take away all that softens the relation; let the conduct be the same, and let the men be conquerors of another colour, another language, and another religion, and let them add the contempt such difference too naturally inspires: you may then have the measure of the feelings of the subject Hindoo or Mahometan towards his European masters. You may understand their vengeful spirit; you may not palliate their mode of vengeance.

If you can so judge the actual outbreak, you will not find it hard to judge the larger general question. You know what oppression means; you know still more how the sense of neglect and injustice rankles, even when there is no active oppression. You cannot find it difficult to sympathize with the Hindoo. Taxes press heavily on you when paid in support of your own national Government. They press still more if you think the money so raised misapplied or wasted. What would it be if they went to pay the dividends of a company of your conquerors? In the eleventh century England was conquered by the Normans. It took long centuries, and the slow progress of intermixture of the conqueror with the conquered, partially to efface the evils of that conquest; and in that case

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there was no difference of race, of colour, of religion. What would it have been had there been no intermixture possible; had the Norman conquest been a permanent occupation by the conquerors, without any gradual fusion of them with the conquered? On all grounds, then, so far as India is concerned, I fearlessly appeal to you for a verdict, given by the light of your common English experience, and by the light of your common human feeling; and, as you would rise, to a man, to prevent your country from being the victim of foreign oppression, so I call on you to raise your voice no less unanimously in protest against her being the oppressor.

And if from India you turn to England, and ask how this Indian question bears on your welfare as the great majority of Englishmen, I answer—You know that on you will rest the burden and the heat, not for you will be the reward, of the labour of the day. You are told of a real increase in the comforts of the great mass of the population. You know what such language at bottom is worth. You know that the greatness and power of England have increased, and that, as the necessary instrument of that increase, your numbers, your work, your skill, have increased also. But you know that at the same time there have increased your political alienation, your moral discomfort, your feeling that you have no part in the existing social order, and, taken on the large scale, your physical suffering. You are sensible, and you only as a class, of the urgent need of some better social organization; and you cannot but be aware that the policy of your governors is at present not to hasten such organization, but to adjourn all such questions by directing the national energies abroad.

Consider their past policy and present action. See their remarkable agreement in this present emergency. See how they are all, with more than usual activity, preaching to you on this Indian question. Be sure that their instinct fails them not. India is the keystone of the existing system of Government. Trust their instinct, and meet them on this point. You feel that they are incompetent to deal with the great questions at home, more especially with the greatest of all, how you may be admitted into the social order so that you shall feel that it satisfies your legitimate demands, and, as doing so, justifies your support. Place a resolute veto on those

incapable governors taking more upon their hands. Their cry is, more power, more dominion, more commerce, more action abroad. Yours should be, a better exercise of the power they have; a dominion narrower in extent but better wielded; not more commerce, but a commerce with some tincture of morality; not increase of action abroad, but increased attention to home questions. I would use no revolutionary language; I was once revolutionary, but I am so no longer. I advocate order as the necessary condition of progress. My whole notions are alien to disorder. But in the interests of that order which they profess to value as much as I do, but which their conduct is placing in such jeopardy, I must speak freely of your governing classes. If my language is untrue, they need not fear it. If there is any truth in it, they need not take it as revolutionary, but as warning. Demoralized as I consider them to be by a false policy, and perverted by a long misuse of power, it is for you, with as little prejudice as possible to order, to endeavour to recall them to a better spirit. You can exert a powerful moral influence. It is time that you should do so. It is time that you should make clear to them the difference of your judgment from theirs. You should enforce on them a total change of their policy, a concentration on home questions of the energies now wasted abroad, wasted on disputes with China of the most discreditable kind, or on Indian misgovernment. The timely expression of your opinion, the timely exertion of your influence, might avert contingencies which otherwise threaten us, might secure sufficient internal progress to guarantee us all against that which would be a common evil to us all, to you no less than to them, a violent interruption of the actual order.

Over and above these general political considerations, there are others of importance. Your governors contemplate holding India mainly by European troops. You are told that 70,000 will be enough. I believe the estimate is below the mark. But grant it true. How is even that number to be raised? They are aware of their difficulties. They are aware that it is not easy to raise it. They are gradually trying to familiarize you with the idea of becoming a military nation. Nothing can give so mean an idea of their

capacity. Your strong common sense will reject the folly. Your instinct is the same as that of the other European populations. It is against war, and the instinct is in this case, as in others, the result of experience. You know that peace is the basis of all rational hope of bettering your social position. A Government which seeks to foster a military tendency, is a degrading anomaly.

But grant, as I said, the estimate to be a true one. What motive have you to furnish that number, to be exposed to the baneful influences of an Eastern climate, to the chances of constant insurrection, and in such a cause? Why should English soldiers be, like the German in Italy, the proscribed and hated ministers of a foreign domination? No higher pay or increased comforts are of any weight in the case. If they weigh in the balance with the soldier, it is because he is demoralized. And you cannot wish this to be the case for those you furnish from your ranks. In the present state of affairs, your union, which has been powerful for other objects, should be brought to bear on this point by a quiet disapprobation of all who enlist. You, and you only, can stop recruitment.

And who is to pay for all the increased exertion? The finances of India are out of the question. In the present they cannot suffice, nor in the future will they be able to bear the whole burden, even granting the right to make a nation pay for its own subjugation. On you then, in the last resort, will it fall; on the slight margin between ease and suffering which is the best you can attain to. You best know how little need there is of any increase of pressure upon you. It needs no argument of mine to bring home the weight of this last consideration.

I call on you, then, to make your sentiments clear by all legitimate means. Let it be clear that you wish England to lay aside her aggressive and bullying attitude, and adopt a policy which shall manifest to all, her desire for peace, and her determination to respect the rights of others. Let it be clear also that you wish the leisure so gained employed on social questions.

I have appealed to your best moral feelings and to your highest interests, and I call on you, in the name of your country's honour, now on its trial, and in the name of

humanity, to listen to my appeal. You have no powerful prejudices to retain you. You know the hollowness of our civilization and of our religion. You are many of you looking around you for something which may correspond to those names. In you, as in women, is vested a moderating power. It is by the union which I have already alluded to, of your class with the social philosopher, that such power can be rightly exercised. Such union must henceforth become more close and active. I call on you to do your part towards the alliance. I have done mine.

The objects of the union are great. They are, the acceptance on your part of the existing order, but the acceptance under the condition that order shall be the basis of progress. Listen then to no revolutionary appeals, accept no revolutionary doctrines, however time-honoured. Reject, on the other hand, all the baits held out to you: care little for extension of suffrage—as little for academic titles and degrees, and a share in the absurd educational system now in vogue. Interest not yourselves in such questions. Know and nobly accept your position, but in accepting it look closely as to how it may be bettered.

Your class and the philosopher, by their union, can secure two things. They can secure an education which shall answer to your wants; an education the same in kind for the working man and the philosopher, different in degree, as their needs are different. They can secure also a moral control over the rich, in whom the government of society is naturally vested. Such control must check the oppressive tendencies, whilst it promotes the formation, of large capitals. It must check by social discouragement the dangerous license, it must give strong social encouragement to the nobler action, of the capitalist. You feel the need of such control. It is in your power gradually to secure it. On such points, in due time, I would gladly be heard by you, for I feel, and have ever felt, sympathy with you, and I have need of your sympathy in return.

Your first demand should be, a different policy towards other nations, whether equal or unjustly dependent on us, and, as a first step, the abandonment of India.

P.S. I reprint this pamphlet on India without any alteration. The point in it is the principle, and any details which might be changed are unimportant. In its substance I see nothing which I would wish to alter.

Nor is there any use in discussing at present methods by which its object, the abandonment of our Indian Empire, might be safely brought about. If there were once to prevail the conviction that such abandonment was desirable, it would be time to attend to the means. As there is no such general conviction, the immediate duty is to work at its formation. Others are, I am happy to believe, co-operating towards this end from other points of view, and events also are more or less rapidly tending in the same direction. Where a position is a radically unsound one, sooner or later it becomes untenable. A statesmanlike forethought has seldom been more needed than on this question, but our system of government is such as to hold out little hope of such forethought, so that apparently we shall drift on to the dangers with which our Indian connection is fraught, without any attempt to obviate them, in the blind determination to hold what we have once got till we can hold it no longer. As for Ireland, so for India, the language is, 'We will not let the people go.' It is an old, but a dangerous position.

17 MECKLENBURGH SQUARE:
January 27, 1872.

PROTEST PUBLISHED AS A PLACARD.

The Thanksgiving ordered for May 1, 1859.

BELIEVING the cause of the English in India to be unjust, that of the Hindoos just, as the legitimate effort of a nation to shake off an oppressive foreign yoke; believing, consequently, the English success to be the triumph of force over right:

Considering, secondly, that even had our cause been just, it has been disgraced at home by fraudulent misrepresentations, by the exhibition of a ferocious spirit of vengeance, and disgraced in India by atrocious cruelties; that we have been demoralized ourselves and lowered in the eyes of all nations:

Considering, lastly, that the English victory is but the source of many evils to us as a nation, involving a further pressure on the already overtaxed and suffering industrial poor of this country, and the sacrifice of the lives of English soldiers drawn from the same class:

I hereby do all that is in my power as a private Englishman to clear myself and induce others to reflect:

In the name of Humanity I publicly protest against the Thanksgiving of the 1st of May, as an act at variance with our national professions as a free people, repugnant to the spirit of the Christianity which the nation yet recognizes, and an outrage upon all the higher feelings of mankind.

RICHARD CONGREVE.

SOUTH FIELDS, WANDSWORTH:
April 19, 1859.

A Letter on the Strike.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE OF UNITED BUILDING TRADES, 'PAVIORS' ARMS,' JOHNSON STREET, WESTMINSTER.

DEAR SIR,—I enclose an order for 2*l.*, payable at the Westminster Post Office, as you wish. I should have sent it sooner, but I had not time last week to explain my reasons for subscribing. Will you allow me to do so now, as shortly as possible?

Combinations of the working classes are, it seems to me, of the most evident necessity. The action of capital is so powerful, by virtue of its concentration, that nothing but the close union of large numbers can meet it with any success. And its use at present is so little directed by any social or moral considerations as to render such union for self-defence imperative. Granting the necessity of combinations, strikes are the regular mode of their action. Nothing can be fairer than that the workmen, if they dislike the conditions offered them, should say, We decline working on such terms.

I consider it a mistake to speak of such unions as a revival of the protective system, a return to the principle of the corn laws. The striking difference between the cases is, that Protection rested on the action of the Central Government, and was embodied in law. The unions of the various trades invoke no such support. Nor again is it to my mind of any force to say that such unions and their objects are against the conclusions of Political Economy. Those conclusions are simply negative, they offer no solution of a positive character. Justly, Sir, do those whom you represent set aside all such considerations. The so-called laws of Political Economy, in my judgment, have been useful in the destruction of false systems. They are practically worthless when the time is come to organize a true one. If believed, they can only lead, broadly speaking, to the inaction of despair on the part of the workmen, to the sanction of indifference on the part of the capitalists.

Accepting, then, strikes as legitimate in principle, the questions as to any given strike are: Is it seasonable? and

are its objects such as calm reason approves? The existing strike aims, if I understand you aright, at two results—

1st. A decrease of the hours of labour from ten to nine.

2nd. The securing of the same wages for the nine hours as were paid for the ten.

And the reasons on which these two demands are grounded are, if again I understand you aright, that the present amount of labour is too great to allow of any moral or mental cultivation; that the introduction of machinery should have, or begin to have, its proper result, the lessening of the pressure on the human instrument; that labour is underpaid: in other words, that the division of the profits which result from the combined action of labour and capital is not fairly made.

These demands and the grounds on which they rest are, in my judgment, legitimate. I feel, therefore, that it would not be right to stand aloof and in no way express my sympathy with your movement.

You will see, Sir, that I have said nothing of other points which have been started in the course of the struggle. I have kept clear of them as in no way affecting the real question at issue. I now briefly notice the two principal ones.

The 'document,' as for convenience sake I may call it, put out by the masters, was an ill-advised step, generally condemned, and largely regretted even amongst themselves. Heartily do I hope that your resistance may be successful.

The second great point is that of your own internal regulations, on which it is the policy of your opponents to concentrate attention. To discuss them fully is no part of my present object. I may say that any such discussion would be unfair, unless it took into consideration the conduct on the part of the masters against which these rules are adopted, and a discussion of the relative merits of the two parties would lead, I feel sure, to the conclusion, that the balance of faults is on the side of the capitalists.

It is an old rule to learn from your enemy. The workmen should think over their rules with the light thrown upon them by the objections that have been raised. The real want is that of somebody competent to counsel and arbitrate. The silence of all the recognized teachers of the country, its clergy and statesmen, makes this want sorely felt. One

suggestion I venture to make—that the rules, whatever they are, should be open and known to all. The secresy of all trade proceedings is a very great evil, and has an immoral tendency.

The Religion of Humanity, and herein it differs from Christianity, deals directly with social questions. It is applicable to all, but it considers as the most urgent of all, the following:—How are the working classes to be made, in the fullest sense of the term, citizens; how are they to be incorporated into the existing social order, so as to have their due share of its benefits?

In the attainment of this object, it inculcates pacific to the exclusion of violent methods; it gives the preference to moral over material means. Speaking freely to both parties, to workmen and capitalists alike, it would, so far as the present question is concerned, say to the workmen, that the greater leisure they desire must be used for the better discharge of their social functions, whilst it urges on the capitalist the consideration that his wealth is a social trust, one main purpose of which is to preserve in its highest efficiency the great agent in its production—the workman, without whose co-operation all other appliances are useless.

It is, Sir, as a minister of that religion that I address you. The present movement has cost you much, and may cost you still more, and its issue is uncertain. You may be beaten in the actual dispute. But you will not therefore have failed altogether. On the contrary, strikes tend to secure, when unsuccessful even, greater attention on the part of employers of labour.

I can only wish you success, and that I had more power to aid you.

I am, dear Sir, yours truly,

RICHARD CONGREVE.

Mr. GEORGE POTTER.

SOUTH FIELDS, WANDSWORTH:
October 16, 1859.

ITALY AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

Order and Progress.
Political Motto of Positivism.

THE political difficulties of Europe admit of no immediate, direct remedy. This is a conviction forced upon us at once by a study of the events from which they spring, and of the character which they wear. Any really satisfactory solution must be the result of a gradual change of opinions and feeling, leading to the substitution of a new order in the place of, but continuous with, the old. In effecting this change of opinions and feeling each may, after his measure, participate, and I offer the following remarks as a contribution to that end.

The policy advocated by Positivism as a religious and political system is based on the recognition of this truth, that in all cases the indirect, peaceable, and moral solution is superior to the direct, violent, and political. Italy is with the disciples of Positivism no exception. They regretted at the opening of the year 1859 the course of events which led to the armed interference of France. They regretted, that is, the want of foresight on the part of the various Governments of Europe which at length made that interference the least of two evils. They would have preferred the maintenance of the *status quo*, under the necessary condition of such maintenance, viz., the diminution of the evils under which Italy was suffering.

Nor have the results of French interference been such as to make Positivists essentially modify their previous judgment. For it leaves unremoved, though limited in extent, the one great evil with which it was competent to deal; it has imported new elements of disturbance into the whole question; it is no permanent settlement, even if it be a step towards one. Such success as attended it is at any moment liable to be reversed, and no one can yet say to what further complications it may lead.

But grant it the fullest amount of success it can claim, and grant, moreover, that such success remain unreversed, we must yet feel, on a dispassionate estimate, that the other course indicated would have been preferable. So great are the ulterior difficulties which surround the question of Italian settlement. No amount of sympathy for Italy under her oppressions and in her victorious struggle can quiet all misgivings as to her immediate future. We still ask ourselves whether the political is not too far in advance of the social and moral solution of her difficulties? We recognize the deadness of the old, we doubt only as to the vitality of that which is to supplant it.

Whilst, however, as Positivists, we openly avow our preference, whilst we would aim ourselves, and would persuade others to aim, at an indirect and moral, rather than at any direct and political solution, we by no means stand aloof from the action that is going on around us. As citizens, we have a part to play. We cannot be inactive spectators; we must, where it is possible, mingle in the drama, and exert our influence upon its course. On each great question, as it arises, we must endeavour to modify public opinion.

In this actual case, our sympathies and hopes are entirely with the movement, as directed by Count Cavour and Garibaldi in the name of King Victor Emmanuel, to the complete liberation and concentration of Italy. We have no hesitation on this point. We wished another course of events. We accept the one which offers itself, and seek to turn it to the best use and to obviate its inconveniences. Purely moral means have been set aside. The material, political, character of those adopted must not force us to remain passive within such limits as our principles allow.

On no question for years has English feeling been so unanimous as on the Italian. The actual results obtained are generally, if not universally, welcomed. There exists an equally general wish that the dangers which threaten those results may be averted. There is a large amount of agreement as to the end to be attained. Nearly all Englishmen wish for the complete independence of Italy, for her entrance into the political system of Europe as a distinct and free agent, as much mistress of her own action as France or England. They claim for her the power to regulate at once

her external and her internal policy in accordance with her own views. Further, there is the same general reprobation of the Governments of Naples and Rome, the same admiration of the political tact which has guided the Italians hitherto, the same sympathy with the unfortunate province which still remains under the sway of Austria, and one universal feeling of enthusiasm for the great man who represents to Europe at this moment the Italian movement.

Again, there is no considerable amount of disagreement as to the dangers which threaten Italy. The meeting of the German sovereigns with the Emperor of Russia at Warsaw; the position of Italy in regard to Austria as still holding Venetia; the relations between Sardinia and Naples; the Papal question, and the French occupation of Rome and its neighbourhood; the degree to which the Sardinian Government is committed with the French; the discrepant views and action of the Sardinian statesmen and Garibaldi; the action of France generally; the excitement prevalent in Germany on the subject of French action; the conduct of our own Government—on all these points in turn the public opinion of this country is directed as separate elements in this complicated question. Public opinion, too, is sufficiently alive as to the difficulties which remain, even granting that all the above-mentioned be successfully met—difficulties which may be summed up in this great one—that of the organization of Italy in the immediate future.

What, then, is the attitude which England should assume in presence of all these complications? What is the policy which she should adopt in the interest alike of order and progress in Europe?

The Congress at Warsaw stands foremost. The language of English statesmen should be very decided on this point. They should state plainly that a congress deliberating on general questions of Western European policy under the presidency of Russia is an anomaly which they can no longer recognize. Without any disrespect to Russia, with the full recognition, on the contrary, of her just position and importance, they should make it clear that they consider her interference westward an evil, and that such interference, if it led to action, would meet with the opposition of England. They

should signify that, in consideration of the meeting at Warsaw, they would draw closer to France, and that their subsequent action would be in intimate combination with that Power. The result of such union should be a clear intimation on the part of the combined Powers—an intimation which should be free from all ambiguity—of the line they were prepared to follow. The policy which involved us in the Crimean war must not be repeated. No delusive hopes, founded on their estrangement, must allure Russia into a belief that she might actively support Austria in the Italian war, or, what is nearly equivalent, that she might again cross the Carpathians without resistance from France and England, and again prostrate Hungary at the feet of Austria. She must meet the evils resulting from the old injustice, as she best may, by wise government within her own frontier. She must not protect herself from them by a second perpetration of a fresh crime without her frontier. Whatever the form which the Russian support of Austria were to take, it must be intimated to her that the necessary consequence would be the Anglo-French support of Italy.

Even quite apart from the immediate interests of the day, it is time that the statesmen of the West should in concert retrace the steps taken in a false direction, and make it a cardinal point of their policy to eliminate Russia from the political state system of Western Europe. Her action since the wars of the Empire has been far too preponderant.

On another point, the policy of England should be equally clear. Europe is full of anxiety as to the designs of the French Emperor. This anxiety is justified by the annexation of Savoy and Nice, and more, even, by the manner than by the fact of that annexation. It is justified, also, by his subsequent movements. The closer alliance with France against Russia and the German Powers supported by Russia, would enable the English statesmen to speak openly on the point in question. Their willingness to co-operate with France would show that their remonstrances were made in the interest of European order, not from animosity to the French Government, much less to France. Strong in the general bearing of her policy, England might hope to be listened to when she pointed out the evil of the disturbance already introduced,

the danger of any fresh introduction, and the very small compensation for that danger. If not listened to—if the French Government showed itself disposed to repeat its action, and turned a deaf ear to friendly remonstrance—then England should signify to the German Powers that she was ready to act with them against France to prevent any fresh step in the direction of absorption.

Such a policy adopted by English statesmen might lead to war. Undoubtedly it might. It might lead to a war in alliance with France—a war against Russia and Germany, or at any rate Austria. Or it might lead to a war in alliance with Germany against France. Either contingency is greatly to be deprecated. The former I cannot but think improbable in the extreme. Neither Russia and Germany combined, nor either singly, would risk a contest with the united force of France and England.

The second contingency, I fear, is more probable, judging from the past. Yet I cannot think even that probable, if the conduct of our statesmen exhibit due firmness and consistency. But, in any case, the war to which the policy indicated led must be accepted by the nation as a necessary evil—a sacrifice to the general welfare of Europe. It would be a war in the interest of peace; a war to prevent war; a repressive measure of European police, such as the disturbed state of Europe may from time to time render necessary, before the final settlement has been effected.

The doctrine of non-intervention is one to which I would give the utmost possible extension. But it is a doctrine for general, not for partial, acceptance; and in the present state of Europe the efficacy of this doctrine should be guaranteed, as alone it can be, by the union of England and France. It is a doctrine which no one of the great Powers can absolutely leave to the others to violate at discretion whilst itself as absolutely observes it. For instance, it is desirable that Italy should act by itself, and organize itself to the best of its judgment, without any foreign aid. So far would I go, that I would even leave it alone to meet the danger which still threatens it from Austria, provided Austria fought alone. But if Austria entered the field with Russian support to secure her against Hungary, with a Prussian occupation or guarantee of

her other provinces, then Italy should not be left single-handed to meet Austria so supported, but the whole forces of the Western Powers should be freely at her disposal to enable her to come victorious out of what would otherwise be so unequal a conflict.

In either case, but not least on the supposition of a thorough union of France and England, the action of the latter Power on Germany would be a wholesome one, quieting the great alarm felt by the nation or its governments on the subject of French aggression. The English Government might also act beneficially on Germany with reference to Italy. This was actually the case last year. It might continue that influence. Pointing out to the Germans how akin to their own aspirations are the wishes of the Italians, how entirely the two movements are parallel and naturally sympathetic, it might lead them to see that from the political as well as the moral point of view the attempt to retain Italy under German supremacy is fatal to the true interests of Germany herself. Such an attempt would, at any rate, meet with no support, but with profound disapprobation from England. And in the event of the German sympathy showing itself in an active co-operation with Austria, the resistance of England would be equally active.

The Catholic Powers will find it very difficult to unite and decide on any combined action in support of the Pope. Such of them as are disposed to act singly, as it is said Spain is, might be addressed on a purely political ground. As a Protestant Power, England has no concern with any arrangements of the Papal spiritual power, but with the position of the Pope as an Italian Power and as an obstacle to the settlement of Italy, she is as competent to deal as any Catholic Power. There is no reason why she should not urge the acceptance of the evident fact that the temporal power of the Pope is ended. It is ended by the fact of the French occupation of Rome quite as much as it would be ended were Victor Emmanuel, in realization of the wish of Italy, crowned king in the Capitol. A Pope purely dependent on French bayonets for support cannot be considered as exercising any temporal power. The degree to which he enjoys mere personal freedom is a question.

The confusion of the spiritual and temporal powers involved in the Papal exercise of temporal sovereignty had its historical

justification. But even when most reasonable it was always the greatest obstacle to the union of Italy and her consequent independence. In the hour when that union has a chance of being sufficiently consolidated to insure, at no distant period, the independence, it is but natural that the confusion should cease by the extinction of the temporal power. It is for Catholicism as a spiritual system, not for those outside it, to adjust itself to these new conditions, and prove its boasted vitality. If successful, there is no reason why, in quieter times, the Pope or his successors should not return to Rome to wield such spiritual power as may remain to him in perfect freedom.

But for the moment his presence in Rome, connected as it is with the French occupation, is one of the gravest of Italian complications. It is most desirable that, by his withdrawal, the Pope should remove any ground for that occupation. In case of his retirement, any active interference by Spain in the Pope's cause might be averted by the joint remonstrance of England and France. The English Government might even now endeavour to persuade the French to remove the embarrassment created by the presence of its troops. Ready to support France in defending Italy against Austrian aggression, it takes away the only palliation for the French occupancy. And a word from the French Government would be sufficient to determine the hesitation of the Pope, and decide him to retire.

In this manner the question would become purely Italian, and there would be no pretext for other Powers to interfere. The Papal States would lapse to Sardinia, and the relations between Sardinia and Naples must be settled by the sword, if not already decided. No European Power can be really concerned to support Francis II.

In regard to the difficult relations of the Sardinian and French Governments, the real point at issue has been already implicitly settled. The pressure by which Sardinia was induced to renounce Savoy and Nice ought not to be renewed to obtain any fresh cession. The cession already made has been pernicious enough. It has endangered, and is still endangering, the peace of Europe. It has made the French Government the object of universal suspicion. It has divided Italy—before unanimous—into two parties. It has damaged

by morally lowering the statesman who is the soul of the political movement; it has embittered the great soldier who guides and personifies the insurrectionary and unitary movement. At any reasonable cost such evils must be avoided for the future, and they would be avoided if Sardinia knew that in her resistance to the instances of her powerful ally, she had to count not only on the sympathy, but the active support of England and the other Powers of Europe.

The Sardinian statesmen have already accepted publicly the necessity by which Venice remains Austrian. Such acceptance, of course, is not to be held as final. But for the time it seems at once inevitable and sound in policy. It is deeply to be regretted that, as the French intervention did take place, it was not complete, and that Italy was not set free in her whole extent. But under actual circumstances Venice, the 'illustrious martyr,' must wait and watch her more fortunate sisters consolidate their power. It is a sad necessity, or would appear to be so at present; for events move so rapidly that what appears necessary to-day ceases to be so to-morrow, and the liberation of this noble member of Italy may be nearer than we anticipate. At any rate, great caution is required on the part of Sardinia not to precipitate matters so as to justify Austria in resuming action. Wisely used, the presence of Austria in Venetia may exercise a good influence on the organization of the rest of Italy.

The recent despatch of Lord John Russell has for its object to inculcate on the Sardinian Government caution in respect to Austria, and, behind Austria, to Europe. The language of Count Cavour in the Sardinian Parliament shows with what statesmanlike sagacity he appreciates the necessity of such caution. The policy of his Government, as indicated by him, may quiet apprehensions as to the immediate danger of a collision. However much we may object to the tone of the English despatch, it is satisfactory to find that, in the result to be immediately attained, the two Governments are at one. The contingencies which the despatch foreshadows are distant and uncertain, nor are they very intelligible. No growth of Sardinia can be deprecated by England, or rather no growth of Italy of which Sardinia becomes more and more the representative, can be deprecated by England, on any ground of

its clashing with our own interests. Why, then, the allusion to the interests of England in the Adriatic? An attack on us there by Italy, even if united, is not probable, and we cannot let our questionable possession, the Ionian Islands, influence us to wish a divided Italy and Venice still under Austrian dominion.

On the contrary, in reference to Venice, assuming that the action of Sardinia and Italy under her guidance, is such as Count Cavour's statement proclaims that it shall be, it will be the true policy of the Powers of Europe to endeavour to arrive at some peaceful arrangement. They may act on Austria to induce her quietly to surrender a province the possession of which will be a constant burden on her finances, a constant source of European disquiet a constant reproach to her from its necessary misgovernment, a constant danger in presence of the rest of Italy united and supported by the popular feeling throughout Europe. Any material compensation for her surrender of Venice in the shape of some other territory is out of the question. But some money indemnity might be proposed and accepted. The former mode is more and more at variance with the prevailing political ideas, not so much unfortunately of statesmen and diplomatists, as of the nations they govern or represent. The latter is one which the state of their finances might invest with peculiar charms in the eyes of Austrian statesmen.

The Italians cannot doubt of the sympathy of the English people, nor till within a very recent period of the moral support of the English Government. That sympathy is so strong that it is doubtful whether the Government can, even if it desire, move in a contrary direction. The great political sagacity of the Italians will make them acquiesce in the abstention of England from active help under the conditions above stated. They will not fail to feel grateful to a Power which so interprets the doctrine of non-intervention, which is prepared, that is, to abstain herself, but is prepared at the same time to exert herself to compel others to follow her example. The moral influence so acquired by England might give her great weight in the difficult and important questions of Italian organization.

This is a work of which no one can disguise to himself

the difficulty, who has in any degree studied Italian politics in the past history of Italy or under her present conditions. It is undeniably a work for the Italians alone. No others can be competent in the matter. Any foreign interference except in the way of advice would be an intolerable evil. Yet the nations of Western Europe are, by virtue of their position and associations, so intimately bound up one with the other, that the influence they exercise on one another is exceedingly strong, and though in general beneficial, may in particular circumstances lead to great evils. In the disturbances of Europe since 1848, to take a late date, we have seen numerous instances in which this prejudicial effect may be traced.

Alone among the States of Europe, England is identified with constitutional parliamentary government. And with the natural predilection of each nation for its own constitution, our statesmen wish their constitution to prevail elsewhere.

I am not concerned here to attack or defend parliamentary government as applicable, or not, to England. The question here is, whether it is applicable to Italy. I think the answer should be negative; that it is wholly inapplicable to Italy, both in the present and in the future; that its adoption would be pregnant with danger above all in the immediate future, waiving more distant considerations. I wish to draw attention to this point, as I think the acquiescence of English public opinion in the view I advocate might be of essential service to Italy.

At the opening of the campaign last year the political instinct of the Piedmontese led them at once to sweep into abeyance all their constitutional forms, and invest their King with the Dictatorship. No step could be wiser; and I believe that even in England it was generally approved. In the subsequent Italian movements the same principle has been adopted as the one most corresponding to the exigencies of the situation. In the interests of internal order and good government, as well as on a careful consideration of the dangers from without, I advocate a continuance of the same policy. I advocate, too, a similar acquiescence in that policy on the part of English opinion. If Victor Emmanuel become King of all Italy, short of Venetia, or within whatever limits

he become King, within those limits the power he exercises should be dictatorial, hampered by no parliamentary encumbrance.

The finances, and the finances only—the public purse—should be left to a Parliament, meeting at definite intervals. This is required in times of safety at present to secure as economical a government as possible. It has its advantages in times when great exertions are demanded of a nation, as those exertions are more cheerfully made when they have been freely promised. But the affairs of State should be in the King's hands as much as they were in the hands of our own Tudor princes, of Cromwell, or of Richelieu.

For the present excitement once over, much more if by some singular good fortune all alarm from without have ceased, the difficulties of the internal arrangements will make themselves felt. The attractive influences have prevailed hitherto, but none can doubt the existence of the repulsive. And the direct energy of a dictatorship, freely accepted by the national will, and capable of acting in judicious contravention of the local will, can alone enable Italy to pass with order and quiet through the critical period on which she is entering.

But in urging a purely monarchical, or, in more strictly correct language, a dictatorial government, let me not be understood to be advocating a system of administrative centralization—such as exists, and may for a time have its uses, elsewhere. Sufficient unity for external defence and internal order—that is the limit on the one hand. The most perfect acceptance of the historical traditions of the country and the facts of Italian heterogeneity—if I may use the term—such is the limit on the other. Italy, one and independent as against other Powers—Italy, richly articulate in herself, preserving her ancient municipal distinctness, her many-sided associations, her administrative separation; such is the solution as I conceive it, even for the present. The dictatorial concentration which I advocate is, in short, but a provisional settlement calculated to meet a real emergency. It is of the essence of a sound provisional settlement that it should not compromise the future, but husband and protect the forces which are to be dominant in that future. It may at times

further them by a wise direction, and in some cases aid in their birth.

Such a conciliation of the government required by the present with the wants of the future may avert many evils. In the past the municipal distinctness of Italy has been a source of weakness, but it offers great prospective advantages, advantages such as may evidently compensate for the past. Italy has suffered much hitherto from others. In getting clear of her sufferings let her not throw away that which she has preserved amidst them ; let no aspirations after external aggrandizement or any material advantages make her deviate from the soundest policy. Let her guard against the erroneous political influences which may beset her. Let her guard, also, against influences of a more general kind, hurrying her from her actual state into a rapid assimilation to the condition of France or England. The progress of the Western revolution has left her different from these two Powers—in some important respects superior to both ; less changed socially and politically than France, more free from the evils of industrialism than England. Let her not hasten to overtake them, but be content with her freedom from their evils, and glad to preserve the advantages her distinct development has left her. One word more. 'Always the oppressed, never the oppressor,' let Italy accept the pre-eminence such destiny confers upon her, and remain, in aspiration and in act, as pure in the present and the future as she has been in the past.

To return to ourselves. England as a nation may retain her own judgment as to her own Government, but may, quite consistently with that judgment, recognize that such a government would not suit Italy. Recognizing this, she may frankly accept the different form which the Italians see fit to adopt. On such a point the opinion of England could not but have great weight, as it would be evidently disinterested.

There is some danger, however, on this head. There is danger lest the influence of the English Government should be directly brought to bear on the particular constitution adopted by the Italians. There is none, however, on another point. English statesmen are not likely directly to concern themselves with any attempt to substitute for Catholicism the national Protestantism. But whilst there is no danger

from the statesmen, it is not so clear that there is none on the part of our various religious bodies. The disturbing action of self-appointed Protestant missionaries has been already felt in Italy. It is to be hoped that our Government will do all that can be required of it—refuse its protection to its subjects if they act in contravention of the laws of the State in which they reside, and discourage as much as possible all proselytizing action. Such action can have, in Italy, but one effect. It can disorganize what exists. No one can hope to undo the past in this respect. No one can hope to re-open the settlement effected at the Peace of Westphalia, when Europe acquiesced in the co-existence and reciprocal toleration of the two great religious parties. With the past before us, it were the part of a fanatic to dream of Italy becoming Protestant. All that could result from any efforts in this direction would be the more rapid decomposition of Catholicism. This in itself is no advantage. The substitution of mere irreligion for such religious feeling as exists would be, in the spiritual order, as great an evil, as to replace the æsthetic culture of Italy by our crude industrialism would be in the temporal. None should aim at decomposing Catholicism unless he be prepared to show a reasonable prospect of some adequate substitute being accepted. Short of this it is the simplest dictate of good sense not to disturb any existing organization, however imperfect.

The sympathy of England for Italy is, on the whole, as pure as it is general. But England is not quite clear in the matter. There is a weakness in her position. She can never act with the requisite freedom and moral consistency in the affairs of Europe, till she consent to look into her own conduct, and ask herself whether she is not responsible for much of the embarrassment which exists. It is my conviction that were she to clear herself from all such responsibility, and stand free before Europe of all complicity in the various international complications, her own moral weight would be greatly increased, and a vast stride made towards the unravelling of those complications. I urge this point here, because it is emphatically a question for public opinion, and one on which no statesman will venture to take the initiative. In our government the impulse must come from the governed, the governors

will but follow the expression of opinion. They may aspire to guide it, they will not anticipate it.

I urge, then, Englishmen to consider, whether there is not something false in the position taken up by their Government and by themselves, for their Government is but the expression of themselves. They are forward to sympathize with and abet Italian independence. They even see with approbation English volunteers joining Garibaldi—a step of very questionable morality. They would gladly witness the ejection of Austria from the Peninsula. But all the while they retain by force under their dominion the free republic of the Ionian Islands. I do not thrust this question forward. Lord John Russell, in his despatch, recognizes the impediment of 'our interest in the Adriatic.' Austrian statesmen have not been slow to point out this incongruity in our conduct, and the answer they received was by no means such as could have been wished. It was not calculated in the least to satisfy any fair mind.

Again. Both Government and nation saw with regret Nice and its adjoining territory extorted from Italy. The feeling was just; but those who indulge it should remember that England holds in its possession a Spanish town, and by so doing tramples on the honour of Spain, to the no small detriment of Western concert. It would be a great gain, politically and morally, if Spain stood side by side with France and England in all European questions. Each new addition strengthens the common action. Each new element of the West called into exertion benefits both itself and others. The mutual action of the various States consolidates and invigorates the whole. But Gibraltar retained by England is the permanent alienation of Spain, it is an insurmountable obstacle to the just reciprocal influence of the one country upon the other.

The policy to be adopted by the Western Powers in the interest of Italy is the principal object of my writing. But Western Europe is so thoroughly a whole that it is impossible, in considering one of its members more especially, to avoid the more general survey of the rest. Spain will not, in all probability, proceed further than a protest in the cause of the Pope. Germany, if France and England are united, will also remain essentially passive. Her action could only be desir-

able in the event of encroachments on her independence, either from the East or the West. But Germany is a complex term. And, unfortunately for Europe, the dominant power in Germany is a State which is, in the main, non-German. The preponderance of Austria, constituted as she is, is a real danger.

Unfortunately, also, English statesmen of both the great parties are imbued with the idea that the conservation of Austria should be one great object of English policy. They are still at the point of view of 1815, and the arrangements of Vienna. They do not see that whatever may be thought of those arrangements, there have been changes since which have completely altered the problem. The real question in regard to Austria is, how best to secure, not its existence but its euthanasia, its peaceable dislocation into its constituent parts, and its disappearance as an empire from the map of Europe. This becomes more than ever urgent if Italy be reconstituted in its integrity. And it is the instinct of this which has inspired the Austrian statesmen with such a passionate, uncontrollable hatred of Sardinia, as the most conspicuous promoter of such reconstitution.

Germany, in fact, should be strictly German ; and for this purpose provisionally it seems necessary that Prussia should resume the tradition of Frederick the Great, and stand forward as the head, to the exclusion of Austria. It is difficult to conceive why the Prussian statesmen should give themselves any trouble to avert this natural process by supporting the crumbling power of their rival.

Italy, Spain, Germany, thus considered, there remain but the two, France and England, and it is these last on whom rests the burden and the duty of an active policy. I have not hesitated to meet the contingency of further encroachment on the part of the Emperor of the French. I have not hesitated to advocate vigorous repressive measures. No one can more earnestly wish that such a contingency may not occur. The alliance of France and England is of paramount importance to Western Europe, and through Western Europe to Humanity. United, the two Powers can preserve order and ensure progress ; disunited, there are no sufficient guarantees for either. Their mutual relations are such as to render in the

highest degree improbable their combination for evil in European affairs. Notwithstanding the events which have for a time estranged them, their real policy is to draw together again. The alliance of the two nations should be looked on as permanent, and as overriding any casual, transient coolness between the two Governments.

In real truth, the spirit of encroachment is even more fatal to France than to any other Power; for it annuls her legitimate influence in Europe, which is then most powerful when it is most moral. It is essential that the great central nation, on whom has devolved the initiative in the revolution of the West, should not compromise her leadership by aspirations after territorial aggrandizement. It is essential that by the evident purity of her policy she should justify her European presidency, that she should not alienate those who naturally gravitate towards her; that she should conciliate those to whom the idea of such presidency is most repugnant. If, then, I have advocated resistance to her on one point, it will be clear that I have done so from no national jealousy, but from European considerations and in the true interest of France.

To sum up my conclusions. For Italy, I advocate complete independence and internal order, to be secured by a dictatorial government vested in Victor Emmanuel; for Europe, the close alliance and active co-operation of France and England, as, under existing circumstances, the rightful conservators of European order, and the competent judges of the requirements of Western policy.

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THE decline of the power of Catholicism, and the consequent disunion of mediæval Europe, were first evidenced by disorder in the international relations of its several constituent States. It is in the same international relations that the restoration of order must begin, as the first step to the reorganization of modern Europe on a sound basis; to the reconstitution of a new union analogous to, not identical with, that offered by Catholicism. This is shortly the ground on which the present work rests for its justification in dealing with the largest questions of human policy. The right settlement of these questions is the indispensable condition of all the more special ones which press for solution.

The instinctive sense that this condition is indispensable is nowhere seen more clearly than in the language of those who would wholly renounce any attempt at its fulfilment. It is loudly urged by the partisans of the doctrine of non-intervention, at present in the ascendent, that we should, in our own interest, abstain from any handling of such matters. We should thus be free to turn our attention to what more immediately concerns ourselves. This is a settlement of its kind—unsound in principle and not possible in practice; still a settlement, and betraying the consciousness that the internal order which its advocates aim at depends primarily on the order without. Rejecting their conclusion, we may accept as valuable their agreement.

We are told that we are incompetent; that human intelligence must abandon as hopelessly beyond its capacity the direction of the affairs of the world. In the conviction that such a view is at once erroneous and noxious—erroneous in its estimate of man's capacity; noxious in that it discourages his

legitimate exertion of his intellect, and sanctions indirectly all his anarchical tendencies—the present work is undertaken. The whole history of man is one continuous argument against the error which underlies this theory of renunciation. It deserves mention only so far as, by contrast, it helps to give greater prominence to the opposite view, that the direction and government of the world are emphatically man's business —a business for which he has been progressively becoming more and more qualified. He may not take refuge in any vicarious system, in the substitution for his own careful and intelligent action of some other guidance, be it some external power, or, as is more common, his own selfish instincts.

The difficulty of the task which thus falls on man; the inadequacy of his faculties in their primitive weakness; the necessity of a long training to raise them to the desired level—all this is allowed. But however difficult the task, however inadequate the faculties, it has been attempted, and they have been found in a degree sufficient during the preliminary period of man's education. They have been exercised on their proper work, and formed by such exercise for its more and more perfect performance. The highest inheritance of the human race is this accumulated power, to which successive generations add their quota, and which each in its turn uses with greater skill. It were treason to the past to halt in this course, to renounce this inheritance.

Nothing is more obvious on the face of History than the gradual growth of its scale; the gradual enlargement of the mutual action and reaction of different divisions of the human race. In the earliest periods to which we can carry our retrospect, prior to the opening of the historical era, we find several civilizations coexistent, but isolated. We may trace the order and continuance of the Egyptian theocracy through many centuries, before it had any consecutive connection with surrounding nations. The same may be said of the Indian theocracy and of the Chinese Empire. In Western Asia—and it is with Western Asia that we enter on the connected series of historical events—one monarchy succeeded another during a long period, without involving in its rise or fall any extra-Asiatic population. The traders of Phœnicia were the sole link between otherwise wholly unconnected nations.

With the close of this period of isolation, History in its narrower, more technical sense opens. It is concentrated at first within narrow limits, on the shores of the Ægean, and on the mutual relations of Greece and Western Asia. It rapidly widens, and embraces the whole basin of the Mediterranean. Towards this common centre was drawn for many centuries all the activity of the race. The circumference from which it was drawn was constantly enlarging; the bounds of the habitable world were constantly receding. The process was completed when the almost simultaneous discovery of America and the sea-passage to India threw open the Atlantic, the Southern, and Indian Oceans, followed shortly by the crossing of the Pacific and the verification of the bounds of man's world.

This simple, outward, geographical expression may suffice to indicate the increase of contact between the several parts of the earth and the nations which inhabit them. This increase has been naturally followed by a growing sense of their mutual interdependence. Widely various as have been found to be their manners and customs, their civil polities and religious creeds, still, in one relation or another, they have been felt to be united by some common bond, traversing all outward differences. The existence of a common interest, and the co-operation of all in the furtherance of that interest, is an idea which, long tacitly assumed, has been drawn out into greater consciousness. The necessary consequence of the development of such an idea is the conception of the unity of the race. No theory as to its origin, no different estimate of the capabilities of its different parts, need or can disturb this practical relative conception. Under whatever divisions man exists, races, national aggregates, tribes, empires, states, families, all are but integral parts, practically, of one whole; branches of one great family; each with its proper function; each able to minister to the welfare of the others and of the whole. They are organs of one comman organism, Humanity.

The idea of this great organism—the idea of Humanity as a real collective personality—has been long becoming more and more familiar to the thought and action of man. It is not to my present purpose to trace any further the process of its growth and acceptance, nor even that of its systematization. It is

enough that, in some degree, it is a not unfamiliar, not unaccepted notion. Nor again is it unfamiliar or unaccepted that the different co-existent portions of the race—the actual generation, in other words—bear a certain definite relation to those which shall follow them; that they work for the future, handing down to that future the inheritance they have received. This part of the conception of Humanity—and it is an integral part of it—is in a greater or less degree an object of general consciousness, however much at times the obligation it involves may be set aside at the dictate of immediate interest. The point in which there is the greatest deficiency is the relation of the actual present generation to the past. The estimate of its obligations in this respect is low, and consequently the due subordination to the past is often wanting. But this is, no less than the two others, an integral part of the conception. Is is even of the three the most essential, the most characteristic part. As such it never has been, never can be wholly ignored; but it may, with most injurious consequences, be weakened and obscured. The sense of continuity in both directions is as indispensable to the right ordering of human affairs, as it is to our right intellectual grasp of the questions relating to man's position and destiny.

Side by side with this conception of the Unity of the Race, so developed and completed, there has at all times existed another—that of a hierarchical co-ordination of its several parts. Long implicitly entertained, with the growth of the race it became a part of its explicit belief. That some are superior, others inferior; that there is a ruling part and a subject part—this doctrine is so easy of comprehension that it naturally preceded, by a wide interval, any direct traces of the former. The shape it wore originally was the simplest possible. Each tribe or nation interpreted it for itself, and claimed superiority over all others. It bears, as the other conceptions of man bear, the stamp of selfishness. But gradually, and in the natural course of things, it has tended to clear itself of that evil, to transform itself. Originally put forward for the mere good of the superior, stronger, or ruling part, it has passed by imperceptible degrees into the service of the inferior, weaker, and

subject. Neither the one character nor the other has, speaking generally, been exclusive. The nobler image and the baser have co-existed; now the one, now the other assuming greater distinctness and prominence. In the earliest history this superiority was asserted by war, to secure the personal services of the vanquished. Its next stage was a change in the object, when political aggrandizement and the incorporation of the weaker nations became the aim. Such was the ambition of the Empires of Western Asia; such the dream of Greek statesmen, modified by the desire to impart the products of their civilization; such was the result of the conquests of Alexander. The most perfect expression of the earlier theory, and the transition at the same time to the later, is to be found in the Roman Empire. It combined, with the ideas of incorporation and organization of the incorporated, the higher conception of an influence to be exercised by the more perfect organisms formed on those ideas on the remainder of the race, the portions which it felt itself unable directly to absorb. In this respect, as in so many others, the policy of Imperial was inherited and carried out to its fuller perfection by Papal Rome. With the necessary modifications, the Popes laboured at the incorporation in one great whole of all the nations of the earth.

The form such incorporation took under Catholicism was essentially different from that which it had taken under the older Empire. A spiritual and moral union was substituted for a mere political one. This new method was adopted exclusively within the limits to which the influence of Rome had extended directly or indirectly. Beyond such limits the superiority of Christendom has been too often asserted by an appeal to force. In the better days of the Christian Church the object principally aimed at—and as far as possible exclusively aimed at—was the amelioration of the inferior. It was the conversion, civilization, humanizing, that was the primary end; all others but accessory. It was reserved for the decay and degradation of the great Christian commonwealth, taken as a whole—for its period of conscious disruption and disorganization—to look on the more backward portions of our race as in theory the mere instruments of the power and

wealth of the more advanced. It is from that period that dates the conception of a whole race doomed to perpetual inferiority, destined to be the property of another race. It was reserved for this period to undo, so far as it could, the work in which the mediæval Church had shared, the constitution of the freedom of the industrial classes; to treat labour, which that Church had shown its respect for without the power of organizing it, as a degradation; and to organize, in the mere spirit of commercial cupidity, a trade in the African race. The idea of raising and civilizing became wholly secondary, or rather was set aside; and the sole object really set before men was the ease, dignity, and wealth of the stronger.

These last remarks are enough to show that, taken alone, the more complete connection and interdependence of the different nations are not necessarily for the good of all, any more than is the superiority asserted by one part over the other. Both may ultimately have a good tendency; both may be necessary conditions of subsequent good; but both, misdirected, or even simply undirected, may result for an indefinite period in the greatest evil. The closer the contact, the fuller may be the oppression of the weaker by the stronger; a worse evil than their mutual ignorance of one another. In fact, it were not difficult to show that the increase of intercourse has been premature; that it would have been better, for many reasons, had it been delayed. The collision between great but undisciplined power and weakness is necessarily fraught with ill consequences. The appliances of a high material civilization used without any moral check, and under the stimulus of contempt and aversion, bring nothing but evil to those who enjoy them, and to those on whom they are used. Compare the attitude of the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire, in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, with that assumed by the civilized conquerors of Mexico or Peru, or by the more highly developed nations which are now in contact with the great Powers of the extreme East.

Yet of the two great facts with which I have been dealing—the spread of contact and the supremacy of some one portion of the whole—thus expressed in their utmost generality—the second, if left to its natural course, is the least liable to injuri-

ous consequences. For the more it is carried out, the more nearly its realization is attained, the more do those consequences diminish. The violence and injustice which accompany the process of its establishment tend to cease when it is established. The great power gained becomes, by a natural reaction, moral and beneficial in its use. *Ex hypothesi*, it excludes competitors, and so guarantees peace ; and the peaceful society of man, if secure from disturbance, would advance by its own laws. In the actual succession of history the supremacy thus supposed has never been attained. Each of the powers which in turn has aspired to it has failed ; yet the failure does not invalidate the lesson taught by the unbroken series of attempts. That series indicates that the problem is a real practical one ; the failure only shows that the methods of solving it hitherto employed have been faulty in principle or inadequate in their means of execution.

It is, I conceive, demonstrable that the idea involved in all the attempts at union of the race, by conquest or otherwise, which the history of the past enumerates, is a true one, has a reality, and is realizable. There are two essential requisites for its beneficial realization. The first is that the Power which attempts it should be duly subordinated to the larger whole of which, by its very nature, it is a part ; that it should acknowledge its dependence upon, and feel that it is but a representative of, that larger whole. The second requisite is, that it should be in its constitution a power analogous to the larger body on which it is to act. That body is complex, formed of many parts, and of parts differing greatly from one another. The agent must also be complex : constituted, that is, by more than one nation; constituted, in fact, by several nations differing also from one another. In this way no merely national interest could get the complete supremacy. In this way there would be ample provision for a larger range of sympathies with those outside, and a just mutual control with reference to those within.

In the simple series of social existences with which we are ultimately brought into contact—the family, the country, Humanity—we need for practical purposes the intercalation of a new term, a collective existence wider than the country or state, less extensive than Humanity. The largest organism,

Humanity, is unselfish, but powerless immediately. It is the end, not the means. The smaller one, that of the state, has power to work out its purposes, but is too isolated and selfish. We want, then, an intermediate organism free from the state's peculiar evil, free also from the necessary impuissance of Humanity. We need an organism which can be invested with a leadership—the hegemony of the race—not for its own service and advancement, but for the service and advancement of the race. This is no new idea, as is evident from what has been above said. It has been repeatedly tried with varying success. The provisional creations of the past have in their failure left us the indications of success, the materials for the definitive construction of a power competent to this high function.

An attentive study of all the previous efforts of man in this direction will be the safest guide in our constructive effort. Enough has been already said on this point to justify the conclusion that the leadership of the human race is vested in the West. What is the precise value or form to be given to such leadership is another question ; but in some form or other the conclusion is generally accepted. All not only within the pale of Western civilization, but those without—not only, that is, those who participate in the function, but those on whom and for whom it is instituted and to be exercised—all equally recognize its existence.

The African races assert no initiative. They wait for, and are not averse to accept, a wise guidance. Egypt was their one great and inestimable contribution to the progress of man. With the disappearance of the Egyptian theocracy, any active influence on their part has ceased. The vast Polytheistic Empires of the East, in their strong organization, strong under any delusive appearances of weakness, have also renounced, if they ever put forward, any claim to the direction of others. They seek but to avoid undue interference, a hasty and rude disturbance of their existing order. Their attitude is passive and receptive—an attitude of expectation, if necessarily and justifiably of distrustful expectation. The same may be said of the aggregate of the Mohammedan Powers. Since the tide of Arab invasion was turned at Tours, and the fear of Turkish conquest was removed by Lepanto, the Mussulman has gradu-

ally settled into his present position, that of a tacit acknowledgment of the practical supremacy of the West, with the further step, in the case of Turkey, of a large adoption of its ideas. By the common consent, whether willing or reluctant, the leadership has devolved on Europe. It is accepted as a fact throughout the world, wherever there is any consciousness of the human movement, that from the activity of the West, disturbing and irritating as it is, can alone come any such modifications in the general management of human affairs as are to be wished or expected ; that it is to the same source that the various nations must look for such modifications of their modes of thought, and consequently of their institutions, as can be received from without, and independently of their own national development.

By the method of elimination, then, we have reached this point, that the guidance of the destinies of man, of the whole human race, is vested in Europe. The actual consciousness of the world accepts this term Europe as a whole. We shall shortly see that it needs still further clearing and definition. This will follow if we attempt to get a clear conception of what the term *the West* means, how far it is synonymous with, how far different from, Europe. In other words, let us seek an adequate answer to the question—What constitutes the West?

The actual, the official state-system of Europe is a heterogeneous aggregate. For any purposes of common action it consists of five great Powers. Since the Peace of Vienna, France, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia have virtually constituted Europe ; and still substantially the system remains the same. The diplomatic world essentially recognizes these five, and these only, though its view is rapidly undergoing a modification in consequence of the recent events in Italy. The minor Powers have their own position in the European system, but the system is in the greater. There is the real power. It is foreign to my present object to enter on any detailed examination of this system, to point out its discordances, its weaknesses, its tendencies to decay, its imminent dissolution. I imagine that all feel that a large modification of it, if not its disruption, is at hand: that most thinking politicians would hail the largest possible modification con-

sistent with the objects so provisional an institution has more or less secured, European peace and order.

I would rather dwell on the different conception of the European order which should be substituted for it. The first step in this process is, however, still negative. The elimination of Russia from the system is the first great rectification. She is an Eastern, not a Western Power, or more Eastern than Western. This naturally suggests the question, wherein lies the difference, what grounds are there in reason or history for asserting such a distinction? It is an important question, and must be answered.

It has been assumed, and up to a certain point all would grant the assumption, that there are solid distinctions between the various branches of the human race. It is assumed further that, for the guidance of the whole, we need to construct some artificial and lesser unity, one which shall admit some branches whilst it does not admit others. These two assumptions made, the ground on which, in one case, the claim to form a part of such lesser unity is allowed, in another disallowed, is the participation directly or indirectly, completely or incompletely, in the progressive civilization which, since the repulse of the theocracy of Western Asia by Greece, has characterized Europe. That progressive civilization includes three essential movements—the intellectual cultivation of Greece, the social incorporation of Western Europe by Rome, and the Catholic-Feudal organization of mediæval Europe. The three have formed one continuous progress. They have been followed by a fourth of a different character, which has however been confined, equally with the other three, to the same populations. For the sake of clearness I enumerate the portions of the race which the establishment of such a ground of union excludes. Oceania and Africa, of course, are excluded. So, too, are the Polytheistic civilizations of Eastern Asia. Inheritors to a degree of the intellect of Greece, and at one time depositories of its science, and almost its sole cultivators, the Mohammedan nations have still been totally alien to the other movements, and must stand apart from the directing body.

So far would be practically allowed by all. It is, however, a more legitimate inference from the same grounds that Russia cannot be admitted. True, her Court and Government

are in a sense Western. True, her religion is in the main doctrinally the same as that of the West; still she is even less than the leading Mussulman populations qualified for participation. Her religion has had no value socially, her government cannot supply the deficiencies of the nation it in a high degree wisely directs. Russia has not, as a nation, shared in Greco-Roman culture. She was never incorporated by Rome. She was not brought within the discipline of Catholicism, nor organized by Feudalism. She has been as a nation alien to the movement of later European thought. Evidently she stands at a distinct point from all those nations which have undergone these profound changes. She is on a lower level of training and tradition than they are. She should follow, adopt, assimilate, not attempt to lead or control. If admitted, she is a heterogeneous element, vitiating the whole unity and lowering its policy; she is a source of retrogradation, not a means of progress. Indeed, a sufficient justification for the exclusion of Russia is found in a right estimate of the social change which has lately attracted the attention, and, in a considerable measure, the admiration of Western Europe. It has been a vast and difficult transition through which Russia has passed successfully. But, in itself, it marks how backward she was. It is many centuries since Western Europe passed through the same stage—the transformation of the serf into the free man. Nothing could make it reasonable that a nation hardly yet clear of serfage should direct those which have long been free.

With reference to the general direction of European policy, the exclusion of Russia is a cardinal point; and Russia herself has greatly facilitated its acceptance and practical adoption, were the statesmen of the West alive to the opportunity she has given them, and sufficiently above their internal dissensions to seize it. The result of the Crimean war should have been to exclude her. Political exigencies gave her an opening for re-entering the councils of Europe, of which she availed herself with great skill. A second occasion was offered, and is still available, in regard to Poland. Her persistence in her policy against the remonstrances of Western Europe, her haughty defiance to the expressed opinions of the other governments and to the general public opinion of the West, should have

been met, and might still be met, not by war—that were an unjustifiable folly when no definite end can be assigned—but by shutting her out from all direct participation in Western affairs. Such a remedy involves no hostility to Russia within her own proper sphere. It is indicated, I venture to think, by the whole previous course of European history and policy. It is imperatively demanded not as a punishment for Russia, but as the efficacious guarantee of the right subsequent conduct of Europe.

Let me put an hypothesis which may make my meaning quite clear. Near the close of the year 1863 the Emperor of the French proposed to the Governments of Europe that they should meet in congress to avert the dangers which threatened its public order. The proposal was declined; and I have no wish to question the judgment shown in the refusal. The objections to that refusal applied to its form rather than its substance. As proposed, it seems clear that the congress could lead to no useful result. Let us suppose the proposal renewed, as it conceivably may yet be; or let us suppose a counter-proposal made; a proposal, that is, for an European congress under different conditions—for a congress, viz., of the Powers which, on the grounds above given, are natural constituents of a strictly European or Western assembly. Such an assembly would exclude Russia, to say nothing of other parts of Europe geographically so called. The invitations to attend it would be addressed to the five true Western Powers, whose community of traditions and associations would enable them to form a relatively homogeneous body, competent to discuss their difficult mutual relations and their no less difficult joint action, and from such discussion might spring very salutary consequences. But the peaceful exclusion of Russia could form no legitimate subject for complaint any more than that of Turkey. The congress so composed would be composed on a definite principle, justified at once by the historical antecedents as well as by the actual political needs of Europe.

I conceive that of the two Powers excluded from this hypothetical assembly, Turkey is the one which might with the greater show of reason claim admission. In other words, Turkey is more Western than Russia. As the leading Mohammedan State, the inheritor of the traditions of the

earlier Mohammedan Powers, the successor in its aggressive tendencies of the Arabian Khaleefate, Turkey is far more intimately bound up with the history of Europe than is Russia, whose admission to that history is barely a century old. The struggle with the Ottoman Empire colours deeply the history of Western Europe for the first three centuries of its modern period. It has largely modified the mutual relations of its different States. In that struggle the dangerous aggrandizement of the Austro-Spanish house—an aggrandizement which is the key to so long a chapter of European politics—finds its explanation and its justification. When, from the field of Pavia, Francis I. sent his ring to the Sultan, when Elizabeth of England invoked his aid, both but acted on the conviction that the Power they addressed was intimately connected with the general interests of Europe; a conviction which has remained unshaken during the succeeding centuries. Such, in rudimentary expression, might be the historical arrangement for acquiescence in the claims of Turkey. Nor is there wanting a political counterpart, the strength of which lies in the very circumstance which will be, and has been, most vehemently urged as the ground for the extrusion of Turkey from the European body politic. It is her religion which would make me wish for her admission, were it legitimate on other grounds. Every recognition of Turkey down to the latest at the time of the Crimean war, has been valuable as a protest against the spirit of religious exclusiveness, as an acknowledgment that there may be common human and political action in spite of the barriers raised by a difference of faith. Every such recognition has, in fact, distinctly set aside the claims of Christian nations, as such, to domineer over others in the name of an inherent superiority conferred on them by their religion. The force of such protest, the value of such recognition, would be increased, if, at the same time that Turkey entered the European councils, Russia, nominally of the same religion as Western Europe, were excluded from them. And besides this indirect advantage, by admitting Turkey the statesmen of the West would gain the further one of placing themselves in direct contact with the head of Mohammedanism, and so generally, through such intermedium, with the East. It is probable that in the imme-

diate future the need of a closer mutual action will be increasingly felt. The complication of international relations is every day growing; and there is growing at the same time the necessity for greater power of dealing with it. No proper opportunity of increasing such power should be neglected.

Still, neither historical nor political considerations would justify us in regarding Turkey as an integral part of the West. Whatever the advantages of such a view, they must be foregone rather than weaken by any immature concession the cohesion of the Western body, already far too weak. If I have dwelt on the superior claims of Turkey, it has been at once to draw out into fuller light the essential nullity of those of Russia, and to offer a contribution in aid of those who on other grounds, more or less empirically, yet in my judgment rightly, uphold the integrity and independent action of the Turkish Empire. No Western politician should hasten its downfall, or its withdrawal even from Europe. Its freedom of initiative should be scrupulously respected.

Be this as it may, the removal of Russia and Turkey from the state-system of Europe rectifies at once a not uncommon error, due partly to an excess of national self-consciousness in the people, or rather the writers of the people, which encourages it, partly to a misconception of mediæval history and an exaggeration of the importance of the German Emperors, the heads of the so-called Holy Roman Empire. In so valuable a book as Heeren's work on the Political State-system of Europe, it is assumed that Germany is the central State; and the idea is popular naturally in Germany, and fostered by certain tendencies in the minds of Englishmen. Germany is the central State if you look merely to the geographical form of Europe and the position of Germany in reference to it. So it is even politically, or might be, if you allow Russia and the Eastern elements to be a part of political Europe in its true sense. But it ceases to be so either geographically or politically if you shut out the Eastern contingent. Then the true Western Europe is seen at once, by the most cursory inspection of the map, to find its geographical centre in France. It finds its political centre there, as is confessed by all practical statesmen. France should be the central figure historically, were the intelligence of Europe rightly trained in historical know-

ledge. For it is not difficult to trace the cause of the historical misconception relative to the German Emperor, nor is it difficult to see its correction. When, in the tenth century, the pressure of danger lay on the eastern frontier of Europe, on the Empire then vested in the hands of Otho, as the representative of the greater emperors, fell the burden of defending that frontier, and with the burden naturally was given the pre-eminence. But the danger once over, the excentric importance ceased with it, and the principal place, if we distinguish real importance from nominal dignity, reverted to France. No one would claim in the Crusades the first place for Germany, and such concession rightly estimated is decisive.

I proceed now to a closer analysis of Western Europe disembarrassed from the complication of Russia. It still contains, in its more strict historical, as it did in its looser practical conception, five great Powers, which must be separately and accurately examined — France, Italy, Spain, England, and Germany ; for Austria and Prussia must merge in Germany in any proper conception of the West. It was said of Italy that she was but a geographical expression. It might be much more truly said of Germany as she at present exists. She is a threefold Power, and sadly incumbered with non-Germanic elements. On the difficult mutual relations of the three ; on the delicate position in respect to one another of the two most concentrated and most powerful States, on the manifold complications which the composition of these two presents, I need not here touch. It is desirable that the Germanic element in Western Europe should be, as strictly as is practically possible, detached from all alien adjuncts, that it should renounce all oppressive action on its neighbours East or South. It is as German, whether united more closely or in some such union as at present, that they should enter into the Western system. The cry for an united Germany has so far a truth in it as it tends to simplify the position. It is unwise as it is out of date. It is a mere political solution of difficulties, and the problem, which is the real task of Europe, is social and moral. Its anachronism is patent on the face of it. It is a cry not merely for internal union, but for internal union for the purposes of a retrograde external policy. It is a demand for aggrandizement, relative power, commercial and

political importance, and that irrespective of the just claims of others. Poland, Hungary, or Italy are not considered but as conducing to German greatness. There is no objection on the score of danger to Europe in an united Germany. If it tended to secure a better government, to remove oppressive distinctions and restrictions ; if it tended to the real internal welfare of the German people, it should be cordially welcomed. It is from the point of view of that people's genuine interests that it may be questioned whether it is not a waste of time ; a movement which the actual state of opinion in Europe makes natural and intelligible, but which is not the less to be regretted.

Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is with Germany as a whole that we are concerned when we are considering it in the composition of the West, as the fifth great Power. For the moment I omit France and England—as by common consent essential members of the West, both in the present and the past—and proceed to the consideration of the two remaining States, whose position needs some notice and rectification. Italy is, in the main, reconstituted as a kingdom. The course of events since 1859 has tended uniformly in one direction : her internal union into one State, and her restoration to her rank as a great European Power. She is not yet fully placed in that position in the diplomatic world ; but daily she is assuming more prominence in the calculations of statesmen, and the most recent change has given an increased impetus to the movement. But this new diplomatic attitude, if I may be allowed the expression, is by no means necessary to Italy to enable her to count as an indispensable constituent of the West. United or disunited, she can never be any thing but such constituent. Her claim rests on far too sound an historical ground. She has too profoundly guided and modified the whole of Western civilization. The second ultimately in real importance of the great Powers, Italy need wait for no material concentration ; she is certain of recognition as her just inheritance from which no jealousy could exclude her, even if any jealousy existed. Still, though the place of Italy is thus secure, it is not the less important that, in the present, for the welfare of the rest of Europe, it should be openly recognized, that in all common Western actions her

co-operation should be sought. The importance of this lies in the definiteness so given to the constitution of the West.

The case of Spain is similar in all essential particulars. She too must be reinstated in her full membership. Her closest co-operation must be invited. Her complete recognition as one of the five great Powers is urgently demanded of Western statesmen. Some years ago I urged on the English government and nation, in the interest alike of Spain, of England, and of Europe, the restitution to Spain of Gibraltar. I urge it not less now. It is not less now, than it was then, the duty of England to restore it. But I would urge more now. I would urge, that is, the adoption of a consistent policy of conciliation and support towards Spain, of which the cession of Gibraltar should be the first act and symbol. It were for the good of Europe that the statesmen of England should take the initiative in replacing Spain in her legitimate place; legitimate, that is, viewed by the light of historical continuity, and not simply under the narrower teaching of mere actual circumstances. No rivalry has been more fatal to Spain than that of England, though none has been more susceptible of palliation, or even justification. No nationality is more alienated from us than the Spanish; and justly alienated, by our selfish, haughty, and oppressive abuse of our power. Nothing could exert so beneficial an influence on the reconstitution of European union, nothing could so effectually tend to heal the antagonism now prevailing between the branches of the Western Family, as a sincere effort—and its sincerity might be tested by its success—on the part of England, Teutonic, Northern, and Protestant England, to restore to its due honour and importance the Latin, Southern, and Catholic Spain.

As a result of these changes, we have, as the five great Powers of the West, France, Italy, Spain, England, and Germany. But this simple enumeration is insufficient for my present purpose. Only one of the five is quite simple; Italy as a geographical expression, and the Italian population are co-extensive, for Italy has neither dependencies nor colonies. She is free from all the evil associations which adhere to those names in the case of the others. Still, for the sake of symmetry, and not also without a real political value in the change, I would at present speak rather of the Italian people than of

Italy. The pressure which is forcing on the Italians a political concentration similar to that of their powerful neighbours—which is giving them a large army, a large fleet, a large debt, all the attributes, in short, of a first-rate European Power—is, it may be hoped, but temporary. Her full independence once attained, Italy may resume her long tradition of a moral, not political union, her highly articulate national existence, rather than remain a strongly centralized government. It is deeply to be regretted that the need of complete independence is interrupting her history, and forcing her to renounce for a time the valuable legacy of the past; which in the past, it is true, has been the cause of so much suffering, but which in the present and future might serve her much,—I allude to the co-existence of a number of real states, large enough for all the objects of a state, not large enough to stifle all civic feeling. The loss of this organization is the great evil to Italy, and through her to Europe, of the retention of Venice by Austria. It has a tendency to result for Italy in a great political aberration.

As Italy for the Italian, so France stands for the French population wherever found, in or out of France proper, in colonies belonging to France or in colonies planted by her, but now owning another political allegiance, such as Lower Canada. Any such offshoots of a nation are, relatively to the rest of the world, still integral parts of it, sympathizing with it, and acting as conductors of its influence to the rest. They form, equally with the parent state, a part of the West, as we conceive it. So that it is seen to be composed, not of five definite political unities or states, but of five freer and larger social unities or populations, of which the closer and more concentrated unities are but the parts and centres. Nor is the social unity confined to the parent state and its colonies; there may be other essential constituents of it which are independent states, and have always been such historically; e.g. the French portion of Belgium is a part of France, in the largest sense of the term.

Similarly, the Spanish populations both in the Old and New World—not merely the Spanish Peninsula, Spain and Portugal that is, but the vast Spanish and Portuguese offshoots in Central and South America or elsewhere—are the equiva-

lent of Spain, as part of Western Europe. So again with England, which enters the European concert as the short expression for the Anglo-Saxon populations of the United States, not less than for its own immediate colonies, Canadian or Australasian. Lastly, the same holds good of Germany. The German population comprises not merely Germany proper, but its natural appendages—Holland, German Switzerland, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and any colonial adjuncts, whether separate colonies or large masses of German settlers.

If, to make my meaning clear, I have thus in detail pointed out that the West means the collective unity formed by the five populations above mentioned, for the sake of convenience of expression I shall use, when speaking of them, the more concentrated terms, the names of the representative nucleus of each population. One remark I would, however, premise: what has been said of Italy applies with equal force to the others in the future. Their great political concentration, such as it exists in France, Spain, or England, has had doubtless, and may have still, a relative value. But in the future it will be otherwise; and the disgregation of Italy is but the type of the political order which is equally desirable for all. Ultimately, it ought as little to be the aim of the statesman to keep together the large national aggregates actually in existence, as it is to reunite those which have been separated during the last three centuries, Holland with Spain, for instance; the United States with England; or the Spanish settlements with the mother country. Such reunion is never dreamt of. All English politicians are aware that the separation of the American colonies in the last century will at no very distant period be followed by that of the Canadian and Australasian; and they acquiesce in this fact. The mere distance offers an insuperable obstacle to permanent union. It will remain for the future to see whether distance alone is the necessary condition of separation; whether size may not equally be a sound reason; whether the principle adopted as the regulator of the magnitude of states should not be the real adequate securing of the highest objects of state-union. The older division of Great Britain was but an anticipation. In one form or another it will reappear. So that in wishing for Italian decentralization, for the separate existence of her

traditional smaller states, I am but applying to her immediately what I consider to be the desirable political organization ultimately for her compeers.

In the meantime, however, whilst the larger national aggregates remain, their action, as centres of the corresponding populations, will be the most powerful, will be for a time the only action that can be sensibly felt. In other words, it is Western Europe, in the narrower, more ordinary sense, which for some time must be the active agent, the minister of the great purposes of the whole Western community. It is desirable to avoid vagueness, no less in action than in thought. The other states are too distant, and in many points in too different a situation, to act much at present. So much may be said without prejudice to their legitimate and naturally increasing influence. The great American Union, reconstituted in its full integrity, must have great weight in all Western collective action. But the exercise of its power will be the more salutary if it is exerted in presence of a reconstituted Western centre, not brought to bear on isolated, and in the main antagonistic, governments.

I spoke above of the inheritance of Greek intellectual culture, Roman organization, the mediæval Catholic Feudalism, and the at once destructive and reconstructive revolution of modern Europe during the five last centuries. It was this inheritance which was made the foundation on which to raise the political and social superstructure of the West. It was the having shared, in some greater or less degree, in this inheritance which constituted the legitimate title to form a part of the collective unity. It is obvious that the five states included have not shared in an equal degree. The transmission of the Western traditions has been more direct and unbroken with some than with others; more direct and unbroken in France, Italy, and Spain, than in England and Germany. Again, it has been less impaired in France and Italy than in Spain, in England than in Germany. Still these differences are differences of degree only. If Germany had the misfortune to lose the benefits of subjugation by Rome, and consequently the fertilizing influences of Roman civilization, the loss has been in a large measure, though far from wholly, repaired by the conquests of Charlemagne and her subsequent admixture with Western political action. Her inheritance has been indirect, but

it is sufficient. If by the Saxon conquest England lost the advantages her incorporation into the Roman Empire had promised her, by the action of the Papacy under Gregory the Great, and by the Norman invasion, she regained to a great extent her position. The indirectness of the transmission does not invalidate her claim to be an integral part of Western Europe.

But there are two European states which require a separate mention, as standing on a distinct ground. Both have a definite history and definite relations with Western civilization ; both are incompletely, it is true, yet necessarily adjuncts of the West. The two I mean are Greece and Poland. It were impossible to exclude Greece from our consideration ; for to Greece we owe the first great step in our continuous movement —the intellectual culture of the race. The poetry, the philosophy, the science of Western Europe are inexplicable without Greece. Sharing nominally in the Roman incorporation, she was really alien and averse to it, and was essentially not benefited by it. She wholly missed the benefits of Catholicism ; nor could she accept those of Mohammedanism. She remains, therefore, incomplete, undeveloped ; yet, by virtue of her past, she interests Western Europe, and is a fit object for the earliest application of her beneficent protection. The heterogeneous protectorate, which is the expression of this relation, and under which she has suffered as much as she has profited, is destined to give way to a more wisely instituted direction, one more purely Western, and as such free from the conflicting interests which have sacrificed Greece to other political antagonism.

It is purely by her conversion to Catholicism that Poland stands out from her more immediate kindred. It is by her services as the bulwark of Europe against the barbarians that she has an especial claim on the goodwill of the West. She is inseparable from its past history. Yet that goodwill cannot be shown by war. There is no justification for such a course ; there is equally none for abandoning her. A beneficial influence in her destiny can only, however, be exercised from without when the Powers which could exercise it have themselves been modified. In the meantime Poland, which in the main suffers from her anarchical political constitution and from her belated social order, must look to her own action, and guide herself by the experience of more advanced nations. When

the time is come for a collective Western action, it would seem natural that, as in the past, so again, such action should take effect through Germany. Once thoroughly Western in its sympathies, disengaged at once from subservience to Russia and from all cravings for aggrandizement eastward, Germany will neither seek to retain the parts of Poland which are now incorporated into her aggregate, nor connive at the absorption of the rest by Russia. Through Germany as its organ the West will assume towards Poland, under better auspices and on more sure grounds, the attitude which the Popes have honourably assumed in the worst times. With more powerful efficacy, the intervention, so directed in favour of Poland, will replace the isolated and therefore inefficacious sympathy of France.

So much for the full explanation of the term 'the West.' In its widest as well as in its most concentrated meaning, it is fairly before the reader. An attentive consideration will show that so vast a collective existence can only be held together by a moral union. A common inheritance, a community of traditions and of the feelings and sympathies consequent thereon, a common faith, a common object—such, and not any outward political or material bonds, must constitute the tie. Such community must evidently be first realized by the more central portions; the stress of instruction and guidance rests on them. Once realized in some approximative degree by them, it will rapidly spread to the more distant portions.

The union above indicated has its prototype in history. Mediæval Europe felt itself to be one in this sense under the Catholic-Feudal organization. There was then a moral and spiritual union of Western Christendom, entirely different from that which had bound together substantially the same extent in the Roman period. The more we study mediæval records, the more we see the completeness and the strength which then characterized the intercommunion of Europe. The isolation of the several nations and their mutual antipathies date in their full force from the break-up of the Middle Ages in the fourteenth century. They have been intensified and systematized by the so-called Reformation of the sixteenth. For our purpose it is sufficient that a different state—a state of communion and sympathy—was once the order of Europe. For its attainment once makes it probable that it may be attained

again, if it can be shown, as it can be and has been, that the causes of its first failure can be avoided, and that the grounds on which its partial success rested still exist. It is for our own generation, and the generations which shall follow it, to form again the intercommunion of Western Europe in the interest of the whole human race, and in obedience to the teachings of the past. It may be revived on a surer basis and with greater closeness. The basis to be surer must be rational and real, not fictitious; the greater closeness may be gained by substituting the definite conception of the West for the indefinite and anarchical term of Christendom. The weakness inherent in this term is apparent from the fact that it never really included all the nations which in belief were Christian; as is sufficiently seen by the fourth Crusade, when the armies of Europe were diverted from their legitimate enemies to attack and plunder the metropolis and empire of their Eastern co-religionists.

The historical probability of the union granted, the means of attaining it are simple in statement, if difficult of execution. There is the direct action of statesmen and governments based on their having mastered the conception. They might exert a most powerful influence by removing existing obstacles and familiarizing the nations they direct with the idea of a new European polity.

Anticipating, accompanying, and supporting their action, a rightly directed public opinion might spread its results rapidly throughout the peoples immediately affected by it. Both together, the action of the statesmen and the opinion of the peoples would work harmoniously to the further object—to the discovery of the ultimate means of insuring a sound foundation for the work initiated by the convergence of their respective influences. Such ultimate means are the institution and development of the education, and the calling into existence the body which should organize the education, of the West. Enough, if I here indicate this fundamental requisite for the new order, which can only rest as its prototype—the Catholic order—did, on a community of faith. It was indispensable to indicate it, were it only to preclude any supposition that the bond which is at present so much vaunted, that of commercial interest, was in any degree relied on. It were

unwise to refuse to the tie created by commerce a certain negative influence in favour of peace. But men are never really united by interests, nor are nations. Morally, interests are more calculated to separate. It is important that we should not be led astray by the teaching now so prevalent, and substitute a delusive connection for a solid one. The inefficacy of this commercial tie may be well appreciated by seeing to what it leads in regard to other nations not professedly included by it. The common interest of those whom it connects finds its expression in the most oppressive action towards those without. It is but a collective selfishness, and naturally works to selfish ends.

I touch but slightly on such a point, as it will find its full consideration elsewhere in this series of essays. But if commerce is rejected as the foundation of Western order, as being inherently and necessarily, when left to itself, negative, however positive in outward semblance, it follows *à fortiori* that no mere negation can be accepted in its default. Yet it is on a mere negation that the State-system of Europe actually rests. The Balance of Power, which avowedly for the last two centuries has been the active guiding principle of Western policy, is and can be nothing else. It is a provisional artifice—the expression of mutual jealousy, the diplomatic remedy for a transitional state of disorder. It implies a state of compromise, not of co-operation; and as co-operation is the aim of human society in all its forms, its temporary substitute must ultimately disappear. Be so much said without impeachment of the statesman-like prudence which invented, has subsequently applied, and still clings to, the balance of power, as, in the absence of any other formula, the best relatively.

For I cannot think that the new principle, whatever its justification, whatever its attractions, which has been largely adopted by what is called the Liberal school in Europe, and is now coquetted with, now trampled on, by the ambition of its governments, offers a less unsound, if more spacious, basis of organization. I allude to the principle of nationalities. I do not wish to extenuate, much less to deny, the evils for which this principle is the proffered remedy. Still the new formula, if examined with attention, is but a variation of the old. It is the old thing under a new name, with the added evil that

it enlists, thus rebaptized, the sympathies of whole populations instead of remaining simply an affair for the colder reason of diplomatists and statesmen. Each separate nationality aims at concentration, independence, and strength, but with the object of asserting itself against all the rest. The violent compression which keeps together discordant aggregates I regret as much as any one. But I can see no real cure for such evils in the immediate assertion of feelings such as have animated Germany in the recent contest with Denmark. For the purely transitional state through which Europe is passing, the older principle is sufficient to maintain a certain order; and it were a waste of time to endeavour to substitute in its place anything which at bottom should be equally provisional. For, apart from all abuses of it by its advocates, the new one is, considered in itself, an arrangement for separation, not a bond of union. True, it may be urged that such separation will lead to union, but it can only do so indirectly, and there are direct means available; and as there are these means, it seems unadvisable to fall back on any indirect and negative method.

Both principles—that of the balance of power, as well as that of nationalities—have a relative value. Either might have been a ground-work for European order. One has been adopted as such; and as neither is capable of being a definitive settlement, it is unadvisable at the present period to replace it by the other. It is on purely relative grounds that the latter is set aside as a substitute. In fact, so purely relative are the grounds that there are cases in which its immediate adoption may be advocated. Applied to a highly civilized community, such as Italy, the national principle is indefeasible. It would, if enforced at once, conduce highly to peace and order in Europe. If enforced in the European dominions of Turkey, it would be a serious political error; it would but tend to disorder.

Both principles are inadequate, and equally so, if looked on as final solutions. They are both of them remedies far too material and political to meet difficulties which are social and moral, and which as such demand a social and moral treatment. They have not in them any tendency to harmonize opinions and convictions; they have not even any

tendency to further concordant action, much less to promote sympathies. And the absence of such tendencies is their conclusive condemnation in the eyes of all who allow that only on harmonious opinion and conviction can enduring sympathy be based, and that without such sympathy no lasting convergence of action is conceivable.

The political conception 'the West,' explained in detail, the principles on which European order actually rests, or is wished to rest, set aside, the nature of the union to be aimed at, having been stated, it remains for me to consider what is the aim set before this collective personality. Shortly, I may state it to be the peaceful action on the rest of the race, with the purpose of raising, or enabling its various constituents to rise, in due order to the level it has itself attained. Such a body would stand forth as the model at once and director of the rest. Duly organized within, conscious of its functions and obligations, it would appreciate the wants and situation of those without it; and, without any pressure or unwarranted interference with their legitimate independence of action, it would be ready to help them in their onward course. Orderly within itself, and keeping order by a joint effort on the common ground of the race, the sea, it would institute systematic connections with the other nations or populations. The basis of such intercourse would not, as now, be mainly, much less purely, industrial and for its own benefit. There would be no slighting of the advantages and uses of commerce; but commerce would hold its proper, entirely secondary and subordinate, position, available as a stimulus and guarantee for continuity of relations. The religious missions of the present are elements of disturbance, and offer no compensation for such disturbance; they are engaged, in the main, in the hopeless attempt to spread an exclusive and unsympathetic faith, which as such has no chance of being accepted. Their only recommendation is their motive and their general idea, but neither the one nor the other prevents their being, in their leading results, a mere evil. Superseding them, the missions of the future will hold a different language, aim at widely different objects, and have a very different efficacy. In full sympathy with the past and present intellectual, social, and religious condition of those whom they address, equally whether mono-

theistic, polytheistic, or fetishist, they will take them each at the point at which they find them, accept their actual state, and lead them on by an orderly development. Such peaceful and sympathetic action, made intelligible by a previous cessation of the violent and fraudulent intercouse which now repels all tendencies to friendliness, will be met by the unreserved admission of the superiority of the West. The nations to whom it speaks will allow its moral and intellectual pre-eminence as completely as they even now admit its material, mechanical, and active predominance. They will have no repugnance to disinterested advice, free from all tendency to disturb or design of conquest. Treated with courtesy and respect, not, as now, with ill-concealed contempt, they will reciprocate an intercourse from which both derive good, as surely as they now reject, so far as they dare, the interchange of dependence on one side and haughtiness on the other.

The experience of the past has repeatedly shown that this is no idle dream; that there is on the part of the less advanced races a strong disposition to appropriate the progress of the more favoured, and to be grateful to the agents of its communication. And this is true, not merely of simple barbarous tribes, whose propensity is almost to worship the white man as a god; but it is true also of those nations which have attained a high degree of organized political and social existence. It is demonstrable that their exclusiveness, such as it is, has been the result of long-proved incapacity on the part of the Western nations to associate with them on terms of mutual courtesy and fair reciprocity of advantage. Their exclusiveness has been justified in the past, and is still justifiable; and were the statesmen of Europe not the mere tools of its commercial rapacity, it would be respected, and, with slight modifications, accepted and enforced. But with a change in the attitude, and consequently in the action of Western nations, such exclusiveness would fall from the mere absence of any adequate motive for its continuance. The natural mutual attractions of the different portions of the race would come into full play, and with the sense of security in their intercourse would come the conviction of its utility.

I need not dwell on the advantages to be derived from an

intercourse so conducted, so far as concerns the less advanced nations. I have but to sketch in principle and in outline its nature and tendency. That done, I may turn to the reaction on the more advanced, on the Western populations. That this reaction would be most beneficial, there can be no doubt. In mediæval times Western Christendom was united under the direction of the Papacy in the Crusades. The Popes felt that in co-operation in a great external object lay a remedy for internal evils. I pass over all discussion of the object of those expeditions, all discussion of their justification; I pass over the direct results of bloodshed and misery. With all their weakness and imperfection, they in a measure answered their end—they united Europe, and they were fraught with collateral benefits of great importance. Curiously enough, they tended on the whole rather to the union than the disunion of the hostile parties. Contact led to a more correct appreciation by the antagonists of one another. A just estimate of the general effects of the Crusades allows them to have been beneficial.

If, in more modern times, we substitute peaceful agencies for war, the spirit of conciliation for that of antagonism, the wish to raise, not the design to conquer or even exterminate, it would be difficult to overestimate the gain that would accrue to Western Europe from such co-operation. In it might be found an adequate sphere for all its energies, a large and wholesome gratification of all its nobler impulses, a powerful stimulus to its own advance, and more complete internal organization and harmony. To form part of a body co-operating peacefully for such great ends, as the recognized instrument of Humanity, were surely a sufficient distinction, a sufficient satisfaction of the less relative instincts of national pride and ambition. Exorbitant as they now are, they might rest in what is hereby offered them. Their full gratification in their present shape is evidently impossible. They exclude one another. This has long been felt to be true. The dream of universal empire has long since passed away, and the partial gratification afforded by being the first among many peers can only be attained by one, while the struggle for either complete or partial satisfaction, from its selfish character, has no tendency to raise, but rather to degrade. But in

this co-ordinate union for the common good of the whole, the instincts above mentioned may receive an adequate development, and may be turned into useful instruments. We of the West, the advanced guard of Humanity, are citizens of no mean city; not lowered by narrow and local aspirations; not isolated by national selfishness; not degraded by anti-social ambition. The barriers of religious, national, commercial separation fall before the new unity. We cease to be solely or primarily members of such or such a Western nation, England or France. We become primarily Western, with an immunity from all the evils which have clung around the exclusive prominence given to the more restricted associations; free from the poverty which now attaches to all our political conceptions, relieved from the antagonisms which render fertile of dangers our actual political and international order. The ties and obligations of the new relation exert a healthy influence on all our thought and action, not extinguishing, nor even lessening, our love of our separate countries and states, but correcting its excess, and by placing it in its due subordination, at once purifying and strengthening it.

The policy here advocated on international questions meets and in a considerable degree sympathizes with each of the two conflicting tendencies of English opinion on such matters.

The school at present in the ascendant preaches absolute non-intervention in Europe. It asserts the duty of concentrating all our attention and our action on ourselves and our own interests. This abstinence from all interference is the final result of a long and sad experience, the fruit of our mature wisdom. Those who proclaim this negation of a policy are naturally jubilant over our recent conduct towards Denmark as the sign of its triumph. Yet it would almost seem as if it were only in Europe, and on a calculation of the profits and losses of our intervention there, that this complete inaction is desirable. Where interference is profitable and easy, and brings with it commercial advantages, it would seem that it may be condoned. Be this as it may, the avowed object is peace and abstention. The only flaw in the doctrine is the being too absolute; otherwise we sympathize with the object. We too aim at peace, consider war as a blunder and

anachronism, though aware that it may even yet be necessary. We would act as much as possible by peaceful means, but we would act, and that in the interest of others. We do not accept the doctrine, that the pursuit by each nation of its own interests will practically lead to the harmonious adjustment of all human affairs.

The opposite school feels indignant at such renunciation on the part of England. It recoils from the consequences of its abstention, but it recoils solely from the consideration of its effects on England. Its language is imperial. The empire we have won must be preserved, as to recede were to degrade ourselves, were to dim our high consciousness of power and greatness, and cramp all our nobler energies. In short, England needs empire for the sake of England. This imperial policy is more directly immoral than the other, for it sacrifices with the quietest determination all the claims of others. Other nations are but to be the pedestal on which we may raise the proud statue of imperial England.

Yet this immoral and essentially degrading policy has a certain truth in it, and one which demands sympathy. The different policy I advocate offers its disciples a sphere of action, the consciousness of a noble place, and a great purpose in the world's affairs. They are right, surely, in thinking that it cannot be a sound conclusion which involves so entire a rupture with the past, with all our historic tradition. They are right in thinking that great sacrifices should be incurred on fitting occasions, and that there are such occasions. A highly social existence is the proper existence for man, whether in states or individuals; and such an existence involves perpetual duties to others and perpetual sacrifices on behalf of others. The opposite theory is inhuman, and contradicts all the obligations flowing from our position as a fact, our actual membership in Humanity.

The primary requisite is to realize the conception of this organization of the Western World and the new policy and the new obligations which are its natural results. Once become familiar in clear and definite outline, it will rapidly exercise its proper influence. The ground is prepared for it. The failure of the older system, the need for some new one—something which may guide us to a reconstruction—are largely

felt. Many obstacles in the way of its acceptance have been removed; the intenser feeling of national self-assertion at the expense of others has been, there is reason to think, losing its hold. There is abundance of it left; but it becomes more and more repugnant to a larger number. In this country—in which at present more than in any other lies, not the power of guidance, but the power of obstruction, corresponding to the immense influence she might exercise in forwarding what is useful—observers recognize a change of opinion on all questions of international policy, so far as Europe is concerned—a change in the direction of moderation.

The conception of the West once realized, the first task is its re-organization within its own limits, the reconstruction of the proper relations of its different national constituents. The second and simultaneous task is the reconstruction of the social order in each of these constituents. During the period of this double process, the main feature of the policy toward all without must be a wise abstention, the steady discouragement, even the prohibition of all attempts at premature interference on the part of its own members or of others. As much as possible all irregular action, all disturbing influences, should be removed. Respect for the organizations that exist is the first cardinal principle, the simplest obligation, on those who cannot offer a substitute. Such should be the action of Western statesmen and diplomatists in dealing with the Mohammedan and Polytheistic East. Their only active interference should be to repress with vigour the freebooting tendencies of European commerce. The simplest way would be to withdraw all protection from the unfair trader. Let him be given up to the justice of those on whom at present he preys. But it would be better still to exercise a vigorous surveillance on the commercial world, and, above all, never to lend support to their encroachments.

A comparatively short course of such a moderate and just policy would restore a right feeling between the East and West. And when the latter had in some approximate degree attained its own reconstitution, it would find no obstacles to its imparting its influence to the former. Its indirect influence is already great, in spite of all the grounds of repulsion. Remove these grounds, and this indirect influence will be

found to have made the way smooth for the direct. So, for the common good of the present and the future of Humanity, might be brought into active operation, the two great principles whose due and harmonious co-ordination would, I consider, meet our difficulties—the Unity of the race and the Leadership vested in the West.

NOTE ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

IN the preceding Essay, with a view to the proper proportions of the subject, I have given but a few lines to the United States—the powerful confederation which in popular language monopolises the name of America. Many reasons seem to conspire to claim more for it. Its large population; the rapidity, hitherto happily unparalleled, with which that population increases; the extent of its actual territory, the possibility, nay, even the probability, of an extension of that territory, northwards and southwards, by peaceful annexation or by war; the energy of its citizens; their now proved capacity for great sacrifices and a long war; their endurance at once and their success; the political doctrines which America represents; the social well-being which materially she has attained—all alike, and especially the two latter considerations, would seem to justify a greater prominence for her in the estimate alike of the practical statesman and of the political theorist. Add further, the accidental complication, that, by the want of right feeling and due foresight, the two leading Governments of the West have placed themselves on a footing, if not of hostility, yet of serious misunderstanding with the American Republic, rendering it more disposed naturally to assert its influence, and forcing on them an anxious consideration of the results of that influence.

Whatever the nature of this influence may prove to be, whatever the dangers we in England may incur in consequence of the blunders of our statesmen and the evil feelings of the governing classes which they represent, there is every reason to rejoice in the reconstitution of the American Union. Its dissolution on the grounds alleged, and with the objects actually

avowed, would have been, so far as we can see, a great calamity. Both the issues of the struggle recently ended were important. The primary, as it were the official and national issue, the maintenance of the Union in its full integrity, was important for the welfare of the American people. The anarchical doctrine of state rights, as asserted, would, under the existing circumstances of America, have had most dangerous consequences. The framework of her social order is already but too ill-compacted. The second and more general issue, the existence or non-existence of slavery as an institution, was important in regard to the highest interests of Humanity. Its greater importance was seen in the way in which it gradually overrode and obscured the other. The industry of man, the basis of all society for the future, must be freed as soon as possible, and has been freed in America, from the stain of degradation, from all association of disgrace.

Yet neither our legitimate admiration for the conduct of the American people, nor our high estimate both of its immediate power and of its future growth, may lead to any essential modification of the abstract political theory given above. Neither the language of her statesmen and her people, nor the acceptance of that language by some of our statesmen, and largely also by the convictions of the English working classes—neither the one nor the other should induce us to admit her claim to be the latest outcome of the mature political wisdom of the race, the type to which all others must eventually conform. For America claims no less, it would seem, she claims no less than to be the leader of the West towards new horizons of indefinite political and social progress. On one point only can that claim be admitted—a point in some degree of form as regards some European governments, though a point of essential superiority as regards others. America stands before the world as the representative of republican government. I will not stay to dwell on the different forms of such government, nor on the distinctness of the two ideas, Democracy and Republicanism. I will acquiesce without qualification in the merit of the American position. As the greatest modern Republic, she is, and must be, in the van ; for republican government, with all its noble associations and inherent advantages, is, as we believe, the

last word in human political institutions. Without any need for impatience, Europe is moving towards it.

But this point of vantage conceded to America, in her further claims we cannot acquiesce. We cannot recognize any general leadership vested in her. The offspring, as an independent State, of a period of negation and dissolution; the offspring also of a nation which is not by its antecedents, or by its present condition, qualified to take the lead in human affairs; founded as she is on doctrines which neither she nor others can work into political utility; penetrated by revolutionary principles, which, as such, have only a transitional utility, and can never be the basis of permanent order; requiring, as she does, as much, if not more, than any Western nation—more than most certainly—a complete revision of her theories of governments and social order; America cannot be in any sense a guide or a model for the Western statesman or thinker. She may and will react powerfully, and in the main usefully, on Europe. In some respects she will react prejudicially, especially, I fear, on our own country; but to such reaction her influence must be limited in thought, as it will be in fact. Her great material well-being—the general diffusion, that is, of a state of material comfort and prosperity to which many European nations, most notably our own, are strangers—the more it is appreciated, the more useful it may be, in raising the status of the labourer everywhere. It is a fair source of pride to America, that nowhere does the poor man find such a compensation for his labour, so comfortable a home. It is this which in a degree justifies the language of admiration for American institutions which is so common in England. We see the masses of our own hard-worked, ill-paid, and suffering poor, whose sufferings and inadequate remuneration are largely the result of social mismanagement, of our defective social arrangements, and we compare them with the same classes in America, and we naturally feel admiration for the different conditions of society and political institutions under which so different a condition of the workman is attainable. But such admiration may carry us too far. By other means than those adopted by America must we work towards the end we aim at—and that end, it must be said, is not identical with the end hitherto attained by America. A sound constitution of

the industry of man is more possible even now on European bases than on American.

It is no part of my present plan to analyse at any length the phenomena of the American social order. All I wish to do is to indicate the grounds on which I think that they who would reorganize the Western World may not take that order as their model. America must weigh heavily in the scales of international policy; but she weighs by her mass, not by her ideas. This is but to say, in other words, that she will receive far more than she can give; be guided rather than lead; be influenced rather than influence. I have already stated that her industrial organization is in no respect in advance of that of Europe. In none of the great divisions of human industry would it seem that she can teach anything: and in one she is more completely disorganized than any other country, not excepting our own. I allude to the relations of the employers and the employed, the capitalist and the workman. Partly from the influence of the empty revolutionary dogmas of the rights of man, and the equality of all men; partly as the result of the unfortunate contact with slavery, which has left its impress on the North as on the South; all the necessary subordination of man to man is a thing profoundly repugnant to the American mind. In one of the valuable series of letters contributed by a 'Yankee' to the 'Spectator,' there was a passage that showed this very clearly. The writer—I have not by me the passage, but am clear as to its general sense—spoke, and spoke with pride, of no native American being willing to hold the position of domestic servant. It was a degrading position in his eyes, as in those of his countrymen. The negro or the immigrant Irish alone were adapted for it. But if it is degrading for the servant, it would seem a duty on the part of the master to renounce for himself the benefits which he reaps from such degradation. To that conclusion the writer had not come. Yet it seems the logical one. The complete disturbance of human life which would result from the universal acceptance of this view—which is not confined to America, however—is a sufficient reason for its rejection practically. Its theory is equally weak. The free and honourable service of man, the direct personal service I mean, on right conditions, is as noble a task for man to undertake,

and as susceptible of defence by argument, as any other human institution. The social order in which so fundamental a tradition of Humanity is ignored or rejected, is by virtue of that omission shown to be deeply revolutionary, and, as such, incompetent to lead in reconstruction.

But if in the sphere of material interests we are to refuse the guidance of America, born and nurtured, as she has been, apart from the influences of feudalism, and open therefore to all the aspirations of nascent industrialism, it will be but too probable that, in other spheres of human thought and order, we can still less accept it, and so it is in fact. Politically, America, if we may trust to those who speak and write for her, is bent, not merely with relation to immediate wants, but as a permanent conception, on forming one vast whole. The disgregation which I have advocated for the populations of the West would nowhere be received with more unquestionable repugnance than by the statesmen and people of the North American Union. Quite as much, too, as any Western population America has her attention concentrated on merely political, diverted from the more urgent social objects ; and her social state is so far more defective than any other that, in the reaction from the evils of privilege, the proper relat ons of the different classes are inverted, and the natural leaders of society are forced, in great measure, to divest themselves of their function, and stand aside as spectators of the political action of others.

Lastly, in the domain of the intellect, in relation to all the more general and higher conceptions of man, whether scientific, philosophical, or religious, America can claim, and, speaking broadly, does claim, no initiative. I imagine that in this all cultivated Americans would agree with me. It is from Western Europe that any impulse to progress in these departments must in the main originate. Nothing can be a clearer proof of this than the evidently greater influence in America than in Europe of the religious ideas of the past. Judging by all the utterances during the late struggle, emancipation from those ideas is incomparably more advanced in Europe.

I have confined myself to the simplest and shortest indications of the general opinion advocated. To work them out

would be out of place, as it would be to enter into any detailed considerations of the immediate or more distant future of the American Union. As necessarily a portion of the West, it will follow the same course as the rest; it will acknowledge ultimately the same traditions, be modified by the same ideas, become organized on the same conceptions, and lend its powerful support to the propagation of that organization.

We who urge on England a more moderate and more just estimation of herself, who urge her renunciation of any claim to be the first nation of the world, her acceptance of the secondary position accorded her by the whole of past history, who urge on her, lastly, to throw away the language of self-assertion, and concentrate her attention on her international duties—we cannot be expected to hold a different language in relation to her great colony. We cannot recognize as valid in America claims which we reject on behalf of her parent. Nor can we recognize as sound, when relied on by American statesmen and writers, doctrines as to rights, international or political, which we wholly repudiate when they are put forward by Europeans. On both sides of the Atlantic the situation is essentially the same; it is modified for the worse in America by the necessary conditions of her youth and expansiveness. On both sides the need is the same, a wise international co-operation, resting on due subordination, in the interest of the whole race ultimately, and with the immediate object of a thorough internal reconstruction. Such need is not less urgent—if writers most favourable to her may be trusted—is even more urgent in America than in any other nation of the Western World.

MR. BROADHEAD AND THE ANONYMOUS PRESS.

Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.

I.

I WRITE no word in favour of Mr. Broadhead or his associates. Absolutely, unreservedly, without qualification, I condemn their crimes. It is necessary, it seems, for an ordinary honest Englishman, in self-protection, to disclaim sympathy with murderers; or, as my friend Mr. Beesly, he may be subject to the cowardly and false insinuation that he is an apologist for murder. Therefore I open with the above direct condemnation of the practices at Sheffield.

Nor do I write a word here in favour of Unionism or against it. I remark only that an important question, such as Unionism, is never settled but on its own merits. The judgment is disturbed, the passions are inflamed by incidental evils, and the settlement may be retarded as a consequence of the disturbance and the heat; or it may be hastened as a result of the increased attention drawn to the subject. But beyond this the evils are irrelevant. In the real discussion of great questions we have to clear away their accidents.

The Sheffield crimes are peculiarly offensive to me, and to those who on industrial questions largely agree with me, and I may claim Mr. Beesly as one of them. They are repugnant to every principle he and I hold in common. Their objects, their methods, their results, the whole spirit which leads to them, all equally do we abhor.

In the contest between labour and capital which is agitating every country of Western Europe—a contest which will be long and bitter—we deprecate all recourse to violence. We believe that the conflicting interests of labour and capital may be harmonized, due allowance being made for the disturb-

ing power of the selfish instincts of man. We hold that the problems of industrial organization are susceptible of a moral solution, and that no other is admissible. We hold that legislation has nothing to do with them—would be powerless to settle them; we hold that force is still more out of the question—still more powerless. All that is admissible is the refusal on the one side to find capital, on the other to find labour, in cases where there is temporarily a complete disagreement as to the conditions under which the capital is given or the labour found. In other words, that either employer or employed may strike—may cease co-operation till agreement be obtained. Crimes of violence, such as the Sheffield crimes, are in direct opposition to these principles.

Again, if there is one condition more than another on which I should wish to insist in the regulation of industry, it is the abandonment of all secret associations. All combinations, all discussions, should be open and above-board. This applies to both parties, employers and employed. Here again, then, the action of Mr. Broadhead and his associates offends against every principle I advocate. Their crimes are the crimes of secret associations.

Lastly, where men risk their own lives in support even of a bad cause, in the execution of the crimes they have planned, the judgment passed on them, however severe, will yet be less harsh than when they plan in safety and risk their agents' lives. The case becomes almost infinitely more abhorrent when their acts by virtue of their secresy expose others to suspicion, and to all the danger which in such cases and with the uncertainties of human justice, waits upon suspicion. There is a peculiar baseness in this which justly arouses the deepest indignation, and the revelations at Sheffield show that the crimes of the conspirators there were of this aggravated character.

I do not palliate them: I do not in aught extenuate them. But I should take shame to myself if I gave in for a moment to the tendency which is too common amongst us to exaggerate them, or if I declined my share of the odium which a just parallel excites in the minds of what is called Society. I have seen on more than one occasion an almost brute outbreak of indignation and vengefulness run like wildfire through

our upper classes; and I say boldly it has ever been in cases in which their interests and their passions have been assailed. When their interests and passions are not involved, they are not easily stirred; and when the crimes are on their own side—appeal to rather than assail their interests and passions—then let any one say whether they do not even acquiesce in them. Not having learnt the fashionable lesson of sympathy with the strong, the oppressor, or the slave-holder, I am free to say that Mr. Broadhead may flaunt his guilt amid his admirers at Sheffield, or Mr. Ramsay may live safely under the protection, and enjoy, it may be, the admiration of the Jamaica planters; or Mr. Eyre may escape trial by the grace of Shropshire magistrates, with the sympathy of the neighbouring gentry and of the upper classes generally, leaving a deep stain of inequality on the criminal justice of their country, which has seldom received such a blow; but the human feelings which they have outraged will find their expression; and, distasteful as it may be, they and their abettors will not, on fitting occasions, escape their just condemnation. The obscurer evil-doers who worked on the less exposed theatre will reap the advantage of sooner passing out of sight. The others, by their position, had it in their power to disgrace their country in the eyes of the civilized world, and must pay the penalty of that position by a longer infamy.

The policy adopted by the Government in dealing with the Sheffield outrages is wise and remedial. To bring the real state of things into full light was the first thing to be done, and the fulness of the disclosures elicited justifies the Commission, and is a compensation for the immunity granted to crime. On a first impression, the natural feelings of justice recoil from the course, but further consideration leads to its acceptance as a necessary evil. The complete publicity will work healthily for all parties. The first horror over, we shall need to judge calmly the state of feelings and opinions which has been revealed. We shall need sober discussions of the remedies; and we shall be thankful for the valuable materials for judgment and discussion which have been secured even at the cost of immunity for great crime.

II.

The evil spirit which has been rampant in Sheffield is not confined to Sheffield. It permeates all society. It is convenient to look on it as the especial evil of a class; but it is neither just nor wise to do so. The persecution, the injuring of one member of a profession or body by other members of the same body, in the interests, as is avowed, of that body, and on the ground of conduct, rightly or wrongly considered adverse to such interest—this is an evil from which no part of society is free. The methods adopted for carrying out the punishment of the obnoxious member vary; the principle, the spirit remains the same. The public schools and universities of England, the army, the navy, the church, all our corporations, civic, professional, or mercantile—wherever men are united, they enforce, or seek to enforce, union by penalties on those who do not conform. 'Woe to the member of a class who is free from the prejudices of his class!' said a reviewer in speaking of Dr. Arnold's position in reference to the clergy of the Church of England. And the remark is susceptible of general application.

The methods of compulsion vary. Here it is open violence, direct bodily injury, or the forcible abstraction or destruction of the instruments of labour. There it is injury to a man's livelihood by intimidation. In a third case, it is injury to a man's character and station—his feelings and his social influence. The more open forms are seen and condemned; the quieter and more insidious are not seen, or, if seen, are not as generally condemned. Yet in themselves they are as immoral and as blameable as the others. It would be as useless as it would be foolish to appeal against the power inherent in all societies of condemning the action or speech of their members. But the means by which such condemnation finds expression are open to criticism, and may be both appealed against and condemned. Upper class opinion in England has at its disposal, and is in turn the plaything of a peculiar and powerful machinery in the periodical press, especially the daily and weekly press. It is an instrument which works with great

rapidity, considerable certainty of effect—temporary effect at least—and with a strength which it is difficult to calculate and control. In unscrupulous hands, in any form and with any checks, it will always be liable to great and dangerous abuse. In its actual form, and without proper check, it is constantly abused, and with most evil consequences.

In the fullest sense I wish the liberty of the Press—I accept unhesitatingly even its license. No censorship, no legal restrictions on its freedom of statement, or its freedom of comment on men and on measures seem to me desirable. Absolute openness of discussion on all topics—none can advocate this more strongly than I do. But absolute openness is unattainable under the present system of anonymous writing, and in the name of free and honest discussion I ask for the signatures of those who mingle in the discussion. This is the only solid guarantee against the abuses which I am convinced every honest man allows to exist in the actual working of this formidable institution.

In its worst form, and we have lately seen it under its worst form, there is a plain analogy between its outrages and those of the Sheffield criminals. The editor of a paper works in secret; secretly and in safety issues his instructions to his instruments who for money carry them out—sinking, as the phrase is, their own personality in that of the paper for which they write. So that an individual may be ruined by men who risk nothing personally—some of whom may even have no personal feeling against him, but to whom the money they earn by his ruin is their livelihood. I declare that—system for system, crime for crime—this moral assassination of individuals or of classes is in my opinion the worst evil of the two. And it is wider spread—more difficult to get condemned—more entwined with the interests of our present social order—far harder on all grounds to eradicate.

The remedy is the remedy which has found acceptance in the case of Sheffield. Let in light on the system—compel publicity—prohibit anonymous writing—give all a fair field and equal conditions, and no honourable man ought to ask for more. But he may fairly complain of his present exposure to attacks in the dark from enemies with whom he cannot grapple.

I know the power of the Press, and have felt it. Its scurrility, its misrepresentations, its calumnies, its suppression of the truth, its garbling of statements—all the disgraceful weapons of its foul armoury—I have seen them directed for years against me, and the cause which I advocate. Not in blindness, therefore, do I expose myself to fresh assaults from the literary bravoes of the 'Saturday' or the 'Times.' I know, too, how little immediate result will follow any such attacks as mine on its present organization. But there is a logic in human affairs on a large scale; and a society which shrinks with righteous horror from the consequences of secresy as seen at Sheffield—which fights hard, and will probably fight successfully, against the ballot, on the ground of its being secret and un-English, will sooner or later see that all secresy is objectionable; and sooner or later the peculiar branch of industry which the Press constitutes will bend to the spirit which regulates all other branches.

III.

None have a deeper interest in this question of the Press than the working classes—the proletariate. None have less reason to fear publicity; none suffer more from its present action. The full power of this mighty engine is in the hands of their opponents. They have, it is true, papers of their own —papers which, as all similar organs, would be benefited by the perfectly open system; but those papers do not penetrate the upper layers of society. The papers read by the upper classes are, as a rule, at once the exponents and the guides of an opinion hostile to the just claims of the working classes, whether agricultural or manufacturing. This is true even of those papers which in their general tone and spirit aim at fairness and moderation. Those which show no such tendency traduce them and misrepresent them, and are ever urging a course of action extremely prejudicial to their best interests—which, as I believe, are really also the interests of the whole community.

The working classes may then stand apart from the system, but it is none the less detrimental to them. It embitters them if they read what is written; it embitters their opponents even if they themselves escape by abstaining from reading. In either case, hostility is engendered, and the beneficial influences of free and open contact are lost. Friend and enemy are not discernible. True friends and seeming friends are confounded; and true friends, as much of what they say is objected to by the class to which they belong, are deterred from speaking, or, if not deterred, are borne down. For only here and there can it be expected that men will risk themselves in a combat where the conditions are so unequal—where the frank advocacy of an opinion is met, not by equally frank opposition, but by men who, under the shelter of the anonymous, are free to strengthen their arguments by every other kind of weapon which expression can furnish to the unscrupulous.

Could I hope to be listened to by the working classes, I would urge this point upon them as a really vital one. I would urge them to accept in all its consequences, and to enforce by all their influence—an influence daily growing—the doctrine of full publicity as the essential condition of healthy social existence. They are willing, I believe more willing far than those above them, to remove every trace of secresy from their industrial action and disputes. If any such trace linger, let them accept the challenge of the upper classes and get rid of it. In political matters, also, I cannot but hope that they will see that the ballot is to be rejected on the same ground; that all secresy in the exercise of a social function carries with it the degradation of the function. On this point, then, again they may meet the challenge of the upper classes, and wisely concede the point at issue.

One step farther, and the process would be ended. The complete openness of action which they accept they may claim from others; and the system of anonymous writing is the last stronghold of the opposite principle: the last, the strongest, the most unsocial, and the most immoral. A simple law by which the Press should be compelled to publish no writing which did not bear a *bonâ fide* signature, with the address (nay, even age) of the writer appended, should be the first, most urgent demand of the working classes. They would nobly inaugurate their new power by a moral revolution.

IV.

I would say a few words of Mr. Beesly and the speech which has raised such an outcry. The virulence of that outcry has in some measure spent itself; the license of the attacks and the excess of misrepresentation have been exposed. Many have stood forward nobly to take his part, and refute the calumnies of which he has been the object. I am somewhat later in the field, and if I lose the merit of an early defence, I have gained time for consideration.

I put aside the fouler insinuations originally started. They have served their purpose, and their authors, if not ashamed of them, would not care to reiterate them. In the language used about Mr. Knox, Mr. Beesly himself allows that he exaggerated. I have no interest in defending that exaggeration, but it was not without a foundation of justice. Public functionaries in Mr. Knox's position are surely not beyond criticism. Their action is of the highest importance. The administration of justice by the stipendiary magistracy is as a rule fair, but in cases of trade disputes, when class feelings come in, the magistrates are exposed to great temptations. If they become partisans, they ought to be told of it; and both this year and last, Mr. Knox has seemed to me to administer his office as a partisan, and therefore to be justly liable to censure.

The parallel drawn between the attitude of the upper classes towards Trades Union outrages, and their attitude towards the outrages of criminals in a higher position, such as Mr. Eyre's, excited a natural indignation in those against whom it was directed—natural, but not therefore just. Every feeling of humanity should have risen against the Jamaica atrocities, and should have prompted to a full inquiry, and full justice being dealt out to those who were found guilty. This was notoriously not the case. There was indifference to the sufferings, and bitter hostility to those who called attention to them. But then they were black men and women who suffered, and officers of the Crown who directed the infliction of the sufferings, and the result was that cruelties which, had they been committed oh dumb animals, would have called

forth unanimous reprobation, were condoned by the planter oligarchy of Jamaica, by the weakness—not, it is fair to say, the sympathy—of the then home Government, and by the strong sympathy of our upper classes with the offenders—a sympathy which found exponents in some of the members of the present Government.

Up to this point, then, I accept fully the language of Mr. Beesly. I think what he said true and just. But I go farther. Not merely as regards Mr. Knox or Mr. Eyre do I wish to stand by him, but in the whole tone and substance of his speech as it bears on the Sheffield question and the attitude of the working men towards it. I consider that he said not merely the right word, but the right word at the right time. And if I may be allowed to state freely my conviction, I should say that it is the sense of this which has lent such bitterness to the attack upon him. There ran through the language used about him two assumptions—one, that the whole class from which the meeting at Exeter Hall was taken is in some sense implicated in the guilt of these Sheffield murderers ; the second, that any one who addresses them from a superior social station should be the representative of the feeling of his class, and preach to his hearers what that class calls sound moral lessons. Both assumptions are as foolish as they are offensive.

Mr. Beesly disregarded both. He did not assume that his hearers were criminals, or sympathizers with criminals. He did not take this attitude of a lecturer from without who was come to 'deepen their moral sentiments.' He spoke as one who had a common cause with those whom he was addressing. He knew the purpose for which they had met, and agreed with that purpose. When it had been answered, as one who respected his audience and himself, he cautioned them against running into extremes. Freely, as before any other meeting of his countrymen, he spoke of errors and crimes committed by members of other classes, and not protested against in meetings of those classes. In this impartiality lies his sin.

The adoption of such a line is undoubtedly bold ; but it is, I believe, when rightly judged, conducive to the interests of both the antagonistic orders of the State. It is as politic as it is bold. The territorial and moneyed aristocracy, in whom

the government of this country is vested, is being brought daily into more direct contact with, and opposition to, the people which it has governed. Our whole political and social arrangements are under question. None can dream that the result will ultimately be the quiet conservation of the existing arrangements. It is matter for hope, rather than expectation, that the modifications which time will sanction may be peacefully introduced. The great chance for a peaceful settlement lies in open and honest discussion preparing public opinion to accept necessary innovations. But for this it is indispensable that the two parties to the contest should be put in relation with one another. To this end, each must furnish men who, free from the ordinary tone of their respective orders, are competent to address one or other as may be required. Such men, to gain the confidence of their hearers, must be known to be impartial and courageous. The conviction, however, that a given speaker is at once impartial and courageous, is not formed at once in men's minds; nor is it formed without some evidence to warrant it. What other evidence, however, can be given than the exercise of these qualities of courage and impartiality when the occasion presents itself? Such an occasion offered itself to Mr. Beesly, and he used it well and honourably. I am speaking now, be it remembered, of the policy of his language, which is the ground on which his opponents—all of them, at least, who are worth considering—have taken their stand. None who know him could conceive his using words which did not express his convictions. I have no doubt that, in the end, the soundness of his judgment will be recognized as clearly as all honourable opponents now recognize the uprightness of his intentions, as all should recognize the noble justice of his feelings. But, pending such recognition, efforts are made—as unwisely as unjustly—to run him down. It is the folly of assailing such men in the spirit in which he has been assailed that I wish to protest against here. They should be welcomed as the most useful of auxiliaries—as discharging a function of high social importance.

Let me say, in conclusion, that the time is past, or rapidly passing, for dealing with questions in a timid, mincing spirit; for respecting in argument or utterance the anomalies and

social conventions on which our present social framework rests: that a new power is rising, a new faith forming, new convictions ripening in the minds of men which shall lead them to act as only one generation of Englishmen has acted. The old Puritan movement of 1640-58 revives under other forms, with a more complete doctrine and with surer results. Cromwell and Milton are the names we honour. Their political and social faith is ours, their political and social objects are ours. We take up and carry on the good old cause which the Lords and Commons of England extinguished, as they thought, in 1660, in the blood of the noblest citizens of England, with every circumstance of mean and ferocious inhumanity. With no admixture of fanaticism, but deliberately and as a religious duty, we move forward to the recasting of our institutions. We aim at setting aside or modifying into a more useful form, the aristocracy of England, with its weak adjunct which men call a monarchy. We move forward to the new sociocratic republic of which industry, rightly organized, is the basis, and in which the benefits of our long tradition of peace and order shall be brought, as far as is humanly possible, within the reach of all—shall cease to be the monopoly of the few.

Those who hold such opinions are prepared to claim and to use the fullest freedom in speech and writing—accepting for themselves, and calling on others to accept, the full personal responsibility of what they speak and write.

SOUTH FIELDS, WANDSWORTH:
Dante 2, 79 (*July* 17, 1867).

MEETING OF THE LONDON TRADES COUNCIL.[1]

THIS meeting, which was convened by circular, was numerously attended by representatives of the engineers, bricklayers, carpenters, coopers, cordwainers, ironfounders, zinc-workers, and others, took place at the 'Bell Inn,' Old Bailey.

Mr. Guile, of the Ironfounders' Association, was voted to the chair, and, after a few remarks, called on Mr. Partridge, of the Operative Tailors' Society, to address the meeting in reference to the prosecution of some of the members of that trade for conspiracy and intimidation.

Mr. Partridge and Mr. Neal, both delegates of the tailors, went through the facts of the case, nearly as they have appeared in this paper, after which Mr. Jefferey (bricklayer) proposed, and Mr. Hughes (carpenter) seconded, the following resolution:—'This meeting is of opinion that the prosecution of the president and secretary of the Operative Tailors' Association on the ground of conspiracy and intimidation, is in direct opposition to the words and spirit of the Act passed in 1859 to repeal the laws relating to the combination of workmen, and has arisen in consequence of the wrong doing of certain trade unionists with whom the Tailors' Society had nothing whatever to do; therefore it is the bounden duty of all trade unions to assist the tailors against the persecutions now being vigorously practised against them.' Carried unanimously.

The Chairman then called on Mr. Conolly, of the Stonemasons' Society, to explain certain points connected with the dispute between himself and Mr. Roebuck. This he did in a very frank way, and the following resolution was adopted:—'That this meeting, whilst regretting the remarks made by Mr. Conolly regarding the constituency of Sheffield, are of

[1] From the *Morning Star*, Wednesday, July 17, 1867.

opinion that Mr. Roebuck has shown such an amount of irritability and vindictiveness in this matter as are thoroughly characteristic of himself, and only worthy of a member of Parliament who has insulted and abused some of the wisest and best men ever sent to the House of Commons; and this meeting is further of opinion that the gentlemen forming the Royal Commission went out of their way to entertain a question which belonged exclusively to Mr. Roebuck and Mr. Conolly, and should have been left to them to settle between themselves.'

Mr. Applegarth desired to call the attention of the meeting to what he felt to be an erroneous construction put by the Press upon the speech of Professor Beesly delivered at Exeter Hall. He regretted that gentleman had been so much misunderstood, and would move a resolution which went some way at least to express his opinion:—'That this meeting of delegates and members of the trades unions of London desires to express its deep sense of respect and gratitude to Professor E. S. Beesly, who for the past seven years has been the patient, zealous, and judicious friend and adviser of the trades unions of the United Kingdom, and who has invariably dealt with the many difficult, exciting, and irritating questions that have arisen between workmen and their employers in the spirit of truth, kindness, and moderation; and has thus done much to calm and assuage bitter feelings on the part of the unionists, and to check the spread of that class antagonism which he has always recognised to be one of the most deplorable results of the present unsatisfactory relations between labour and capital.'

The resolution was seconded by Mr. Howell (bricklayer), and carried unanimously.

Mr. Harry, of the Amalgamated Carpenters' Society, thought it necessary to propose another resolution on the subject, as he believed the one just passed did not go far enough:—'That this meeting also desires to express its sorrow and indignation at the mode in which certain influential portions of the public press have attempted to destroy the character, position, and influence of Professor Beesly, by misrepresenting and taking advantage of a few isolated passages in his speech at Exeter Hall, on the 2nd of July last,

which passages, if they afforded the slightest excuse for the denunciations for which they have furnished a text, do so only by the incompleteness with which they expressed his views, and which ought, by all fair men, to be interpreted in accordance with the honourable, just, and useful character of his public life; and this meeting is assured that no impression was conveyed to those who heard his speech at Exeter Hall that he had offered, as is alleged, the slightest extenuation of the Sheffield crimes.'

Mr. Barrow (Amalgamated Engineers) seconded, and it was adopted with cheers.

IRELAND.

Lascia dir le genti.
DANTE, *Purgat.* v. 13.

TWO points are generally allowed in the actual state of the discussion of the Irish question. First, it is recognized that there is a widespread feeling of discontent and disaffection to English rule. Secondly, that in the past history, and even in the present condition of Ireland, there is real ground for that discontent and disaffection. There remains open the large subject how to deal with the feeling. But the recognition of the two points above mentioned makes the way clearer for its treatment.

For it becomes needless formally to go back on the history of Ireland or the causes in the past of her actual state. Incidentally it may be necessary to allude to them for purposes of explanation or of argument. But the main work has been well and sufficiently done.[1]

An attentive study of the remedies proposed for the admitted evil does not lead to the same conclusion. I can find no plan which seems fully to meet the question in all its bearings, or which seems complete in principle. I have read and re-read Lord Russell's pamphlet, and the impression it has left, with all the respect due to the age and character of the writer, is, that the class of which he is an eminent representative, is incompetent to govern Ireland; that its function is pure conservation without any capacity for such political prevision and accordant action as are required by the actual conditions of society, whether Irish or English.

With regard to Mr. Mill's proposals, sharing, as I cannot but do, the admiration which is justly due to their courage and ability, and wholly indisposed to offer any direct opposition

[1] See Dr. Bridges' Letters on Irish disaffection to the *Bradford Review*, Truelove: 256, High Holborn.

or even criticism,—in fact, gladly welcoming the measures he advocates—I yet feel that on certain points my views so far differ as to render a separate expression of them a necessity. Had it been possible, I should have been but too glad to acquiesce in silence in his statement, and to support it to the utmost of my power.

The present excitement, due to the action of Fenianism, only so far bears on the policy I advocate, as it gives an opportunity for its expression. It makes it neither more nor less urgent. But men's minds are more awake to the fact that the evils are not superficial, and possibly more prepared to entertain the notion of a treatment which is not superficial. No immediate result enters into my calculations. Moral solutions of political questions need time. They work slowly on opinion, and, in so far as they are true and complete, guide opinion; and they make counter-solutions unsatisfactory and unacceptable, so far as they are less true and less complete.

Throughout the whole of this pamphlet I assume that ordinary and partial remedies are not available. But that is no reason why I and those who agree with me should not accept and promote all partial remedies as useful in their degree. Many of the schemes proposed, whether by Mr. Hutton, Mr. Bright, or Mr. Mill, might be most useful as palliatives, and peacefully tide us over imminent danger. They might even secure a much healthier atmosphere for the discussion of such ulterior changes as I believe inevitable. But if experience and reason warrant the persuasion that, separately or in combination, they are ultimately inadequate, there is ground for the putting forward of a policy which claims to be adequate and definitive. To this the others may be subordinated as instalments.

I have worked for some time in conjunction with others to form a centre for social action in reference to Ireland on what seemed a more immediately practical basis. From the paper I print as an appendix it will appear that my present propositions are in advance of those on which it was attempted to secure some combined action. As the effort has hitherto had no very definite result, it leaves me quite free. Not indeed that the programme given could be interpreted as fettering or narrowing the views of any who adopted it; but whilst there was a chance of its adoption it seemed advisable to give it

full room and see what effect it might have. Under present circumstances I am free to put forward that which I consider the only satisfactory solution—the moral one which represents the application of Positivist principles to one of the most difficult problems of European order.

From the work called 'International Policy' Ireland was purposely excluded. Its peculiar situation rendered this advisable, for Ireland occupies an intermediate position, as being formally not in an international relation with England, but part and parcel of an United Kingdom. Yet it was seen to be in a different relation to its co-parts from that in which other portions of the same whole stand to one another—Kent or Cornwall for instance. Ireland is in fact one example of another order of European questions—those which concern the reciprocal action of the members of aggregates which have not actually coalesced into a whole. In their case the sense of union has never prevailed so far as to cloak the tendencies to disunion, and there has always been danger of the disunion violently asserting itself, as there has always been more or less the character of force attaching to the union. So that in reference to the political questions which require attention, Ireland and its congeners are intermediate between the purely internal and the purely external. If these latter, the purely external, have received a sufficient treatment, the next in order are such as Ireland. Independently, then, of any actual excitement, our conduct to Ireland is a natural subject for inquiry and discussion, and the principles which preside over such inquiry and discussion need not be new ones. The simple ones which served for the larger international problem are competent to solve the smaller intermediate problem, which is only more difficult as it comes into more close contact with our prejudices and institutions. Clear away the mist which these throw around us, and there would be but little left to embarrass us in principle.

The pamphlet which follows consists of three parts.

In the first, I explain my conception of what should be the policy of England to Ireland.

In the second, I treat of the government of Ireland in the immediate future, and as a provisional institution.

In the third, I enter on general considerations in support of the said policy and government.

I.

AN IRISH POLICY.

NUMEROUS and divergent as are the opinions held on Ireland, they may, for practical purposes, be resolved into three, represented by three distinct parties, and issuing in three distinct policies.

First. There is the policy of the strictly Conservative party. It upholds the existing order in Church and State, resisting all changes of principle in the institutions, but allowing for a better adaptation of those institutions to their proper ends. A just administration under the actual conditions, order maintained, confidence restored, and as a consequence capital pouring in, and material prosperity developed—such are at once the objects this party sets before it, and the means by which it would secure the pacification and allegiance of Ireland.—It considers the absence of these as the final and sufficient account of the discontent it confesses to exist. It can or will conceive no deeper reason for that discontent. Naturally, then, it looks to its remedies as adequate.

A second policy is that of the party which sees in the Irish Protestant Church a real grievance, and the main cause of the existing discontent. It allows the injustice of an alien establishment. It accepts as reasonable the dislike of the people on whom it is forced. It is ready by more or less speedy means to remedy the evil it admits, though it is not agreed on the special method. But, apart from this peculiar institution, it agrees substantially with the former party. It acquiesces, without much misgiving, in the other arrangements of the Irish social order, and in the general treatment of the case. It offers ecclesiastical equality as its remedy.

Differing from both these is the party which treats the Church question as subordinate—that of the Land as paramount. This third school would sweep away, but *en passant*, and as a comparative trifle, the Protestant Establishment. It concentrates its attention and its energies on the Land. In reference to the tenure of land, this school comprises many

shades of opinion, but there is a large amount of agreement among its members as to the end to be attained. The precise methods are open for discussion ; some are for milder and slower, others are for more speedy and stronger methods—methods even of a revolutionary character, only carried out not by revolutionary agents, but by the powers that rule. The object is common. It may be given, if I remember them rightly, in the words used some years ago by the late Sir James Graham. It is to re-marry the land of Ireland to the people of Ireland.

Over and above this difference of special remedies, there is a more general point of view under which the three parties diverge. They are at variance as to the degree of assimilation between England and Ireland which it is desirable to secure, so far as it can be secured by legislation and administration. The first evidently has no conception of a different organization for Ireland. It is part of England, and to be treated as such. Where unlike, it is to be made like. The social arrangements and the sound economical principles which, in the judgment of such reasoners, are the peculiar glory and advantage of England, must be communicated to Ireland, and all will be well. Voluntarily or involuntarily there must be perfect assimilation.

Largely agreeing in this end, the second party would aim at it only politically. Ecclesiastically, or spiritually, it renounces the hope of assimilation, and by the disestablishment, if not disendowment of the Protestant Church, it recognizes, under one important aspect, Ireland to be essentially dissimilar to England. As before, the third party carries on the process, and insists neither on ecclesiastical nor on social assimilation. It defers not merely to the Catholic traditions of Ireland, but in a certain degree to the peculiar traditions of her land system. Under a second, and, at least immediately, a still more important aspect, it recognizes Ireland as essentially dissimilar.

With these marked differences, there is yet a foundation of agreement between all the three schools. They accept the present relations of England and Ireland as the basis of their policy. The government of Ireland should be just and conservative—just and revolutionary for a time—but equally in

both cases, and permanently, it is contemplated that it should be the Imperial government, and not a separate Irish government. Ireland definitively is considered as a province of an empire, not as a coequal and imperial kingdom, using the word imperial as a Plantagenet or Tudor might have used it, without the associations that, in later times, have gathered round it. No essential modification of the relations of the two countries is considered desirable. The more clear-sighted may fear that such a modification may be necessary, but they wish to avoid it, and would accept it, if inevitable, with regret.

Yet it seems impossible to doubt that in Ireland itself a large proportion of the people does not acquiesce in this common basis of English parties. Almost all who, in England, write or speak on Ireland,—some with dislike and contempt, others with more or less sympathy, though without assent,—intimate a consciousness of a fundamental discrepancy between the English point of view and one popular in Ireland. To what extent it is adopted by the Irish nation is disputed; but in some extent or other, and in an extent sufficient to form an element worthy of consideration, it confessedly exists. By its existence, and so far as it exists, the Irish problem assumes a national character.

Seeing this, there are English writers and thinkers who would deal with it as such—who would, as far as possible, satisfy the national feeling of the Irish, but would insist on satisfying it without disturbing the present relation of the two countries. Permanent union is the cardinal aim of their policy, and an aim which is not to be abandoned except under one contingency. They would not enforce it by violence—they would not consent to a new conquest. Their wish is for English policy to be as Irish as is compatible with its continuing English. They desire one state composed of the two countries.

It is not my object to discuss these various and, in some respects, conflicting views. The purely conservative and economical policy I believe untenable. The general current of English opinion is as hostile to it as is the state of Ireland. Some movement and some moral satisfaction of the demands

of Ireland are felt to be inevitable. The question is what degree of movement, and what satisfaction.

The section of politicians, strong in itself and in the forces behind it, which is persuaded that the Irish Church is the only real grievance, the sole point to surrender; that the demands connected with the land tenure are rash and wild demands, dangerous for England and dangerous for Ireland, and, as such, not to be entertained; that the condition of the Irish people, when the insult of a dominant Church has been removed, must be left to the action of time and opinion, and the good feeling of landlords, and the gradual rise of wages, and that unknown but important factor, Divine Providence, human providence being out of the question; this section of politicians is confronted with one difficulty. Not merely in Ireland, but in England, they are met by the answer: It is too late; your remedy is good and acceptable, but it is insufficient.

It is difficult to estimate the political efficiency of the party which goes directly to the land question as the real root of the matter—as difficult as it was, say in 1840, to estimate the strength of the anti-Corn Law movement, or in 1865 of the Reform movement. It is probably not so powerful in wealth or station as the others, but stronger in numbers, and supported by the advancing reason of the community. It is, as far as it goes, in accordance with the dominant Irish feeling, in accordance with the opinions of all Western thinkers and statesmen outside England, in direct and formidable hostility only with the numerically small, but highly organized and powerful body, which we may for convenience designate as the Anglo-Irish landholders.

Yet strong as I conceive the remedy put forward by this party to be in reason, and certain of ultimate acceptance and justification, I think it open, if treated as a final remedy, to the same answer as the last. It is too late. It is incomplete; and at the period which we have now reached an incomplete remedy has no promise in it. It is incomplete as not dealing with, or not dealing with so as to satisfy, the national longings of the Irish nation. Those who advocate it have no contempt for those longings, but they think they can offer a sufficient inducement to their renunciation.

In opposition to all the three plans above indicated, though without the slightest disposition to undervalue the good each contains, and with the most complete acceptance of the two last as partial remedies, I venture to propound another. I believe that the Irish national view is the right one. In principle I accept it, unmodified, as the only ultimately complete and satisfactory solution for both countries alike, the stronger and the weaker, for England and Ireland. The grounds alleged by others I have little concern with. If hotter reasons are urged, I am not bound to them. I make no appeal to evil consequences. But deliberately I urge, as the best policy we can adopt, that we direct our action to the reconstitution of Ireland, as a self-existent state,—that we no longer endeavour to assimilate her to ourselves, to mould her into our image, or retain her in her present inharmonious connection with ourselves.

Without dwelling on or attaching too much importance to the immediate urgency of the disaffected portion of Ireland, there seems to me reason, persistent reason, in the wish of her population to stand alone, as a full and complete state. It matters little whether in connection with the crown of England, or in federal alliance as a sister and equal state, or in a simply friendly relation to England, but with absolute distinctness, as distinct as Holland or Belgium. The essential point is, that her citizens, of whatever origin, should live their life in her and for her, understand her interests, possess and cultivate her soil, develope her resources of every kind, mutually join in the reciprocity of all the duties of citizens, feel at home in her, be Irishmen of Ireland. In plain language, the particular piece of earth's surface bearing that name, should belong in full sovereignty to those who are born in it and inhabit it. It has, as they think, and as they are right in thinking, all that is required for such a purpose ; it is not so constituted as to be necessarily dependent on others in any sense, but that in which others are dependent on it. It is the natural home of the Irish people ; and it is only as a consequence of a violent and fraudulent displacement, or series of displacements, that it has ceased to be such a home, in the literal sense, to millions, in any satisfactory sense, to the vast majority of the people.

Pour in capital, make life and property secure, glut with

material prosperity any country whatever, and that country is not necessarily satisfied, and cannot be required to be satisfied. You may have bribed it at a high price, but if it accept your bribe, you have degraded it by inducing it to forego all the higher objects of the existence of a state. It may accept, for the mass of mankind in all ranks easily rests and is thankful. But it may refuse, and be wise in refusing, even temporary acquiescence in the condition offered it. For there are other elements in the problem than mere material prosperity, feelings which no amount of such prosperity can satisfy. More or less consciously the people of Ireland expresses this in its almost universal dissatisfaction, whilst a definite portion of that people is quite explicit in its avowal. And conscious or unconscious, the demand which, well or ill expressed, lies at the bottom of the whole Irish difficulty, is, I maintain, a wise and right demand—one which ultimately will be acceded to, which it would be reasonable to accede to in spirit at once. It is the demand for the independent existence of the Irish state. If you could pacify Ireland on this point by capital and security, you ought not. If you could induce her to waive her demand, you ought not to try. Rightly interpreted, her claims are reasonable and noble, and we should make no effort to set them aside, but, on the contrary, see how they can be met with least inconvenience to herself in the difficult process.

Whether they so understand the matter or not, the Irish wish is to form a real state, an individual in the family of states. To this their action and their language tend, so far as the dissatisfied portion is concerned. Now the conception of a state is that of a definite political whole, completely organized and self-moving, not deriving its principle of motion and action from without, nor, again, looking outside of itself for the satisfaction of the legitimate wants of its citizens. Such a state is not dependent on the will and fortunes of another. Dependence has not answered for Ireland. The satellite condition always rejected by the instinct of her people, is now equally repugnant to her educated and thoughtful citizens.

The Sister Island or Kingdom is an expression in common use. I do not wish to found any argument upon it. But I quote it here as expressing vividly the position which Ireland

should assume in reality, and not in mere name, and which England should help her to assume by a deliberate act of statesmanlike prevision. Not incorporated with England either by force or persuasion, but as a distinct personality should we try to deal with her, forward her welfare, assist her in regaining her lost identity, in making herself in all respects a well-organized body politic, conscious that when we had made her so she would and must stand alone—so far as any other state, that is, stands alone—bound only by the obligations resting on her as a member of the common human family.

Historically considered, two lines of thought converge to the same conclusion, that it is sound policy to accept the task of reconstituting Ireland as a state.

The history of the Western World points to the break-up of the larger aggregates as oppressive and factitious unities called into existence to meet certain evils. Those evils removed, there ceases to be any justification for the continued existence of their remedies. Holland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the United States of America in the eighteenth, the States of Southern and Central America in the nineteenth, are so many unequivocal instances of the tendency to disgregation. Under the pressure of European complications, combined with an excessive importance attached to the idea of nationality, there is at present apparently a movement in the opposite direction. But there is no solid ground for thinking that such counter-movement represents the real course of the current of human affairs. There is no warrant for looking on the actual arrangements as equivalent to a permanent settlement of Europe, any more than for considering them as in accordance with the best interests of the nations which they affect. And all the reasons which might be urged to show that no reversal of our previous historical judgment is called for by present facts, would be especially applicable in the case of Ireland, reinforced as they would be in her case by much of what constitutes the strength of the present European movement.

For if, turning from the general tendency, we fix our attention on the particular case of Ireland, we shall find that her history offers peculiar support to our policy. And this

narrower and more special ground is the more convincing of the two. Not to dwell on the flaws in the so-called Union of England and Ireland, constituted by difference of race and religion, there remains the one patent undeniable fact that it never has been, in any fairly approximative degree even, a union. There was possibly a time when the two countries might have been amalgamated. But the opportunity, if it existed, was lost, and the time has gone by when it is lawful to hope that it may be recovered. It is a dream to think of incorporating Ireland with England. It is a dream, by virtue of the simple historical statement that the seven centuries of the enforced connection have not incorporated her, but have resulted in an increased and more reasoned alienation. It is not too much to say that the trial time is over, the Sibyl's books burnt. There is traceable, I cannot but think, under the more objectionable aspects of the Irish movement, a distinct growth of a rational and well-grounded consciousness that the peculiar life of Ireland must not be merged in that of England; that Ireland cannot consent to have the English system and organization forced upon her. She has suffered much, and may have to suffer more; but the suffering must not have been in vain. The instinct of self-assertion which has supported her through her long trial must be justified by the event. By some means or other she will vindicate her past resistance as legitimate, and not allow it to be the mere capricious rejection of a higher destiny, as her English conquerors have ever regarded it, and by so regarding it have failed to overcome it.

To raise Ireland to the position here indicated, to form an oppressed and injured dependency into a perfect state, to remove that which in Europe constitutes the peculiar opprobrium of our nation and its statesmen, consciously to perform an act as it were of creative political wisdom,—all this might, it would seem, compensate for some immediate apparent sacrifice, and make the policy attractive in the eyes of Englishmen. We have renounced the attempt to govern directly our colonies, on the ground partly that they are English, partly that they are too distant. We have never attempted the direct government of India. She is too distant, but also she is too different: too distant from us in other

senses than that of mere local distance. The difference of feelings, habits, associations, and history, may make two nations as distant, though contiguous in space, as if they were locally thousands of miles apart. And in this sense Ireland is distant from England; the interval which separates her from us is not as wide as that which separates us from India, but it is very considerable. To ignore this simply on the ground of local proximity is a great political error.

It would be wise if, in regard to states, we allowed something for that which we tend to exaggerate in the case of individuals—the importance of respecting their individuality. When two countries so long in juxtaposition as England and Ireland, yet remain so completely distinct, we might naturally infer that the distinction has its sufficient explanation in facts, and accept, as the fundamental principle of all our conduct, the recognition of that distinction.

The policy then propounded is not negative, remedial, reparative; on the contrary, it is positive, constructive, and definitive within the necessary limits—so far, that is, as the direct action of England upon Ireland is concerned. Ireland, mistress of herself, must subsequently determine her own course. This follows from the very idea of autonomy.

Nor is it a policy which sets before it the aggrandizement or even maintenance of the Empire. On the contrary, it avowedly contemplates its peaceful dismemberment. It is, I am well aware, antagonistic to the feeling of corporate imperialism, which is so dominant, and naturally so dominant, in the preponderating centre. But I look on this as the worst form of imperialism, as being the most difficult to shake off, ministering as it does to the selfish instincts of a large mass—of a nation, not of an individual—and drawing strength at once and a veil from its extension. I make no attempt to conciliate the hostility of those who justify it. I believe that such justification as there was for large aggregates exists no longer—that they are exhaustive of the higher life of the extremities to the apparent benefit of the over-stimulated centre. And in a case like that of Ireland, without any suspicion of impatience or prematureness, we may fairly claim a hearing for a proposal which implies the partial disruption of one such aggregate; we may refuse any longer to sacrifice any confessedly unwilling victim on the altar of our national pride.

II.

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND.[1]

WHAT I have said may be interpreted as pointing to immediate separation, to repeal of the Union, and the severance of the long connection between England and Ireland—to the adoption, in fact, of the language which was, not long ago, so popular with our governing classes during the American war—'Wayward sister, go in peace.'

To repeal of the Act of Union—Yes. To immediate severance—No. I would not so rudely and rashly break with the past. I respect too strongly the doctrine of historical continuity. I accept too fully the conception of progress as the development of existing order. I have also too keen a sense of the obligations under which England lies in consequence of her previous conduct. Even in the future, a closer union between the two countries than exists between either of them and any other state of Western Europe may, possibly, always be maintained by a wise and moderate policy. Be this as it may, a temporary retention of the government of Ireland by England seems to me in the highest degree desirable. It would appear necessary to renounce it only if it were satisfactorily shown that the sole hope of securing such temporary hold lay in force—naked and simple force.

[1] 'That dense population in extreme distress inhabited an island where there was an Established Church which was not their Church, and a territorial aristocracy, the richest of whom lived in distant capitals. Thus they had a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church, and, in addition, the weakest executive in the world. That was the Irish question. Well, then, what would honourable gentlemen say if they were reading of a country in that position? They would say at once, the remedy is revolution. But the Irish could not have a revolution; and why? Because Ireland was connected with another and a more powerful country. Then what was the consequence? The connection with England thus became the cause of the present state of Ireland. If the connection with England prevented a revolution, and a revolution were the only remedy, England logically was in the odious position of being the cause of all the misery in Ireland. What then was the duty of an English minister? To effect by his policy all those changes which a revolution would do by force. That was the Irish question in its integrity. . . . The moment they had *a strong executive, a just administration, and ecclesiastical equality*, they would have order in Ireland, and the improvement of the physical condition of the people would follow.'—*Extract from Mr. Disraeli's Speech in* 1844, *as given in Lord Russell's Letter to Right Hon. C. Fortescue, M.P.*

Nor do I believe that, in the sober estimate of moderate Irishmen, however averse they may be to us, Ireland is judged ready for an abrupt separation. They know too well the consequences of continued dependence, and of a dependence accompanied by misgovernment and its natural attendants—division and discontent. The resettlement of a country even when a real nucleus of government and union exists, is a work of great difficulty, as may be seen in Italy at present. It would be much harder where, as in Ireland, the problem would not have any such favourable condition.

But repeal of the Act of Union is, though a subordinate, yet a necessary step, and it is implied in all that follows in the constitution of a government for Ireland. For to constitute a new government for her seems the dictate of sound policy, and it is to the outline of such a government that I now address myself. If I make the proposal sharply definite, it is not as attaching any particular importance to this or that detail, but for the sake of clearness.

There is but too much reason to think that Parliamentary government, such as we have at present, is incompetent to the task. The experience of the two centuries during which it has had Ireland under it, might be thought decisive. It is a government eminently unfitted for dealing with dependencies. This is a judgment not uncommon with political observers, and one which finds support in all the later practice of our Parliament, if that practice be closely examined. For Parliament has, in a measure, proclaimed its own incompetence. The course of imperial legislation, with respect to the states dependent on it, has now for some time been steadily in one direction; it has aimed at getting rid of direct responsibility. The process has been, in many cases, premature, and the policy a feeble and, in truth, a cowardly declining of just obligations. But the fact is none the less true, that in our various dependencies we have instituted self-government, as it is called, reserving only certain important bonds of connection, of imperial rather than of local importance. The action of the Imperial Parliament has been reduced to its minimum, has become almost entirely indirect; the local action has been called into vigorous exercise. Even in India, when the government of that vast dependency became in theory, as well as in

practice, an attribute of the Crown of England, and consequently of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, no direct parliamentary action was thought advisable. A viceroy, an Indian council, a secretary of state—the links essential to preserve some degree of unity, were formed; but the direct government of India is not parliamentary, but local, and that in a very high degree. The power of the Indian viceroy is very great.

It would not then be breaking too violently with our general tradition, though it would be with our more recent traditions of Irish government—a tradition, be it remembered, of only two generations in its actual form—if we renounced direct Parliamentary government for Ireland.

For this is the capital necessity of the case, the great point to be insisted on. Neither in an English or Imperial, nor in an Irish or local Parliament, should be vested for the present the government of Ireland. Not in an Imperial Parliament, for it is alien in sympathy, too slow in action, and warped by the preponderance of English modes of thought and English interests, national interests, or, still more fatally, class interests.

The debates on Ireland, which whilst I write are not yet closed, are a sufficient proof of the incompetence of Parliament. In the first place, by an almost unanimous consent, material prosperity is the sole consideration and standard by which the question is judged. Not insisting on this point, which is characteristic at once of the crude industrialism of our time, and of a body which is, on its own theory, we may say, the representative of interests (interests are emphatically material), there are two other assumptions so interwoven with all the opinions expressed, so underlying the whole debate, that, notwithstanding one, or possibly two, remarkable exceptions, they may fairly be taken as countenanced by the body as a whole. The first is that rent and landlords are indissolubly connected with the social system; that all sound organization of the body politic presupposes those institutions as essential conditions. It would seem that a landlord Parliament holds them as inseparable from the social, as the physiologist holds pleasure and pain inseparable from the natural, body. Yet the Irish, as a nation, have a feeling that they are not essential,

but—I will not say a curse—but certainly a social arrangement of which it is as desirable as it is possible to get rid. And the Irish feeling is tenable—nay, right; applicable, too, not in Ireland only, but in England. Landlords are a luxury with which a really wise ordering of agricultural industry will tend more and more to dispense. The term may ultimately disappear in the more useful and more normal term—proprietors.

The second, and on the surface unanimous, assumption, so far as the members for Great Britain are concerned, and not confined to them, is that the connection with England is an unquestionable good for Ireland. No trace of misgiving on this head. There may have been evils in the past, but that is unimportant. No evils can counterbalance the inestimable privilege of being bound up with free and imperial England. If the privilege is inadequately appreciated, that is a defect of taste which will be remedied by longer converse with the higher society; and, in fact, it is only the low and vulgar, the great mass of the Irish nation, that is afflicted with this deficiency. No statesman, no eminent personage—nothing of the sort is seen among the vast numbers which form that mass. It is the old story—a great popular movement set at nought and scoffed at, till it find a leader, and break down all before it. I know not whether this absolute want of sympathy with the feeling which finds one expression in Fenianism be not really a more convincing proof of English incapacity for governing Ireland, as well as in its essence a greater vexation to that country, than the cold assertion of pure selfishness: 'You are indispensable to us from our point of view of our interest, and we will not let you go.'

Not then in the Imperial Parliament can the government be vested. But also not in an Irish Parliament, for an Irish Parliament is scarcely more hopeful, under present conditions at any rate, than the Imperial. To say nothing of the time required to organize a new electoral system, the existing one manifestly and confessedly not being sufficient as the basis of a really national action, is there any evidence or probability that the new electoral body would be qualified to choose wisely, or would have the materials for a wise choice before it? and, granting both these conditions, the body chosen

uld be a discordant body, and one moving slowly and olutely where resolution and vigour are needed.

Again, an Irish Parliament once chosen, if it is to be of l , must be essentially a free agent ; and, if fairly chosen, would, as soon as possible, assert the independence of its constituency. This independence as an ultimate result I have already advocated. But for Ireland to reach it without confusion and error, and consequent suffering, great precautions are requisite. The evils might be avoided and the good more safely secured by a prudent acquiescence in the gradual modification of the existing order, in the acceptance for a time of the English rule and initiative. To induce Ireland to this acquiescence and acceptance may be difficult, perhaps at this late period impossible. But if possible, it can only be by making it clear to the Irish nation that England is in earnest in wishing to remedy the past and to provide for the future ; that she is ready to help the Irish to a government and a position such as may satisfy not merely their material interests, but their best national aspirations ; that she has laid aside all wish to domineer over Ireland for her own sake ; that she has awakened to a sense that there is a better policy for both countries than any hitherto pursued ; but that she thinks that to inaugurate a new policy her aid is really desirable, and that it would be at once weak and selfish on her part not to contribute that aid.

If then Parliamentary government is set aside as incapable of dealing properly with Ireland, and equally so whether imperial or local, we return to the older form of the connection between the two islands, with such modifications as the changes since wrought render inevitable. Ireland was, up to a comparatively recent period of its history, directly under the crown of England. It should be replaced formally for the present in that relation.

'A settlement with something monarchical in it.' This seems to me the principle to be adopted. But as it would be absurd not to bear in mind the depression of the monarchical element in our constitution for the last two centuries, whilst the power constituted in Ireland would be the creation in form of the monarchical element in the English State, it must in reality be the creation of that element which really rules

and which expresses its will through the Houses of Parliament. The deputy or viceroy in whom would be centralized the government of Ireland would be the delegate of the powers of the whole Imperial Legislature, though nominally the representative of the Queen. So that in fact it would be by its own act that our Parliament would retire from the direct administration, and from direct legislation for Ireland, and assert its powers only in the original organization of the new government.

To give definiteness to the conception of the proposed government, we might suppose a Royal Proclamation issued, answering to that addressed to the people of India on the transfer of the government to the Crown, and, like that, based on such previous steps as our constitutional forms require.

It might announce that the Queen had, by the advice and resolution of her faithful Lords and Commons, resumed the title of Lord of Ireland (Domina Hiberniæ), and taken on herself the administration of that country as a distinct portion of her empire. Acknowledging in explicit terms the past wrongs of the English government, and the justice of the discontent prevalent in Ireland in consequence of those wrongs, it might proclaim her determination to remedy past evils, and to enter on a new system of government, and a new system of social organization, purely in the interest of Ireland, and with constant reference to the wishes of the Irish people.

To enable the Queen's government to carry out these purposes, it would insist on the necessity of order, express the firm resolution to maintain it, and call on all the Queen's subjects in Ireland to assist in its maintenance.

To calm existing irritation, and as a guarantee of the reality of the purpose expressed, a full amnesty would be granted to all political prisoners, allowing the return of all who are in banishment for political offences.

With these premises, and for the attainment of the great ends of redress and re-organization, the proclamation would go on to state that the Queen had named —— her Viceroy and Captain-General with full powers for five years; that it was her pleasure that he should call to his aid a council of —— persons, in large majority Irish, one only necessarily English,

ıncil to propose measures and give advice, but not with ı ı to restrain or veto his acts—no ecclesiastic of what- ı ır denomination being a member of such council ; that the Viceroy would have a sufficient force at his disposal to maintain order, and the aid of the Imperial treasury in carrying out the measures he should deem advisable.

That he would be instructed and empowered to remove the grievance of the Protestant Church in Ireland, and to do so on such principles as he might think fit to adopt, with fair regard to existing interests.

That he would be empowered equally to deal freely with the tenure of land, without any restrictions beyond that of compensation to vested interests.

That full personal liberty would be restored, and liberty of the press guaranteed.

Lastly, that after the expiration of the five years of office, it would be renewed for a like term, or terms, with the same powers ; that during these terms means should be devised by which the people of Ireland might freely make known its deliberate wish as to the relation in which it would choose to stand towards England, with the promise that such wish should be granted and promoted whether it tended to union or separation.

The government here sketched preserves the Imperial government, and allows for the participation of our peculiar machinery in reconstituting Ireland. It brings therefore into use the great strength which that machinery must be allowed to possess when fully called into play. We should enter on a new policy by a conscious act of the national will, so far as that will finds expression in our institutions. The Parliamentary constitution of Great Britain is not set aside by the proposal any more than it is by, say, the New Zealand constitution. But the action of Parliament is limited to the initiation of a new system, and to the acceptance of it when initiated. Its executive functions are superseded. Whatever opinions may be held as to the value of our Parliamentary institutions in England, this plan does not attack them. It recognizes their action even for Ireland, under certain conditions.

As to an Irish Parliament, the case is different. That is superseded for a time at any rate. None but a pedant of

constitutionalism can deny that there may be cases where Parliamentary government is inapplicable. All English statesmen recognize our Indian dominion as such a case. Ireland seems to be another; her people seem singularly ill-adapted for it, and to have little sympathy with it. Ultimately that people may come to desire it, and may indulge its taste. But in the meantime the condition of Ireland points to a strong executive, with somewhat exceptional powers. And the temporary suspension of constitutionalism may well be acquiesced in, if by its suspension the whole social system of Ireland may be safely placed on a wider and more secure footing.

The fact is, it is not the Irish people that is likely to cry out for a Parliament. I doubt whether any people, properly so called, does, or ever did. The true strength of Parliamentary feeling lies with those who can wield its machinery for their own advantage; in England with the upper and middle classes, in Ireland with the proprietor class. The liberty Parliaments confer is the liberty of the powerful and the wealthy, and these look with natural aversion on any government which curbs them and protects the poor. In Ireland, all but a few have long seen that some check is wanted on the action of landlords, and it is difficult to conceive a Parliament exercising any check. In the interest of the mass of the Irish nation we may well demand a concentrated power—one not responsible to the Irish landlords, but responsible in the last resort to the English Parliament, so long as England holds real power over Ireland. The Viceroy, that is, would be responsible mainly as regards the definitive sanction of his acts, or his punishment if he administer amiss his high office, but not responsible in the sense of liability to constant interference on the one side, or the obligation to constant reference on the other. For the term of the office, unless under the gravest emergencies, the officer appointed should exercise his delegated power in its full completeness.

It may be asked, Why one man, and not a commission? If the commission had the same power, there would be no fundamental difference. But it would be equally a break with our Parliamentary traditions. It would equally be a direct government, only there would be an increase of difficulty in

ecting the commission, the difficulty of finding three men, l not one; and there would be the greater probability of , in consequence of discordant views, and greater bl less as the result of divided responsibility. Some c s ago, more might have been urged for boards or commissions than recent experience would warrant. Generally, their failure has been too notorious and gross not to throw suspicion on the institution in principle. The undivided responsibility of single power constitutes politically its capital recommendation. It stimulates and invigorates, and when directly delegated and accepted as a delegation, it loses what elements of danger our timidity might otherwise see lurking in it.

The practical question arises: Can we find the man? Why not? The now long list of those whom we sometimes call our Indian proconsuls, if it is not one of entirely pure, yet is also certainly not one of incapable statesmen. Unquestionably, England could find many men who, placed in this high position, with great power and equal responsibility, would be found competent to exercise such power, and not anxious to decline such responsibility. Even limited as we are, by the misfortune of our aristocratical institutions, practically to a narrow choice, the man might yet be found. The Board of Trade, or the Post Office, or some such branch of administration might send its chief, and the situation in which he found himself, *ex hypothesi*, placed, would probably enlighten him, and raise him up to the required height—at least, experience is in favour of this conclusion. In such an emergency, for so critical a post, it might even be worth while to consider whether our narrowing aristocratical influences might not give way, and the choice be extended so as to range freely through England or India; with our present Premier, such extension seems no unreasonable supposition. It is not the man that is the difficulty, but the will to select him, and to constitute so near home such an awkward precedent—so awkward, yet so valuable. The theory of single-handed power is unpopular with the powerful.

One thing is clear—and the remark is made necessary by language that has been used in reference to this particular point. The Queen's Deputy in Ireland the *Dictator Rei pub-*

licæ constituendæ—so in older language would run his title—whatever his name, must be no royal personage. The conditions of royalty in this country preclude the employment in real posts of utility and difficulty of those who partake of its quality. The governor of Ireland must be responsible at the termination of his office, and open during its continuance to the true judgment of his countrymen and the free expression of that judgment. Now, such is the tone of servility current with regard to our Royal Family, that these conditions are out of the question with them. We seem determined to compensate by flattery and similar means for their enforced renunciation of any real power.

It has always seemed to me inexplicable that so much stress should be laid on the presence of Royalty in Ireland, or on the presence even of our Parliament. Allow to the full what is urged by a somewhat cynical school in favour of the illusional part of our constitution, and at last we come to this, that it is an appeal to the weakness, not the strength of mankind—has a tendency to lower, not raise, those on whom it acts. And it is pushing the illusion too far, when, with its constitutional powerlessness, it is offered in lieu of redress of solid grievances. Parliament is not open to this objection, but to the more serious one of its having been and being, in the eyes of a large portion of those before whom it would present itself, the instrument of their misfortunes and sufferings. And men are not soothed by the sight of such instruments.

One word more. If this pamphlet should find any Irish readers, it would be natural enough that, long accustomed to the thought of Parliamentary government as representing freedom, they should be impatient of any wish to suppress it even temporarily, not to speak of its permanent suppression. The continuous repetition of delusive reasonings works them into the framework of our minds, and they are finally acquiesced in by those who suffer most from the consequences they involve. But no Irishman can, I think, charge me with indifference to the liberties of his country or defective appreciation of her just claims. I write in England for Englishmen, and this colours my language and proposals. But I write to the best of my ability in the interest of Ireland, and

to aid in the work of reparation. And the spirit in which I write is that of respect for an equal and injured nation, of confident hope, that if not immediately, nor even soon, she will yet, at no very distant period, partly by her own wisely directed and temperate efforts, partly as the result of a change of opinion in England, be restored to her legitimate rank, take her place, that is, in Western Europe as a self-determining political existence.

III.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRELAND.

THE repeal of the Act of Union, the constitution of a new and strong Government for Ireland, are then, I allow, but first steps to an ulterior end, that end being to create an independent Ireland, or to call her into existence as a separate imperial state.

The proposal of such an end raises many questions. The separate existence of Ireland may be regarded under two aspects, as England or Ireland itself are respectively taken into account. And first as concerns England.

What would be the consequences for England, supposing for the moment the end attained, and supposing Ireland to be in the same relation to England as Holland; supposing further that such relation had been England's doing, and that Ireland had not been rent from its dependence on England by a war such as, not without English aid, made Holland independent of Spain? Would there be danger or injury to England if this were the relative position of the two countries?

If there were a possibility or even a probability of evil results to England, such a contingency would not change my conviction that we ought to enter on the course of policy which exposed us to it. No contingencies, whether near or remote, should divert us from the certain good of a wise and just conduct.

But it seems impossible to believe that there would be any

real danger for England in the policy suggested. One of two alternatives must be taken. An independent Ireland would be dangerous by herself or in union with some other power or powers. The first alternative may be dismissed. Ireland alone is not likely to be aggressive against England. The relative strength and resources of the two are a sufficient guarantee against the weaker being the assailant. The other alternative demands more consideration. Ireland is looked on as the possible basis for American or French aggression. Yet in the event of a peaceful and friendly separation, after a system of government which had given her order, prosperity, and ultimately her independence, what conceivable motive could she have for wishing to become a state of the American Union or a province of France? Discontented and angry, and chafing under an enforced union, then indeed Ireland might welcome America or France as a deliverer; but only as a deliverer, not as a new and permanent occupant. What advantage could she find after getting rid of one foreign domination in submitting to another? She must be allowed to have been tenacious hitherto of her separate existence. Why should that spirit only be shown against her nearest and most natural neighbour, and fail her when in presence of the Anglo-Saxon Republic, presumably as repugnant to her as Anglo-Saxon England, or of Imperial or Republican France, between whom and her there is the barrier raised by difference of language?

Setting aside possible or probable evil consequences, it can hardly be disputed that England would derive many advantages from a full satisfaction of Ireland, as she has suffered greatly by her dissatisfaction. Many complications of the internal difficulties of England would be removed. Her political and social atmosphere would be clearer, her hands freer for all needful action at home or abroad, her peace more secure. The bulk of the nation would have its condition bettered by the removal of the competition with another nation which, under the pressure of its actual social state, acquiesces in a lower kind of existence than is healthy for any civilized man. Few things would be of more service to our manufacturing and artisan population than to stop at the fountain-head the stream of ragged pauperism which overflows

the towns of England, as it does the eastern seaboard of America. It brings but little that is for the good of either country; it acts injuriously on the status of labour wherever it comes; in both countries it threatens serious political difficulties. Substitute for a kingdom producing this commodity in abundance, and which is yet in perennial discontent, a population duly occupied at home, and in a contented and settled state, the world, and England in particular, would gain greatly by the exchange.

Again, to be without so vulnerable a point, to have by our side a neighbour which, if not friendly or sympathetic, could hardly be jealous or hostile to a power which had aided her to her existence, would strengthen us much in respect of the world without. Our statesmen tell us that the present object of our efforts as regards European politics is consideration and moral weight. Nothing would conduce more to the attainment of that object than a right conduct towards Ireland, deliberately initiated and consistently carried out. It is an evil for us and for Europe that we, one of the leading powers of the West, are weighted with, what all but ourselves consider as, the incubus of another Poland. It would be much to remove this stigma. It would be much also for ourselves, if in one notable case we could show that we are able to deal rightly with a dependency. We boast our imperial capacities, but the fact remains that we can only display them at the cost of the degradation, if not destruction, of all those over whom we exercise them. And our statesmen, even of the better order, have too often accepted this result as an inevitable consequence of our contact. We seem incapable of assimilation and incorporation on fair terms. If, abandoning the attempt in Ireland, where it has hitherto been so disastrous, we adopt the higher policy of helping a nation into its legitimate development, it might surely react upon us as wholesomely as the immoral sense of arbitrary lordliness is now said to do on the English character by the advocates of our policy of Eastern aggression. The futile plea in favour of our conduct needs no examination. It is but the pretext for our evil ambition, a varnish for our disgraceful abuse of our material power; nay more, a stimulus to the worst propensities of our nature.

If we turn to the Irish point of view, it would seem at first sight that not many words need be wasted on that—a policy such as the one here advocated is *primâ facie* desirable for Ireland. But it is certain that this point would be disputed, and disputed even by those who would do most to conciliate the feelings, as most alive to the wrongs, of Ireland. Separation, a distinct existence for Ireland, is condemned as not conducive to her true interests. It would be a descent for her, a derogation from her present position under its potential aspect. It would bring with it, it is urged, the loss of imperial privileges and outlooks, the ennobling consciousness of forming part of a great whole. It would lower not raise, dull not brighten, her existence.

This involves a point of great importance, the full discussion of which is beyond my present limits. But the general answer may be indicated, and the leading considerations on which that answer rests.

The mass of the nation would not lose, so much would be conceded. For the mass of every nation, if society is to go on at all, must be occupied as it always has been, whatever its nominal conditions, in the apparently humble task of supplying its own material wants and the wants of others. Permanent and peaceful labour, such must be the rule for the immense majority of mankind. That majority then finds in a rightly ordered community its interest in two things; first, in such social arrangements as make its labour as safe and as pleasant as possible, as consistent as possible with the just consideration and dignity which should be the lot of every human being as discharging a useful social function; secondly, in such means for moral and intellectual cultivation as may make it feel that its proper human existence is not sacrificed to its more animal or more material existence. These two objects adequately secured, what we choose to call the larger prospects for man are not essential; they are, in fact, so little so, that they are prejudicial as impediments to the permanent acceptance of the normal conditions of man's real welfare.

Paucis nascitur humanum genus—The many are born for the few. Such has been, and is still, too much the accepted view by those in whose favour the maxim tells.

Pauci nascuntur humano generi—The few are born for the many. Such is the truth which lies at the bottom of all the confused democratic babble of the day. Such is the truth which wants working out in all departments of our social existence. And its application to our present subject is evident.

Given the peaceful and settled industrial existence of the majority of the Irish nation, it is objected that the more energetic and ambitious portion would feel cramped in such narrow limits, and unduly repressed by the consciousness that they were but citizens of a small state. That they would, like the Athenians, shrink from being μικροπολῖται, not members of an imperial aggregate, with all the chances of domination over others, to rouse them to exertion, and to gratify their pride.

They might feel all this, and they probably would. For we have lost the sense of the purpose and nobility of the strict life of the simple citizen. All that is to be said is that they must come to feel otherwise. That they must accept a new position; against their will if they are unwise, freely and as a gain if with due submission they first bend to their duty. They must learn in the practice of that duty to find that it is conducive to their higher interests, and so let their feelings cluster round it to give it beauty and sacredness in their eyes. Ambition and energy as commonly displayed have had their use and their day. For good, and largely also for evil, they have written themselves on the world. They need, not suppression, but transformation and discipline; and so changed, they have an ample field before them. The ambitious and the energetic are, to speak out, becoming more and more analogous to the animals of prey of the lower species, more and more analogous to the Greek tyrant, the 'beast broken into the fold of civilized society, whom it is every man's duty to destroy.'

The progress of man's history has been from the hunter and the nomad to the sedentary life of the agriculturist and manufacturer. But the full and complete issue of that progress in the extinction of all the primeval tendencies is not yet come—not even in that approximate degree which might be attained by human society. The combined forces of the race will have for a long period a work to do in promoting the

advent of a perfect settlement of all its portions. But no one disputes that the peaceful settlement of all is the limit to which we should consciously tend ; and, if so, where ultimately is to be the scope for the exercise of the domineering faculties as at present conceived and justified ? Chastened and disciplined, they will always have room. The industrial chief, of whatever class, may find his capacity for government as much employment as it can manage, and, be it added, as noble an employment as it can desire.

On this question I must leave much unsaid. The language used in favour of our restless encroachments on others recalls an old remark : ' He who is to govern others should himself have first practised submission.' As a general rule, this is far from being true of our self-constituted governors of the more backward portions of the race. They are but too often pre-eminently undisciplined. For one Columbus there are many Pizarros.

In the full development of the industrial life, it will be found that it is not the sphere which is to be created for the individual, but the individual who must adapt himself to his sphere ; and, rightly considered, this does not impair, but elevates, the just dignity of the individual, as it attaches consequence to him, and not to his circumstances.

In any case, whether satisfactory or not to the few, the life of the citizen of a state, in the true sense of the term, must be the life in which the energy and ambition of men must learn to find themselves at home, for the simple reason that in society industrially constituted no other will be open to them.

Further than this I do not enter on the question. In a state of the size of Ireland, or even in a much smaller one, such as Holland, all rightly directed energies might find a legitimate sphere, and by the co-operation of all its citizens the stable welfare of such a whole might be indefinitely promoted.

There is, however, something in the objection to small states, with the narrow and exclusive patriotism which they often develope, and a community devoted to peaceful industry might easily sink into a mere material, physical well-being. The remedy lies in the spiritual organization of Humanity, which has to bring all the separate states into connection and

to a sense of communion, to raise them above their local interests, and imbue them with a constant consciousness of their relation to the whole race. The priesthood of Humanity, as the priesthood of mediæval Catholicism was in its time, will be the representative and the fosterer of the more spiritual considerations which prevent the too exclusive predominance of material interests. It will reconcile a true patriotism with the larger claims and obligations of the Universal Church. It will counterbalance, by a common education and a common worship, whatever there is of a lowering nature in the daily round of industrial existence, as it will, by a new interpretation, transmute that existence from within, and demonstrate its inherent nobleness.

It follows, from what I have said, that I consider the true interest of the minority no less consulted by the separate existence of Ireland than that of the majority. The compression of a concentrated and permanent social existence is a necessity for all men, however much, in our revolutionary state, we recoil from it, under an over-estimate of our capacity for independence—of our claims and our aspirations. The many and the few are alike in their need of some pressure. They are unlike, in that it is enforced on the many by their circumstances, whilst the few can escape from it in some measure. They should place themselves both on the same footing by a voluntary acceptance. Equal in submission to the social order, the two would supplement each other. The few would serve the many. The many would ennoble the existence of the few by the consideration and honour with which they would surround it. This is a better prospect than any amount of great prizes held out to the encouragement of irregular ambition—prizes, too, which the altering condition of social organization will tend to abolish.

Small states and not large, local not imperial action, true permanence in the relations of life, and not orderly or disorderly displacement—such are, in this view, the conditions of the human future, and equally with others in such conditions Ireland would, I conceive, find satisfaction.

CONCLUSION.

To create in Ireland a new self-existing and self-ruling unit amongst Western States, this is the fundamental idea of the policy I have ventured to urge in the first part of this pamphlet. Whether sound or not, it does not in any way stand or fall with the plan of government suggested in the second. Again, that plan, conversely, might be accepted in principle by those who in no degree assented to the end, to effect which it is here proposed. The only point, I may add, to which I attach importance, so far as the details are concerned, is the substitution of a direct, responsible, and for the reasons given, single-handed power—though a delegated power—for the action of a Parliament.

It were useless to try and disarm opposition. There is no subject, indeed, on which I should more wish a candid hearing; but I have no hope of such treatment, and eventually it does not much matter.

In the main principles and purport of what I have written I do not stand alone. In points of detail or isolated statements I may do so. But in substance I express the sentiments of others, and have their deliberate countenance. My pamphlet is the manifesto of a circle, small it may be, of resolute adherents to a definite policy, in regard to Ireland, wholly at variance with our national traditions. Beyond this circle I feel confident the number is increasing of those who are looking for some complete and satisfactory answer to the difficulties of the Irish question, and who will not be deterred from accepting it by its running counter to the ordinary political views. To such lies my appeal, not to any wide audience. They who speak in the name of the past and the interest of the future may well expect to be out of keeping with a present which but too generally would scornfully ignore that past, and take but little thought of the future.

WANDSWORTH:
Aristotle 22, 80 (*March* 18, 1868.)

APPENDIX I.

ON May 4, 1867, a petition was presented to the House of Commons relating to the Fenian prisoners actually under sentence, and to the general conduct to be pursued towards the Fenian insurgents.

In the conception of its promoters, this petition was not an isolated act. It was meant to break ground—to be the first step in a definite course of action, the general object of which was the direction of public opinion in England to a wholly different policy in reference to Ireland from that hitherto pursued. Accordingly, simultaneously with the drawing up of the petition, and previous to its presentation, measures were taken to secure further combined action on the part of the petitioners, and the outlines of the policy to be advocated were agreed upon.

The undersigned are not supporters of the doctrine of nationalities, which, in the abstract and absolute form in which it is advanced by many writers of the democratic school, has been and is a source of disturbance and confusion throughout Europe. They do not allow that either race, or religion, or geographical boundary, or language, or subjection to a common Government, is of itself sufficient to constitute a nation. They are not sufficient separately; and to make them sufficient even in combination something more is required. The combination must have been found to work well. To show that a national union, in the true sense of the word, has been formed, we should be able to show that the members united do, amidst all kind of partial differences, in the main work together as fellow-citizens linked by common memories and common political objects. Union in political action is the essential characteristic of a nation.

But where the craving for national independence has continued unabated for centuries; where in two countries, however closely linked together, there are not common memories and common political objects; where the sense of union decreases instead of increases—in such a case, in the judg-

ment of those who sign this paper, the question of nationality ceases to be an abstract and absolute question, and becomes one of that highly practical order which imperatively demands the attention of the statesman. Such a case is Ireland.

The facts which at once account for and justify, both in the past and in the present, the absence of such a common feeling between England and Ireland as is required to constitute a national union, may be summed up under five heads :—

1. The forcible establishment and the actual maintenance of a religion at variance with the national faith.
2. The confiscation, at three separate intervals, of nearly the entire Irish soil.
3. The enactment of the Penal Laws against Catholics. These have been repealed, but much too recently for the evils they produced to have disappeared.
4. The deliberate, consistent, and successful effort to destroy Irish mercantile prosperity. This, too, has ceased, but not its effects.
5. The continuous attempts of the English Government to encroach on the legislative independence of Ireland.

All five may be compressed into one short statement. Ireland has been consistently governed for England, and not for Ireland ; from the point of view of the stronger and conquering nation, not in the interest of the weaker and conquered. Herein lies the root and justification of the permanent and increasing discontent of Ireland. Herein lies also the obstacle to the removal of that discontent.

It is evident that for its removal a new and an Irish policy is required—a policy which shall give satisfaction to what there is of well founded in the words 'Ireland for the Irish'—such a policy as in the case of India was announced by Lord Cranborne, to the general satisfaction of the public opinion of England.

For two reasons, we who here advocate such a policy wish it to be carried out imperially, and not locally ; by an Executive Government common to the two kingdoms—not by a distinct Irish Government.

The first reason is found in the state of Ireland itself—in

its divisions, political and religious. The strength of the Imperial Government may be wisely used to maintain order and enforce peaceful relations between the parties during the introduction of the necessary changes.

The second reason has a natural weight with us as Englishmen. We cannot but wish that the national disgrace which attaches to the record of English supremacy in Ireland might in some degree be atoned for by a bold and wise system, however late, of national reparation.

In the conviction that nothing but a general modification of opinion in England can secure the adoption of a true policy for Ireland, a Society has been formed, to consist exclusively of Englishmen, with the title and programme subjoined. These few remarks are by way of introduction. We ask for the co-operation of all who wish sincerely and fearlessly to do justice to Ireland.

The Ireland Society.

The object of the Ireland Society is to bring together those Englishmen who can agree on certain principles of Irish policy, and so to give consistency and definiteness to their action and their efforts to spread such principles.

It aims at forming a sounder public opinion as to the duties of the Imperial Government towards Ireland. To attain this, the best and most logical policy is to be put forward. The necessary compromises and adaptations are for the practical statesman to consider.

By the best and most logical policy is not meant a policy conformed to some abstract standard ; but the best relatively to the history, wants, and feelings of the Irish people—the best adapted, that is, to remedy its wrongs, and make it competent to direct its own affairs.

Statement of Principles.

1. Misgovernment and bad land laws—in other words, political and social evils—are, for the time, a sufficient explanation of the unfortunate condition of Ireland, without

having recourse to considerations of race, climate, or religious, as opposed to ecclesiastical, differences.

2. The history and traditional ideas of Ireland are so peculiar that special legislation is indispensable; such legislation to be from the Irish, not the English, point of view.

3. No considerations of the interest of any particular class or institution in England, civil or ecclesiastical, nor of the interest or safety of England as a whole, should interfere with our conception of the policy to be adopted.

4. The divisions among the people of Ireland, as well as the general social state of that country, make her union with England under one executive Government for the present desirable, provided that the Imperial Government be willing to do her justice.

5. The aim of a just and provident Government should be to put an end to those divisions, to form Ireland into one nation, and to raise into its proper vigour her national life—to give her, that is, complete control over all her institutions.

6. Such objects once approximately attained, the last excuse for a compulsory union would be at an end; and if the desire of the Irish people for independence should still continue unabated, it should no longer be resisted.

7. Even at present, if the Imperial Government does not show itself able and willing to do justice promptly, it will become the duty of all Englishmen who value morality in politics to bend their efforts towards creating a public feeling in favour of a complete separation between the two countries with as little delay as possible.

The Results aimed at.

1. The abolition of the Irish Protestant Church, and the withdrawal of all State support from every other religious body, Catholic or Protestant.

2. A settlement of the land question in harmony with the feelings of the Irish people, the object being to replace the nation in possession of its land, by converting into proprietors the actual cultivators, whether large or small.

3. A strictly primary education to be placed by the

Imperial Government within reach of the poor. All higher education to be renounced by the State.

4. To atone for the oppressive action exercised in past times by England on the commerce, manufactures, and even agriculture of Ireland, liberal grants to be made for public purposes, with the object of developing her resources.

APPENDIX II.

THE PETITION.

'To the honourable the House of Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, the humble petition of the undersigned citizens of England showeth:

'That your petitioners, whilst disapproving of the movement known as Fenianism, in so far as it is a secret movement, into which men are admitted by oaths of secresy, whereas all combinations should be open and ready to submit their objects to free discussion, whilst blaming the recent outbreak as a resort to violence where it has not been shown that violence is the only means remaining of attaining the end proposed; and whilst, therefore, hoping that order may be restored to Ireland by the judicious use of the power of the English Government;

'Your petitioners, remembering nevertheless that the history of Ireland has been the history, first, of imperfect conquest and long neglect, then of war and dispossession of the Irish people, then of legal injustice and harsh repression of the disturbances caused by the said injustice;

'Remembering also that the actual Government of Ireland is the government of the conquered by the conqueror, as is shown by the maintenance, against the undoubted wishes of the bulk of the nation, of the Irish Church Establishment, and by the enforcement of a system of land laws at variance with the traditions and feelings of the Irish people; that, in short, it is a Government in the interest not of Ireland, but of England, or rather of the State Church and territorial aristocracy of England;

'That by the present distribution of political power the

Irish nation is unable to make its wishes adequately felt by the stronger country to which it is bound; that in the consequent apparent hopelessness of a remedy for the evils which press on their country, honourable Irishmen may, however erroneously, feel justified in resorting to force; that, in a word, there is legitimate ground for the chronic discontent of which Fenianism is the expression, and therefore palliation for the errors of Fenians;

'Your petitioners, therefore, pray your honourable House that it may take such measures as it shall judge fit—Firstly, to secure the revision of the sentences already passed on Fenians—sentences of great, and, in the judgment of your petitioners, generally excessive and irritating severity; secondly, to provide in any case that prisoners suffering as Fenians are for a political offence shall not during the execution of their sentence be confined in common with prisoners suffering for offences against the ordinary criminal laws of their country; thirdly, your petitioners, justly alarmed by their recollection of the atrocities perpetrated by the English troops in Ireland in 1798, as also by their recollection of the conduct of the English army and its officers in India and Jamaica, and by the suggestions of the public press and the general tone of the wealthy classes with regard to the suppression of rebellion, pray your honourable House to provide that the utmost moderation and strict adherence to the laws of fair and humane warfare may be inculcated on the army now serving in Ireland; and lastly, your petitioners pray that the prisoners taken may be well treated before trial, and judged and sentenced with as much leniency as is consistent with the preservation of order, and that in the punishments awarded there may be none of a degrading nature, as such punishments seem to your petitioners inapplicable to men whose cause and whose offence are alike free from dishonour, however misguided they may be as to the special end they have in view, or as to the means which they have adopted to attain that end. And your petitioners will ever pray:—

'RICHARD CONGREVE, South Fields, Wandsworth.
'EDWARD SPENCER BEESLY, University Hall, Gor-
'don Square.
'FREDERIC HARRISON, Lincoln's Inn.

'J. H. BRIDGES, Bradford, Yorkshire.
'H. CROMPTON, 23 Westbourne Terrace.
'S. H. REYNOLDS, Brasenose College, Oxford.
'C. A. COOKSON, Inner Temple.
'F. B. BARTON, 29 Lamb's Conduit Street.
'JOHN MAUGHAN, 1 Pleasant Row, Canonbury.
'S. D. WILLIAMS, Birmingham.
'E. TRUELOVE, 256 High Holborn.'

PAPERS ON THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870–71.

POSITIVIST CONSIDERATIONS ON THE WAR.

Religion of Humanity. Republic of the West.

IN the present day war has no longer any proper place. As the human race grows in unity and in the consciousness of unity, war assumes more and more the repulsive character of civil war. It does so the more, in proportion as those between whom it is waged are more closely connected by all the ties that connect nations. The war then between two nations of Western Europe, intimately bound up as they are one with the other by the whole course of their history and civilization, is to be looked upon as emphatically a civil war, and condemned as such by the reason and feeling of mankind.

There are, in fact, but two cases which can justify a nation in making war. The first is that of self-defence, the case in this instance, up to a certain point, of Germany.

The second is, when a nation, by virtue of the duty attendant on the possession of strength, interferes in favour of another nation unjustly attacked or overharshly treated; a principle in some degree recognized in our recent Belgian treaty.

The French Government, and the French nation so far as it is the accomplice of its Government, can plead neither of these justifications. It cannot be alleged that France was in any danger warranting her appeal to arms. It cannot be alleged with truth that she takes up arms to protect another Power. The Danish question is evidently a side issue. It cannot be alleged wisely, in presence of facts, that she had ground for interfering on behalf of Southern Germany. She was the aggressor, and, as such, justly forfeited the sympathy of Europe.

But the actual course of events suggests other considera-

tions. France is suffering defeat after defeat, and is being overborne, and the tone of triumphant Germany is rising. Two alternatives present themselves. The existing French Government may retain its hold on the nation, which it seems to treat as its real enemy. In that case the Powers outside can but wait and watch. It has long been recognized that interference with the internal arrangements of France is inadmissible, and neither Louis Napoleon nor the dynasty of which he is the head can claim any support.

But France may change her Government, and with a new Government front the invader. Here again two alternatives present themselves. Under her new Government the French armies may still be unsuccessful, and France still be overborne, whilst Germany rises in her demands. The spirit of aggrandizement shown by Prussia of late years, and largely shared by Germany, is not unlikely to reappear. There is a real danger of a retrograde policy of annexation, of a departure from the original ground of the war, of the substitution of conquest and aggression for a simple and noble defence.

I have spoken quite plainly of the blame attaching to France and her Government. But Prussia and Germany are not free from blame. The war of 1866 was as iniquitous a war as the present one. The war with Denmark was even worse. The German nation, long the oppressor of Italy, still oppresses Denmark, and claims as by right domination over Poland. And, distinct from these special questions, the military spirit fostered in Prussia and forced by her upon Germany, is, rightly considered, as much as any French error, responsible for the actual evils, and pregnant with future danger. No nation of Western Europe is so retrograde in this respect as Germany. The facts of the present war show conclusively that France had less of the military tendency in her. A nation permanently organized for war is a solecism in an industrial *régime*; she is a nuisance to the whole world. Her example is pleaded to degrade other nations to her level, and to burden them with all the evils of the soldier spirit. I say this with the consciousness that I am out of tune with the prevailing tone in what is called society. We clapped hands over Sadowa—we are again bowing down before success, heeding little the consequences involved in that success.

But to return. In the case supposed, of continued French reverses, the opinion of England should, I think, press on her Government the duty of opposing such a policy on the part of Germany, the duty, whether in co-operation with the other neutrals or singly, of supporting her opposition by direct aid to France if just remonstrances in favour of moderation are set aside. It can be no part of England's present policy, it is inconsistent, I make bold to say, with her past history, to see France unduly depressed.

It were a noble opportunity to redress many an earlier wrong. France as the representative, the martyr nation of Europe, has large claims on all Western sympathies. Whatever comes, I, and those for whom I speak, should see with shame those claims neglected, this opportunity lost.

There is no room for the plea of inability. We have, in fact, abandoned it. Our fleet, our money would do much. Our army, so near, would do much also. 50,000 English troops would be a formidable contingent, and one easily reinforced. And apart from this, England has but to speak in tones of decision, and Germany would find herself isolated in Western Europe; Italy and Spain must gravitate to the Western Powers.

Lastly, there is the second alternative. On a change of Government France may be successful and expel her invaders; and, as in her great revolution, stand flushed with victory and, in her turn, prepared to invade and conquer. In such a contingency, the English Government should equally be prepared to take with Germany, and against France, the very same course of remonstrance and active opposition which, on the other supposition, she is prepared to take in conjunction with France, and against Germany.

In no case can it be for the interest of Europe, rightly considered, nor of any portion of its kindred and highly civilized peoples, that territorial displacements should take place, either to gratify this or that ignoble ambition, or under the specious pretext of a precaution. The danger of precautionary measures has been shown by the whole experience of Europe since the settlement at Vienna in 1815. No infringement of this principle should be acquiesced in. To maintain the *status quo*, and in peace and order to work out

the great social problems which pass before all others, and which are common to all the nations of Western Europe—such, shortly stated, is the true policy under existing conditions.

RICHARD CONGREVE.

17 MECKLENBURGH SQUARE:
Gutenberg 6, 82 (*August* 18, 1870).

THE WAR.

In the Name of Humanity.

I have no access to, nor have I any confidence in, the Newspaper Press: I therefore adopt the Placard, the Street Press.

I.

ENGLISHMEN, especially Englishmen of the Working Classes:

France, as the aggressor in this horrible civil war, for civil war it is, incurred just blame. Her Government deserves most blame, but the French nation must take its share.

But the attitude of the two parties is changing; has, in fact, already changed. The military spirit fostered in Germany beyond all due bounds, has thrown the nation on the French army, and in its triumph the German nation is throwing aside all its original moderation, and avowing plans of annexation and interference with the just independence of France. Germany is now the aggressor, France on the defensive. Germany is even rejecting the claims of the other States of Europe to have a voice in her settlement.

Whilst Louis Napoleon is officially the ruler of France, our Government cannot easily interfere, for he was the aggressor; though even this obstacle may, under certain circumstances, have to be set aside. But he may cease to rule at any moment. Should not England in that case actively interfere in behalf of France, if an energetic diplomatic remonstrance is not listened to? Should she not require of

Germany the withdrawal of the German nation from the French soil, on the receipt of a fair indemnity in money, and under the guarantee that, if France assumed the offensive, England would join Germany to resist her?

These terms accepted by France and refused by Germany, we should support them by arms. No selfish abstinence from action, but war in union with France—the English and French armies side by side, as in the days of Cromwell or in the Crimea—to drive back the German inroad—such is the policy I appeal to you to adopt. Arms, money, a fleet, and an army—we have all these means in our power. We might call on Italy and Spain to join us; nay, even upon Austria and Russia. It is a policy of great sacrifices, but great interests are at stake. Think what the iron rule of Prussia may mean for the industrial movement, the interests of labour in Europe. There is once more a banding of powers against the Republic, in which lies the hope of social progress.

II.

As a nation we are being urged to imitate the example of Prussia, to organize society on a permanent war footing. A strong expression of your refusal to be drawn into such imitation, of your entire and unqualified reprobation of the whole military spirit, is, believe me, urgently needed. Your upper classes are radically unsound on this point. They are not industrial, they are retrograde and military; and that with the less excuse, in that our island position removes even the appearance of necessity. The public opinion of Europe should make it clear to Germany that her military *régime* is an unsocial and criminal disregard of the interests of Humanity. You, above all others, should stimulate that opinion.

III.

One word more. Both Governments have appealed to the same God; and the German victory, at least, will be celebrated by thanksgivings, with the sanction of official Christianity. France, if victorious without Napoleon, will possibly not so insult the religious feelings of mankind. The Religion of Humanity would, by its very name, have protested against

this aggression of France, as it would protest against the continuance of the war by Germany in a spirit of aggression and annexation. In the name of that religion, I call on you to say loudly that in such a war there can be no triumph—that the only feeling should be one of shame and sorrow; nay, even, that no war in the present day can confer glory; that the reason and the feeling of mankind combine to refuse honour to any military excellence, be it of the pure fighter or of the life-long student of military schemes.

RICHARD CONGREVE.

17 MECKLENBURGH SQUARE, W.C.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

THE present is one of those critical periods in the history of Europe when it is most desirable that a firm and complete policy should be adopted by England. Our Government remains, so far as the nation is concerned, silent. We do not wish to blame this silence, but it leaves us uncertain and anxious. We, the undersigned, therefore, in this hour of silence, danger, and distrust, offer the subjoined suggestions, and invite signatures to them from all who can adopt them, premising that they are limited to foreign policy, and therefore purposely omit Irish and Colonial questions, to be treated nevertheless on the same principles.

The great facts of the case are open to all. The order of Western Europe is disturbed, and the concert of her several constituent elements is needed to restore it. We think that England, as one of those elements, must not stand aloof. That is our starting-point. Her history and her duty alike enjoin on her a contribution to the common welfare. She must serve the common cause, even if it cost her some sacrifice to do so.

In European policy her position is only defective in one point. Her hands are not clean in respect of Spain. She

should, we urge, clear herself by giving up at once Gibraltar, *as it is*, to the Spanish Government. Heligoland, if Denmark values it, might be returned to Denmark. These cessions, voluntarily made, would evidence her desire for peace, her readiness to make her sacrifices for it.

Further, we repudiate all but defensive warlike action, out of Europe, as much as in Europe. Our warlike action should be limited to maintaining, in conjunction with the other Western nations, the police of the seas. We are compelled to remark on the painful contrast presented by our Government and our nation, in its upper ranks at least, between the peaceful professions with regard to Europe and America, and the proneness to violence, when occasions offer, in regard to Asiatic or African nations. Even now it is rumoured that we are to take up arms against China in support of no quarrel of ours, but of the meddling proselytism of the late French Government. The Republic, we hope, will hold a different language, and make it clear to French missionaries that if they intrude on the Chinese nation, they do so at their own risk.

We deprecate war as a means of spreading English or Western commerce, civilization, and Christianity. If they cannot spread themselves, let them stay where they are.

Lastly, with regard to England's action within herself; we protest against any military system, in principle different from the present, being adopted by the nation. In present circumstances, we admit that an army is necessary; but we protest against an armed nation, the evil of which, in national demoralization, is apparent in Prussia.

The present crisis over, we think the true policy, in this respect, is the formation of a relatively small constabulary force, armed and disciplined, but with its members citizens, and married if they wish it; a sufficient maintenance of the highly-trained special arms, engineers and artillery and navy—the navy on a much more moderate scale than it is now; and lastly, the suppression of the standing army.

So much premised, and the present conditions continuing—that is, Prussia refusing to resume her defensive attitude and rejecting our mediation—we advocate a defensive alliance with France, in the first place, as the Power more immediately threatened, assuming, of course, that France offers peace on

such terms as Germany ought to accept. Without exacting any conditions for our alliance, we might wisely ask France to restore Nice to Italy and allow Savoy freedom of action, as a disclaimer of the Imperial policy; thus conciliating the opinion of Europe. Further, we might then, with a fair prospect of success, invite Italy to join us in the same conduct, and Spain also. Denmark, Sweden, Holland, these Powers as integral and valuable elements in the European order, might also be applied to. The peculiar position of Austria should make us slow to invite her, though ready to act with her if she wishes it. The same negative attitude would be, perhaps, the wisest in respect to Russia.

There remains one great Western Power to which it is said France has appealed. The Republic of the United States cannot but sympathize with the French Republic in her hour of need. The past imperatively demands such sympathy. Our relations with America have been so disturbed by our own fault as to make common action difficult, but a wise concert between the two Governments for this special case might be possible; and, if so, we might see the whole opinion, and, if necessary, the force of the Western world banded to repress the deviation of Germany from the line prescribed by the common welfare. The union would make it more easy for Germany to yield.

Such a policy would require neither reserve nor reticence. Our diplomacy might openly proclaim its course and its object. That object attained, European order re-established as before the war, a great impulse would have been given to Western Europe to enter on that which is its true function—its peaceful internal organization, with a view to the service and advancement of the less developed portions of the Great Family of Man.

Wednesday, September 7, 1870.

PARIS.

THE Prussian King, an old soldier, a mere soldier, incapable of any higher notion than that of a soldier's glory, impenetrable to all the better tendencies of our time, or viewing them with a king's instinctive hatred, is marching upon Paris. His attendant spirits, Bismarck and Von Moltke, those fell representatives of a retrograde policy of war, of ideas which are as inhuman as they should be extinct, are there to guide the Apostle of Absolutism, the crowned opponent of Republicanism, the more successful Brunswick of 1792. The German army, officered by the princes, nobles, and squires of Germany —men who are bred to think arms the only gentleman's profession—is tramping on to enjoy its insolent triumph; to humble the Republic, if possible to put it down; to dismember France; and to fill the Prussian treasury with money to be husbanded, according to the tradition of Prussia, for the next war.

The heroic city stands at bay. She has resisted for years the foul Bonaparte and his accursed *régime*. She has cleared herself so far as she could of this war. This the Prussian leaders know; and it is this very resistance that is the real crime of Paris in their eyes. It is the Republican party which has, on all fitting occasions, spoken out its hatred of Napoleon, and it is that party which is the real object of their attack. Paris resists the Hohenzollern as she has done the Bonaparte. She throws herself into the gap for France and for Europe, which needs as little a Prussian military monarchy to domineer over it as a Napoleonic. She thinks, and thinks rightly, that to repel this now causeless aggression is a duty at all risks; and finding her inspiration in her noblest self, she is, by the latest accounts, determined to fight it to the last. She may succeed, or she may fall, but her resolve is noble and wise—all that is noble and wise in Europe should sympathize with her.

The death duel may even now have begun, and the city may have heard the first boom of the Prussian artillery. And we—what are we doing? What is England doing? Her Queen is in the Highlands, away from the care and

trouble; reading, possibly, with sympathy the last devout despatch of her royal compeer of Prussia, and indulging in satisfaction over the glorious prospects of her daughter's husband. Her Ministry is silent, and apparently careless. Her Premier visiting exhibitions, or Clumber. Her Foreign Secretary enjoying Walmer. Her First Lord of the Admiralty in Belgium;—the rest, here, there, and everywhere. Her nobles and gentry are bent on their annual *game* destruction—is it not the season of that mighty interest? Her commercial classes counsel peace; her press preaches submission. No hand is raised—no voice, even in sympathy.

Men of London, we may awake one morning and find that the death struggle is over, and that through the smoking ruins of Paris, bombarded and taken by storm, the ministers of German vengeance and German greed are raising their hoarse psalm—it will be, of course, a psalm!—of triumph to the God of Battles.

And the infamy of this result will slowly settle down into the minds of Englishmen; and slowly too, perhaps, will visit the Ministry under which it was suffered.

But what can England do? Why, her Government might acknowledge the French Republic, and speak, in the face of Europe, her disapprobation of the Prussian attack. France would be grateful even for that. There have been statesmen of England who would have done more; who would have been able to pierce the sophisms of Prussian policy, and to see that the issue is now clear between the peace and orderly progress of Europe and the triumph of a great military monarchy; and, true to her traditions of resistance to such an evil, they would have called the nation to another great effort. We have no such statesmen.

Men of London, none better than you can realize Paris girdled in with that iron instrument of destruction. You can speak. Do so, and clear yourselves. Meet and speak. Lend a voice to England. Say that you, the heart of England, have no part nor lot in your Government's supineness and impassivity; that as you sympathized with Germany in her original wrong, so you look with abhorrence on her present attitude of triumphant aggression, as fatal to her own best interests as it may be to those of European civilization.

Come what may, I and those who think with me have done what we can—will continue to do what we can.

Noble and Holy City, there are true English hearts who, in this thy supreme hour, watch thee with hope and admiration; would encourage thee in thy great daring; will, if thou fall, honour thee and avenge thee in the noblest way, by continuing thy high mission. Thy lesson of courage and sacrifice shall not be lost.

Sept. 10, 1870.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE WEST; OR UNION OF THE FIVE POPULATIONS: FRENCH, ITALIAN, SPANISH, ENGLISH, AND GERMAN.

Order and Progress.

THE Governments of France and Prussia, with the complicity, *equally in both cases*, of a large portion of their respective nations, have for some years been rivals for political and military supremacy in Europe. A frivolous occasion converted rivalry into war. The superior craft of Count Bismarck managed to throw the whole blame on France, and to secure, by her declaring war, the moral weight of European sympathy. Again, both Governments had been plotting against the established order of Europe; and at the last moment Bismarck turned Queen's evidence, and through a singular agency—if, as is commonly said, our royal family was his agent—he revealed the plot, thus, astutely if not reputably, deepening that sympathy.

What followed, we all know. Germany cannot plead that she is now fighting for safety. She is, more or less consciously, making herself the tool of Hohenzollern ambition. European sympathy and English sympathy should pass—as it is passing; as with you, men of London, it has passed—to the side of France. The oppressor of Italy, the oppressor of Denmark, the oppressor of Poland, the would-be oppressor of the Czech and the Magyar, the German nation has been of late years, in larger measure than the French, the troubler of

Europe, and nourishes aims and aspirations alien to the peace of Europe. The sins of France have been more extra-European. Germany covets empire by land and sea. Other Powers have done so, and suffered morally and materially for it. She, if successful, must suffer for it. The latest-born and lowest in civilization of the Western nations—witness her military development—Germany might have profited by the errors and crimes of others—say, of our own country—to avoid the pernicious example. She has not so profited.

Is Europe to be disordered for long years, to breathe an atmosphere of militarism and distrust, solely that Germany may be at peace? To substitute the Hohenzollerns for the Bonapartes—one military power for another—this can be no gain to the world. Yet this is the meaning of the attempt to crush France—to crush the French nation. Veil it under what name you like, the real aim of Prussia is not self-defence, but supremacy—'Germany is in the saddle.'

I hesitate not to brand the present action of Germany as a display of the most gigantic national selfishness which has ever been varnished over with a fair name. She must be strong; secure for all eternity; maintain armies and fleets at her discretion; have fortresses, frontiers—all at her wish; incorporate Germans, or non-Germans, with their will or against their will; while France is to be humbled, reduced; her fortresses dismantled, her territory dismembered, her frontier open, her independent action given up, a limit set on the force she shall maintain; and the grounds for this unequal attitude are, partly, the god-like attribute of vengeance, partly the now hypocritical plea of safety for Germany. There are more forms than one of national demoralization; and the nation which can unblushingly advocate such a policy as this, be her force of thews and sinews what it may, is essentially and profoundly demoralized. I well believe that there are thousands of Germans who protest as I do; but, Workmen of England, you see what German freedom is, in the treatment of the Brunswick Socialists.

In the interest of Germany, quite as much as in the interest of France, the action of the other States of Europe is now desirable. This siege of Paris is a blunder—not the less a blunder if it succeed. I speak but the voice of the civilized

world, when I say that the storm of Paris will recoil upon its authors. The other Powers, however, hold aloof—mainly, it is thought, through the influence of England.

Such is the situation abroad.

What is it at home?

Our Government is silent. In ordinary times there is much talk of taking the nation into confidence. Why is it, in this crisis, kept completely in the dark? Why does our Government not recognize the actual Government of France? Mr. Lowe does not answer this question. Why does it not lend that nation the moral support of England in this hour of danger and depression? What is the obstacle? Is it Court influence, or a mere formalist scruple? We are left to conjecture.

There are moments, it has been said, when rashness is wisdom. The English statesman who should utter some word of generous feeling to break this oppressive silence, and in the face of a hostile Court and impassive governing classes, give voice to the nobler impulses of England, might be judged rash, but might, in the end, be found to have been wise even in his own generation.

By the nation at large a good work is being done; contributions are pouring in to mitigate the horrors of war—a good work, but not the best. It is but salving their conscience if the governing classes limit themselves to this, if they shirk the higher duty which rests on us all, in the measure of our ability, of understanding and judging rightly the causes, conditions, and issues of this great struggle, and of acting upon such understanding and judgment.

Working Men of London, on the broad general question, you, in common with other great towns, have formed your judgment; you have met to express your sympathy for France and the French Republic, your admiration and your encouragement of its resistance. Your Government may not listen to you at present; but events are moving rapidly forward, and you will not see reason to regret that you have spoken in the cause of Justice and Freedom.

RICHARD CONGREVE.

17 MECKLENBURGH SQUARE: *Sept.* 17, 1870.

PARIS.

(2.)

'MEN of London, we may awake one morning and find that the death-struggle is over, and that, through the smoking ruins of Paris, bombarded and taken by storm, the ministers of German vengeance and German greed are raising their hoarse psalm—it will be, of course, a psalm!—of triumph to the God of Battles.

'And the infamy of this result will slowly settle down into the minds of Englishmen; and slowly too, perhaps, will visit the Ministry under which it was suffered.'

So I wrote September 10, 1870; and on January 13, 1871, after four months, it seems coming true to the letter. The bombardment has now lasted more than a week. The storm of shells is raining fast into the most populous and most popular quarters of Paris—the quarters most hostile to Napoleon—most averse to the war. Nor are shells all. Inflammable material, says the *Times* correspondent—petroleum, says a letter I have received—is being poured into the heart of a great city. It matters not what city. Is such conduct tolerable?

What does our Government intend to do? Raise no voice? Stand by respectfully, whilst the German Emperor, whom it has congratulated, works his own and his nation's wicked will?

Our Queen, too—she can speak gracefully and tenderly to private suffering. Has she no words for the suffering population of a large city? Can she not make it felt that she is not in sympathy with the excesses of Prussia; that she is in sympathy with the sufferings of France? Can she give no sign that she is the representative of a nation—not of a royal caste?

All that is powerful, all that is wealthy in England, is silent. Her clergy speaks not. Her literary classes give

but faint signs, and that as often as not on the side of the oppressor and the strong. One of them is heard—it is Mr. Carlyle—shame on his grey hairs, now and for all time!—cheering on the barbarians to their work of destruction.

In this terrible hour I again raise my voice to protest, in the name of Humanity, against this selfish and timid silence; against the miserable attitude of feebleness and incapacity assumed by the Government and governing classes of England.

The heroic city—the epithet will pass now—will, I fear, die; but her death, so nobly faced, and in so noble a cause, may be the salvation of France. Nay, it will be so later, whatever the immediate issue. So costly a sacrifice will not have been in vain. May she have courage to complete it!

I grieve not for her; I grieve for the nobler hearts in Germany, who, not accomplices in this great crime, are forced, by the pressure of power, to see it committed by their nation and to listen to the exultation of its perpetrators. I grieve, too, for England; and for all who in England, with myself, feel the burden of this great national shame. I grieve, lastly, for the deferred hope of Europe and Humanity.

Noble and Holy City, thy fall will but ratify the pre-eminence which we have justly accorded thee. No other such city would have dared what thou hast dared. Thy present destruction will but raise thee in the thoughts and love of mankind, whilst it will leave thy destroyers branded by the world's execrations. The victory will be thine, not theirs.

RICHARD CONGREVE.

17 MECKLENBURGH SQUARE: *Jan.* 13, 1871.

THE ASHANTEE WAR.

ON April 6, 1872, the representative of the English Government on the Gold Coast took formal possession of the Dutch settlements on that coast by virtue of a treaty with the Dutch Government. The consideration is thought to have been (I do not find it in the Parliamentary papers) a greater liberty of action for the Dutch Government in the East Indian Archipelago. Be this as it may, before the year had elapsed, both Governments were at war—the English with the kingdom of Ashantee, that of Holland with the Sultan of Achem, in the island of Sumatra.

On the history of our relations with the Ashantees I shall be brief. It is nearly two generations since we came in contact with that Power. Up to 1821 it was the African Company which was nominally responsible. Since 1821 the national responsibility has been directly engaged, the English Government having taken the settlements into its own hands. In this period we have had four, I might in strictness say five wars, the one in which we are engaged being the fifth. These wars, by our own accounts, have not been due, or at any rate not mainly due, to an aggressive spirit on the part of the successive kings of Ashantee—aggressive, that is, as against the white settlers. It is clear from the documents presented to Parliament, that even in the later wars—and these form the best side of our case—the judgment of our own officials is far from wholly favourable to our case. Our policy has been neither frank nor consistent. Our avowed object there is commerce ; but while we have been mainly traders, considerations of government and extension of the Empire have been largely admitted. Probably some dreams of renewing in Africa our Indian experiment have influenced our action. The result has been an equivocal position, and the necessary

consequences of such a position, in presence of a lower civilization, have been fully developed. There has been a constant tendency to the recurrence of war.

In justification of these statements I give, as shortly as possible, the history of our complications.

In 1806 the Fantees, a coast tribe, joined some revolted tributaries of Ashantee, 'and there is some reason to suspect that the English authorities encouraged a revolution by which they hoped to prevent the further encroachments of the Ashantees.' ('Penny Cyclopædia,' art. Ashantees.) The result was disastrous, and the English governor had to make peace with the King of Ashantee on terms, it would appear, highly favourable to that monarch—the acknowledgment, with some reservations, of his supremacy over the coast districts. This arrangement lasted till 1816.

In this year the English drew upon themselves the resentment of the Ashantees by interfering for the protection of the Fantees. They had to buy off the invader. This was the second war. It was followed by a formal treaty of peace between the two Powers.

This peace lasted till 1818. In that year it would seem that the false news of a defeat of the Ashantee king, in some war in the interior in which we were not engaged, led the English authorities to connive at and encourage a revolt of the Fantees; war was the inevitable result of this conduct. Negotiations were entered into in 1820, which issued in a definitive treaty of peace. When, however, this treaty was communicated to the authorities on the coast, they refused to ratify it, and the historian of the period does not hesitate to stigmatize this conduct as 'bad faith' (Martineau, vol. i. p. 309), and our official papers confirm the judgment. Naturally war was resumed—the third and longest war, lasting from 1820 to 1826. It ended, after some disasters on our side, with the defeat of the Ashantees and with the consequent withdrawal of that Power from the coast districts and renunciation of its claim. A review, however, of the facts shows that our success reflects but little honour on the nation. I say on the nation, because it was during the progress of this war that the government of the Gold Coast was assumed by the Crown.

Between 1826 and 1864 I find no record of hostilities, and it would be unimportant for my purpose if there were any. We seem to have been disposed to limit ourselves to strict trade. In Mr. Porter's work on the 'Progress of the Nation,' edn. 1847, I find the following language used by that accurate writer in reference to our Gold Coast possessions :—'The posts on the coast held by us are, in fact, stations, to which the natives from the interior may resort for the purpose of carrying on a barter trade. We do not pretend to any territorial possession beyond the actual site of our several forts. . . . The population of the district within the direct influence of the British forts along this division of the coast is roughly estimated at from 700,000 to 800,000. They are Fantees. Our principal trade is with Ashantees from the interior. These people are very superior in intelligence to the Fantees and other dwellers on the coast, who have most probably been demoralized by the slave trade, formerly so actively pursued.'

This quotation has an interest, as showing the very slight importance then attached to that which now assumes so great a prominence—the protectorate of the coast districts. It has become now, in the interest of our pride, a solemn responsibility, carrying I know not what obligations with it. We know the usual artifices in such cases, the convenient application of these ambiguous relations. The quotation is interesting also from another point of view, as it touches on that which constitutes one real permanent difficulty in our relations with Ashantee and similar Powers—the question of slavery. The fourth war had its origin in this question. It arose from the refusal of the English governor to give up two runaway slaves. For about two centuries England had been a leading Power in the slave trade, active, remember, on this very Gold Coast. After the abolition of that trade, she still continued directly responsible during a generation for slavery in her colonies, indirectly responsible, therefore, for the continuance of the trade ; for her colonial slave population could only be maintained by that continuance. In 1833 she cleared herself of the reproach, and, strong in her new-found virtue, has since been actively engaged in inducing others to follow her example. But it may well be doubted how far it is reason-

able to expect of an African prince, whose whole ideas are based on the assumption that slavery is a normal feature in human society, and who, in reference to the actual social state around him, is justified in so regarding it, to require of such a one, I say, that he should accommodate himself to our newer morality, and acquiesce in the refusal of some alien traders to restore him or his subjects their property. It is the identical difficulty which lay at the root of the great American issue—a slave Power 'marching' with a non-slave Power. The fugitive slave law was a provisional settlement of it. Its final decision was attained only by four years of civil war. The comparison may serve to give a clear idea of one of the embarrassments inherent in our position. (Comp. App. E.)

The war thus occasioned was undecisive, and lapsed, rather than terminated, in a satisfactory settlement. The Government of the day refused, and rightly refused, to sanction any attack on the Ashantee kingdom. 'It was not our duty.' said the Colonial Secretary of the time, 'to make expeditions at a distance from the sea-coast into the interior of Africa; and as there was no desire or intention to extend our territory, and the rains had put an end to all warlike operations, it was not proposed to renew them.' ('Annual Reg.,' 1864.)

After the end of the war, the instructions to the governors were to avoid, if possible, any renewal of it, and for eight years peace was preserved. It appears, however, from a despatch of Lord Granville, dated May 17, 1869, that it was an uncertain and anxious peace. The same despatch sufficiently explains why it should be so. Lord Granville says:—

'You have elsewhere reported to me that the Fantees who inhabit part of the British protectorate have adopted certain hostile proceedings against the Elminas, a portion of their own tribe, under the control of the Dutch, almost on the express ground that they are allied with the King of Ashantee, with whom the British Government is, and desires to remain, at peace. The Government of the Gold Coast has attempted to appease this quarrel, and to a certain extent has succeeded in doing so, but in a manner not unlikely to give umbrage to the Ashantees.

'With this cause of discontent already in existence, a quarrel has broken out between certain tribes in the neighbourhood of the Volta, at some distance from our principal settlements. Over some of those tribes who are on the other side of the river we have never hitherto affected to exercise any influence. If we now claim to exercise any, it is in consequence of the former cession by Denmark of their settlements in that neighbourhood.

'You had yourself visited these tribes, and had persuaded them to sign a treaty which I collect they disregarded as soon as you had left the river.

'Mr. Simpson, if I rightly understand what has passed, appears to have considered himself bound, or at liberty to follow up what he supposed to be your policy, by proceeding to the scene of the dispute and endeavouring to repeat or supplement your work.

'He found that the Ashantees had been beforehand with him, and that the tribes whom he had hoped to persuade were inaccessible to argument. They detained him for some days by something like force, and he hardly escaped from their hands.

'It is plain that he had adopted a very hazardous course, without a clear apprehension of the state of the facts, or a just calculation of his own power: a serious error in an officer occupying so responsible a position.

'Such a step, if it did not succeed in averting hostilities, was obviously calculated to precipitate them. To meet that probability Mr. Simpson had recourse to menace on the one hand and offers of protection on the other.'

After quoting some passages from Mr. Simpson's letters, Lord Granville proceeds :—

'I have quoted these passages at length in order to make the effect of what Mr. Simpson has done perfectly clear.

'That effect is, as matters now stand, to make the British Government not a neutral nor even an ally, but a principal in the quarrel or complication of quarrels which are arising between the kingdom of Ashantee and the neighbouring tribes; so that the defeat or ill-success of those tribes is the defeat or ill-success of the British Government, and that their destruction from default of adequate assistance will be chargeable on

the British Government if it have authorized or should adopt the acts of its officers, or on that officer personally if his proceedings are not so authorized or approved.

'The statement which I have made will, I think, convince you that as Her Majesty's Government have never authorized, so that they are not at liberty to confirm, the threats or promises to which Mr. Simpson has resorted.

'The announcements which I have selected from his letters, so far as they are addressed to allies, must be effectually recalled; and those allies must be made clearly to understand that although the British Government, so long as they conduct themselves satisfactorily, may be ready to give *them some assistance in the way of arms, ammunition, and money*, yet the wars in which they engage themselves are their wars, and not the wars of this country; that they must rely on themselves for success in those wars; and that the British Government is unable to make itself responsible for their defence in case they should prove unable to defend themselves.

'I have had occasion to approve Mr. Simpson's zeal and intelligence, and am much satisfied on the present occasion with the clear and apparently unreserved account which he has sent me of his proceedings. But the announcement of the views I now communicate to you must necessarily impair his credit with the natives, and his power to carry on the administration of the Gold Coast with effect. If he were a less efficient and zealous public servant, I should have therefore thought it necessary to recall the Administrator's Commission which he at present holds; I refrain, however, from doing so in the confident hope that he will loyally dispel the delusions his words must have created, and that his knowledge of native character will enable him to regain that influence which this untoward affair must no doubt impair. But it does not appear necessary to remove any misapprehension which may exist in the mind of the King of Ashantee, unless it is of a kind which is likely to be mischievous.

'If unhappily war shall have broken out, it is impossible for me to foresee the state of things which may exist when this despatch reaches you, or to measure the obligations which the steps taken by Mr. Simpson may have imposed on the British Government.

'I can only say that by the opening or stoppage of trade, by advice and countenance, by the supply of arms, stores, or money, any reasonable assistance should be given to those who will have embarked in a very perilous war in reliance on pledges given by a British officer. But in giving this assistance they should, if possible, be made clearly to understand that this is all that they have to expect; that Mr. Simpson's promises, so far as they go beyond this, are not confirmed by Her Majesty's Government; that British troops cannot be employed in their aid; and that their safety must depend on their own exertions.'

This despatch is very suggestive; I have quoted it so fully for the light it throws on our relations with Ashantee in the interval between the last war and the present, between 1864 and 1872. The last war, be it remembered, never was terminated by a peace formally made with the King of Ashantee. It offers also one or two special points for attention. Had any responsible officer of our Government, in his relations with any great Power, acted as Mr. Simpson acted, would Lord Granville have treated him to the mild rebuke he administers to Mr. Simpson? No; he would at once have disavowed him and recalled him, as a proof of his disagreement with his action. In presence of a barbarian Power, where a frank and loyal conduct is still more necessary, why was no open disavowal given? Secondly, not only is there no such open disavowal, but in a sentence to which it is difficult, I feel, to attach an honourable meaning, Mr. Simpson is relieved from the necessity of removing any misapprehension which may exist in the mind of the King of Ashantee, unless it is of a kind which is likely to prove mischievous. Lord Granville should be called on to explain his meaning. Lastly, what a miserable policy it is, this furnishing arms, ammunition, &c., to tribes which are at war with a Government with which we are and wish to be at peace—miserable as regards that Government, miserable as regards those whom we thus delude and are prepared to abandon.

Such were the relations existing when, in the year 1870, the two European Governments concerned negotiated the transfer which has led to the present war. Our officer on the coast foresaw two difficulties in regard to that transfer—the

one the connection between Ashantee and Elmina, between whom there had been a long and friendly alliance; the other the slave question. 'Looking at it as we do,' says Mr. Ussher, 'and dealing with it as we are accustomed to deal with it here, the settlement of such repugnant matters as rendition of runaway slaves, &c., will have to be carefully considered. I believe the Netherlands authorities had no scruples on this point, and did not thereby offend the natives' prejudices.' The long alliance between the two Powers is confirmed by the Dutch Governor, who states that there has been since 150 years an uninterrupted friendly understanding. In one of his letters the same Governor gives us further insight into the whole question. For he says: 'That the King of Ashantee will be very annoyed by the transfer of those possessions to the Queen of England, I readily understand, as he will lose the free intercourse, not only with his Elmina friends, but with the seaside people from Assinee to the Volta. He has always endeavoured to have a station, as the Chief of Dahomey has at Whydah, and now all his hopes have failed.'

We can see from these hints in what light the Ashantee Government regards the cession. It looks upon it as a complete exclusion of itself from the coast, and that by the action of a Power with which it has no formal peace, and the agents of which have been in other quarters intriguing against its policy or extension—intriguing, too, with tribes who are not themselves unfavourable to it. It sees, moreover, persistent efforts made to put an end to all connection with friendly tribes through whom it had access to the coast. It is aware that the whole result is to bring it into contact, not with two European Governments whose uncombined action might leave room for greater freedom on its part, but with one which standing henceforward alone can act unchecked. And of the two, the one which disappeared was known by experience to be the less difficult to deal with, the more strictly trading, the less political, the more tolerant of native customs and prejudices. Take all these considerations into account, and we may ask ourselves—and with our Indian history before us the answer is not doubtful—what in a similar case we should have done; should we have considered it incumbent on us to wait and see the invader concentrate his power, should we have

thought a war under such circumstances justly stigmatized as an unprovoked outrage?

It is on such general considerations that we must judge the action of the Ashantee Government, and the conduct to be pursued by England towards the Ashantees. The pedantry of technical diplomacy is out of place here. It is the more so, inasmuch as, owing to the contemptuous attitude of our minds in regard to all barbarous nations, however we may seek to veil it, we are tempted to disregard technical usages ourselves, whilst for our own purposes we enforce them upon others. We had a painful instance of this in the Abyssinian affair. The neglect by Earl Russell of a letter from King Theodore played no insignificant part in that shameful business. On such general considerations it is easy to understand the Ashantee resistance to our concentration; and the policy of a country like ours should be based on a correct understanding of that resistance, and on the considerate allowance of such elements of justice and naturalness as it has in it.

But I turn for the present from the details of a policy on which others have dwelt and will dwell. So far as it concerns the honour and interest of England I have no doubt that in the press and in the feebler atmosphere of Parliament the whole business will receive a considerable if inconsequent discussion. My object lies rather beyond the bounds of that discussion. I would pass into a more universal and more moral region, and, disregarding the issues raised by our writers and public men, test this war by the standard of our duty to Humanity.

On certain points I shall not insist, but pass them with the shortest mention. It is allowed that our trade is insignificant; were it not so, were it an important constituent of our foreign commerce, it would make no difference to a right judgment. No trade whatever should be supported by war. This is a conclusion which ought to be enforced upon our merchants wherever they are found. A century and a half's experience of commercial wars has left quite sufficient stains on the history of England. Frankly and at once we ought to adopt a new line of action, and let our commerce take its true character of an absolutely peaceful interchange, as voluntary on the one side as on the other.

The same may be said, and has often been said lately, but needs repeating, of the support of religion by war. I recur to it here because in this case again there has been a complication about some German missionaries. So it was in Abyssinia. Let the missionary go at his own risk, take his life in his hand, and, if it so happen, perish in the cause. He receives his due reward and will be honoured by those who sympathize with his belief, partially by those who do not. But it can be no business of others to interfere with his legitimate action and its natural consequences. For religion even less than for trade should force be employed.

The same conclusion is valid as against the third ground on which we take our stand, when, in this and similar cases where the real motive is the lust of power and wealth, we look around us for all the varnish we can find to disguise an unholy cause. The interests of civilization are pleaded, and colonial governors and under-secretaries at home are loud in their recommendations of vigorous action on behalf of this new interest. How far they are sincere it is not for me to say. In general the language is as hypocritical as it is ill-grounded, and the prevalent insincerity of our public men is but too notorious. But the error lies in assuming that the cause of true civilization can be served by violent conduct on the part of the more highly civilized nations. I speak with reference to the present state of the world, and to the wide interval which separates the higher civilizations from the lower. In this state of things a peaceful action is the only civilizing agent available; and lessons of ferocious retribution, such as our Commander-in-Chief announces, are the worst possible means of attaining the ends we should have in view.

In close connection with this last ground, though somewhat differing in form, is the policy of extension of power which is advocated in some quarters. It is an appeal to very mixed feelings, but when closely examined it may be reduced to the conception that Englishman are peculiarly qualified to discipline and raise the lower races. With this proud conviction of superiority, all the buccaneering elements latent in our national disposition are appealed to, and loot and dominion are dangled before the eyes of our Brookes and our Bakers. Whence comes this conviction of superiority no careful retro-

spect of our past history enables one to say ; for the record of failure in all quarters of the globe is almost unbroken. Wherever the Englishman has planted himself upon a lower population, that population has been first degraded, and then has tended to extinction. So much is this the case that the late Sir Robert Peel quietly announced in the House of Commons, as a law, that the lower race must disappear in contact with the higher. He was simply generalizing from English experience. In the case of India, which will be objected, the ancient civilization with which we are in contact is too powerful for our action thoroughly to disorganize it ; but we neither raise it nor assimilate it ; we largely contribute to its degradation, and, as a necessary consequence, we are doomed to ejectment. The immense disproportion of our numbers prevents the extinction of the Indian population. But be this as it may, let the English aspirant for power rely on his own resources, and not on the army of his country. Let him, as the missionary and the trader, succeed or perish at his own risk. For it seems useless at present to call on our Government to do what it should do, and will do when it comes to recognize its full obligations, namely, to lay the strong hand of repression on those of its citizens who interfere forcibly with the other nations of the earth.

I recur to the statement that the policy of extension of our empire, if carefully examined, is reduced to the conception of power attained by individual Englishmen. For it is manifest that, as a Government, we are giving up that policy. It would be difficult, even for those most bitten with the mania of a collective Imperialism, to disguise from themselves the fact that the stream of opinion is setting against them. Let them look back on the blustering assertions with which for years they have made us familiar, as to the determination of the English people to maintain at all hazards the scattered possessions which, by fair means or foul, have been accreted to the English Crown. Let them then compare with those assertions the language of our public men as one by one, of either party, they rise in different quarters of the kingdom to speak on this present war, not forgetting that our public men are exponents of public opinion, not its creators nor, in general, its leaders. The policy of renunciation, of self-

limitation of our empire, of withdrawal from this and that dependency—the policy, in fact, which through twenty years of evil report and good report we Positivists have unhesitatingly maintained —has passed from scorn into acceptance. Seven years remain to complete the quarter century from the time when the cession of Gibraltar was distinctly advocated. As I watch the current growing more rapid, I think he would be a bold man who should say in the face of the actual state of Europe, and of the tendencies of thought, that such cession within that quarter century is the dream it then appeared to be, especially under the contingency of the establishment of a Spanish Republic, and the consequent awakening of the popular sympathy here. In any case the conclusion is inevitable, that with our present dispositions no Government will venture on enlarging our responsibilities.

If we look back on the past we shall, I think, be led to see that a revision of a doctrine once held and acted upon by all European nations, with one exception, is incumbent upon all. The doctrine I allude to finds its explanation in the peculiar beliefs and circumstances of the age in which it prevailed. The discovery of Africa by the Portuguese, of America by Columbus, modified considerably the ideas of men ; and the theory they adopted in regard to these vast regions—a theory sanctioned by the Papacy, and readily admitted by those to whom the sanction of the Papacy was of no value—was that they fell as lawful possessions to the first discoverer. One bar alone was there to this claim—the bar of capacity for resistance. But, as a rule, where the European landed he took possession in the name of his sovereign. In the course of subsequent centuries the possessions thus claimed became involved in the disputes of the European Powers, and hence the existing distribution of them. England, in particular, as the greatest maritime Power, has seized more of them than any other, and the settlements on the Gold Coast are an instance of this. But the degree of occupation makes no difference to the principle. Wherever, and by whomsoever, positions have been occupied on the assumption of the inherent right of the white man to domineer over the black, or of the higher civilization to intrude, uninvited and unwelcome, upon the lower, there it would be advisable to revise

the action, allowing, of course, that the results of past error are yet revocable. I take a strong case where they are not. It would be useless to require the English Government to retire from Tasmania, for the English settlers have shot down every native Tasmanian. Where, again, the country occupied was so sparsely peopled as to be practically deprived of its due usefulness, it would be difficult to require its restitution to its original possessors, much as we may regret, or even blame, past conduct. Such are the cases of New Zealand and North America, including Canada. But where there is an adequate population, at whatever degree of civilization, and a population as yet unsubdued, there all claim to intrusion upon it without its own consent should be impossible for the future, should be abandoned where it has been made. Such, at least, would seem to be a fair statement of the duty of the advanced towards the less advanced portions of Humanity.

It follows from this that even if we could hold and govern the Ashantee kingdom, we should in no way be justified in doing it. Fortunately, all reflecting men are agreed that it is impracticable. That portion of Africa finds protection not in any hesitating moderation on the part of England, but in its own deadly climate; and we can resist the temptation which would bring so rapidly its own punishment.

But it may be asked, what are we to do immediately? There should be, in my judgment, but one answer—retire from the war. Till lately there has been but one—we are engaged in the war, we must go through with it—the language of schoolboy folly. But quite recently a different language has been used, and will, I hope, become prevalent, sufficiently prevalent to strengthen our weak Ministry in the moderate designs it is said to entertain. Let there be no hesitation on this point. If our only justification for the war is the punishment of the Ashantees, as the necessary assertion of England's strength and as an escape from the loss of prestige, then such a war becomes an unmixed crime—every death a murder for which our Government is responsible. Day by day it is becoming clearer that this is the only justification pleaded, and that it is felt to be so. The responsibility of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues is becoming, therefore, more sharply defined. Let them nerve themselves to carry

out their good intentions, and give some shadow of dignity to the miserable weakness they have shown in Europe by a courageous concession to a Power allowedly our inferior in strength.

We may well demand this, not merely in the interest of the Ashantees, nor for the sake of our country's good name, but from a due regard to the lives of our countrymen engaged in the struggle. I speak not for those who, from whatever motive, have volunteered for the war. As I cannot respect their action I should have no sympathy with them if they suffer by it, beyond the common human sympathy which all suffering claims. It was open to them to choose, and they have let the soldier spirit blind them, and if they have to pay a penalty, so be it.

The same holds good substantially of another class of volunteers, however specious the grounds of their action. Why should medical men, who are certainly by education qualified to judge of the goodness or badness of a cause, be exonerated from the duty of forming a judgment? Why should they be held blameless if they act blindly on purely professional considerations? They go to remedy suffering—such is the plea—but the assistance they lend facilitates the success; and therefore for such success they must be held responsible. I never sympathized with—I may say I viewed with unqualified dislike—the honour paid to the unhappy surgeon who sank with the semi-pirate Semmes in the *Alabama*. One who embarked in such a cause could hope for nothing better than silence. In a less degree, in proportion as the cause is undoubtedly less obviously bad, but still in some degree, our sympathy should be withheld from those who unthinkingly engage in this Ashantee struggle. But for those, whether officers or men, whether civilians or combatants, who are under orders, and who therefore take part in the war simply as a question of obedience to their Government, the case is widely different. I think such obedience may be carried too far, and that there are causes from which all should shrink at any risk—the soldier should break his sword, the civilian resign his post. Still, under present circumstances, and with the standard of duty actually prevalent, one may feel the strongest anxiety that, by the adoption of a sounder policy, our Government may relieve them from the danger

arising from their participation in what has too great a tendency to become an ignoble butchering. One may well press upon our Government its responsibility for the lives of those it employs, in a struggle for which, as I conceive, there is no adequate motive.

The advocacy of immediate withdrawal from the war, and of abandonment of our possessions, raises three difficult questions. We have to consider the interests of, and our duty towards: first, the white settlers on the coast; secondly, the Fantee tribes; thirdly, the Ashantee kingdom.

With regard to the first nothing tends to show that if they confine themselves to simply commercial objects—if they are pure traders, that is, renouncing all political ambition—they have been or would be in danger, allowing, of course, for the hostility which they have excited against themselves by their wrong conduct in the past. That there has been wrong conduct is certain. For the papers presented to Parliament bear here and there witness—and other evidence is not wanting to corroborate such witness—that in Africa as in the distant East, and in both cases from the same cause, viz. the consciousness of an armed force at their back, the action of our merchants has been constantly unscrupulous. The sudden leaving of them might therefore involve some personal danger. Let those who, with or without reason, dread the danger, retire with the civil and military power of England. It would be wise for this country, and also economical, after a rigorous investigation of their case, to grant some indemnity in order to facilitate this settlement. With a trade so insignificant, and with so small a white population, no such indemnity could possibly reach the amount already spent, and which will have to be spent, on any military operations. But, I repeat it, everything shows that legitimate trade would be welcomed by the Ashantees, if masters of the coast; that they have consistently and under great provocation abstained from hostility to the white men.

I come to the case of the Fantee tribes. Had we never interfered, all must allow that they would by this time have formed part of the Ashantee kingdom. And it has not been in their interest, but our own, that we have prevented this result. In the protectorate we have sought to establish they

evidently feel little interest, even when not openly averse to it. It is a foolish sham, and the sooner we abandon it the better for them. They have not gained any good by it, but have been weakened in all directions. We have always held the language that they must mainly rely upon themselves for defence against their neighbours, and there is conclusive proof that they rely solely upon us, and that without any affection for our rule. There are few things more supremely ridiculous than the appeals made by English officials to the loyalty of these tribes and to their sense of the blessings of living under the English flag. This applies to the appeals, if sincere, but they can hardly be so; and if not, they degrade by their insincerity those who make them, and can scarcely delude those to whom they are made.

This does not imply that in leaving the Gold Coast we should renounce the obligations our long connection imposes upon us. It is highly probable that we underrate the intelligence of the Power with which we are at issue. We are making this mistake, I believe, in all directions, We are acting as if there were no movement in intelligence outside us; as if experience conveyed no teachings to the other less forward nations with whom we are in relation, and we shall probably wake up when too late to the perception of our error. By virtue of our long tenure, the rulers of Ashantee cannot but be aware of our power, cannot but be aware of the advantages to them of some moderate compromise with that power. Once convinced of our change of purpose, of our wish to retire from the coast if some moderate settlement could be arrived at, they would be willing in all probability to offer favourable terms to the protected tribes. Indeed, the most probable issue of the whole difficulty, if we withdrew, would be the immediate incorporation, without resistance, of the Fantee confederation. And if without resistance that natural consummation might be attained without suffering. It is in the interest of both that it should be so. But, whether this be probable or not, our obligations to the Fantees cannot be so construed as to involve our permanent continuance amongst them. And this for two reasons: first, such continuance only tends to prolong the evil we have already done—only tends, that is, to perpetuate their degradation; secondly, we have

consistently said, as will be clear to any one who attentively examines the despatches of our colonial secretaries, that we are not principals but allies, protectors not governors of the coast, and that in the main they must rely on themselves. This language implies that we have not accepted any unlimited obligation, but one limited by a certain action on the part of the Fantees. If they fail utterly, our responsibility ceases, and all our accounts show how completely they do fail.

On a sober review of the real interests of these unfortunate tribes who have been sacrificed to the commerce of England, and who have gained no corresponding benefit, it may, I think, be maintained that the best thing for them is to let them fall back into a connection with a social organization better adapted to the state they have reached, and, therefore, more likely to raise them.

There remains the question of the Ashantees. What is our duty towards them? It cannot be simply to disorganize, much less to destroy them, though both the one and the other seem to find advocates. The utmost that any reasonable man should aim at in continuing the war is to check their advance, and so weaken them as to leave the tribes on the coast strong enough, if they have the will, to assert their independence. This, I presume, would be the limit of the pretensions of our Government. Closely examined, is even this policy, with its apparent moderation, to be justified? Put aside (I shall return to it later) all considerations of the honour and prestige of England, and judge it strictly on its own merits, and it will appear not to be defensible. The Ashantee kingdom has lasted for at least a century and a half. It has had a tendency to consolidate itself and to absorb the surrounding tribes. It forms, therefore, a social organization with a certain civilization, and, as such, a basis of order—the first indispensable requisite for subsequent progress. Grant that the civilization is low; that to us, in the pride of our advance, it is repulsive; that the religious conceptions and social institutions of Ashantee are such as the more advanced nations must condemn. All this we may grant to the full. We need not say a word in favour of what exists, and yet it does not follow that we should destroy it. Proud as we are of our position, we, too, have been bondmen in the land of Egypt. We have passed

through lower stages, and only gradually reached our present highly imperfect condition. It is a slow process, the rise of any portion of Humanity; and each step taken, however insignificant we may judge it, should be carefully made sure and jealously guarded against all retrogression. All our efforts should be directed to encourage farther advance, not to render it difficult by undoing what has been done. The more powerful, the more extensive the Ashantee kingdom, the sooner it is likely to modify what there is in its state which requires modification, and to look around it for guidance in its upward movement. There can be no plea of danger to ourselves; there can be no plea of its being a lower power acting prejudicially upon a higher; therefore there can be no justification for our impatient interference. Taking our station on the broad ground of our duty to Humanity, this African Power has a claim upon us for consideration and support—supposing us able to give it support, which we can do negatively, by our withdrawal, that is; and on no lower ground is it worth while at the present day to argue any such question, however reluctant opinion may be to accept the conclusions we thus attain.

I spoke but just now of our prestige—that insidious element in our political ideas which has lured us to so many crimes. Can anybody seriously maintain that a successful war with Ashantee, with all the appliances of modern destructive skill, and in sole reliance on our superiority in this respect, is calculated to give us prestige? Putting aside the climate, the disparity in every point except personal bravery is too great to make success a credit even on the ordinary standard of military judgments. War under such conditions can only cease to inspire disgust when it is absolutely in defence of our own safety.

We have had quite enough to teach us what our action should be, in the case of Abyssinia. In was in the interest of our prestige, especially our Indian prestige, that the guilt of that war was incurred. On whom lies the full responsibility of the particular termination of that war, of the murder of Theodore, and the disorganization of the nascent order which he had established, it is not easy to say. As in the present case, the professions of our Home Government were moderate.

We may hope that in the present case those professions will not be as signally belied. But we are exposed to the same danger. I explain myself. So far as has yet appeared, it would seem that the final issue of the Abyssinian war was determined not by the Home Government, but by the General in command. The avowed object of the expedition was attained, the captives were restored, and peace was sought in a submissive manner by the Abyssinian king. It ought to have been granted him, but the General had determined otherwise, and the king preferred death. That death lies at the door of Lord Napier of Magdala—so far, I repeat, as yet appears. His determination was not in accordance with the professions of our Government. But the Government of the day condoned the high-handed act, and by condoning it shares the guilt. The Queen accepted—or was made to accept—the blood-stained trophy that act secured. There exists no more disgraceful trophy in the collections of the nation. We triumphed. We left Abyssinia a prey to almost hopeless disorder, but we conceived we had raised the national prestige. I believe that we were wrong—that the judgment even of contemporary Europe was against us, as the judgment of posterity will assuredly be. But were it otherwise, we may well ask, what was the use of the costly effort? On the very next occasion when really great interests were at stake and the peace and welfare of Europe were gravely compromised, we were found incapable of exertion; 'too blind to avert the danger, too cowardly to withstand it,' our Government fell back on its insular position, vaunted its own selfish happiness, and made itself and the country it directed an object of just scorn.

It is possible that no such blunder awaits us in the present case—that the pacific intentions of our Ministers will not be counteracted by their subordinates. But the omen is a bad one, and our peculiar system leads to great weakness on the part of those who are ultimately responsible—weakness equally shown in success and in failure; in presence of disasters like the Crimean, or of triumph as in Abyssinia. We talk of responsible government, but practically responsibility is a fiction.

I return to the more general aspect of the case. As all

nations of the earth are daily coming into closer contact, and as the unity of the race is making itself felt with increasing power, the obligations of its leading constituents are becoming at once clearer and heavier. Those who are charged with its practical direction, equally with those who are charged with its spiritual direction, are bound to rise to the level of those obligations. The simple idea which may guide both is the peaceful co-operation of all portions of the race, whatever stage they have reached. The maintenance of that peaceful co-operation devolves in large measure on the West—one might almost say exclusively. Friendly relations then, not hostility, are the object we have in view. Will that object be in any degree furthered by following the dictates of our national pride and vengeance, and inflicting what is called a severe lesson on the Ashantees? Shelling towns and villages may or may not be a pleasant occupation to those employed in it, but it is clearly one from which all civilized men should recoil. It has already been unjustifiably practised in the present war. With all respect for a brave officer, I can see no ground for Captain Commerell avenging in this way the natural results of his own culpable imprudence. What business had he up that river? So much by the way on an incident of the struggle. The general issue I would take is—that we ought by all possible means to avoid anything which embitters our relations with even the humblest of the less civilized races; that we ought to seek to draw them to us, so that they may not be averse to accept at our hands, in the measure adapted to their wants, the benefits of our higher civilization.

Or are these some of the questions for another generation of statesmen, some of those questions with which Mr. Gladstone would have it understood that he is not competent to deal? I could wish that he would look on them as most urgent; that he could awake to the conviction that no theological issues have half the importance of these human ones. For it is not considerations of controversial theology that are now at stake. The true discussion lies in this: which of the two, the servants of Humanity or the servants of God, can best direct the world's affairs; and no defence of Christian doctrine, by volunteer or official defenders, will be of much avail, if it become patent to

the judgment of the many that on all great questions of public morality, be they political, social, or international, no noble teaching comes from the Christian Church—that it stands cold and silent on such topics; that no outrage on the simplest human feeling can rouse it from its torpor; nay, worse, that it is but too often ready with acceptance and apology. In England, as elsewhere, the existing moral order is in imminent danger. I doubt it not. But its worst enemies are at present from within, not from without. Those who would substitute for it a newer and a higher moral order, one more binding because of strictly human obligation, find their strength at present not in themselves but in their opponents. Their own weakness makes them honestly regret that the degeneracy of the Christian spirit is so marked as to leave it voiceless on all such questions as that with which I have been dealing. We should welcome any co-operation in what should be our joint object on the part of the various bodies which claim the name of the Church of Christ. But as a rule we look for it in vain. National and social considerations exercise too strong an influence, and the religious and moral being disappears in the Englishman. It is for the supporters of Christianity to estimate the consequences of its abdication.

APPENDICES.

A.

Extract from a Paper in the 'Lancet,' October 25, 1873.

EXPERIENCE of wars against 'uncivilized' enemies has over and over shown that they are at times *resolved* by a casualty such as could hardly be calculated upon under opposite circumstances. Let us hope that a similar 'consummation' may occur with regard to Ashantee. In the event of no such good fortune befalling us, however, some points of difficulty unquestionably present themselves. The bush is impenetrable. How are serviceable roads to be made? The 'protected' tribes are disaffected, and of little use if they were well disposed: white men cannot, it is feared, be depended upon to work long. How, then, is a railway to be made?

Animal transport there is none, and it is more than doubtful if any can be maintained, even if landed ; everything has to be carried upon the heads of the natives, and thus their capabilities become very small. In all probability most of the crops and of the villages of the Fantees have been destroyed by the Ashantees, rendering it necessary to carry, with every force that may advance from the coast, supplies of food and means of shelter. It is not meant to assert that these difficulties are insurmountable. Possibly they may be overcome ; and, in so far as sanitary measures are concerned, they could not be left in better hands than those of the distinguished principal medical officer of the expedition. We must acknowledge, however, that they exist, and that they have to be overcome.—By C. A. GORDON, M.D., C.B.

B.

Mr. Bright's Speech at Birmingham. From 'Daily News,' Thursday, October 23, 1873.

WITH regard to the savage African nation, I will undertake to say that there are not fifteen men in this room more anxious to avoid war with the African nation, or who will be more disposed by all possible and reasonable pacific measures to adjust the troubles which have arisen on that continent, than her Majesty's Ministers. (Loud cheers.) The time will come—and I trust before long—when Parliament, acting on the opinion of one of its own committees, will consider that it will be wise to withdraw absolutely from that coast. (Hear, hear.) There is no slave trade there to put an end to now. Trade flourishes better where there are no forts than where they are to be found. The country I am speaking of is one in which English life is scarcely to be maintained; and I believe the interest and the honour of Great Britain, at some not distant period, will be best consulted by an entire withdrawal from that coast. (Cheers.)

C.

Extract from Lord Derby's Speech at Liverpool.

HALF-A-DOZEN words more before I sit down on a matter which interests everybody at this moment. We are unluckily

engaged in a quarrel which, however it came about, must involve considerable cost, probably the waste of many valuable lives, and which can bring us in return very little increase of military reputation, and no substantial advantage. (Hear, hear.) The liability to quarrels of this kind is one of the penalties we pay for extended empire; and as long as we have an enemy in front, even though the enemy should only be a Gold Coast savage, there will be no difference of opinion among politicians of all colours as to the necessity of defending British territory, or of vindicating our honour by resenting attack. (Applause.) That may or may not be an easy business. I don't venture to prophesy. I believe that in Sir Garnet Wolseley we have an able and energetic commander; but neither courage nor skill is proof against disease, and improved artillery won't help us when the chief enemy we have to fight is fever. (Hear, hear.) It is a doctor's war and an engineer's war, quite as much as a soldier's war. Let us keep our men healthy, and make roads they can travel on, and all the black fellows in Africa won't stop them. (Cheers.) But it is impossible not to see that those are two conditions on the realization of which you cannot reckon with safety; and if a disaster should occur, we must be so far prepared for it as not to exaggerate its real importance, and not to break into a wild freak of indignation against everybody concerned, without waiting to hear what they have to say for themselves. When the necessity of defence is provided for, there will be two points to consider—first, how we got into the quarrel, and who is responsible for it. Of course this is a question not to be raised here, even if my judgment were more fully formed upon it than it is. In the public interest it is an important matter for us to make up our minds as to what we are to do to prevent such troubles from breaking out again. (Hear, hear.) Now on that I have a very decided opinion. I trust that no visionary ideas of a vast tropical empire in Africa—no exaggerated fancies as to its being our duty to put a coat of moral whitewash on every black man we come across—will lead us to extend further a protectorate which I hold had better not have been allowed to reach its present dimensions. (Hear.) I doubt whether it was wise to take over Dutch forts, and I greatly doubt whether any man in or

out of the Colonial Office exactly knows or could define the limits of our authority and of our responsibility in regard to the tribes included within the protected territory. No doubt pledges must be kept, but the narrower the limits within which we contract our relations with these tribes the better I believe it will be. I have no great faith in that kind of moral influence which you acquire by burning a man's house over his head, and telling him he is to be your subject whether he likes it or not. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) I believe as a matter of fact that trade is found to grow quite as fast, if not faster, in places where we do not exercise political power, than in those where we do; and while I firmly believe in the value to the empire of colonies to which our own people can go out and where they can work, I think, to put the thing plainly, we have got quite black men enough, and that we had better not go in for more. (Laughter, and loud applause.)

D.

To the Editor of the 'Daily News.'

SIR,—Knowing of old your acquaintance with, and interest in, and enlightened impartiality in discussing colonial policy, I beg to write a few words to you on the Ashantee war. No doubt we cannot judge fully of it till official information is given, which will be about next March, when all is over. But it is time now to consider its passing stages as far as we can. It is said we must at all events protect the lives of our gallant soldiers and sailors. But those who talk thus may at least consider whether a counter invasion of the Ashantees is the likely way to do so, or whether, having got them at bay, and knowing they are terror-struck and starving, and certain to disperse, we should not consult our country's interests and honour best by simply securing all we claim—namely, our forts. As to the question if we did right in purchasing the Dutch forts, this much is certain, that our object in doing so was to become the sole European Power on the coast, and so no longer protect one tribe in its claims against another, but deal with all alike as traders.

The disaster which befel a rash expedition into the interior

cannot be a reason for making another. The eagerness of military administrators on the spot, and of military men at home, for employment, cannot be satisfactory causes of war. The claims of merchants, always ready and reckless where Government is pledged to fight for them, are still less satisfactory grounds for war. When Sir Garnet Wolseley has returned with the best possible success, the worst result will have been accomplished for us, namely, the occupation of a villanous country, which it was our interest to leave in native hands, only forced to keep mutually at peace.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

C. B. ADDERLEY.

HAMS: *October* 18.

E.

Extract from the 'Times' of November 8.

A WEST AFRICAN question must in any case shortly have arisen. It might take one of many forms, but this is the most probable.

In the competition among traders, which is keen, one question is, who will give the most credit. Anxious to sell, the young clerks in charge of factories vie with one another in this matter. By-and-by their principals at home call out for larger returns; they are then obliged to put the screw on their debtors by refusing to extend their credit further. The 'nigger' is generally true to his trader, and will pay in time; but occasionally he tries to play him a trick and transfer his custom. If the creditor finds this out, he will very likely, the first time he can lay hands on him, 'tie him up'—that is, chain him to a post in the factory-yard—until the debt is paid; or, if the debtor is a chief, he may 'tie up' one of his head men. This is native custom, and the natives, as a rule, think it quite fair. I know King Charlie Dido, of Cameroons, was once chained to the main hatch of a Bristol trader for many days to enforce payment of a debt. But sometimes a wrong man is 'tied up,' or stronger proceedings are taken. The 'cat' is not altogether unknown in African factories; and for offences such as pilfering, cheating, assaults, even lives have been taken.

These strong measures are apt to call forth retaliatory acts on behalf of the natives. Food or water is poisoned, or factories are burnt. Trading boats are robbed, property is injured. It is hardly possible for the white man to find the individual aggressor, but he charges the tribe or tribes he suspects of complicity in the matter; and, if he can get no other satisfaction, he complains to the commander of the first man-of-war he meets of the circumstances. That officer requires him to state the particulars in an affidavit, and he may or may not consider it a case deserving tribal punishment. If he does, he proceeds in the first case to gain possession of the persons of the chief or head men of the tribe, to hold as hostages for the satisfaction due to the trader; but this is not an easy matter, so all that remains for him to do is to burn the villages, and destroy the crops and canoes of the offenders. If the natives had confidence enough to come forward and plead their cause, I doubt if in half the cases any naval officer would proceed; but unfortunately the natives have not that confidence. At any rate nothing can be more unsatisfactory than this mode of proceeding; and, sooner or later, as the trade increases, and as tribes get more confidence in their own power, a West African question must arise herefrom.

Another fruitful cause of trouble is likely to be the labour traffic. At present the factors and shipmasters on the coast employ large numbers of labourers, who, under the generic term of 'Kroomen,' are brought from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast. They are useful as sailors, boatmen, storemen, and sometimes mechanics. A weekly mail steamer passes down the coast, and when she arrives at Sierra Leone, Monrovia, or Palmas, these men embark. Some of them bear orders to the purser of the steamer, from factors on the coast, to give them a passage, and he looks to the factor for payment of fare and provisions. Others come on board on the chance, work on board the ship while taking passage, and hire themselves out to traders as they go down the coast, the hirer paying their fare, &c. Now it sometimes happens that the market is glutted, and the ship's officers, on their return, find themselves with more of these Kroomen on board than they require for the ship. This is likely to be unprofitable to them, and they are got rid of on the best terms they can, irrespective

of the Kroomen's wishes. I know a case of two Palmas lads landed at Fernando Po under these circumstances, who became nothing more nor less than slaves, and I was told by a very respectable trader of that island that he had known them sold to native chiefs in the Oil Rivers. Whether true or not, the present system is very liable to abuse, as Kroomen for passage are neither put on the muster-roll of the ship nor on the passenger list.

Postscript.—The war is over, the treaty of peace signed, with the due admixture of hollowness in its terms. We have broken up, so far as in us lies, the kingdom of Ashantee—a questionable result even, it would seem, to the principal agent. We have burnt the capital of our enemy, giving scope to our feelings of pride and vengeance; we have exacted an indemnity of an amount apparently beyond the king's power to pay. We have secured, we are told, respectful awe for the national flag. We have stipulated for the gradual cessation of human sacrifices—a stipulation good in itself, but the ground for which must read oddly when contrasted with our conduct. Is there nothing repugnant to the feelings of Christian nations in the burning of Coomassie?

I can only say that in my judgment the whole war lacks justification, and is an abuse of our power; that its consequences are deplorable; that the burning of Coomassie is an act of savagery on the part of Sir Garnet Wolseley which deserves the strongest reprobation—a far worse act than the barbarous destruction of the Winter Palace; that to exact an indemnity—any indemnity—is a meanness, and that such indemnity should be repaid; that, in short, the Government of England should disapprove of its officer's conduct.

On the general question I need not say more than that the result attained in no way alters the conviction which the above pamphlet expresses—that sound policy and true morality alike dictate our withdrawal from the coast, so far as any Government establishment there is concerned. The trader and the missionary may go at their discretion, but unsupported by the power of England.

A CORRESPONDENCE.

I GIVE the passage which gave occasion to the following correspondence :—

'But the most striking instance of Fetishism is supplied by the Prophet of Positive Philosophy himself.

'*S.* What do you mean?

'*W.* Have you never heard that when Madame Clotilde de Vaux died, Comte had her two arms cut off and dried; and, hanging these crossed over her portrait, used to perform his daily worship to humanity before it?

'*S.* A strange story!

'*W.* I give it you on the authority of Pierre Leroux, a thoroughly sincere man, in a departed periodical of his, "L'Espérance." A more ghastly Fetishism I cannot conceive, though the idea is one entirely consistent with Comte's Romanist training, and with the habits of Relic Worship.'

South Fields, Wandsworth: August 19, 1861.

SIR,—The statement in No. vii. of 'Tracts for Priests and People,' which refers to M. Comte and Madame Clotilde de Vaux, requires some notice on my part.

It is discreditable to your acuteness not to have suspected it from its improbability. It is discreditable to your accuracy not to have inquired further into its truth. Its convenience as a handle should have made you, in a serious controversial work, very careful before you used it. Christian advocates should beware of bringing disrespect on a cause which all Positivists feel bound to treat with respect.

It is, I need not say, a gross and silly calumny, which I call on you to retract as publicly as you have stated it. If you do not accept my authority, I call on you, as a man of

honour, to make inquiries in Paris. The brother of Madame de Vaux is living (M. Marie), and is very hostile to Comte's memory. In appealing to him you will not therefore be appealing to a witness favourable to Positivism. Others are living also who could speak on this matter. M. Littré I have no doubt would bear testimony, if you rejected other names more favourable to M. Comte.

I shall hope to hear from you what steps you are inclined to take, reserving to myself the liberty of giving such contradiction to your statement as I may think desirable.

Your obedient Servant,

RICHARD CONGREVE.

J. M. LUDLOW, Esq.

3 Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C.: August 20, 1861.

SIR,—I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th August. It is the second I have received from a Positivist on the subject, and you will allow me to say that its tone is not such as is usually adopted by one gentleman towards another.

Silly as it may seem to you, M. Pierre Leroux's statement, referred to in 'Tract vii. for Priests and People,' bore to my mind no antecedent improbability. M. Pierre Leroux I know and respect, and it never occurred to me, till I received a letter from a Positivist friend yesterday, that his statement was open to question. Had I suspected this I should not of course have reproduced it, nor would I now do so after what has taken place, should a further issue of my Tract be called for.

As, however, I have been unfortunate enough to insert the statement, my first step, as it seems to me—and a step which I had resolved upon before receiving your letter—should be to ask M. Pierre Leroux himself for his authority. If he should admit having been misinformed, I should of course withdraw the statement without further inquiry. If he should persist in the accuracy of his statement, and assign grounds for it, I should then feel myself bound to address myself to one of the persons whose names you have mentioned, and should exercise my own judgment as to dealing with the results of the inquiry.

I purpose writing to-day to M. Pierre Leroux; but, as I do not know his present address, can only send my letter through a friend, so that some little delay may occur before receiving his answer. I should be obliged meanwhile by your supplying me with the addresses of MM. Marie and Littré, should they be required.

As to the sort of threat with which your letter concludes, I can only reply to it by saying you are at perfect liberty to make what use you please of the present one.

Your obedient Servant,

J. M. LUDLOW.

RICHARD CONGREVE, Esq.

South Fields, Wandsworth, S.W.: August 21, 1861.

SIR,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 20th.

I can only guess who your other correspondent is. If I am right in my guess, you are not warranted in calling him a Positivist. It is unfair, in the present state of society, to fix the name on those who repudiate it, and repudiate it justly.

I regret that I had occasion to write as I did. I cannot regret the tone in which I wrote. I wished to express decidedly the blame which I judged your conduct to deserve. I must leave my expression to the judgment of those who will impartially estimate your conduct, and the language which it drew from me.

I note with interest your admission that 'M. Pierre Leroux's statement bore to my mind no antecedent improbability.' It throws great light on the question of your competence to write tracts on Positivism; for I infer from it that you have not read the principal work of M. Comte, whose system you attack. Had you read the 'Politique Positive,' and weighed the language he there uses in reference to *post-mortem* examinations (vol. iv. p. 437—I give one quotation out of many), it were an imputation on your candour to suppose that you would not have seen the antecedent improbability of the act imputed to him.

I do not say or think you were bound to read any work of M. Comte; but if you have not read them, and that carefully, you were bound not to write on the subject. Criticism, without pains taken to ensure competence, is but charlatanism.

The same remark holds good as to details of M. Comte's and Madame de Vaux's life and conduct. Full and careful inquiry alone can justify attacks. Had you made such inquiry, you would have found that Madame de Vaux died under her father's roof, and that her body was in the keeping of a family, some of whose members were most hostile to M. Comte—not, therefore, likely to permit such an outrage on her remains.

I have no objection to the course you purpose taking. During the delay incidental to it, the circulation of the tract should be stopped.

M. Marie's address I cannot give you. I will inquire in Paris. M. Littré's private address, either in town or country, is equally unknown to me ; but I doubt not that a letter sent to him, to the care of the editor of the 'Revue des Deux Mondes,' would find him, if one addressed to him at the Institute should fail.

The conclusion of my letter was meant to intimate that I did not consider it a private communication.

I think of at once publishing the correspondence, as the statement is circulating, and you must be aware how greedy people are for charges against us.

Your obedient Servant,
RICHARD CONGREVE.

J. M. LUDLOW, Esq.

MR. HUXLEY ON M. COMTE.

'In so far as my study of what specially characterizes the Positive Philosophy has led me, I find therein little or nothing of any scientific value, and a great deal which is as thoroughly antagonistic to the very essence of science as anything in ultramontane Catholicism. In fact, M. Comte's philosophy in practice might be compendiously described as Catholicism *minus* Christianity. . . . .

'A French writer of fifty years later date, in whose dreary and verbose pages we miss alike the vigour of thought and the exquisite clearness of style of the man whom I make bold to term the most acute thinker of the eighteenth century—even though that century produced Kant.'—FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, February 1869, pp. 141–142.

THESE remarks of Professor Huxley appear to be a little fling on his part, *per sfogarsi;* a vent for a feeling of spleen; an utterance, which, doubtless, at the time, gave a pleasant sense of relief. Yet they are hardly worthy of their place, and would have come better from one of our débonnaire literary oracles than from a high scientific authority on whom rests a certain responsibility. Science claims much. We may claim that it teach patient and well-grounded judgment, even beyond its immediate sphere.

Mr. Huxley finds M. Comte's pages 'dreary.' I have no wish to challenge his judgment. A great deal depends on the interest felt in a subject. My own interest in political and social subjects is, perhaps, what makes me form a widely different estimate. Criticism on the mere form of directly philosophical works is, possibly, more wasted even than other criticism. To me all purely critical writing seems indefensible. Life is not long enough for such pastime. We have already more than sufficient occupation for our very moderate powers of work and thought.

'Verbose.' If used in its ordinary meaning, the epithet is one which a student of M. Comte's works would hesitate to apply to them as a whole. Some might—I should not my-

self—term the 'Philosophie' verbose. If applied to the style of the 'Politique,' or the 'Synthèse Subjective,' it is ludicrously misapplied. 'To term these works verbose,' a friend observed to me, 'is to say that you have not read them.' Mr. Huxley allows for no such distinction between the works. I draw the inference, subject to correction, that his acquaintance with the writings he criticizes is partial. I infer that his study has led him no further than the 'Philosophie,' and that he is condemning the rest in ignorance. Compare the matter with the expression, and this wholly apart from any judgment of the truth or falsehood of the matter, there is no writer, so far as I know, whose condensation, in parts of his works, is equal to M. Comte's. Let Mr. Huxley try his hand at a translation of a few pages of the 'Politique.'

I draw a similar inference from the substance of the remark. That M. Comte is inferior in vigour of thought to Hume, is a proposition which I am content to leave to the general judgment of the competent in such matters. To me it seems rash in the extreme. The great beauty of Hume's style I admire as much as any one; but the style adequate for Hume's purposes, as a philosophical thinker and essayist, might not be adapted to M. Comte's, as a constructive philosopher. A wholly different task required a wholly different instrument. Kant, for instance, whom Mr. Huxley seems to admire, has a very different style from Hume. When the conditions were such that M. Comte could attend to the form and was not compelled to concentrate his whole effort on the matter of his work, an attentive consideration of his style will show that the clearness of M. Comte's thought has an appropriate vehicle in his language, and that such obscurity as there is lies in the difficulty of the subject, or the want of preparation in the reader, rather than in the expression of the writer.

There is, however, another more striking point in the passage. 'I make bold to term,' says Mr. Huxley, as from a sense that he is venturing on a courageous expression of opinion—something original and daring. Yet, in vol. vi. of the 'Philosophie Positive,' page 318, there is a recognition of Hume's merits which has the advantage of greater completeness than the one here given, and which an instructed audience might have recalled to their lecturer. Again, in the Preface

to his 'Catechism,' M. Comte gives an equally favourable judgment of the 'immortal school of Hume and Diderot.' Lastly, in the 'Calendar of Positivism,' Mr. Huxley might find the position assigned to Hume to be that of the superior of Kant and the other philosophical thinkers who occupy the week over which Hume presides. His name is placed on a level with the greatest names of modern philosophy; he is made the equal of Aquinas, of Bacon, and of Leibnitz; he is, with them, subordinated only to Descartes. I find it difficult, where there is such agreement between Mr. Huxley and M. Comte, to explain the absence of all mention of the agreement; and I infer, as before, that the silence is due to an imperfect acquaintance with the works assailed. Otherwise, I should have expected, from Mr. Huxley's candour, an acknowledgment that, in his judgment of Hume, bold as it might seem, he had long been anticipated by the French writer he was depreciating.

Were this all, however, I should have been silent. It is the other paragraph, the first of the two which stand at the head of this article, which is my main object; and the previous remarks have been made as conducive to a right estimate of the value of this paragraph, by leading to a presumption that it rests on inadequate knowledge. Be this as it may, Mr. Huxley's recognized eminence in the scientific world makes his statement remarkable. It has already excited great attention.

It consists, so far as I deal with it, of the two sentences in the first extract. I suppress a previous sentence as merely irritative matter. Of the two left, I am not careful to answer or examine the amount of truth contained in the last. I have been long familiar with the loose judgment it expresses in such writers as Mr. Goldwin Smith. *Valeat quantum.* It stands in juxtaposition rather than in any consecutive connection with what precedes, and is therefore easily detached. If it throws any light at all, it is on the writer's attitude to the system he compendiously describes.

And yet, as it stands, the passage suggests a remark. Whatever advantage Mr. Huxley may have over me from his introduction of Christianity, I must leave him in possession of. Such are the conditions of discussion in England. But

in reference to Catholicism, I may say that in our attitude to this we evidently differ. His language has no meaning unless he considers the imputation of Catholicism a taunt. I, on the contrary, whilst I regard the identification of our system with Catholicism, as the word is generally understood, as erroneous, one-sided, and misleading, yet have never shrunk from recognizing, with satisfaction, the affinity between the two faiths, or in owning the debt we, in common with the whole world, owe to the noble system of the medieval Church. Such resemblance as there is, I consider a ground for honour, not for reproach. I would, therefore, modify Mr. Huxley's description. I would suggest to him one equally compendious, but more accurate—one less purely negative, and more useful as a guide to a right estimate of Positivism, though not so available for his purpose. Instead of 'Catholicism *minus* Christianity,' I recommend to his notice 'Catholicism *plus* Science.'

There remains one sentence, and this I proceed to examine. Its exegesis is not easy. It is not easy, in the first place, to assign its proper value to the saving clause, 'so far as my study has led me.' It implies an incomplete study, and yet the context shows that the view of the writer ranges—however superficially—over the whole works. This is obvious from the mention of Catholicism. Practically, the limitation will be disregarded, and the general conclusion will be that an eminent man of science finds no value in M. Comte's works; and as this conclusion chimes in with the popular wish, it will be acquiesced in; such acquiescence being, I presume, the result desired. Next, in what sense is the term Positive Philosophy used? It must stand as a short expression for M. Comte's whole system. For in any limited, careful use of the term, no candid man could say that the 'Positive Philosophy' contained a great deal as thoroughly antagonistic to science as Catholicism.[1] I may remark, *en passant*, that I do not see the force of the epithet 'Ultramontane.' I am not

[1] On this passage Mr. Huxley has the following note:—'Mr. Congreve leaves out these important words ["the very essence of"] which show that I refer to the spirit, and not to the details of science. I should not like to say that "no candid man" could have thus conveniently mutilated my words, because I know that very candid men occasionally do very odd things; yet a few lines on I give the term "essence of science."' I own I do not see that it affects the argument (1874).

aware of any difference between Ultramontane and Cismontane Catholicism as regards their attitude towards science. Catholics may vary, but Catholicism and Positive Science must be essentially antagonistic. That Positivism in any sense, religious or philosophical, is equally antagonistic, is, in my judgment, an unwarrantable statement. I conceive it to have originated in the writer having present to his mind, not the philosophical or scientific works of M. Comte, but his religious and social system. It is the claim to control science in the name of man's social and moral interests, which, I doubt not, prompted, and which alone supports, the remark in its actual form. In the mind of its author, it probably was directed against other and more special conclusions, which are looked upon as unscientific. If any such exist, they do not imply a thorough antagonism to the essence of science, but simply, *pro tanto*, an error either of method or inference.

The real aim, however, of Mr. Huxley's attack is the philosophical and scientific portion of M. Comte's works. It is this which he wishes to set aside himself, and to damage with his readers. And, as the most useful weapon ready to his hand, he has appealed to the popular prejudice against the political and religious system as a kind of revival of Catholicism. In all probability he, with the archbishop, of whose address he speaks in terms of compliment, which form an odd contrast with his disrespect for M. Comte, thinks the religious side of Positivism so hopelessly unacceptable that no direct notice of it is required; but, unlike the archbishop, he avails himself of the disrepute of the religion as an indirect method of attack on the philosophy, which he is perfectly conscious holds a different place in public estimation.

Lastly, we have no clue to the meaning of the words 'what specially characterizes the Positive Philosophy.' Mr. Huxley apparently had not leisure to give precision to his expression, and so to make it more intelligible.

In opposition to all this, enough for my present purpose if I remind the reader that M. Comte's works contain, in the first place, a religious and political construction; a work belonging, that is, to the political art, and to be judged with reference to the requirements of that art; secondly, a philosophical system; lastly, subordinate to, and forming part of the

latter, certain scientific treatises. These are mixed up in one undiscriminating estimate by Mr. Huxley; but in the examination of his attack it is important to keep them distinct, as the judgment of the writer has a very different presumptive value, according as it refers to one or the other. Once separated properly we can see which of them it is useful, which it is useless, to discuss; and, looking at the tone of his language, I hold it useless to discuss with Mr. Huxley the political and religious construction of M. Comte, either in itself, or in reference to his rejection of it. On this ground, and for the sake of clearness, I put aside the whole theory of the future organization of society as alien to the point immediately at issue.

Then comes the question of the Positive Philosophy, properly so called. The characteristic of that philosophy I have been accustomed to consider the co-ordination of all the abstract sciences by virtue of an uniform method into one consistent system, the synthesis of the sciences hierarchically arranged. The ulterior end of such co-ordination I do not here touch on. What Mr. Huxley considers its special characteristic I have already said I cannot get from his language. I do not even infer that he has ever thought it worth his study as a philosophy, even so far as to master its leading conception, or to place clearly before himself its fundamental aim. Why should he? it may be said. Just so; there is perhaps no reason why he should; but, if he has not, it would be wiser, as it would be fairer, not to attack it.

In the uncertainty in which his present expressions leave me, and in order also to narrow my remarks to the one most definite issue between us, I will enter on no discussion of this second aspect of M. Comte's works, or on the discussion of the Positive Philosophy, properly so called. I will content myself with observing that a philosophical system may have great and permanent value, even though the scientific details which form, as it were, the material of it are insufficient, or, in many cases, even incorrect. For example, the encyclopedic construction of Aristotle marks an era in the intellectual progress of the race, though, scientifically speaking, modern inquiry may attach but little value to its details. Further, I would remark, that in the special sciences, and more especially in

reference to biology, as a student for many years of that science, I have often had occasion to regret that its teachers avail themselves so little of the philosophical treatment it has received from M. Comte, and are so little imbued with the Positive spirit in which he handled it. Were they more familiar with it, we might be spared the weariness of listening to, or reading, the weak theological arguments which so often detract from the value of teaching in other respects good; we might be spared also the constant introduction of the metaphysical fiction, Nature, which is even less respectable than the fictions of theology. And we should have, what we have not now, the sense of pleasure in a historic treatment of the subject, a point of view which would at once facilitate and give soundness to the exposition of any science. No really good teaching of any subject is possible without the introduction of historical considerations. This is true if we confine ourselves to mere intellectual considerations—still more so if we take in moral. The ungrateful omission or stinted recognition of the successive efforts of previous labourers in the same field is punished by the dulness thrown over the subject, and the consequent tedium felt by the learner. I cannot say how far Mr. Huxley's teaching is an exception. I should imagine that he keeps constantly clear of theology and metaphysics. But I should fear also that he keeps equally clear of historical conceptions. But, in any case, he might, I make no doubt, have learnt much from the teaching of the great master whom he throws aside so contemptuously. He might, at least, have learnt the moral lesson of just respect for the contributions and services of others, in which in this instance he seems to me deficient; and the intellectual lesson of a true discrimination of the relative value of thinkers, a discrimination which would have kept him from committing himself to a distinct preference of Hume, as a thinker, to M. Comte.

But, putting aside the political and philosophical parts of M. Comte's works, we come now to the third part, and, for my object, the most important. We have to deal with these works under their strictly scientific aspect. On this I join issue.

The Positive Philosophy is a co-ordination of the sciences, but this implies that you have the sciences to co-ordinate. Some of them M. Comte found, in a sense, ready to his hand;

and with regard to these his work was one of revision and arrangement. Having, that is, sciences more or less constituted as materials on which to work, his work was to place in their due philosophical relation the scientific labours of previous thinkers, and to eliminate all non-positive elements. This is the work done in the first three volumes of the 'Philosophie Positive.' In them M. Comte's attitude to the sciences which he reviews may be considered, for my present purpose, as purely philosophical. Any claim to scientific eminence he may derive from their treatment may be kept out of view, and the case for him, in the purely scientific aspect, may be made to rest, not upon them, but upon another foundation. For one of the sciences required for his system was not ready to his hand. His work in reference to it is not one of revision, but one of original construction. Let us look at his works. The first glance at them shows that the last three volumes of the 'Philosophie,' and they are the largest, are devoted to one science; and that out of the four volumes which constitute the 'Politique,' two deal exclusively with the same science; one, the second, with that science under its statical; the other, the third, with that science under its dynamical aspect. That is, out of ten consecutive volumes five are upon one subject—are, in the ordinary sense of the word, the creation of a science hitherto non-existing. This is a sufficient indication of the point I wish to establish, that the scientific reputation of M. Comte must be most conclusively tested by his success or failure in regard to this particular science—that he must be scientifically judged in reference to sociology. The denial of his claims in other branches cannot invalidate them in this higher and perfectly independent department.

It is Mr. Huxley's judgment of M. Comte on the strictly scientific ground that I now proceed to examine. On that ground, *primâ facie*, his opinion will have weight. His positive statement is, that he finds little or nothing of any scientific value in M. Comte's works, taken as a whole. I have shown reason for taking this as the legitimate extent of his decision, and this certainly will be the general inference from it. For he cannot but allow that he has lent the sanction of a name generally respected in the scientific world to an unfavourable,

nay, a contemptuous judgment of M. Comte's scientific merits, with no expressed reference, no qualification, no limitation to this or that branch of science. He may have had only biology in his view. I imagine that he had ; but that does not appear.

Now one would like to know what is Mr. Huxley's competence to form so sweeping a judgment. How far is he qualified to judge M. Comte's services, even in the lower sciences—mathematics, astronomy, and physics? I will assume that he is qualified in reference to chemistry and biology as sciences, nor do I deny for an instant his competence in the others mentioned ; but, as far as I know, it is not proven ; and, unfortunately, eminence in physiology does not of itself carry any presumption in favour of competence in other branches. Even in the lower sciences, then, it may be that the Professor's decision rests on insufficient ground.

But if in the lower sciences, for the reason above given, we require some evidence of competence in the biologist before we can attach much weight to his opinion, the case is far stronger when we come to the higher science of sociology. Many eminent biologists not only allow the value of the preliminary sciences, but seek themselves, and inculcate on others the duty of seeking, the benefits to be derived from them. With sociology, on the contrary, the case is different ; its value, as reacting on the study of biology, is not allowed, is not in general suspected—nay, I may go further—it would be generally denied. If I were to say, what I believe to be strictly true, that for a right study of biology, a study of its superior, sociology, is an essential condition, a condition the non-fulfilment of which vitiates but too often our biological conclusions, I should probably at the present time subject myself to ridicule ; yet there are sound grounds for the assertion. For the present, however, it is sufficient to state that this attitude of the biologists constitutes a presumption—and, for my purpose, a presumption is all I need—that the science of sociology is one on which Mr. Huxley's opinion is of no value, as one which he has not studied. I do not here go further than the presumption—my statement is purely negative—but the presumption cannot be too carefully kept in view.

The case, then, stands thus. One science is in a special sense connected with M. Comte's name. The most jealous

scrutiny cannot deny him a peculiar position as the creator of sociology—I use the term in the largest sense. In this, his own particular sphere, has M. Comte no scientific merit? Has he contributed nothing of any scientific value in sociology? This is the question I venture to put to Mr. Huxley. His answer, as it stands, is in the negative. Then comes the further question, On what competence does this negative answer rest? A contemptuous treatment of the subject does not incline one to look for a high degree of competence.

Mr. Huxley must, I conceive, choose between one of the three following alternatives. He may care little for sociology, set small store on any such science—nay, deny its claim to the name of science. With him science may stop at biology, and the kindred branches of knowledge which are usually called sciences. All beyond may be to him merely empirical, and have no scientific value in the proper sense. In this view, naturally, he neglects M. Comte's writings. There is much in Mr. Huxley's language to favour this conclusion, yet I doubt whether, in the present state of opinion, he would deliberately avow it. It would be falling back too far from the van.

Is it, then, that whilst he allows social phenomena to be as truly the subject-matter of a science as biological phenomena are of the science which deals with them, Mr. Huxley considers M. Comte not only to have wholly failed in his attempt to construct such a science, but to have made no valuable contribution towards it, and that he has come to this opinion on a careful study of the volumes devoted to this construction, namely, the last three volumes of the 'Philosophie Positive,' and the second and third of the 'Politique Positive'? I recur to these two volumes because they, and not the three volumes given to sociology in the 'Philosophie,' are the definitive construction of the science; and he who has been content with the first work, and not studied the second, should be careful how he speaks of M. Comte's works in general. He has not studied them in their due connection. He is not competent to judge them. In the absence of a direct and deliberate statement from Mr. Huxley that his opinion has been so formed, I look on this second answer as improbable. It is to me inconceivable that any one who should have studied the volumes in question, whether he accepted or rejected them,

should fail to see that they have a certain scientific value. Allowing, for the sake of argument, that they fail in their direct object—that they are unsuccessful, that is, in laying down correctly the lines of a new science—still, as the first solution of a great problem hitherto unattempted, a definite and comprehensive solution, they would have a scientific value independent of any absolute results. Modern biology has got beyond Aristotle's conception; but in the construction of biological science, not even the most unphilosophical biologist would fail to recognize the value of Aristotle's early, incomplete, and in a certain sense premature attempt. So for sociology. Subsequent sociologists may have, conceivably, to remodel the whole science, yet not the less will they recognize the merit of that first work which has facilitated their labours.

It is to me, then, inconceivable that a real student of those volumes should form the judgment Mr. Huxley has apparently formed. Still, it may be that he adopts this second alternative. And should Mr. Huxley state that this is his deliberate conviction, I should ask no more; I should acquiesce in the fact of his denial, and be content to feel that the position he occupies in this respect was fairly before the world. When I use the word 'deliberate,' I mean it to bear the full sense of an opinion formed on a sufficient study and mastery of the subject. And for the present argument, be it remembered, this implies not merely a knowledge of sociology, a knowledge of the conditions of man's existence as a social being, and a knowledge of the historical development of the human race—this Mr. Huxley may have—but it involves such a study and mastery of certain definite works in which that science is set forth, and on the value of which Mr. Huxley, *ex hypothesi*, pronounces a judgment.

The conclusion to which I ultimately come is that a third supposition is the true one, and that the remarks on which I am commenting do not really express a deliberate judgment in any true sense of the word. I judge them to be an impatient utterance based on a wholly imperfect and insufficient acquaintance with the subject of which Mr. Huxley is speaking. I judge them—I speak under correction—to be the opinion of one who has looked into the works of M. Comte

mainly with reference to his own special subject, and who, not finding, as he thinks, anything to serve his purpose there, turns from the whole as useless, and in an unguarded moment publishes his condemnation. I look on them, in fact, as the judgment of a biologist penetrated with the importance of his own subject, and full of respect for the preliminary sciences but bounding his horizon with his own science; either not allowing that there are higher sciences, or not caring for them.

I crave a more deliberate judgment from the Professor. If he cannot or will not give that, I would urge upon him abstinence from these side blows which have no appearance of calm reflection about them. He is well aware that in the present state of opinion they cannot claim the merit of courage. All are ready to abuse M. Comte and his disciples. They will not conciliate opponents; and though I should not like to charge Mr. Huxley with any such wish, they have an unpleasant look about them. What they certainly will do is to alienate those who in the struggle in which he is engaged might be useful to his cause; who sympathize with him within his own incomplete limits; and who, when he steps into the field of social discussion, as he has more than once nobly done, are ready to give all the support they can, and at least can offer a hearty admiration. For I cannot but remember that on more than one occasion Mr. Huxley has stood forward to protest against injustice, to share the odium of an unpopular cause, and to stem the tide of prejudice. Whilst doing my best, then, in the present instance against him, I could not be silent as to his social exertions. Even in this article there is a passage which, whatever my objections to it, testifies to his interest in social questions. On this passage I will briefly touch, as it illustrates his attitude towards sociology as a science. I hope I have not misunderstood it. I have tried hard to get at its real meaning.

In a 'simple, unsystematic way' Mr. Huxley approaches the social question. He speaks of a world full of ignorance and misery; and he recognizes, in language which, though it bear the stamp of poverty of conception inseparable from the doctrines of individualism, is yet manly and civic, the plain duty of each and all of us to struggle against that misery and

that ignorance. Now what does he offer in the way of aid for the right discharge of this plain duty? He offers two beliefs,[1] and two only, as generally necessary. These may be all very well in their way, but are an unsatisfactory equipment for those who wish to know how to act. The latter of the two is one which I doubt whether any man who has ever acted has been without, whatever his theory might be. The former has long been fully possessed by the thinker and the statesman, nay by all who have at any time consciously striven to improve the world, either by intellectual or practical effort. Yet experience shows that an *effectual* dealing with the ignorance and misery around us is still a desideratum. Would the physician—and the physician has to meet ignorance and misery, though it may be more especially from the physical point of view—feel as he visited the bed-side of his patients that he was effectually armed for his task, however full his possession of these two beliefs? And if Mr. Huxley, whilst he would ridicule such a preparation for the physician, thinks that it is adequate for the more difficult and complex problem of ignorance and misery when approached from the more social point of view, he is but betraying the disadvantage at which he has placed himself by his unwise neglect of M. Comte's sociological system.

Still, as I said, the language is a simple and manly recognition of our social duty. It naturally leads us to think that he who uses it would sympathize with those who have endeavoured to discharge the duty it inculcates. Now he knows—or if he does not know he is blamable for not knowing, as he has chosen to write upon the subject—that M. Comte's life was one long unbroken effort to construct a philosophical and political system to meet the evils they both recognize. I will not do Mr. Huxley the injustice of supposing that had his intellect been fairly brought to bear upon the examination of that system he would have failed to recognize, not its truth, I speak not of that, but its evident power and greatness as an intellectual exertion. On this point I speak with confidence, because, from various quarters, many the most unlikely, there comes a recognition of this point. Men opposed to M. Comte's

[1] For convenience I give the beliefs: 'The first, that the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events.' (Fort. Rev., p. 245.)

conclusion as philosophers and statesmen, men again whose dearest faith as religious believers his doctrine threatens to supersede, agree in the acknowledgment that, however mistaken, M. Comte's effort was great and honourable. Why is it that a leader of science—speaking (as I am afraid I must allow) in harmony with the general current of opinion prevalent amongst the men of science—is unable to separate his non-acceptance of the system from his estimate of its author's intellectual value, but rejects the whole with undisguised and unqualified contempt? Why is it but that those I have before alluded to can, as men and as citizens, feel a certain community of purpose, and therefore a certain sympathy and admiration for a powerful but as they deem misguided genius; whereas the men of science, forgetful of the true position of science as a minister to the social well-being of man, confront an attempt to recall them to the sense of its real function with impatient hostility, and view with alarm and hatred the spread of a doctrine which they instinctively feel is destined to put an end to their indiscipline? It seems to me that they might mitigate their hostility if they would calmly consider what Positivism, as a system, aims at in regard to science. They fear encroachment on, or any tampering with, their scientific independence, their pursuit of truth. Now there is a great distinction between a limitation of the choice of subjects and a limitation or fettering of independent inquiry on the subjects when chosen. The moral and social system known as Positivism claims to select the subjects which should be studied by those who cultivate science in any of its special branches, natural or human, not to dictate the special conclusions on these subjects. The scientific inquirer is left uncontrolled within a definite limit. This, as we think, would find him an ample sphere for his faculties, avoid waste of time, promote the real acceptance of science, make its true value felt, and at the same time conduce to the real interests of the race. But I have little hope that any effort of conciliation on the part of the Positivist student of science will lessen the opposition of the non-Positivist; only let it be remembered that the value the former sets on science is as great as that which the latter attaches to it. The difference is simply one of direction and discipline.

From one point of view I feel that they who are too much disposed to arrogate to themselves exclusively the title of men of science are unfortunate. Their attitude is an anachronism, I suspect, and they feel the effects of this false position and are irritated by it. The interest of the world, broadly stated, is not merely that 'orderly mystery' or science should take the place of disorderly, but that, in an especial sense, social and political order should take the place of disorder. And the Western world is dimly conscious that it is settling into a new order after more or less of disorder. It is dimly conscious also that two faiths are contesting the direction of the change. One or other of the two must prevail, and the result will be an organization which will grind down all recalcitrant elements. But the world judges roughly. It listens to the men of science, and pays them the compliment, often undeserved, of thinking that they are beings with a social purpose, not mere advocates of unlimited inquiry and discussion. It attributes to them, that is, a wish to aid in the reconstruction of society, not a mere pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. It sees the older faith fading under their solvent applications; and, no longer recognizing mere destruction as valuable, it considers them as partisans of the younger. It insists, that is, on ranging them with those whom, under the name of Positivists, it looks upon as the representatives of the new faith of which it has heard indistinct rumours. It yokes them to a service for which they feel the most utter repugnance; it identifies them with an organization, and the very name is distasteful to them. Hence impatient disclaimers, such as the one here made by Mr. Huxley, and the disclaimers avail them not. The instinct of their opponents, whether learned or unlearned, is keen, and, in the main, sound. It steadily identifies the guerilla chieftains with the regular forces of the opposition.

In fact, their disclaimers are only valid with the Positivists, who feel, and regret for the sake of their cause, the hostility of the savans. We cannot but acknowledge that it is a powerful obstacle in the way of social reorganization; the most powerful probably, affording as it does an excuse to so many for not examining or for rejecting our system. We can but hope for better things, for the gradual disappearance of the

singular bitterness with which the Positivist cause is regarded by too many of the scientific world—a bitterness not easily accounted for. Our natural allies are those who have, and feel that they have, a common end with us, however different our respective means; the large class which is seeking for a religious constitution of society. The new scientific clergy must act, as far as it is allowed, in unison with the clergy of the older faith.

One word more. M. Comte's life was not only a life of intellectual effort; it was a life of self-denial, of abstinence from all lower aims; a life of persistence—and that in the face of persecution, and danger, and neglect—in the endeavour to serve his kind. It was a life the beauty of which has now been recognized in many quarters which must have come under Mr. Huxley's observation, and by men whom he cannot but respect. Yet he has but words of contemptuous indifference, no word of recognition, much less of admiration for a life which, I challenge him to deny it, has a marked character of grandeur about it. His entire silence on these points, especially on the last, whatever the motive that prompted it, and irrespective of any and every estimate of the actual results attained by M. Comte's efforts, I cannot but deeply regret for Mr. Huxley's sake. I should be ill expressing my own feeling if I did not say in frankness, but not in disrespect, that it is not mere regret that I feel—that I look on such silence as discreditable injustice. It is this feeling which has led me to write.

Fortnightly Review, March 1869.

THE NEW RELIGION IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OLD.

A SERMON.

I WOULD ask you for a few minutes to turn your thoughts to the other members of our Church, wherever they may be, and more especially to the two centres, where, on this day, a similar act of worship will be performed—Paris, and Long Island, New York.

I read rather than speak to you, as our small number makes speaking difficult. It is scarcely possible to avoid a conversational style when there are but few present. Yet my wish is to avoid it to-day, for reasons which I need not here state. When writing, though we write what is to be heard directly by a few only, and though perhaps it is a good rule to write with some one person ever, as it were, before one, yet we can keep the consciousness that what we write may be heard by a larger circle outside, and whilst the one person preserves us from vagueness, the sense of the larger audience stimulates and controls. I would ask you to keep this in mind, if what I have written seem out of place in so small a congregation.

I use the word 'congregation' purposely, as the technical term for a religious meeting, for such I consider this. I do not, I am aware, speak to you as a Priest of Humanity. My age is a bar to that. Nor, were our Church in possession of its full organization, should I speak as one of the second order of her ministers—as a vicar. My insufficient scientific training would prevent me. But, under existing circumstances, I feel that Mr. Edger is right in saying that I exercise in a sense the vicar's office. Where there are disciples or members

there, however limited their number, is a Church. We have a faith, the outlines of a ritual, and sufficient members. It would be an undue shrinking from responsibility not in such a case to supply, within the limits of what is absolutely necessary, that which alone is wanting—a ministration. I look on this discourse as the first definite act of such a ministration; and though in the immediate present the case is not very likely to occur, yet should it occur, should there be a call for other acts of a minister, such as the administration of the indispensable sacraments, I mean Presentation and Marriage, I feel warranted in saying that I should have power to administer them with the full sanction of our central direction, duly sought and obtained. For the present, preaching is all we want, and that part of our institutions I hereby inaugurate. I am aware that such a step implies much; that it imposes obligations. I accept its consequences—I will meet those obligations to the full measure of my strength. I have during the last few months anxiously tested our position and its needs. I have listened to the objections made to us, to the advice offered. I have examined also the position of our opponents, whether friendly or not. I have also looked at the general state of our country; the evils under which it labours, and their remedies; the state of opinion, and the measures which, with a fair attention to prudence, we may attempt. The general conclusion I have come to is, that the boldest course is the wisest; that the doctrine we advocate, the faith we hold, must be put forward as a religion, as something to believe in and live by—not as something which demands intellectual assent; that here in England we can be nothing if we do not claim, and show the grounds for our claim, to be everything; that we must make it clear that we are not a philosophical school, but a church. On the practical measures which this conclusion invoives I will not detain you now. My only aim has been to make it quite clear in what light I look on this present act of joint religion, as the inauguration, however imperfect, of the ministerial functions in the English branch of the Church of Humanity.

Two days have been set apart as festivals of the Religion of Humanity. Both have reference to its founder. The one commemorates the birth, the other the death, of our Master,

Teacher, and Guide, Auguste Comte. On the latter, in September, in the present state of things, it is an object, as far as possible, to make the celebration of his memory as collective an act as possible. Whenever we have it in our power, we should, I think, consider it as a duty to join with our brothers, of whatever nation, assembled at Paris, to visit the tomb of our founder, and be present at such ceremony as our head shall think proper. On the day set apart in memory of his birth, the nature of the case, and our local separation, rather point to a national celebration at the outset, to merge, as our faith extends, in more local ones.

I have at times regretted the choice of this second day. I have wished that the first of the year had been taken. I have wished, that is, that there had been one directly personal day, whilst the second had been at once consecrated as the Festival of Humanity. Yet it is more in the spirit of our religion to accept cheerfully what has been done, and turn it to the best account. The ground of the decision was, I believe, that we were not ripe for the more abstract worship; that in our existing state we could join most truly and with most reality in such worship as had direct reference to our founder. This language of course implies that the other had been better, and points us onward to that riper state. How, then, can we best make this day serve that purpose—let it keep, that is, its own character as a personal festival, at the same time that it assumes a preparatory character as leading on to the direct worship of Humanity, which I confidently trust will ere long be begun? A comparison of the two events which we commemorate will give us the answer. When on its anniversary we mourn our master's death, we naturally concentrate our attention on him, on his life and services. We worship Humanity in and through her noblest servant and organ, Auguste Comte. Our worship of her takes something of an indirect character; we insist more on the individual instrument and on the work done, less on the power which it served or on the cause in which it was done.

To-day, on the other hand, we may take a different view. Placing ourselves, as we naturally do, at a period prior to the work which Comte did, we ask ourselves what was the preparation made for it? And the answer makes us look back on

the past which had preceded him—on the upward movement of our race, on the accumulation of materials, on the means placed at his disposal. We concentrate, then, our attention, not now on the work done, but on the cause in which it was done ; not on the servant, but on the power he served ; not on the product, but on the producer. We reverse the former process, and contemplate Comte in and through Humanity.

So looked at, both festivals equally bear on one of the most prominent characteristics of our religion—the worship of the dead. In the one, we worship them in and through the last and greatest of those eminent few who, being dead, yet speak to the race of which they were the servants. In the other, we worship implicitly the aggregate of those whose collective services had prepared his way, who had hewn the materials which he was to employ in his construction. We worship that ever increasing portion of Humanity to which he is now joined, which comprehends all those who have lived worthily. Again, the second is the more collective, the first the more individual view.

Let us place ourselves in thought at the period of Comte's birth, quite at the end of the eighteenth century, and estimate, on as comprehensive a scale as we can, the result of the past history of our race and its then condition—at the time, that is, prior to the first promulgation of his conceptions. The prevalent feeling was one of uncertainty, distrust, almost despair. Movement there had been, and still was ; and that the movement in the past had been, in the ordinary sense, a progress, was scarcely denied. Whether it was so in the present, was a matter of question. Looking back, men saw that one organization after another had been tried, and attentive study might show that each successive one had been larger than the last. All, however, including the last and widest, that of Catholicism, had failed ; or, at least we may say, it had been broken up for a time, so that even its most devoted admirers only ventured to put its restoration as a possible alternative. The crash of the old society still ringing in their ears, men were glad to accept any temporary shelter which might avert anarchy ; but such shelter as they found could satisfy no competent judge. They questioned history, and whatever the

value of the answers they elicited, they did not succeed in so interpreting her teaching as to draw any guiding principle from it. They saw that not merely temporal organizations, kingdoms and empires, had broken up, but that spiritual ones also had ceased to command men's faith. They were looked on as fancies which the world had outgrown ; disencumbered from which we might proceed onwards without hesitation. In a word, the intellect of man had acquiesced in denial, in negation. Yet it was clear to the blindest, for it was subsequent to the great crisis of 1793 and 1794, that the heart of man had not, and could not, acquiesce in negation and denial ; that it was at issue with the conclusions of the intellect ; or that, if it accepted them, the result was evil. For the nature of man was there still with its eternal combination of two elements, eternal under every difference of name, its selfishness and its unselfishness. The first was universally recognized, by some even made to constitute the whole nature ; the second was only recognized as an independent element by a few ; yet its existence was felt by the vast majority, felt if not explicitly acknowledged. Science and feeling were at variance. The questions put by the heart were disallowed by the intellect, whilst the conclusions of the intellect were rejected by the heart. Under such conditions action was difficult.

Had, then, the past been a failure? Had the efforts of the human race been wasted? had its movements been governed by no law, and so did they afford no light for the future? Was all to begin again, and without any definite aim was society to go through a cycle of new changes to end in a new crash, instinctively suiting itself to its wants, and turning itself, like the sick man, only to get a change of position, under the impulse of mere weariness? Was history but a record of action, with an interest of its own but with no teaching, of the same character as a work of fiction, serving to occupy the learned, or to amuse those who had a taste for it?

But ten years before Comte's birth, a different feeling had been common. The European world had been full of hope on the eve of a great change which had held out the brightest prospects—a new era of justice, and peace, and universal

brotherhood. But the change had come; the event had disappointed all, and a general lassitude was the consequence. A large destruction had taken place, but no new construction had followed; and men were building again their temporary shelter with the materials which had failed them so often. The consciousness of this was discouraging.

In all times, since the earliest dawn of history, men who had not been absorbed in the immediate present had looked inquiringly on the spectacle of man's nature and human society, and had sought to give a reason to themselves of what they saw. As the race grew older, and its experience consequently increased, the judgments of such inquirers had become more comprehensive. An immutable destiny had presided over human action as over the order of nature, nay, even over the gods whom men and nature equally obeyed. An overruling Providence, in the person of an all-wise and all-powerful God, the Maker and Preserver of all things, had taken the place of that earlier belief, the creation at once of the philosophic intellect, as well as of the popular instinct. Subordinate to this general conception, there had been a dim sense that man's actions and social development depended on fixed laws, traceable by observation, and capable of giving a certain measure of guidance. A combination of these two ideas had led men to frame schemes on which they could arrange the events of history and the sequence of human revolutions. Boldly rejecting the first part of the combination, others had gone so far as to look for the solution of all such questions simply in man's circumstances, and nature, and history. Strong in the results of a limited and one-sided observation, they had trusted to their instinct, and proclaimed that progress was the law which Humanity obeyed—progress ever onwards in a direct line, with an indefinite horizon before them of perfectibility, encouraging the most magnificent, must we not also add, the most visionary hopes—hopes, however, valuable even in their wildness, as testifying to the instinct which had induced their formation. That instinct, we may truly say, had never been wanting; we may trace it in the earliest periods of our race, in the creations of the poet, in the conceptions of the philosopher, in the anticipations of the prophet. The old language

is true. The earnest expectation of the creature waited for the manifestation; the whole creation groaned and travailed in pain until now.

Such was the state of things, such the materials prepared, at the time when Comte's powers were sufficiently matured to form a judgment on them, and on the use to which they might be put; such I may add was the instinct of man, such the great want to be satisfied. The old interpretations of nature, and of human government, and social organization, had failed. Was a new interpretation possible? Such was the problem to be solved.

We say with confidence, and with gratitude: It has been solved. The interpretation has been given. Reading afresh the writing which had lain before the gaze of statesmen and philosophers, by the help of aids which they had not had, Auguste Comte was enabled to give an interpretation which they had missed from the want of these aids. He saw that in one department there had been unbroken progress, whilst in all others there had been interchange of growth and decay. He saw that in regard to that outer world, which is the theatre of man's actions, a certain method had been all-powerful to reduce it more and more within the range of man's knowledge and consequent power of dealing with it for his own purposes. That method had been the recognition of invariable laws, which we could learn by observation, and turn to useful account by obedience. Two branches only, of all that were accessible to man, remained exempt from the application of this method —the social and the moral. Once show that they could be brought within its range, and the philosophical problem was solved. The intellect was enabled to move evenly over all the field of human knowledge, without any abrupt separation of its parts. This Comte is acknowledged by competent judges to have shown.

Social and moral laws being demonstrated, it remained to apply them to practice. The philosophical study of human nature must find its expression, its application, in practical politics. So alone could the truth and utility of its results be tested. But here his work undergoes a change. Its character is raised, might I say, transfigured. The powerful philosophical elaboration becomes a creation. The treatise on the

principles of government and morals passes into the constitution of a living church. The teacher and philosopher stands before us as the apostle and the priest.

He had long worked alone, and under the most adverse outward circumstances. His intellect had been severely tasked, his affections repressed, his character exposed to all hardening influences, his daily life embittered by constant domestic annoyances. He had borne up against all during seventeen years, in the faith that the truths he had to discover and reveal would be of real social value. He had laboured to fix on a firm basis the great discovery of his earlier life, the law of social development, the law of the three states of all our conceptions, holding good equally for the race and for the individual. With this object he had gone through the whole range of abstract thought, whether as applied to the outer world or to man. In this work he had found his refuge, in this work and in the spirit of love in which he had undertaken and continued it. Hence his great endurance, which had been tried at times even too severely. His life had been a constant act of devotion to the power he served. Outwardly impassive, the fire had burned more strongly within, and the affection which could find no worthy individual object had been concentrated on a collective one. As he studied the movement of the human race in its history, we cannot doubt that half unconsciously his sympathy had grown more lively, his conviction of a brighter future more intense. This was but the natural result of such work as his. Every artist loves his work; and as Comte worked out into fuller light the conceptions of the past stages of man's existence, those conceptions became, though under a strictly scientific garb, what his poem is to the poet. And all his conceptions and studies tended one way, to raise him out of himself, and to make him lose himself in his race. In silence, then, I conceive a great work had been going on; he had been preparing for a new existence. At the end of his philosophical elaboration, he rested before entering on the subsequent construction for which that had been but the basis. It was in this interval of rest that he became acquainted with Madame de Vaux. His intercourse with her was short; one year saw its beginning and end. His intercourse, I mean, in the ordinary sense of the word. In

the truest sense it ended only with his death, eleven years later. But that one year was enough. The inner deep was broken up; the great springs of affection were opened; the long pent-up nature revealed itself, and as on the high mountain tract, what was but yesterday snow, was to-day the grass and the flower. His endurance and faith had met a reward. For him, too, there was a possibility of individual sympathy and affection, and the love of the race might be quickened by the genuine human love of a noble woman. I have heard it said, that for the truest tenderness you require great strength; and the language is certainly so far correct, that where a strong nature does not harden, but suffers itself to develope its tenderness, there this latter quality will master the man in a way which poorer natures find it hard to conceive. Be this as it may, it is clear that his love for Madame de Vaux revealed him to himself, placed his being and his work consequently in a new light before him, at the same time that it gratified the want of personal sympathy under which he had nearly sunk.

In the vivid sense of blessedness which this change brought with it, in the enjoyment of this individual love, I again say it with the full consciousness of what I am saying, he was transfigured. His true nature was shown forth; the warmth of his sympathies became evident; his character was softened, yet lost none of its force; his genius became clearer under the impulse of his heart. He trusted himself more fully, and gave himself a more complete expression. In the highest sense of the term, as well as in its more limited and more ordinary sense, he became purified. He had himself drunk at the true spring of human happiness, which is love, and he had been prepared for its effects by his self-sacrifice. He was enabled to see that for others, too, for all men, there was no other source to which they could go but to this, where the laws of happiness and duty are fused into one.

He stood revealed to himself, and his work also stood in a new light before him. The unity of the human race, over whose progress he had pondered, had long been a conviction with him. With the conception, too, of Humanity as a higher organism he had familiarized himself, and by the light of that conception had interpreted its past and meditated on its

future. Neither in this respect any more than with regard to his own moral nature was there any abrupt change. The philosophical character had been predominant; it gave way to the human. The conviction became faith; the organism in which he had believed claimed and received his veneration and his love—in other words, his worship. So I read his progress.

We who share that faith, that veneration, and that love; we who would worship as he worshipped; we who would preach by our lives, and, where possible, by our spoken or written words, that great Being whose existence is now revealed; that Being of whom all the earlier divinities which man has created as the guardians of his childhood and early youth are but anticipations, we can appreciate the greatness of the change which his labour has effected. We can see, and each in his several measure can proclaim to others, that what was but a dim instinct, has become a truth, in the power of which we can meet all difficulties; that where there was inquiry, now there is knowledge; where there was anxious searching, now there is possession; that uncertainty has given way to confidence, despondency to courage. We see families forming into tribes, and tribes into cities or states, and states into still larger unions. And distinct from all such unions we see, besides, different races co-existent, distrustful, or hostile. We feel that the ascending series is not complete; that as the family in the earliest state is at war with other families, the tribe at war with other tribes, so the nations and races are at variance with each other; and that as the remedy in each previous case has been the fusion of the smaller into the larger organism, so it must be still the same if the process is to be completed, and that no more than the single family or the isolated tribe can the greatest nation or the most powerful race stand wholesomely alone. All must bend, all must acknowledge a common superior, a higher organism, detached from which they lose themselves and their true nature, become selfish and degraded. Still higher organisms there may be; we know not. If there be, we know that we cannot neglect the one we know, nor refuse to avail ourselves of the aid which it can give us when once acknowledged and accepted.

We accept it then, and believe in it. We see the benefits

Humanity has reaped for us by her toilsome and suffering past; we feel that we are her children, that we owe her all; and, seeing and feeling this, we love, adore, and serve. For we see in her no mere idea of the intellect, but a living organism, of which we all are parts, and from which we cannot conceive ourselves cut off, the highest organism within the range of our knowledge. The family has ever been allowed to be real; the state has ever been allowed to be real; St. Paul felt, and since him, in all ages, Christians have felt that the Church is real. We claim no less for Humanity; we feel no less that Humanity is real, requiring the same love, the same service, the same devotion. We see the General Assembly and Church of the first-born, the faithful who in all ages have served, not themselves, but their race. We would be joined to them ourselves. We see with Isaiah, in the visions of the future, all nations coming to join us and them. The great apostle saw the Christian Church in its glory, without spot or wrinkle. We throw open wider than he could the portals of the Church to which we belong—the Church of Humanity. The world to him lay in wickedness, and was given over to the service of devils. We can trace the good underlying the evil—can sympathize with our fellow-men in all their phases of existence; and where he saw devils, we can see creations of as much validity as his own God; and, as I have said already, in his and their objects of worship we find anticipations of our own. True, St. Paul spoke of there being neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ being all and in all. And the language testifies to the largeness of his love, and the grandeur of his intellectual conception. But for the union to which he aspired a condition is implied which could not be fulfilled for the time which preceded him, and has not been fulfilled since his time; which, we may safely say, never will be fulfilled. Christendom is not Christian, nor becoming Christian. How should it convey to others that which it does not believe in and live by itself? How should it convert Heathendom? We are limited by no such condition. We cannot restrict our admission. The very idea of Humanity forbids any such exclusion. In one way or other she admits all human beings within her pale. Nay she goes further, and recognizes the services of the animal

races that promote her welfare. Nor is this the limit of her power. She may borrow Shelley's words, and say—

> I am the eye with which the universe
> Beholds itself and knows itself divine;
> All harmony of instrument or verse,
> All prophecy, all medicine are mine,
> All light of art or nature—to my song
> Victory and praise in their own right belong.

In the exercise of her power she proceeds to complete herself by two great creations.

As we contemplate man's action and existence, we are led to think of the sphere in which they take place, and of the invariable laws under which they are developed. We rest not, then, in any narrow or exclusive spirit in Humanity, but we pass to the earth, our common mother, as the general language of man—the correct index to the universal feeling—has ever delighted to call her; and from the earth we rise to the system of which she is a part. We look back on the distant ages when the Earth was preparing herself for the habitation of man, and with gratitude and love we acknowledge her past and present services. With the same feelings, though with less intensity, we regard the heavenly bodies, which in a greater or less degree influence this abode of man—the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth's fellow-planets; the World, in short, in the real sense in which we use the term. The stars in their brightness, the hosts of heaven are a sight of beauty, but beyond that (I speak broadly, not unaware that the statement requires a certain limitation scientifically) they offer us nothing. And in the spirit of self-discipline we accept their beauty gratefully, but we seek not to penetrate further, for we recognize the limits of our powers, and we can afford no waste of them.

The invariable laws under which Humanity is placed have received various names at different periods. Destiny, Fate, Necessity, the Heaven, Providence, all are so many names of one and the same conception: the laws which man feels himself under, and that without the power of escaping from them. We claim no exemption from the common lot. We only wish to draw out into consciousness the instinctive acceptance of the race, and to modify the spirit in which we regard them. We accept; so have all men. We obey; so have all men,

We venerate; so have some in past ages or in other countries. We add but one other term—we love. We would perfect our submission, and so reap the full benefits of submission in the improvement of our hearts and tempers. We take in conception the sum of the conditions of existence, and we give them an ideal being and a definite home in Space, the second great creation which completes the central one of Humanity. In the bosom of Space we place the World; and we conceive of the World and this our mother Earth as gladly welcomed to that bosom with the simplest and purest love, and we give our love in return.

> Thou art folded, thou art lying
> In the light which is undying.

Thus we complete the Trinity of our religion, Humanity, the World, and Space. So completed, we recognize its power to give unity and definiteness to our thoughts, purity and warmth to our affections, scope and vigour to our activity. We recognize its power to regulate our whole being; to give us that which it has so long been the aim of all religions to give —internal union. We recognize its power to raise us above ourselves, and, by intensifying the action of our unselfish instincts, to bear down into their due subordination our selfish ones. We see in it yet unworked treasures. We count not ourselves to have apprehended, but we press forward to the prize of our high calling. But even now, whilst its full capabilities are unknown to us, before we have apprehended, we find enough in it to guide and strengthen us. It harmonizes us within ourselves by the strong force of love, and it binds us to our fellow-men by the same power. It awakens and quickens our sympathy with the past, uniting us with the generations that are gone by firmer ties than have ever been imagined hitherto. It teaches us to live in the interest and for the good of the generations that are to follow in the long succession of years. It teaches us that for our action in our own generation we must live in dutiful submission to the lessons of the past, to the voice of the dead, and at the same time we must evoke the future by the power of imagination, and endeavour so to shape our action that it may conduce to the advantage of that future.

Such are the general principles, by the light of which the

institutions of our nascent Church and social organization have been sketched by its founder. A detailed notice of these institutions I avoid at present. Enough if in brief I state some of their leading points. On the basis of the Family, the primary and indestructible element of all human society, we raise the Country or the State, and the Church, as the three social forms which can never be dispensed with, which admit neither of diminution nor of increase when the human organism is rightly constituted. Marriage indissoluble even by death; the parental and filial relation strengthened by an education which shall not neglect the intellect, but which shall never forget its essential subordination as the minister of the affections and the guide of action; which shall therefore recognize the mother's influence as predominant during childhood, and shall direct all its efforts to preserve it and strengthen it during youth and early manhood,—Women freed from all hard labour; freed from the necessity of leaving their homes, and maintained by the labour of man; honoured as the highest influence in domestic and public life, as the purest representatives of Humanity; a Priesthood, which as every other great priesthood has been, shall be the depositary of all the intellectual accumulations of the race, and which shall, with perfect gratuitousness, freely give out from that store to all equally, without distinction of sex or of rank; a priesthood which shall bring to the performance of its high duties devotion and zeal such as we honour in the better members of other priesthoods, whilst it shall give guarantees which have never been as a whole exacted from them; which shall renounce all temporal power and all property, all tendency to isolation of interests and distinctness of position as given by celibacy, whilst it brings a long novitiate and ripe age to ensure so far as may be its intellectual and moral competence; a priesthood which, as the fountain of education, and the dispenser of knowledge—(a knowledge, be it remembered, accessible to all, and consequently guarded against any undue concentration or abuse,)—shall reject all claims to mysterious power, and stand on the right and noble performance of its educational functions; but which on that firm basis shall speak to all classes and on all questions with freedom and sincerity,

thus exercising a great consultative influence over those whom it has educated; a priesthood, finally, to which all orders and degrees of man shall look for their sanction and consecration whilst living, for the judgment on their life after death, that consecration to be given, that judgment to be pronounced, by virtue of a common faith and common principles of action.—Capital and labour both honoured, both recognized as essential; the capitalist looked on as wielding the most indispensable of material functions in the accumulation and transmission of wealth; as the comptroller and dispenser of the treasures which the industry of man has brought into existence by its long efforts, but never suffered to forget that he is the steward of society, the depositary of a trust to be used for no selfish ends; the workman released from his now brutalizing toil—released to an extent which as yet it would be thought wild to dream of—taught to estimate aright and acquiesce in his position; taught at the same time to modify it so far as is compatible with such acquiescence; accepting labour not as a curse but as a blessing; only asking that the treasures of affection and of art and of thought shall be opened to him largely and freely, so that he, too, may feel and enjoy his human nature; finding therefore in the rich enjoyment of the family life, in the powers conferred on him by education, in the consciousness of his freedom from their responsibilities, a compensation for the absence of power and wealth; yet feeling at the same time that by the sympathy of the priesthood and that of his fellow-workmen there is placed in his hands a strong power to moderate the action of the other social forces from which he at present suffers so grievously.—Such are the points to which my present limits confine me, but they may be enough to give in a measure the conception of society such as we view it from the vantage ground of Humanity. I would add that such a form of society looks to no law or despotic agencies to establish it or to maintain it. It must rest on a purely spiritual basis, on the free convictions of those who form it, such convictions to result from a common education. On no points are the statements of our founder clearer; on no point are they so little understood. The degree to which they are misunderstood or misrepresented is scarcely conceivable by any one who has honestly read his works.

I have stated the problem which Comte found unsolved I have stated the personal conditions under which he solved it. I have stated very briefly the solution he has given. I turn to the consideration of ourselves who accept that solution and its fullest consequences, who are to begin to reap where he has sown.

It is true we are but a small body; it is true we are but pioneers of the future; that we can never hope to see the organization of that future otherwise, speaking generally, than as he saw it, as an ideal. Yet by virtue of his labours and of his creations we have entered into our inheritance. We are of age—we claim the full possession of that which is ours. I feel that we must work mainly for the future, but I do not therefore feel that we need renounce any part of that which the past has bequeathed to us. We have the consciousness of being the children and the servants of Humanity. We would use in her service all the materials with which she endows us. We would enjoy as her children all the property she has stored up for us. Her existence is one and continuous—a constant struggle to raise herself and increase her possessions; to adapt herself to her home and her home to herself; and whilst we would add in our turn, we feel that we may freely enjoy the results already attained. Our inheritance consists of the great actions that have been done, the great words that have been spoken, the great creations of art in all its forms. Religion, philosophy, art, science, industry, all are put under contribution. So, too, are the various social organizations which men have formed, and in which they have embodied their conceptions of order, of law, and government. We are made free of Humanity, and we pass upwards or downwards in her course by the power of sympathy. Nor does our freedom stand us in less stead with reference to the problems of the present day, and the co-existent branches of the great human family. Our sympathy is in this case limited only by the imperfection of our knowledge. It will increase as our knowledge increases. We are sure that the faith by which we live is sufficient for all our requirements. It has been felt that Catholicism, and still more Protestantism, stand in a difficult relation to the arts and civilizations that preceded them, as also to those which exist at the same time with them, though

distinct from them. The difficulty has been variously met, but never quite got rid of. We feel no such difficulty. In the unity of Humanity we set ourselves clear of it. All previous, all co-existent civilizations are different in form only. We accept all as useful and true in relation to the wants of those who lived or who live under them. We seek to understand and sympathize, not to regret or condemn. We can admit no break. Nay more, we seek to trace out the ideas and feelings which men have clothed so variously, that we may incorporate them so far as we can, for our faith is not new in its elements, but new in its combination of those elements. With the simple worshipper of the Fetish period, we endow the world without us with will and feeling; we do not treat all the beautiful forms around as inert matter, we only refuse them intelligence. But whereas he rested in that belief as sufficient, and assumed that it was an adequate account of the external world, we consciously adopt it, and, after the labour of the scientific intellect is complete, we turn from it and borrow the eye of the poet. With the later worshipper of the gods of polytheism we can also sympathize, and recognize the services of his graceful faith, as the poets of our Western civilization have ever done. The severe conception of the Jewish legislator or the Arabian prophet, their pure monotheism finds no stinted admiration from us, any more than the modification of the former aimed at by early Christianity, or the half polytheistic system of Catholicism. The framework of polity which all the religious lawgivers have constructed on their religion is made to conduce to our teaching.

And we so treat all the past, so seek to combine it, not as a mere intellectual question—for the pleasure of contemplation—glorying in 'the wide thought and the vast hope,' as a species of personal distinction and acquisition. Rather would we share the simplest and the lowest of previous faiths than thus dwell alone in our palace of art, however richly adorned with all forms of beauty, replete with all high associations. No; we seek to sympathize with all, to understand all, to embrace all, in order that we may serve more usefully. The real and the useful, such are the tests to which we bring alike philosophical conceptions and poetic visions—such is the basis on which we build. Men amongst our

fellow-men, we raise our palace towers on the broad foundations of our common Humanity.

Resting on this cordial sympathy with the past, on this dutiful submission to the influence of the dead, we feel no difficulty when we try to penetrate and call up before us the future. Experience teaches us no distrust. On the contrary, it inspires us with full confidence. We are sure that what has been an unbroken progress shall continue to be so, and with this conviction borne in upon us, on the most rational grounds, we cast aside all hesitation. The imagination of the poet, the vision of the prophet, we use them both. And within the limits of man's condition soberly estimated, there is no good of which we do not see the certain fruition. We see wars cease and jarring interests reconciled by virtue of the convergent tendency which we verify in the past history of our race, and not by any fanciful anticipation. We see the human race, conscious of its destination, advancing towards a more complete mastery over itself, its energies, and its circumstances. We see the numerous evils to which we are liable met with more skill where skill is available, with greater resignation where resignation is necessary. We see many of those evils disappear as the natural result of the greater unity of the whole man, which the Religion of Humanity ensures. The forms of European disease are unknown, many of them, to the simple Fetishists of Africa. It seems no mere dream to suppose that the return of mental harmony to the distracted populations, whether of Europe, Asia, or America, may have a like result. The past civilizations have seen the arts cultivated, and productive of fruits which are the heirloom of the race. The civilization of the future, we doubt it not, shall see the same effect on a grander scale, in proportion as the basis on which it rests shall be firmer, and men's sense of possession stronger. True, that for the present the new faith exists but in outline, and appears but meagre in this point of view, when put side by side with its predecessors, Polytheism or Catholicism. This is its necessary condition at its birth. But whilst it adopts, nay, claims as its own the productions of its rivals, it will in due time match them and complete them. Till it does so we enjoy what others enjoy with a better title than theirs, and a more inspiriting hope.

For the present, in which our lot is cast, its consideration is less cheering. We need the strength derived from the other two, and the steadiness of conviction which our view of them is calculated to give. We need, I hesitate not to say it, to live as little as we can in the present, as much as we can in the past and future. Still we must live and act; and, whilst I allow the gloomy character of the present, I feel that our faith can meet it and master it. The more we rise above it, the clearer will be our view of its wants and of our own conduct. We know that, wander and revolt as it may, no generation or succession of generations can withdraw itself from the operation of the fixed laws of our nature. It may not be for us to see how the existing condition of things is leading on to the future of which we are so confident; yet we may be sure that it is so leading, and by an attentive study we shall discern the how. We must not be led astray by the noise and hurry around us, but watch what has preceded us, and be sure that in silence influences are at work which will set matters right. We are freed from all nervous excitement and impatience by this conviction; at the same time I can trace in it no tendency to enfeeble our action. Our great object must be to get a clear conception of the nature and limits of our intervention if it is to be useful, so as to avoid waste of efforts. There is scarcely any feature of the present time in England which is more discouraging than the waste we see going on owing to the want of such a conception and the misunderstanding of the social problems. We can avoid this, and yet find abundant scope for our activity. For whilst we acknowledge the evils and imperfections that exist, and would sound to their very depths the social wants, we avail ourselves to the full also of all remedies that offer, nay, even largely of palliatives; and we feel the real interest which society, however disorganized, can never lose. This follows, of course, from our view of life. This earth is to us our home; its actual inhabitants those whom we are to help, and by whom we are to be helped, more immediately. We feel that, if accepted, our faith can largely minister to the good of mankind. We acquiesce in no despairing abandonment of our position. We acquiesce not in the general *sauve qui peut* cry which I hear loudly preached from the Christian pulpits. We would stand ourselves and

gather others round us, turning the rout into resistance, and resistance into victory. We call on others to do the same, or to confess that they cannot, and, as confessing that, to stand aside whilst we act, guide, and govern.

It will, I hope, be seen from this language, that when I say we ought to live mainly in the past and in the future, I speak in no spirit of quietism, or from any wish to shirk the questions, and difficulties, and duties of the present. If we are to clear ourselves of the present, it is in order that we may serve it better, and gain strength for that service. In another form the language would be accepted by all religious minds. The acts of devotion, prayer, meditation, the Christian sacrament of the Mass or the Lord's Supper, what are they but communion with the invisible—the not present? and what is one great object of them but to enable those who are most careful in performing them to act the better on the visible—the present? We differ not in principle if we modify and enlarge the form. We, too, would live in faith or communion with that which is not seen, whether that communion take the shape of commemoration of benefits received, or of imagination of the future blessings to be conferred by Humanity. As a necessary link in the great chain of these blessings we would exert ourselves with all vigour.

Thus imperfectly I have touched on the main points of our position considered in relation to our direct action. But we can none of us forget that we are in the midst of opponents, and that our bearing towards them is of the greatest practical importance. We cannot hope to escape the fate of all who have broken off from received opinions and the traditional faith of their time or country. In vain we urge that ours is a continuation, a development of the past. It is antagonistic to the present; that is undeniable and enough. Nor, however much we may wish to strip our faith of any aggressive character, can we prevent its being in competition with existing forms of religious belief. Opposition then we must meet, and considerable hostility; and though I cannot wish even not to have the former, nor hope to conciliate the latter, still I would do what lies in me to make our own attitude as inoffensive as possible, and to attract the sympathy of the better amongst our opponents.

In their ranks, and with the same general professions, are to be met men as widely apart in feeling as is conceivable. With some few I know the sympathy I offer will not be rejected, that which I court not be denied me. I feel also that there are many on whose strongest opposition I count who will not lose all kindly feeling. With such I would wish the contest to be of a very simple character. I would say to them—We differ as to means, but in a large degree our end is the same; we would serve our fellow-men, so would you. Where there is misery, or ignorance, or vice, there we both would try our remedies. We, the servants of Humanity, accept and honour your efforts as the servants of Christ; the more truly you serve him, the more thoroughly you mould yourselves into his image, the more keen will be our sympathy and admiration. I speak as one who was once a Protestant to those who are still Protestants. We have in no way lost our sympathy with the Church of our fathers, with the faith taught us in infancy, which guided us in youth and early manhood. Our memory is stored with all holy and gentle associations; we can yet appreciate the attractions of Protestantism, we yet dwell with pleasure on its greater names, on the devotion which it has inspired and still inspires, on the great influence for good which it can yet exercise. We can look on you as unconscious servants of Humanity. We are glad that you should look on us, as I know some have done, as unconscious servants of Christ.

Again, if you are, either by birth or by change, members of the Catholic Church, our language need not essentially alter, whilst in one respect our sympathy is quickened. For of all the steps by which the race has advanced, on none do we linger with more respectful and enthusiastic admiration than on mediæval Catholicism, on the church of the Gregorys, the Innocents, the Bernards. None of the transitional forms of spiritual organization has conferred greater services on Humanity. We study the traditions of your Papacy, and we seek to adopt them into our system. To Catholicism we owe the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal power, the great cardinal principle of all right social organization. To Catholicism, in combination with Feudalism, we owe the worship of the Virgin, in which creation we find a more perfect

anticipation of our Divine Humanity than in the God-Man of early and northern Christianity. Our debt is deep to your Church, and we freely admit it.

Or take another and not uncommon case, and suppose that the opponents, such as I am dealing with, have wandered from all the paths which have hitherto been accepted, but feel it impossible to acquiesce in the new one we offer. Again we have no difficulty. We have many of us been in the same condition—we have passed through a stage of negation, and can sympathize with those who remain in it. Your efforts to attain something more satisfactory are such as ours were; your labour to do good in your generation in spite of your negative state is inspired by the same spirit which we wished to direct our own. To all such, whether Protestant or Catholic, or neither, we can say indifferently—Let the only question be which shall work most efficiently in the cause which he considers the right one. You may not accept our aid, we will give it unaccepted and unsought. As your dangers thicken round you, you may adopt a different spirit, and welcome those whom you now reject. Come when it may, we shall be ready to meet such a change. Even now we would organize a league between all who feel the evils of our time, its social anarchy, its religious negation. If you say you cannot join us, that to you our remedy is a worse evil than the actual state, we shall none the less feel that there is such a league, though its existence be unrecognized by you; and we shall be glad when you are ready on your side to recognize it. It were well if that time were come.

With the large mass of our opponents those whom I have been addressing have almost as little in common as they have with us. Nominally they have the same cause, but their spirit is widely different. They profess the same belief, but with the one it is the guiding principle of their lives, on the other it has no visible effects. Here will be the worst hostility. We cannot hope to disarm it. Suspicion, reproach, cold friendship, and zealous enmity—such was the treatment Arnold taught us to expect whilst Christian, and his teaching was the legitimate result of his experience. We can hardly drink a more bitter cup than he drank. We may count even more surely on the same in our new faith. We can only submit in patience,

calling on our adversaries to make it clear by their conduct that they really value the faith which they profess. We can urge on them to act up to it, or not to attack us if they do not. But at the best we must bear their enmity as we may; the less easily as we feel that those who show it have no warrant either intellectual or moral.

Generally with regard to all opponents of whatever creed and whatever conduct, our attitude must be respectful and patient. And, widening our view so as to take in all who are not with us, we must seek to act on them in as sympathetic a spirit as possible. *Inflexible in principle, conciliating in action* —such is our rule, as we know. But few will join us at present. Yet we are in contact with many. Whilst firmly asserting our own faith and rules of practice, and heartily trying to make our life accordant with them, we may treat all others around us, be their faith or practice what it may, with respect; they are men with human sympathies and under strong temptations, and with but slight aids to withstand them. Let us seek, then, to take them at the point we find them, understand that, and without impatience try to urge them on from that point, not too abruptly severing them from their past. Where they express a want for what we can offer, there we freely offer it; where they do not, let us act on their present condition as we best may, here a little and there a little. Our business is, in fact, to convert where we can, but to serve all, whether they join us or no. And this the character of our faith enables us to do without any compromise or duplicity.

For myself, I have been met, as a general rule, in a spirit which I can hardly think generous, even when I have not been attacked with personal abuse. I can promise my assailants that I will never fight them with their own weapons. I can promise them that no attack shall ever draw from me a direct answer, but that each one, when worth considering, shall lead me more carefully to examine my own position, and to endeavour to set it forth more clearly and convincingly to others. Each attack shall, in fact, be a stimulus to renewed exertion, so long as I am capable of exertion. When I believed and preached the faith of Christ, I gave no reluctant or timid service. This I may confidently say. When later I doubted that faith, yet

had accepted no other, when, therefore, whatever work I could do could be done only in the general faith that what was good, and true, and beautiful would ultimately be clear, I say with equal confidence that whilst I regret many things I said and did, yet my service was in spirit at least not grudgingly given, that where I saw my way I spoke and acted uncompromisingly. In the new period of my life on which I have entered, and so long as it shall last; in the new religion which I preach with the most cordial assent and the fullest satisfaction—satisfaction for whatever energies, or intellect, or feelings are left me—I feel that my service will be only different in form, the same in spirit. As I look back on my work, and such writings as I have published, I cannot but think that my adversaries have been mistaken in their tactics; that a less personal warfare would have been wiser. To that I now invite them. The contest will, I foresee, be hot enough. So long as men are merely negative they are tolerated, or meet with secret sympathy; but when the work of reconstruction begins, when we offer something positive as a basis, the character of the struggle changes, and it will be war to the knife. I shrink not from such war, but it is the interest of all parties to strip it as far as is practicable of its evil features. In the cause to which I have devoted myself I would fight with all possible courtesy.

Thoughts crowd in on me on an occasion like the present. I cannot express all. I have endeavoured to give a general idea of our faith, its origin, its founder, the position of its disciples in England, viewed in itself and in reference to their opponents. Other subjects must be reserved for other similar occasions, or for utterance in other ways. I would end to-day by a return to the point from which I set out. I would return to him whose birth we commemorate; to him and to her whose love he so highly valued, to whose influence he attributed such a powerful modification of his work. Each separate part of this discourse should but make us feel more profound gratitude for the joint services of these great benefactors of their race; gratitude to him who set forth Humanity to man, gratitude to her who supported him by her affection, and, as I said above, revealed him to himself. As time passes their names shall brighten: we can but anticipate by imagination the benefits of their services to our posterity, and the

fulness of its gratitude. In the present sense of the benefits gained, in the enjoyment of the regeneration of which we see but the faint beginnings, that posterity will seek and find an adequate expression for that gratitude. At the close of the long preparation of our race, at the commencement of the new era, surrounded by the great who preceded them, and who shall have followed them, in high pre-eminence will stand the pair from whom we date the foundation of our religion—Clotilde de Vaux and Auguste Comte. Nor may we separate those whom he has associated—the two who with Madame de Vaux are commemorated on the tomb in which for a time he rests—his mother, and his adopted daughter. The first we know but through him, but his grateful and reverent remembrance is sufficient to ensure our honour. The second some of us are privileged to know, and are enabled to appreciate the singular beauty of her lofty yet self-denying and humble love to him, and not to him only, but towards all who share his faith.

In conclusion, I turn from her chosen servants and organs to Humanity, the power whom we serve, in whose name we are met to-day. We repeat our acknowledgment that we owe to her whatever we are; we repeat our resolution to consecrate to her cause all our powers. This is our reasonable service, and in the discharge of it we have great encouragement. We pray that we may not be found wanting, each in his several station—each according to his opportunities soundly estimated. We pray that we may feel the influence of the holy faith we preach; that we may be led by it to all good in thought, word, and deed; that we may discipline ourselves—our heart, our intellect, our character—not suffering ourselves to commit the common error, and neglect ourselves and our own change into good whilst we are endeavouring to reform others; but fully sensible that efforts upon others are but hypocrisy unless accompanied by constant efforts on ourselves. So may we grow purer, and gentler, and more loving, at the same time that we grow wiser, and firmer, and more enduring! So shall we modify, even where we do not win.

In communion with the illustrious dead, and still more living communion with those whom we have ourselves known and loved, in sympathy with all men and the world without

us, in loving obedience and resignation to the laws of our own nature and of that outer world, in loving acceptance of our destiny, we may feel, and think, and act, we may find peace ourselves and do useful service to others.

May the blessing of Humanity be with you all!

Moses 19, 71 (*January* 19, 1859).

THE PROPAGATION OF THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY.

A SERMON.

IN its temperate advance, the Religion of Humanity will gradually develope, to meet its wants, adequate liturgical forms. Meanwhile, I give greater fulness than I gave last year to the introduction.

Each one of us must instinctively think of Mrs. Edger, whose presence last year brought us into such immediate connection with our American brethren. This natural feeling will suffice to call up our sympathy for them in their struggles and sufferings, and in the act of worship which they, equally with ourselves, will this day celebrate. Only on this special ground should I have mentioned them before our common centre in Paris, with which we would both be in the closest communion. And not such centres only of our religion, but all its scattered disciples, wherever their lot may be cast, claim our thoughts. In proportion as they stand alone, apart from the strength which results from the communication of feeling, and thought, and action, the stronger is their claim on us who are, in this respect, more fortunate.

Nor, as disciples of the Religion of Humanity, would we limit our sympathies to those who are at one with us. Rather let us extend them as freely as possible. Let us take in all those—a small number it may be as yet, but a number gradually increasing—who, whilst they do not accept our faith, or accept it only partially, whilst, consequently, they stand aloof from our organization, yet, so far as it is an organization, have a kindly feeling towards it, and fully share in the aspirations of which the faith is the definite expression. Servants of no other form of religion acknowledged among men, they would

serve Humanity in their generation, and stand aloof lest the free service they give should be fettered or impaired.

Again, let us include in our sympathy all true members of the faith which we once shared; all, whether Catholic or Protestant, who evidence by their lives and conduct their real belief in the religion they profess.

Still wider may be the range we take. Not with Christians only would we sympathize; but with all, in all countries, be their form of creed what it may, who, in a pure and unselfish spirit, are serving, not themselves, but their fellow-creatures. Monotheist, Polytheist, Fetishist, we know no difference. The bond of our common humanity effaces all lesser distinctions.

Nor need we confine ourselves to man under his religious aspect: his social and political organizations may be included. Narrower and more temporary, they yet are the centres about which human feeling and action largely group themselves, and as such cannot be indifferent. By the title which suffering gives to precedence, we may name, as first in their claim of our European compeers, the oppressed nationalities, Italian, Hungarian, or Polish. From them we proceed to the great kingdoms which, together with our own, are constituents of the troubled and restless Western World. The empires of Eastern Europe and Asia, with their several adjuncts; the tribes of Polynesia and Africa; none should be omitted on this the Festival of Humanity.

Lastly, to the whole human race—to man, wherever he is found—we add in our sympathy the animals who, through the long generations of his existence on earth, have been his helpers and companions, willing and glad co-operators in his efforts.

Something more is left. The present of Humanity must not absorb us, nor even Humanity herself. The grateful task of commemoration calls up the memory of the past, of the large amount of benefits of which we are the inheritors, and which we should transmit increased to our successors.

We recall with gratitude the services which have been hitherto unconsciously received from her coeval institution, Space—services of which we now consciously avail ourselves.

We commemorate the services of our common mother the

Earth, the planet which is our home, and the orbs which form, with her, the Solar System.

We commemorate the services of Humanity, the great organism of which we are inseparable parts; those, too, of all the generations of her individual organs who have by their efforts made us what we are. Reverently and thankfully we commemorate the dead, without exception, as having all aided in the work; but with more especial honour the dead to whom we are each in particular bound; and those who, by their eminent services, have become the common property of the race.

So we end this commemoration, as we should end it to-day, with a special acknowledgment to Humanity for the benefits conferred on all subsequent generations by her greatest servant, Auguste Comte, and we include with him, in this acknowledgment, those whose memories he wished ever associated with his own, his three guardian angels. May his memory be present with us now and through our whole life, guiding and encouraging us, teaching us what our service should be, and helping us to perform it with an ever-brightening devotion!

The past year has brought no marked change in the position of our cause, either as regards our own numbers or the light in which we are viewed by others. Still there has been an advance. If, in some cases, hopes that have been raised have been disappointed, there have been in compensation evidences given of sympathies which may lead to more or less co-operation. And the quarters from which such evidences have proceeded have been so remote one from the other, so little likely to be portions of any common movement, as to raise the encouraging feeling that the want which we come forward to supply is making itself more widely felt, and that what we offer is found not unacceptable to minds under many various conditions. I speak, of course, solely with reference to that branch of our Church which exists in the United Kingdom. If we extend our view, and take in the American Church, I think, from Mr. Edger's accounts, after all allowance is made for the depressing influences of personal suffering and straitened circumstances, we may augur well of its prospects from what has occurred during the interval since we last met.

The state of society in which he is working is more favourable to the spread of a new doctrine than our own, as there is less inert resistance to be overcome.

I know not that in the notices of us by others, so far as I have seen them, there is anything which calls for remark. We have not yet reached that stage—I speak with reference to the remarks I have seen, be it remembered—at which men think it necessary to understand and quote correctly that which they attack. What may be the danger to be apprehended from carefully considered and candid attacks, I can hardly estimate; at present, the only point of view from which I have had to judge any comments on our system, is their value as an advertisement.

Our action in England during the past year has been very small. A protest, which I thought it right to issue, in the form of a placard, against the unseemly Thanksgiving of the 1st of May, 1859, and a short letter addressed to the workmen engaged in the Builders' strike—these are all the steps that have been taken. As you are aware, this comparative inaction has been inevitable.

We meet, then, as we met last year, few in number and with no exciting progress to record, but with unshaken confidence in the goodness and destiny of our cause, and with a strengthened conviction of its necessity. The year 1859, not less, but more, troubled than its predecessors, leaves, as an inheritance to 1860, a series of complications which admit of no easy solution—complications not limited to one order of questions. On the contrary, they affect all orders—political, social, moral, and religious—on all equally are there difficulties. The relations of the maritime Powers of the West with China—the relations of the different Powers of Western Europe with Italy—the deeper and more important question of the relations between workman and capitalist—these are but the more prominent of the long list. Were they the whole, they were enough to show the amount of disorganization which exists, and the urgent need of some remedy.

On these three points I can here touch but in the most general way. If I can, I hope shortly to speak more fully on two of the three—on China, that is, and on the Labour Question. Meanwhile, I may avail myself of this opportunity to

show what is the teaching of the Religion of Humanity with reference to them all.

The Italian difficulty is but one of many questions of a similar order—the questions, I mean, which concern the gradual disappearance of the old order of Europe, the gradual substitution of the new. The wisdom and unwisdom of the past have handed down a complicated system, the disruption and re-arrangement of which require for their peaceable and effective operation a change of feelings and opinions. Hence the paramount importance which Positivists attach to peace, as affording the desirable atmosphere in which such change may be prepared and wrought. We seek to create an opinion through Europe which shall supersede the clumsy and inefficient machinery of war, and shall render it impossible for any one member of the European States system to oppress another. So strong would be the voice of moral reprobation to which the powers of the earth are becoming more and more amenable. We seek further to implant in the minds of men a belief and practice before which the time-honoured, but worn-out, system of Catholicism shall fade away, and the Papacy therefore be no longer a difficulty either in the temporal or spiritual order. During the process of this long change, or at any rate in its earlier stages, we must stand by and watch the efforts of statesmen and diplomatists with such acquiescence and satisfaction as we may. For we cannot but feel that the wisest solution they can offer is a compromise pregnant with future difficulties, their largest hope a temporary calm.

I offer no examination in detail of the question of China. I might abstain from any explicit opinion on the character of the Anglo-French action. I might, that is, leave such opinion to be gathered as an inference. But, with the perfect openness which should characterize our teaching, I hesitate not to condemn, in the name of Humanity, our whole policy with regard to that great Eastern civilization; and not least, the last disgraceful act in that policy, the conduct of our ambassadors, which has led to the expedition now in contemplation. The grounds for such condemnation I shall give in detail elsewhere. Here I may say, and of course more especially with reference to England, that, whilst we have been jealous of the

honour of our flag, we have been neglectful of our true honour, commercial or national. We have pressed to the uttermost our rights, our extorted rights ; we have thought but little of our duties. Hence, in presence of the largest and oldest organization under which the human race has found an adequate shelter, our attitude, in the blind pursuit of gain from any source, is that of mere destructive agents, incapable of sympathy, too overweening to feel respect. We assume the tone of superior wisdom and morality, when we are really believers in nothing but brute force, and when we acknowledge no commercial restriction but the absence of demand. The conduct we havd pursued internationally is but the symptom of a graver evil, and as such I note it here—the graver evil of the low national morality which identifies the cause of human civilization with the basest commercial interests, which puts forward the interests of England, its interests in the narrowest and most isolated sense, as the predominant, I might say the sole, consideration, whilst it ignores the obligations that rest upon our country as a member of the human race.

I know that other and higher interests are pleaded ; but, with the facts before me, I content myself with saying that I look on them as the flimsiest pretexts to varnish over our cause, so far as they are pleaded by the real actors ; as a mere bait held out for the support of those who are led by the peculiar views of their religion to swallow such bait without any over-nice inquiry. I abstain from pressing against Christianity the degrading service to which some of its existing professors are yoking it as a sanction for violent injustice.

The relations between labour and capital, the position of the working classes of Europe (for the question is quite European) in respect of the social order with which they are connected, but of which they do not in any proper sense form a part, are by far the most difficult of the three points selected. It is a question which, ever recurring and to recur, has this last year assumed a greater prominence than previously ; anything, however, but an undue prominence. For in its full aspects it is, of all social questions, the most fundamental and most important, the one therefore which demands the most careful study and boldest handling from the preachers of the Religion of Humanity. As that religion accepts as its chief social mission the

incorporation into the framework of society of the proletariate, or working classes, the raising them to the full citizenship from which they are undeniably at present excluded, it cannot hesitate to accept as in substance legitimate their objections to their present condition. It cannot hesitate to sanction any peaceful movement for the raising themselves from that condition. It cannot hesitate to sanction all fair bonds of union among themselves which are essential to the success of such peaceful movement. In this sense it legitimates their actual societies and the action of such societies; it reprobates any attempt to put an end to them by an undue exertion of the concentrated power of capital. In this sense, too, it holds legitimate the actual demand on which the strike took place—the diminution of the hours of labour; for due leisure is essential, as Aristotle saw, to the full citizenship which is the end to be attained.

Beyond this I need not enter on details. Here, again, the moral and religious question is the real one; the social one only superficial. With the rarest possible exceptions, as far as I am aware, the clergy of all denominations stand aloof, the better not thinking such questions within their province, the more ordinary sympathizing with their class; both alike, as a general rule, satisfying themselves with the existing economical doctrines. Here and there a voice has been raised, but almost invariably on the side of the capitalist, whether the speaker has been himself a capitalist or not.

In the moral aspect of the question I may express my disgust at the one-sided language that has been used. With such writings as I have read we have this in common, that we would bring home to the workman the consciousness that he exercises a social function, that he plays a part in the economy of society which he may not withhold. But I do not see any evidence that the workman forgets this. I use general language, be it remembered; and remembering this, it is surely true that the working classes in England have not been the classes in which social feeling has been dead, or the discharge of their social functions weak and uncertain. I use equally general and equally true language when I say that with the capitalist class rests the real blame for the evils that are patent. To their immoral and unsocial action is it owing that there is, not an occasional—that I consider inevitable in human society

—but a permanent disruption between themselves and those they employ. The whole conception of the capitalists is erroneous. They have got their money, is their language, and they may employ it as they like. They do not as yet consider themselves as holding their wealth in trust. Capital is the result of the industry and accumulations of past generations. It is a social possession. Let them treat it as such. Let them look to it that they take not from the common social store to spend on their own luxury and enjoyment a grossly disproportionate share. We urge no narrow views on such a matter, no oppressive regulations. We leave it to the capitalist, on his own moral responsibility, to take such amount as he deems sufficient; but we assert our competence to blame him if he takes an undue share.

But this is only the negative side. If a kingdom is ill at ease, all Englishmen blame the government, unless it be their own; if an army is disorganized, we blame the general; if a ship's crew is mutinous, the presumption is against the captain. Carry on the reasoning. If the industrial organization is out of joint, the fair presumption is that the leaders, the officers, are to blame, and that to a change in their action we must look for the remedy. Let them once accept the view that they hold an analogous position to the leaders of any other organization, and the duties which follow from such a view would become clear to them, and would be accepted in many instances and faithfully discharged, as here and there even now they are. They would look less to enjoyment, and more to the right discharge of their duty. It would be a nobler, if in some senses a harder, task. None more than we should honour the capitalists who accepted this position.

I have been the less reluctant to introduce these subjects, because their introduction offers a contrast between the preaching of the Positive Ministry and that of the Christian. From the Christian pulpit, with rare exceptions, such subjects are excluded. The clergy differ on these themselves, having, as a general rule, no definite principles of historical and political science on which to rest their judgment. And were they agreed among themselves, their hearers are at variance. Arnold invited the English clergy to take up social and political subjects. They have never listened to the invitation. And they have done wisely in a sense; they have obeyed

a sound instinct, for their congregations would not tolerate it. I can imagine no move more fatal to the already somewhat worn machinery of the English Church than the introduction into sermons of real every-day interests. Even within the limits of what are deemed proper topics for the Christian preacher we have seen, and are seeing still, the shock given to the stability of the institution by the change in tone on certain trivial subjects adopted by some as more calculated to meet the wants of the day.

In lively contrast to this—a contrast each year, probably, more and more marked—will stand out the preaching of Positivism. Coming forward to claim the direction of this world, we feel alien to none of its interests. The questions which agitate it and divide it are exactly those which we have to study, and on which we have to judge.

But apart from any secondary reason for their introduction, the three questions are a sufficient indication of the disordered state of human affairs, of the need of a reconstruction. The older organizations, religious, political, or industrial, are shown to be inefficient. Is a new one attainable? This is a question which most answer in the negative. We think differently, and seek to organize a systematic intervention, in obedience to the observed laws of human nature, whether considered in the individual or the society.

The organization we offer is simple. It wears at present a provisional character, the necessary result of the premature death of our founder. But this provisional character in no way impairs the efficiency of its action. The consecrations it gives are definitive.

Our centre is at Paris; and the direction is vested in one man, in conformity with the Positivist doctrine of concentration of power. He acts on his own responsibility, advising as he sees fit with the small body of those named by Auguste Comte as qualified in due time, and on the fulfilment of certain conditions, to become Priests of Humanity. Subordinate to this central direction, there are at present two centres—one in England, one in America. The other Positivists are scattered, but may at any time form themselves into centres of action, as circumstances admit or require. All are connected by the community of faith and practice. The sole material bond is

subscription to the Positivist fund, which every Positivist should feel to be an obligation. The smallest amount which for England seems desirable is a penny a week. Anything beyond this is left to each one to settle for himself, on his own free judgment as to his means.

The objects of this subscription are, in the first place, the accomplishment of certain duties left us by the will of Auguste Comte. These discharged, the one great object is indicated by the epithet the fund bears—*Sacerdotal.* It is to aid in the formation and maintenance of a body of priests, who shall, when formed and maintained, be charged with the duty of education—an education open to all classes and both sexes—an education in all cases equally gratuitous. Wherever Positivism forms a centre, this is the one highest object it sets before itself. For we aim at changing the opinions and feelings of men, and, through this change, at modifying their action; and the only possible way of effecting this change, so that it shall be solid and permanent, is through education. In France this educational movement is already inaugurated. In England we must wait. But, whilst waiting, we need not be wholly inactive; and such means as occasional publications on points of general interest, and preparatory lectures, are open to us. I hope before long to enter on a course of such lectures; such a course as at present is possible, under the pressure of the work of preparation.

But we need not wait for a body of teachers to begin, though for the full efficiency of the system a body will be requisite. The teaching may commence whenever there is one qualified teacher. A minor, yet important, point is a place in which to lecture for the present, to teach and preach when the time shall be come. For, as each year passes, it is more and more important to assert the complete independence of our position, and to make it clear to others. As, however, this is at present unattainable, with the full concurrence of M. Laffitte I sacrifice the unessential to the essential, and shall lecture wherever I can conveniently.

Such, then, is our mode of working, such the machinery we set in motion. To the superficial observer it may seem feeble; but its weakness or strength does not depend on any numerical estimate; it depends on the coherence and strength of the

doctrine it represents, and on the capacities for expansion it possesses. It must be able to meet each want as it occurs. On neither point do I feel the least doubt. And therefore it is that I feel no discouragement at our actual numerical weakness. We are in this obeying the general law of all great religious movements. The one teacher and founder—the few disciples venturing in face of opposition to gather round him—the spread to large numbers—such have been the phenomena of each successive Religious innovation as it has arisen to modify the faith, and worship, and life of mankind. Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Mahometanism—I know no execption within the limits of recorded history. Nor has any previous experience warranted the expectation of a very rapid spread in the early period of our religion. Looking at the general rate of movement in all social and religious matters, I incline more and more to the belief that the Religion of Humanity will spread more quickly than the previous faiths, which have been imperfect foreshadowings of it. The time is as ripe for an universal religion as the Græco-Roman world was for the limited form which was in a measure adapted to its wants, and which has never succeeded in really passing its limits. And the sense of the hollowness of existing forms of belief is as prevalent as it was in those regions which so rapidly adopted the faith of Mahomet.

Such, on the most general view, would be the judgment I should form. Narrowing the field, and coming to a closer inspection of our position, viewed as a system of religious propagation within the limits of the Western World—that world with which alone we are in actual contact, and must for a long time continue to be, postponing all direct efforts at a wider missionary action—what shall we say of the forces arrayed against us, a sober estimate of which is desirable? Such an estimate shows abundant difficulty. It has no tendency to despair.

The one great obstacle in the present state of Europe and America is the negative one, the power with which we, in common with all renovators, come into collision, the inertia of society, the conservative clinging to what is, the *primâ facie* objection to anything new. This force has its side which claims sympa hy and respect, as it has its contemptible side. The bases of every social and religious organization have taken too

much time in the laying, and have involved too great an amount of human sacrifice and exertion, to make it desirable that they should be easily shaken at the first appearance of a new doctrine. Such a doctrine must make good by a certain probation its claim to supersede that which is received. Conciliatory and sympathetic as our doctrine is, respectful to the old whose relative value it freely recognizes, whose large admixture of truth it gladly incorporates, between whom and itself it would avoid any discontinuity, any abrupt severance; grooving as it does the new in the old—still nothing can obscure the essential fact that it does claim to supersede the old, to superimpose itself as predominant in the first instance, finally to replace the old. Hence naturally the resistance of the old, the attempt at self-assertion, the vehement hostility against us, the galvanic efforts to revive itself which we are now witnessing.

I have no wish to under-estimate the one great power I have been alluding to. It is so great, that it requires some faith to look it in the face and feel that we can conquer it. But we remember for our comfort that all previous movements, however partial, have had the same enemy to contend with, have in each case met it in faith, and have in each case overcome it. We feel sure that we shall do the same; and we proceed to estimate the more positive forces arrayed in opposition to the faith we preach. We must not over-rate our own strength—no illusion would be so fatal. But we must not over-rate, either, the strength against us. In our own weakness lies the obstacle to our success, not in the strength of our opponents.

The more I examine the motley and discordant array against us, the more do I feel its essential feebleness. Its subdivisions are endless. But, waiving these for the time, there is the division of our opponents into those who believe in Christianity and those who do not. From this point of view there is an approximate bisection of the English world—an inconvenient, unpleasant aspect of the truth which established Christianity would gladly keep out of sight, and which the unbelieving portion, especially among the higher classes, does not care to press, as from social motives it dreads any disturbance of the existing order. Turning to those who believe,

they are divided, and most unequally divided, as they must in sorrow confess, into those who accept Christianity, with a belief really worthy of the name, as the principle of their life and conduct, and those with whom it is a mere profession—scarcely a belief, in no sense a faith. Put this largest portion aside, and scan the more formidable body, the real servants of Christ; listen to the sounds that issue from their camp; read the writings in which the leaders of the several sections of the Christian world embody their system of religious doctrine, their methods of religious action and teaching—the result of such study may well encourage us if we wish to be convinced of their weakness, their necessary weakness, as divided.

Or turn to the scientific and literary world, to whose protestations of conformity none attach much importance, aware, as all thinking men are, how deeply its belief is a negation. There is no union there. On the contrary, they are of opinion that all union is unadvisable. They have systematized disunion. If any among them turn their attention on social subjects as one branch of science or literature, they offer nothing better than the rest. If I were to say what I think the most favourable event for the cause we advocate of the last year, in reference to this branch of our opponents, I should select the work of their most eminent name, Mr. J. S. Mill, whose work on Liberty is the very apocalypse of social despair.

Such is my estimate of our own organization—such the judgment I form of anything that can be called an organization against us. We advance, then, in all confidence; we seek to give greater extension and efficiency to the work of propagation. Our first object is to bring it to bear as effectively as possible where there is nothing to resist us, the weakest part of those against us, or outside us—on the large mass in whom no definite faith exists. We leave all firmly rooted faith to stand as much as we can. Our work must be essentially constructive, organic—never purely negative. It is important therefore that, in touching on questions as they arise, we should not sacrifice to the desire of immediate success. The views we put forward should harmonize thoroughly with the general principles of our faith, even when by so doing they appear too widely divergent from the actual and pressing want. We sow for the long future, and, doing so, are obliged

at times to discard appeals which might ensure a more rapid acceptance.

In treating of the propagation of any religious faith, there are always two points of view from which we may consider it. The systematic organized propagation is one thing, essential, valuable in the highest degree. But the unsystematic, individual propagation, is another: the constant, silent influence that spreads from the disciples of a religion over all those with whom they are brought into contact. This is for us, in the recognized interval and abeyance as to some of our modes of action, really the more important to consider. This, then, is the subject of the rest of what I say.

I dwelt last year on the attitude we assume towards all without, whether friendly or hostile, whether believers in some definite system, or disbelievers in any, whether religious in feeling and tendencies, or the contrary. This year I would turn more to the question of our own intrinsic action, viewed each one of us as media of communicating the impulse we have ourselves received.

Our religion claims to be complete and universal, complete in that it embraces the whole nature of man—physical, intellectual, and moral; universal, in that it embraces all men. It is more in our power to evidence the first of these two characteristics than the last. Time alone can decide on its claim to catholicity or universality. But now, in the present, its completeness may be made manifest. For each of us it is an ideal of difficult attainment so to manifest it. Yet it is the ideal which we set before us, and towards which in our measure we must unceasingly strive, in the spirit of social devotion, not in that of mere self-perfection. The constant presence of a social aim is necessary at once to sustain and regulate our efforts in self-improvement, and to preserve them from a certain tendency to self-worship.

We seek, then, to improve our whole nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, as servants of Humanity, and with a view to the propagation of our faith. Seeking this, no part of our existence is insignificant. We adopt all practices that tend to promote our bodily health—careful cleanliness, rigid moderation in diet—in order that we may be the better instruments, as well as on other social grounds. We train ourselves

in all intellectual strength, for we are aware of the immense power of the intellect when under due control. We 'make our moral being our prime care,' because in that we find the one permanent end of life for the individual, the one means of spreading our religion, which is universally applicable.

Undoubtedly it is in one sense a laborious existence that we set before us. But we have not been trained by any teachers to look on life as an easy matter. In this respect the contemplation of the past has a strengthening effect as in so many others. We inherit the results of long generations of suffering toil—why should we refuse to take our place in the onward march? Our fathers have worked for us; we work for our children. On the earliest stages of man's existence we may look back with comparative satisfaction. For apart from the creations of the poets, we may well believe that there was a period of lower, it may be, such as we in our pride should spurn, yet of simpler enjoyment and fresher sympathies. Closing this period and consolidating its results, yet introducing at the same time ideas and institutions which complicated and disturbed the intellectual and social being of man, stand the great theocracies, under whose sway the existence of large portions of mankind was organized on some very tolerable basis. But these two phases past, on the subsequent three thousand years of restless movement there hangs a shadow of sadness. They call on us for what Mr. Helps speaks of, if I remember right, as an infinite pity for all that they underwent in handing down to us the materials which we enjoy, and with which we work. I know not whether, in the brighter future which we confidently anticipate for our race, the memory of this previous suffering will ever be wholly lost; whether man, even in that his high festival time, will not, as Prometheus in the banquet hall of the gods, bear traces, though faded, yet still traces of his ancient pain—

Extenuata gerens veteris vestigia pœnæ.

Be this as it may, a deep and ever increasing sympathy with the past will be one of the feelings most encouraged by the Positive religion; teaching, as it does, the constant predominant influence of the dead over the living. This is unfortunately one of the feelings most dead at present. But in the

power, at present, of such sympathy we need not take the past merely in its sadder aspect. Its exertions, its hopes, its success, all are equally calculated to stimulate and to cheer us. It is by no means one unbroken record of waste and suffering, even during the period I mentioned above as marking the transition, in the Positive view of history, between the original theocratic organization and the new organization under the reign of Humanity. So little so, that in all periods men have found encouragement from the study of the past; though from want of any consistent view different minds have chosen wholly different periods on which to dwell with pleasure, making the one chosen exclude all the others. This deficiency we hope to remedy, and, by grouping all previous history in an orderly system, to draw from each part of that system its appropriate encouragement, moulding the whole in harmony. Such is our use of the past. The future offers us not less of excitement to exertion, to effort over ourselves, in the service of others. What has been done is sufficient guarantee that what we do in our time shall not be without effect. And whilst we with the Christian Apostle recognize the superiority of love over faith and hope, we do not any more than he discard the two subordinate. We accept the consolations, the confidence they give us.

Yet we deal with no utopia. We recognize the fact that do what we will, make ourselves what we will, neither by action nor by being can we escape the rigorous laws of our condition—the severe fatalities of human life. At the best, when all is done, that life remains subject to sorrow, we ourselves subject to the constant consciousness of a poor and imperfect result, or at least with so much imperfection as at times to seem scarcely worth the effort we make. And I see not that under any future arrangement this character can be wholly lost. In this fact lies very much of the strength of existing religious feeling. In our weakness we are prone to carve out a future exempt from the harsher laws which now govern us.

We, who allow no such consideration, who, without denying such a future, cannot take it into account, must find elsewhere an equivalent for the support its contemplation gives, or is thought to give. I think such an equivalent not difficult to find. We have it ready to our hand. I see really

no need of any illusions to support us. In the principle of all action for the disciples of our religion—sacrifice of self for the good of others, embodied in the great formula of Positive morality, *Live for others*—I find the one all-powerful compensation at once for the evils of our condition, and for the hopes we renounce.

> Unless above himself he can
> Erect himself, how poor a thing is man

The difficulties which surround us must become the materials which we use to rise above them. We may not absolutely free ourselves from the sense of incompletion; we may do so sufficiently to be able to work on in the consciousness at once of a noble resignation and a noble activity. We ought to be strong enough not to want more than this. We should be strong enough were it not mainly for the long weakening produced by the monotheistic doctrine of a future life, with its complementary doctrine of rewards and punishments, debasing our religious aspirations into a calculation of consequences.

I have made, I feel sure, sufficient allowance for the need of resignation, for the more depreciating view of human existence. I am bound to add, that the power we have of modifying it is really very great, the power of modifying its external conditions, as well as that of so modifying ourselves as to make these external conditions, even when apparently harshest, minister to our advance. A systematic exertion of this power has never yet been made. The results of such an exertion are therefore difficult to calculate. Two very opposite schools meet in objecting to any such systematic effort. The religious school thinks it wrong to take the direction of human affairs out of the hands in which it has hitherto been placed. The scientific school objects that we have gone on instinctively adapting ourselves to our position, and that it were better to continue in the same path, not to develope the instinct into consciousness. To the first we answer, that we do not accept the fact implied in their statement, and that we reject the inference based on that fact. To the second we say, that whilst we allow what they urge to be true for the past, we see no reason for its continuance in the present; that we are confident that systematic action is both sound in principle and fruitful in result. For we feel that

when the restless activity of man shall turn from the conquest over matter, in which at the present day we take so much pride, to the nobler task of guiding and controlling his own proper world, the future of the race will justify the faith, which we now seem overbold in advocating in the teeth of so much opposition, the faith that man can be a providence to himself, in a more practical and beneficial sense than any of the various providences he created in his earlier existence; that Humanity will be found the real, God but the imagined source of the blessings hitherto attained, or in the future attainable, and as such source the legitimate object of our gratitude, our love, and our devotion; in other words, the legitimate object of our Worship, in the Positive sense of that term, when freed from theological associations.

Moses 19, 72 (*January* 19, 1860.)

CULTE DES MORTS.

L'Amour pour principe
Et l'Ordre pour base;
Le Progrès pour but.

AU NOM DE L'HUMANITÉ.

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,—Maniant une langue qui n'est pas la mienne, je réclame toute votre indulgence. J'ai tâché de me faire comprendre ; pour le reste je n'ai eu ni le loisir ni le calme d'esprit qu'exigeait la rédaction d'un tel discours. Lorsque j'ai accepté la délégation que m'a offerte M. Laffitte, notre directeur, j'étais bien loin de prévoir ce qui nous est arrivé.

Le but principal de cette réunion reste toujours le même. Nous nous réunissons pour nous rappeler et pour honorer la mémoire de notre Maître, le Fondateur de la Religion universelle. Nous venons faire un acte spécial de la grande institution du Culte des morts, institution ébauchée déjà par d'autres religions, mais que le Positivisme adopte, agrandit, perfectionne et met en harmonie avec l'ensemble de notre vie. C'est un acte spécial, mais il sera toujours l'acte le plus solennel, le résumé le plus complet de ce Culte, l'acte auquel se rattacheront, comme à leur centre, tous les autres Révélateurs de l'Humanité ; sa mémoire résume celle de tous ses serviteurs, tant involontaires que volontaires. En commémorant sa mort, la même liaison se fait sentir sans que nous puissions nous en dispenser. Culte, dogme ou régime, perfectionnement individuel ou organisation collective, tout se rapportera à lui, pour tous ceux qui adorent simplement et directement l'Humanité. Il restera, pendant l'existence humaine, la grande figure centrale qui domine toutes les autres et les rapproche.

Cinq années se sont écoulées depuis la mort d'Auguste Comte, et il n'en est guère une seule qui n'ait été marquée par la disparition de quelques-uns de ses disciples et de nos confrères. Déjà, lors de sa première commémoration, il y avait

d'autres souvenirs que le sien pour le Positivisme. Non-seulement l'image qu'évoquait son nom était compliquée par celle des nobles femmes qu'il avait associées à sa mémoire, mais il y avait entre nous et la série des bienfaiteurs de l'Humanité, qui compose notre calendrier, quelques serviteurs avec conscience qui avaient reconnu son existence, et qui, avec plus ou moins de fermeté, plus ou moins complétement, s'étaient dévoués à la faire reconnaître par les autres. Depuis sa mort, leur nombre est bien augmenté. La nouvelle série, la série des morts positivistes, se forme avec une rapidité effrayante. Lentement nous marchons vers la pleine occidentalité quant à la composition de la société que nous représentons aujourd'hui. Nous avons marché moins lentement vers cette même occidentalité, quant aux morts. Nous n'avons que trop peu d'effort à faire pour réaliser la vérité, que les morts dominent les vivants ; le culte positif des morts ne nous est que trop facile. L'un après l'autre, nos frères se sont suivis dans le tombeau, nous laissant le regret, l'amère douleur et la tâche difficile de nous soutenir, de faire face aux poids de nos fatalités, de savoir obéir à nos convictions, tirer parti de cette triste nécessité même, et y puiser le courage et le dévouement.

Jamais nous ne nous sommes réunis dans d'aussi tristes circonstances que cette année-ci ! Nous qui venons de loin assister à cette cérémonie, et qui ne pouvons venir qu'une fois par an, en entrant dans ces lieux, nous avons dû tous éprouver un sentiment de vive douleur ; nous avons eu le cœur serré. Pour la première fois, il nous manquait l'affectueux accueil, la pleine et évidente bienveillance de celle qui constituait le charme de cet appartement, de celle que tous nous honorions et aimions. C'est un grand vide qu'elle nous a laissé ! Elle a déjà, je le sais, été appréciée ici. Il me sera permis pourtant, de la part de ceux qui n'ont pu être présents à sa commémoration, de dire, le plus simplement possible, que nous avons profondément ressenti le coup qui nous a frappés. Sa sollicitude pour notre cause était constamment en éveil ; et elle y coopérait de la manière la plus utile, comme elle la concevait dans sa plus ample largeur. Je n'oublierai jamais les grandes vues qu'elle puisait dans sa sympathie, et qui rendaient ses entretiens si admirables pour retremper les âmes. Dans mes visites annuelles, qu'il me soit permis de le dire, c'était ce qui

me faisait le plus de bien ; je pourrais bien dire nous. Elle regardait tous les croyants d'un amour maternel, qui était le fond de tout ce qu'elle disait, de tout ce qu'elle faisait. Cet amour, tous ceux qui l'ont senti le lui rendent bien. Son souvenir nous reste parmi tout ce qu'il y a de plus pur et de plus tendre dans notre mémoire. Vivante, elle nous associait, plus qu'aucune autre chose, à la vie de son maître et son père. Morte, elle complète le groupe central, elle prend part à son immortalité.

C'est la première fois aussi que M. de Constant nous manque. Lui aussi il a déjà été dignement apprécié, et je ne prétends acunement y revenir. Mais l'absence d'une si vive et saisissante personnalité ne me permet pas un silence complet. Je ferais tort à mes sentiments et à ceux de beaucoup d'autres, si je ne m'efforçais d'exprimer, quoique imparfaitement, l'affection intimement sentie que nous gardons pour sa mémoire. Jamais sa bienveillance personnelle ne nous faisait défaut. Sachons nous en montrer dignement reconnaissants, et il n'y aurait pas de reconnaissance plus digne que de nous approprier ce qui surtout le distinguait. Chaque fois que nous le voyions, si le temps nous permettait de nous pénétrer de la conscience de ce qu'il était, de sa manière de vivre et de son action en détail, car il fallait le suivre d'un œil attentif et lui arracher en quelque sorte son secret, il était facile de nous convaincre que dans l'intervalle il avait grandi moralement, qu'il avait acquis plus d'empire sur lui-même, enfin qu'il avait fait un progrès sensible vers ce perfectionnement intime auquel il se consacrait. C'était bien là pour nous tous un exemple à suivre, un enseignement des plus utiles. Je mets en avant ce qui me frappait le plus, sans que cela nuise à la perception de ses autres qualités, ou à l'honneur que méritent son activité continue et les éminents services qu'il a pu et voulu rendre à notre Maître pendant sa vie, à son Œuvre après sa mort

Bien autrement douloureuse est la mort de notre jeune Confrère. J'en parlerai directement et ouvertement, car il est impossible que ceux qui l'ont connu intimement, et il y en a plusieurs parmi nous qui le connaissaient ainsi, n'en soient pas préoccupés. Et ceux qui ne le connaissaient pas personnellement, car il assistait trop rarement à ces réunions, auront été intéressés à son sort et n'auront pu entendre sans douleur la

nouvelle de sa disparition. Il m'est bien pénible et bien difficile d'en parler. Les autres sont tombés les armes à la main, luttant pour la grande Cause. Quelle que soit notre manière d'envisager sa mort, pour moi il ne peut être douteux qu'il n'ait voulu disparaître, qu'il n'ait voulu renoncer à toute son action sociale, qu'il n'ait désespéré de la vie et qu'il ne soit allé chercher le repos et le soulagement de ses souffrances dans une mort volontaire.

Quel bel Avenir ! me disait un jour M. de Constant en parlant de lui, et, en effet, il semblait tel. Jeune, riche, jouissant d'une position sociale des plus solides, doué d'une haute intelligence, d'une âme capable des plus grands sacrifices, estimé même par ceux qui ne comprenaient pas ses principes d'action, aimé par ceux qui le comprenaient et le connaissaient, la vie semblait lui offrir tout ce qu'il fallait pour le bonheur, sauf un tempérament physique qui obscurcissait tout et auquel finalement il a succombé. Il s'est laissé aller à l'isolement, à la tristesse, et le désespoir est venu clore la série. Il n'a pas eu la force de sortir de la solitude qu'il s'était créée. Si la vie lui souriait, ce qui arrivait à de rares intervalles, il cherchait et goûtait la sympathie ; mais quand ses heures de tristesse revenaient, il la fuyait. C'est le caractéristique des âmes élevées. Il a eu gravement tort de céder au sentiment de son impuissance à soutenir plus longtemps la lutte ; il a manqué à ses principes ; il nous a placés dans la douloureuse nécessité de ne pouvoir commémorer sa mort publiquement.

Noble et généreux Ami, tu serais le premier à accepter le blâme que j'ose ainsi formuler, telle était la parfaite rectitude de ton esprit. Tu ne méconnaîtrais nullement le sentiment de devoir social, qui me pousse à ne pas chercher un refuge dans le silence, mais à m'exprimer librement sur ton comte. Tu ne méconnaîtrais pas non plus les sentiments personnels de regret, d'honneur et de la plus douloureuse sympathie que m'inspirera toujours ta mémoire, et que ta mort ne pourra aucunement altérer.

Tout digne éloge implique la liberté de blâmer. Mais la part du blâme une fois faite, il nous est permis, Messieurs, de donner libre cours aux inspirations de l'amitié et de l'estime. Et d'abord, sachons-lui gré d'une chose : c'est que jamais, sous le poids de ses impressions personnelles, il n'ait

douté de notre doctrine. Ma conviction, à cet égard, est confirmée par tout ce que j'ai vu dans ses papiers, par les témoignages directs et indirects de ses amis et de sa famille. Il est resté inébranlable, non-seulement quant à la doctrine, dans le sens le plus étendu du mot, mais aussi, ce qui chez nous est plus rare et plus difficile, quant à son opportunité.

Il ne transigeait en rien ; il était d'une droiture remarquable, et ce qu'il acceptait en théorie, il voulait le faire passer directement dans la pratique. Lors même qu'il sentait, et qu'il regrettait comme nous le regrettons tous, que dans l'état actuel des choses, la société Positiviste ne lui offrait nullement le soutien qu'il désirait ardemment, ne remplissait aucunement la fonction d'une Église et d'une société organisée de manière à soutenir et consoler ses membres ; lors même, ce qui lui arrivait parfois, qu'il regrettait la foi de sa jeunesse ou se laissait aller aux imposantes offres du Catholicisme du moyen âge, jamais cependant cette forte intelligence n'a renié ses convictions, n'a cédé en rien sur la foi positive.

Je l'ai déjà dit, Messieurs, il a succombé au sentiment de son impuissance, de l'inutilité d'une existence prolongée, de son indignité, c'est son propre mot. Par quelles souffrances a dû passer un tel homme, une telle nature, avant d'en venir là ? Passons là-dessus, ne nous y appuyant que pour en tirer ce qu'il faut pour modifier notre jugement, et l'ayant jugé avec calme, rappelons-nous ses grands services, sa large volonté envers notre cause, son dévouement à l'Humanité, son abnégation de lui-même. Rappelons-nous aussi et davantage tout ce qu'il y avait en lui de bon et de noble, sa loyauté, sa délicate sympathie, sa justice et sa tendresse. Honorons l'ami, chérissons sa mémoire qui, j'aime à le croire, d'après le jugement même le plus sévère, et sans aucune concession faible, restera toujours non-seulement pour nous qui l'avons connu, mais pour nos successeurs, liée d'une manière honorable et indissoluble, aux souvenirs du Positivisme.

La situation morale est bien changée. Ceux qui ont assisté aux commencements de notre œuvre ne sont plus. D'autres viendront, mais ce n'est plus précisément la même chose. Les amis de la jeunesse du Positivisme disparaissent,

ils n'assistent plus à nos luttes, ne nous encouragent plus de leur voix. Leur place est vide, nous ne le sentons que trop. L'œuvre est toujours la même ; mais si la part qui en revient à chacun est devenue plus lourde, c'est que ceux-ci nous manquent.

De telles pertes sont bien faites pour nous décourager. A contempler ce triste spectacle de la vie perdue par les uns, jetée par les autres, nos forces nous quittent, nous nous sentons presque incapables de soutenir la lutte. Mieux vaut se résigner et laisser faire. L'esprit se rétrécit, le cœur s'affaisse. Heureusement que cet état ne dure pas, et que, par le cours naturel des choses, nous reprenons peu à peu le courage que nous avons perdu ; nous rentrons dans la vie ordinaire. Mais trop souvent, nous n'y rentrons que gravement atteints dans notre énergie, mal disposés pour les efforts qui auparavant ne nous coûtaient pas, pénétrés même d'un vague et dangereux sentiment de l'inutilité de tout effort. Notre courage est moindre qu'il ne l'était. Il s'agit très-sérieusement, Messieurs, de combattre ces tendances, de ne pas nous laisser aller sur cette pente si facile ; il s'agit de puiser une force nouvelle, et nulle part pouvons-nous le faire mieux que dans le Culte des morts. Ce n'est pas la seule source, je le sais, mais c'est une source bien puissante, vu l'absence de toute excitation, vu le grand calme qu'il est de nature à nous inspirer, tout en nous inspirant aussi la résolution ferme et soutenue de ne pas manquer aux grands exemples. En présence de nos souvenirs, de ce grand mais douloureux Passé, si empreint de souffrances mais si empreint aussi des traces de courage et de dévouement, faiblir devrait nous être impossible, tant devraient être puissants les sentiments de sympathie et d'obligation. Une telle force devrait exercer sur nous la pensée que la cause des souffrances et la raison du dévouement existent autant qu'elles aient jamais existé ; les sacrifices qui ont été faits impliquent des sacrifices correspondants de notre part.

Aussi nous n'évoquons pas le Passé, pour nous laisser affaiblir par lui. Au contraire, nous regardons la mort en face pour stimuler et régler notre courage. Nous nous pénétrons du souvenir de nos morts, nous nous recueillons pour le méditer, afin de sortir de cette méditation plus forts et plus énergiques, plus sympathiques pour les vivants par la

mémoire de leur sympathie, plus dévoués à l'Humanité par le poids de leur dévouement. C'est à la vue de cette puissance très-réelle que nous sentons qu'oublier, refuge des âmes faibles, c'est nous priver d'un de nos plus solides appuis, en même temps que c'est agir en lâches envers ceux que nous avons aimés et que nous aimons toujours. Notre véritable vie, conçue dans son vrai jour et dans son intime réalité, consiste à les faire vivre en nous, à reproduire leur vie en continuant leur œuvre, en nous emparant de leurs grands desseins, en propageant leurs nobles sentiments. Nous n'y ajoutons que peu, et ce que nous y ajoutons c'est en nous inspirant d'eux que nous y parvenons. Nous rappeler ainsi ceux qui ne sont plus, nous lier ainsi à eux, c'est nous élever à leur hauteur, c'est nous approprier les bénéfices de leurs efforts, c'est participer au calme qui règne autour d'eux, c'est leur rendre dignement honneur, c'est instituer le vrai Culte des Morts.

Notre situation est bien changée aussi, matériellement, par les événements de cette année. Je n'insisterai pas là-dessus, mais il m'est impossible de ne pas y consacrer quelques mots, puisque nous y sommes tous intéressés. Personne ici n'ignore que ce qui a été fait, a été fait en grande partie par l'assistance pécuniaire des deux positivistes dont nous déplorons la perte. Sans eux, nos ressources sont bien faibles. M. Winstanley n'a rien légué au Positivisme. M. de Constant, au contraire, nous a destiné un legs considérable ; mais il est pour moi presque certain que nous ne réussirons pas à faire valoir nos droits, qui, moralement valides, n'ont aucune validité légale. Je dirai plus même. Si nous pouvions les faire valoir par une contestation légale, je préférerais qu'on y renonçât franchement. Ce serait le plus digne de notre part. Dans le cas où nous échouerions ou que nous y renoncerions, le subside se trouvera réduit tout d'un coup de plus de moitié. Nous aurons, s'il reste à son niveau actuel, à peine de quoi suffire aux besoins les plus urgemment nécessaires, c'est-à-dire au maintien intégral du local. Toute activité en dehors de cela nous sera interdite, toute activité, bien entendu, qui dépend de la possession de l'argent. Il est douteux même si dans cette limite nous parviendrons à maintenir la situation actuelle. Il ne devrait pas en être ainsi, ce dont se convaincra facilement quiconque consentira à étudier avec un peu

d'attention les circulaires qui, sous ce rapport, font autorité. Rien de plus évident que ceci, que nous pourrions accomplir tout ce qui est indispensable, si l'on pouvait remettre les efforts sur le pied où ils l'étaient l'année qui a précédé la mort de notre Maître.

Quant à moi, je ne le dissimule pas, je vois, sans le regretter aucunement, ce changement dans notre situation matérielle. J'accepte le nouvel ordre comme plus normal et au fond beaucoup plus utile que l'état antécédent. Une cause qui doit s'appuyer sur l'assentiment général et sur la coopération populaire, mais qui ne s'appuyait effectivement que sur deux hommes, était dans une fausse voie. Peut-être eût-il mieux valu que la chute en eût été plus graduée, c'est possible. Mais peut-être aussi cette subite interruption de notre marche a-t-elle aussi son avantage. Elle nous réveille un peu en sursaut, mais, la surprise passée, cette rude secousse peut nous donner l'énergie qu'il nous faut, et nous retrouverons en face d'un grand danger la pleine vigueur d'action qu'une diminution moins sensible de nos ressources eût tendu à assoupir. Nous ne pouvons plus nous reposer; il faut que tous, chacun pour soi, nous nous sentions appelés à un effort bien calculé, bien ferme ; que nul ne se croie dispensé, grâce à une intervention extraordinaire, de contribuer pour sa part et régulièrement à ce qui est l'affaire commune.

Il est vrai que pendant un temps plus ou moins long, et dont la durée dépend en grande mesure de nous-mêmes, nous serons entravés dans notre action, ce qui, sous quelques rapports, nous sera très-pénible. Renoncer à des engagements formels, c'est à quoi nul ne saurait se résoudre sans en éprouver de la peine, même quand la plus manifeste impossibilité de les remplir l'ordonne. Ce n'est pas non plus sans peine que l'on renonce à une action plus étendue et qu'on se replie sur une apparente inertie. Et pourtant, tout bien pesé, je demeure convaincu que, pour l'avenir du Positivisme, il était essentiel d'asseoir notre œuvre sur une base plus réelle, moins large, mais plus solide. Quelque inattendus qu'aient été les événements de cette année, cependant si l'on suit attentivement notre action collective, on trouvera que tôt ou tard il n'était que trop probable que nous en viendrions là ou nous en sommes actuellement ; car, il faut le dire, les efforts de cette

petite minorité de deux allaient toujours en augmentant, en même temps que l'effort collectif de nous autres diminuait ; la proportion entre les deux éléments du subside, d'après une analyse exacte, n'était pas ce qu'elle devait être, et tendait peu à le devenir. Il y avait là toujours un sujet de grave inquiétude. Ce qui nous est arrivé est imprévu nécessairement, quant à la violence du choc, mais pourtant entièrement dans la logique des affaires humaines. Nous aurions donc dû le prévoir et agir de manière qu'il ne nous arrivât pas.

En acceptant la situation actuelle comme dans un certain sens un avantage, je ne prétends nullement en atténuer la gravité. Elle est grave certainement, mais les difficultés qu'elle présente ne dépassent pas la mesure de nos forces sobrement estimées. Vouloir, c'est pouvoir ; seulement, ici, il faut que tous veuillent, que tous se mettent à l'œuvre, qu'une action générale, modeste et régulière se substitue à l'action partielle et disproportionnée de quelques-uns. Nous avons assez vécu des efforts des autres ; quand je dis nous, je parle de la société, de l'organisation positiviste. Il faut vivre maintenant de nos propres efforts, efforts qui doivent être mesurés et continus. C'est la régularité qu'il faut à tout prix. Je vous invite tous à réfléchir sur notre position, sur l'action qu'elle exige, les devoirs qu'elle impose, les vrais moyens de la maintenir, et aussi les vrais moyens de remédier à ce qu'elle offre de faible et d'étroit. Assez pour moi si je répète que si tous n'interviennent pas, chacun dans la mesure de ses forces, dont lui seul doit être juge, nous ne pourrons pas entretenir la vie collective ; qu'il faudra renoncer (pour le moment), à continuer sans interruption l'œuvre que nous avions commencée ; il faudra nous replier sur les efforts purement individuels. Il n'y a pas à en douter, il n'y a pas à se tromper là-dessus. Notre existence sociale est directement en question. Agissons donc en hommes conséquents. Si nous voulons la maintenir, les moyens sont clairs ; si nous voulons la laisser tomber, que cela aussi soit un acte de volonté réfléchie et non pas de faiblesse. Le mot de Milton est juste :

> Ange déchu, être faible, c'est être misérable.

Quoi qu'il en soit, Messieurs, n'oublions pas que c'est nous personnellement qui sommes en question et non pas la cause.

Je verrais avec le plus profond regret les suites nécessaires de notre faiblesse, si nous étions assez faibles pour laisser tomber ce que nous sommes parvenus à faire (d'une manière ou d'une autre) ; si la continuité de notre existence sociale se rompait. Si c'était par nécessité que cela arrivât, une nécessité bien constatée, tout en la regrettant il faudrait bien la subir avec résignation et sans en rougir. Et je ne dis pas, quoique j'en doute fort, que ce n'est pas là le cas actuel. Mais il faut bien la constater, cette nécessité, il faut être bien sûr que ce qui manque ne soit pas la volonté, que nous ne mettions pas sur le compte de l'impossibilité ce qui n'est véritablement que faiblesse. Dans l'un et l'autre cas également, je verrais avec regret se dissoudre les liens qui unissent les Positivistes entre eux par l'abandon du local consacré par tant de souvenirs, par l'absence forcée de toute action collective. En faisant un retour sur le passé, je ne pourrais me dispenser de croire que c'est en grande partie à nous-mêmes qu'il faudrait s'en prendre pour expliquer ce triste résultat. Avoir cinq ans d'existence et ne pas avoir réussi à assurer cette existence dans sa plus simple expression, il y aurait là, Messieurs, un fait que nous ne pourrions accepter qu'avec honte. En grande partie, ai-je dit, nous-mêmes nous en serions la cause. Pour être juste, il faut bien faire la part des autres, la part de ceux qui, participant largement à nos croyances, se sont tenus par divers motifs plus ou moins respectables en dehors de toute action, se refusant à tout appui matériel ; la part aussi de la génération actuelle qui, par l'ensemble de ses convictions ou plutôt par défaut absolu de convictions, et par la faiblesse de son caractère, ignore et désire ignorer, car c'est là la vérité, la doctrine que nous lui présentons.

Mais quel que soit l'apportionnement respectif du blâme, et quelque divers que soient nos regrets, la cause que nous soutenons survivra à notre chute. Elle est toujours là, Messieurs, cette grande question de la réorganisation sociale par l'avénement d'une nouvelle Religion ; et elle y resterait, alors même que nous disparaîtrions tous, nous qui, de pleine conscience, avons accepté la mission de l'avancer. Les hommes meurent, l'Humanité vit. Il y a perte d'efforts, mais non pas cessation totale. Efforçons-nous d'éviter les pertes et les délais qui en sont ordinairement les suites. C'est là notre

devoir immédiat, et de la manière dont nous l'accomplissons, dépendra notre estimation et notre valeur. Mais que notre devoir soit accompli ou non, l'œuvre sera continuée ; d'autres se mettront à notre place ; le feu sacré, qui n'est pas descendu sur nous, touchera les lèvres d'autres plus compétents, et, nous écartant comme faibles, nos successeurs réussiront où nous aurons succombé. C'est une consolation collective pour ceux qui n'auront pas su obéir aux impérieuses réclamations de la conscience individuelle.

D'ailleurs, Messieurs, qu'elle vive ou qu'elle périsse, notre organisation collective, d'après sa nature complexe, c'est toujours des efforts des individualités qui la composent que dépend son utilité. Si elle parvient à durer, ces unités conservent leur valeur actuelle ; si elle se dissout, leur responsabilité et leur utilité, au lieu de diminuer, seront largement augmentées ; car n'oublions pas que la vraie propagande n'est pas une affaire collective. Si, en ce qui regarde l'intelligence, elle nous est prescrite plutôt orale qu'écrite, afin que la personnalité et les sentiments y interviennent davantage, afin qu'elle laisse plus à l'esprit vivant et vivifiant qu'à la lettre morte ; à plus forte raison, en ce qui concerne l'action, notre propagande doit-elle s'appuyer davantage sur les sentiments que sur les raisonnements, sur les exemples que sur les préceptes. La meilleure, la plus sûre propagande pour nous comme pour les autres religions qui nous ont précédés, c'est la vie largement et nettement conforme à nos convictions. C'est aussi la seule absolument universelle, à laquelle c'est-à-dire tous peuvent participer. Si nous avons été trop disposés, telle est la faiblesse humaine, à oublier, ou du moins à ne pas pratiquer cette simple vérité, les circonstances actuelles peuvent nous être d'une haute utilité. Forcément nous devons y revenir, puisqu'à défaut des moyens que nous avions, nous sommes obligés de sentir, avec exactitude, ceux qui nous restent. Et il n'y a rien de décourageant si nous nous trouvons réduits à un seul moyen, car il est le seul efficace, valant bien tous les autres dont, au bout du compte, il constitue la condition effective. On ne saurait trop insister là-dessus que pour faire partager aux autres notre Foi, dans toute sa plénitude, il est nécessaire que nous nous en montrions pénétrés et

qu'une vie conforme à cette Foi en soit la seule preuve convaincante.

Même pour les convictions intellectuelles, ce qui au temps actuel est de beaucoup la plus facile partie de notre tâche, il faut les avoir soi-même ou renoncer à tout espoir de les répandre. Mais quand il s'agit d'une complète acceptation de la religion de l'Humanité, avec les obligations qu'une telle acceptation impose, c'est alors que cette condition se présente dans toute sa nécessité, mais c'est alors aussi que nous sentons combien elle est intimement justifiée.

Outre la difficulté qu'il y a toujours à se pénétrer tellement d'une foi quelconque, à accepter si complétement une religion quelconque, que son influence se traduise visiblement aux yeux de tous dans la conduite générale de notre vie, dans tout le menu détail de nos actions, nous autres positivistes nous avons une difficulté de plus. Elle dépend de la nature même de notre Religion, dans les conditions actuelles, pendant la période de transition, et avant que le nouveau culte, la nouvelle doctrine et le nouveau régime, ayant pris pleine possession du cœur et de l'esprit des hommes, soient parvenus à les modifier et à les harmoniser. La relativité du positivisme, le besoin urgent de rester dans le réel, voilà deux écueils contre lesquels il n'est que trop facile d'échouer; car on peut pousser la relativité à un tel point que toute action franchement positiviste soit écartée sous le prétexte de manquer d'opportunité ; de sorte qu'elle devienne en effet un motif spécieux pour la paresse et la lâcheté.

Encore une fois, en présence des obstacles que nous offre la constitution actuelle de la société, il est de la dernière urgence que nous conservions notre sang-froid à un degré qui nous permette de juger librement de nos propres forces, de notre propre action, et, en même temps, des forces et de l'action opposées. Le coup d'œil calme, même froid de l'homme pratique, concilier cela avec le vrai enthousiasme de l'homme religieux, c'est un problème qui ne se pose pas seulement pour nous, mais qu'il nous est plus impérativement nécessaire qu'aux autres de résoudre, nous qui, plus que les autres, reconnaissons la réalité comme base indispensable de la foi. Nos devanciers ont dû avoir plus d'affinité poor l'élan mystique. Il nous incombe de démontrer que l'élan qui se

base sur le réel peut être tout aussi puissant et soutenu. Que cela deviendra évident dans l'avenir, je n'en doute nullement ; que cela est déjà évident pour ceux qui apprécient dans leur vrai jour les exemples que nous possédons dans le Positivisme, c'est pour moi un fait constaté. Mais néanmoins la difficulté reste pour nous tous, et il importe de s'en rendre compte. Un enthousiasme calme, sage et réglé, c'est là la disposition que nous devons nous efforcer d'atteindre, quelles que soient les difficultés de la tâche que nous nous imposons. Car en cultivant le jugement sain qui écarte le fanatisme, qui voit les choses telles qu'elles sont, il y a risque de nous refroidir ; à force d'être sages, nous devenons tièdes, et il nous faut une grande et vraie chaleur.

Que ce soit là notre vraie tâche, c'est ce qu'indiquent les critiques que nous adressent les plus sérieux et les plus dignes de nos adversaires. C'est une religion froide, de raison et non pas de sentiment ; nous n'y voyons pas le levier qui puisse soulever le cœur humain. Je n'accepte pas, bien entendu, ce reproche qui repose en grande partie sur l'ignorance ; mais je le cite comme indice de la direction que nous avons à suivre, du danger que nous avons à éviter. Satisfaire aux exigences de la plus froide intelligence et ne pas se laisser dominer par elle, mais la montrer au service du plus pur sentiment, c'est justement le problème que résout le Positivisme comme Religion, et que nous, personnellement, nous devons résoudre dans la pratique journalière. On s'intéressera peu à la première partie ; elle aura toujours son importance, mais, en restant isolée, elle ne sera pas pour nos ennemis un sujet de crainte, elle aura peu d'attrait pour ceux qui pourraient être tentés de s'associer à nous. Elle sera une grande force comme appui, en restant faible pour le reste. Dans l'œuvre de la propagande, nous nous servons de la doctrine comme arme défensive ; comme moyen d'attaque, c'est aux sentiments religieux, dont la plus haute expression est la vie religieuse, que nous avons recours. L'amélioration personnelle en vue d'un but social, voilà le résumé le plus net de notre action, l'amélioration personnelle complète, s'étendant à tout, depuis les plus infimes détails de la vie la plus ordinaire jusqu'aux plus importantes actions.

Quant à la propagande par la voie de l'esprit, et en dehors

de notre exemple, c'est au sentiment religieux que nous faisons appel personnel, et nous ne pouvons faire cet appel avec le moindre espoir qu'autant qu'il nous est dicté par notre propre sentiment religieux. La conception de l'Humanité, étant plus complexe que celle de Dieu, est dès lors plus difficile ; it faut s'attendre à ce que l'on y mette plus de lenteurs à l'accueillir. L'intelligence a sa part à l'hésitation que l'on éprouve envers notre doctrine, hésitation naturelle et qui a sa raison d'être. Envers les autres, cette concession devrait nous porter à leur en faciliter la sortie, en stimulant à la fois l'intelligence et le cœur, la première en leur expliquant le passé humain, le second en faisant savoir et en mettant en première ligne les solutions sociales que nous offre notre doctrine. On peut bien et l'on doit, en conservant sa primauté à la Religion, en ayant soin de ne jamais laisser inaperçue la liaison qui existe entre ses doctrines et ce que nous offrons, aborder les hommes plus spécialement par les questions sociales, et intéresser le citoyen où l'homme pourrait nous échapper. Il y aurait peut-être une différence dans la ligne à suivre pour les différents peuples occidentaux. Mais comme le vrai fond sur lequel nous pouvons construire est définitivement le sentiment social et civique, qui seul peut donner l'énergie nécessaire pour sortir de l'ancienne voie, je pense que, comme moyen de conversion, il sera toujours le plus sûr de porter la question d'abord et principalement sur le terrain social.

Je m'explique un peu. Si nous portons nos regards sur nos contemporains, et c'est à eux que nous nous adressons pour la plupart, la principale difficulté à vaincre c'est la faiblesse. Il est évident, Messieurs, que dans une société comme celle sur laquelle nous voulons agir, une société mourante pour ainsi dire, où ce qui a servi de lien dans le passé n'y sert plus, à défaut d'une conception raisonnée de l'avenir, l'instinct social amènera les hommes à se roidir contre toute tentative qu'ils ne comprendront pas, à frapper du ban social tous ceux que la perspective d'un nouvel ordre fait dévier de l'ordre établi. Il y en aura beaucoup de ces hommes, et le nombre en ira toujours en s'augmentant. Mais d'abord le degré de leur détachement du passé, de leur acceptation des nouvelles doctrines sera bien inégal, et quand l'un et l'autre sera complet, ils auront

grand'peine en face de la puissante résistance, qu'ils ne peuvent aucunement éviter, à faire le pas décisif, à rompre entièrement dans le sens positiviste avec leur milieu. Le seul moyen de leur donner la force nécessaire, la seule source où ils peuvent la puiser, cette force, c'est, à mon avis, aux convictions sociales. Ceux qui non-seulement reconnaissent intellectuellement, mais qui sentent intimement les maux, les souffrances des hommes qui les entourent, ceux-là sont, en règle générale, les seuls à qui nous pouvons nous adresser avec un espoir bien fondé d'être écoutés, examinés, acceptés ou rejetés d'après un examen sérieux, et un examen sérieux est tout ce que nous demandons.

Je m'en tiens, Messieurs, aux questions les plus simples, à celles qui ont ou doivent avoir de l'intérêt pour tous, à celles qui touchent directement à la pratique. Nous pouvons tous avancer d'un pas ferme dans la voie de l'amélioration morale, et si nous le faisons, il est certain que l'influence d'une telle conduite ne manquera pas de se faire sentir, sans que nous y travaillions sciemment. C'est la propagande, par la voie d'exemple, dont j'ai parlé. J'ai parlé aussi de la ligne à suivre en prêchant la foi ; mais vous aurez remarqué que tout ce que j'ai dit regarde nos efforts individuels, soit que nous nous occupions de notre perfectionnement moral, soit que nous visions à la conversion des autres. N'oublions pas toutefois que partout où il y a un foyer positiviste, la question de notre action sort du domaine purement individuel et prend un caractère collectif. L'accord ou le désaccord des divers membres du foyer, leur union plus ou moins intime et amicale, leurs soins mutuels de se soutenir entre eux, de se consoler dans les mauvais temps, de se prêter un constant appui, tout cela, Messieurs, est d'une grande importance, non-seulement quant à ces membres eux-mêmes, mais aussi pour tous ceux qui, tout en restant en dehors de la société, ont des contacts avec elle. Se rallier les uns aux autres, c'est le devoir des Positivistes ; c'est le seul moyen aussi de constituer un noyau qui puisse réagir sur les autres et qui puisse les attirer. Mais ce ralliement ne dépend pas d'un seul, et suppose comme toute action sur les hommes de la réciprocité. Il suppose aussi le règlement individuel. Rien de plus clair en effet que l'obstacle le plus puissant à l'union c'est l'égoïsme, pris dans le sens le

plus étendu. Mais aussi dans un sens beaucoup plus rétréci, un sens presque négatif, c'est bien souvent l'égoïsme qui nous sépare les uns des autres, en nous détournant des soins nécessaires pour nous rendre agréables aux autres. On peut avoir beaucoup de vraie sympathie et ne pas la faire sentir aux autres, faute de se régler convenablement. De ce point de vue encore nous rentrons dans la question de l'amélioration personnelle dans un but social. Si nous travaillons à cette amélioration, il ne tiendra pas à nous si ce ralliement manque. Nous y aurons contribué pour notre part. Et quoiqu'il ne dépende pas d'un seul, en règle générale, il émane d'un seul ou de plusieurs, dont chacun constitue à lui seul un centre. C'est un don rare, celui de rallier presque instinctivement les hommes ; il a appartenu aux grands hommes que souvent il caractérise. Mais à un certain degré nous pouvons tous l'exercer, ce pouvoir, car nous pouvons tous offrir les conditions indispensables. Nous pouvons tous avoir de la valeur, de la fermeté, de la persistance, et ce sont ces qualités et leurs pareilles qui rallient. Du reste, si dans un foyer positiviste le ralliement n'existe pas, et par conséquent la vraie société, qui est toujours constituée hiérarchiquement, n'existe pas, il est impossible que là notre Foi fasse de grands progrès sociaux.

Qu'il me soit permis, avant de quitter cette partie, de remarquer que si le but principal de cette réunion est de commémorer notre Maître, elle peut bien servir à un autre but, celui de rapprocher ses disciples. Depuis des années elle n'a guère servi à cela. Nous nous voyons, nous écoutons et nous nous en allons. Oserais-je vous prier tous de consacrer quelques instants après ce discours à un but purement social ? Faisons au moins la connaissance les uns des autres, afin que si nous nous rencontrons quelque part, ce soit en hommes qui se sont vus et se sont entreconnus. C'est un regret que j'ai toujours emporté après chaque séance, qu'il y avait bien de nos confrères avec qui j'avais essayé en vain d'entrer en relation. Il faut profiter de ce que nous avons en main. Il serait mieux, peut-être, que cet échange de civilités personnelles pût avoir lieu ailleurs. Mais il n'est guère possible. Ainsi, tout en croyant convenable qu'avant la séance un silence religieux soit observé par tous les assistants, un silence qui permette à tous de se recueillir, je crois aussi que ce serait sacrifier le fond

à la forme de ne pas utiliser ce local pour le but que je viens d'indiquer. Ce n'est là qu'une question de détail, mais à mes yeux elle n'est pas sans importance.

Je me résume, Messieurs. J'ai parlé de nos pertes et de nos difficultés, sans vouloir vous attrister par la considération des unes ni vous décourager par le tableau des autres. J'ai parlé aussi de notre action et de notre propagande, tant personnelle que collective. Il me reste peu à faire. Je reviens à mon point de départ. Au milieu de notre douleur et de notre découragement, il y a toujours pour nous un point fixe, un exemple en commun, qui puisse nous ramener au juste sentiment de ce que nous devons faire. Il y a toujours la grande mémoire d'Auguste Comte, qui a fait face à la plus amère douleur et combattu le plus profond découragement. Puissions-nous, comme lui, dans notre mesure, tirer parti pour l'Humanité des calamités que nous subissons ! Puissions-nous nous soutenir nous-mêmes et savoir consoler les autres ! Tout au moins puissions-nous tous persister, et, la plus triste expérience en fait foi, la persistance est déjà une vraie force !

PARIS: *le* 24 *gutenberg* 74 (5 *septembre* 1862).

SYSTEMATIC POLICY.

THE believers in a purely human religion are more than others at once bound and disposed to bring their thought and actions and their acts of worship into complete agreement. For this reason it is that, after two years of hesitating adoption of another course, which had some practical advantages, I have this year preferred, at the risk of a smaller audience even than we have usually had, to abandon the plan of meeting on the first Sunday in the year, and to meet on the proper day set apart for this Festival, the first of the new year. By this arrangement we in England are in concert with our brethren in France and America, so far as the day is concerned. It is not of equal importance, indeed it is not practicable, that the three meetings should be at the same hour. We are somewhat later here than in Paris, where, in all probability, however, those who have been able to come have not yet separated; and before we separate, those who take part in the American meeting will have entered on their act of Positivist worship. But should another hour on the same day be found another year more convenient to a larger number, and more suited to our social arrangements, I should be quite ready to adopt it. The point which I consider now permanently fixed is the day; and I urge on those Positivists who, by their residence, are within convenient reach, to make it an object, when possible, to attend.

Nor is the reason I have given the only reason for the change. The fuller sympathy which naturally results from agreement as to the time would be in itself a sufficient justification of the transfer. But, in addition to this, it is time that those who speak in the name of a religion which claims superiority over the other faiths in which men have believed should

not suffer themselves to be hampered by a dependence on the arrangements of those older faiths. The power we serve as alone real takes precedence of its predecessors and types, and the only festival as yet instituted in its honour should at once stand out in clear independence of any that belong to prior states.

We proceed, then, to the main body of to-day's discourse in thoughtful communion with the Parisian centre of the Universal Church, and with the only other nucleus of that church which co-exists with our own; equally, also, in communion with those members of our faith who, less fortunate, pay their devoted and persistent service in isolation, wherever such members may be found, in France, or England, or Ireland, or elsewhere. They are scattered here and there, some avowed adherents; others, under the pressure of circumstances and not without valid reasons, unavowed. There are more of such than we are apt to think.

One remark more by way of preface. In what I have said, in what I am going to say, I use language which seems to assume that those here present share my convictions. I am aware that this is not the fact, that there are wide differences in the degree in which you sympathize with what I say; that some are complete, some incomplete, some, again, in no sense disciples of our religion; none are pledged, in any way, by their presence here. But they will not, if here, object to my addressing them as if they were full sympathizers. I conclude that the end we aim at, the regeneration of the race, we aim at in common, whatever the divergence of belief as to the means in which we have confidence, and in particular as to the worship of Humanity.

The Festival of Humanity, which we meet this day to celebrate, is the great festival of our religion, the most comprehensive, the most synthetical; in fact, the only one which is an adequate expression of the new synthesis. Run your eye over the list of the subsequent festivals of the year, the well-ordered and exhaustive series of eighty highdays, which, at due intervals, bring before us, one after the other, all the varied aspects of our rich human existence; you will see that each is a constituent part of the whole which we place before us to-day; that all combined are *the* constituent parts into which that

whole is divided. The primary relations, the sum of which constitutes our domestic life; the stages through which the intellect, the action, and the feelings of the race have passed, in order to raise it by a gradual process into a self-conscious and self-directed collective being; the functions by which that being, when formed, sustains, perpetuates, and improves its existence; the organs of these functions—all pass before us in succession; each singly, as it takes its turn, enabling us, from a fresh point of view, to gain a better knowledge of the whole. Whereas the true characteristic of to-day is that it offers us Humanity in its unity—in all the fulness of its synthetic conception, as the organism in which all man's powers and functions, and all voluntary powers and functions external to man, combine together towards one great common end—that end the progressive improvement of the human world, and of the local habitation in which that world is placed.

We stand at the beginning of a new order, and the position has many disadvantages. The time will come when that new order shall be established, and the institutions which answer to it created. The time will come, that is, when in temples corresponding to the worship paid in them, priests trained to the right exercise of their high functions shall direct the devotions of sympathetic congregations; when the artistic faculties of man shall symbolize by sound or by form all the natural accessories and stimulants of such devotion. There will be little difficulty then in realizing the object of this day's ceremony, and receiving from it the impressions which should give, as it were, the key-note of the new year. The charges of coldness and unattractiveness which are now made will be impossible then. They are wholly unreasonable now. The Greek or Roman listener who in the early period of Christianity might have been attracted by curiosity to see what the new Faith, of which he had heard, offered, would probably have found that the meeting was small, the room bare, the ceremony unimpressive, the whole thing unattractive, and with little promise for the future. Tried by the future facts of Christian history, his judgment was baseless. But he had an excuse. The new Faith, to the preaching of which he had listened, was a revolutionary faith, the first great conscious innovation

on the earlier religious experience of mankind, which had previously moved on without any sense of a break, developing itself spontaneously to meet the wants of man as they made themselves felt, and in each successive stage animated by no hostility to what had gone before. But the two great revolutions which connect with the names of Christ and Mahomet should teach the curious auditor of another and newer creed what are the conditions under which a new religion is ushered in; and the smallness of its beginning, if no argument for its truth and power, can equally not be, to the professor of Christianity, an argument against them. We then, who stand at the beginning, must accept these necessary conditions of that state, however disadvantageous they may be. We must accept a worship with no outward ceremonial to attract, with no artistic accompaniments, in inappropriate places, and even these changing; worse far, we must worship, as we must live, with few to sympathize, amid the contempt and dislike of most around us. Yet the position has its advantages—advantages accessible to all. Equally with our descendants we can contemplate, in its oneness, the power we serve; we can range over the past period of preparation, the close of which we have seen in our own day; we can call up by imagination the future, which we of this generation inaugurate, which dates from our own memory; we, as they, at however remote a period, will be compelled to do by the necessities of their imperfect human condition, may abstract ourselves for a time from the hurry and whirl of ordinary life, and in religious thought dwell on the benefits we reap from the action of Humanity in the past and in the present. We enjoy the accumulations of the untold generations who have gone before us; they form our very being; are the instruments and materials of our thought and action. We are sheltered by them from the hard necessities which encircled the earlier periods, and they afford the means of extending that shelter to others. So far we are on a level with our, in some respects, more fortunate descendants. In one point we have, experience would seem to show, a certain advantage, or, at any rate, compensation. They who, at the opening of a new era, at the beginning of a great change, are not in opposition to it, but, to the best of their ability, promoting it, have usually a more

vivid conviction of its necessity and its promise, and have the greater vigour such conviction gives. The contrast of the old and the new, of the remnants of the past with the construction rising from among them, the sense of opposition, and the assurance of triumph, all aid them in presenting more definitely to themselves the object of their efforts. It is, to give an illustration of my meaning, doubtful if medieval saint or pope, in the period of the highest power of the Roman Catholic Church, ever realized, even in an approximative degree, as St. Paul realized, the ideal of the Christian Church.

All is not against us, then, in our present position, though it requires some exertion to convince ourselves of the fact. This, however, is but the common lot. No great system, no religion, comes without effort; time must be given to the subject. Meditation, and meditation ripening into prayer, such are the means by which we, as our religious ancestors of whatever denomination, must gain insight into the religion we have adopted. We cannot dream that it will imprint itself on us by some unconscious process. Such a delusion would be more inexcusable in us than in others from the very nature of our faith, which demands a greater effort than previous faiths. At the same time it offers us greater means. We enter into the labour of others in this respect also; we profit by the additions our predecessors have made to the spiritual treasures of their race; and, further, we have the incalculable privilege, denied to them, of seeing in vigorous outline, and in sufficient detail, the whole conception and scheme which we have to make a part of ourselves, unto which we are to mould ourselves, by which we are to be guided in action. We have at once the doctrine given, and the practical application of the doctrine; we have, in other words, what none have had before us, a rational and demonstrable religion, and the construction in which it finds its expression. The future is cleared to us by the interpretation of the past.

How to secure the growth of this religion, how to promote its triumph, is the practical question to which all that follows is meant as a direct or indirect means. We date the foundation of our religion from the close of the second generation of the French Revolution, at which period it had found its mature expression in the fourth volume of the 'Politique Positive,'

the elaborate development of the earlier and more condensed catechism. The conception of Humanity is there explicitly set forth, as are the obligations flowing from that conception. The adoption of that conception, the triumph of that religion, is but a question of time to those who believe in it. But that time may be longer or shorter in proportion to the zeal, energy, and ability of its disciples. Neither the judgment of the founder, nor their own, warrants them in trusting it to its spontaneous growth without any combined effort on their part. For it, as for all other faiths, to spread, human agents are required, and human agents who shall give a conscious and devoted service. To gain the best results, all experience shows that their efforts must be concerted, that an organization is needed; and the organization actually in existence to meet this want, however wanting in numbers and in means, is so constituted as to require no alteration in principle under any possible extension of the religion. What it does want is support; such support as might set free for its purposes those who, in default of such support, can only bring to the cause a divided and overtaxed ability. This is the object of the sacerdotal fund, which still remains insufficient for its purposes; insufficient even for that which is most to be wished under present circumstances, the enabling M. Laffitte, the chief of our Positivist organization, to devote himself wholly to the work, instead of wearing out his life and powers in the task of self-maintenance by a laborious profession. We are not, be it remembered, of those who think slightingly of personal effort, of the value of the individual. Great intellects and great characters are a costly production, and the generations are to blame which stand by and see such inestimable value wasted. The records of the past are full of instances in which this waste has happened from the neglect of contemporaries. In large measure, Auguste Comte himself was an instance. Within and without our body I cannot but hope that this task will gradually be more recognized, and that the recognition will find an expression in the persistent and steady growth of the contribution which is designed to meet the difficulty.

In any case, whether it be raised to the full efficiency of which, under present conditions, it is susceptible, or its action be fettered, as hitherto, by deficient material support, the exist-

ing organization will continue to render what service it can. Few will deny that it has rendered some service, that by the efforts of its members the cause is in a different position both from what it was some years back and from what it would have been if left entirely without any concerted effort. More I need not say of the past; the future action is more important. It must be of the same kind as hitherto. Direct teaching when possible, in the shape of lectures; the use of opportunities such as the present, of the anniversaries we now celebrate; occasional publications on special questions of interest as they arise; larger works, as time and means may be found; lastly, on all reasonable occasions, oral propagation in society: these are the means at our disposal for the direct spread of our religion, which must be our main object. Our action, however, fortunately, considering the times in which we live, and the vehement revolutionary hostility to our doctrine which characterizes them, need in no way be confined to this direct propagation; we have the larger field open to us of indirect propagation, by showing its power of dealing with and solving the questions of the day, by evidencing its power of guidance, by acting on public opinion, and, as a consequence, modifying public action. Our system gives us great advantages for this, as it accustoms us to look on all problems as connected one with the other, as necessary parts of one great problem—the reorganization of society; and I think I can trace, under the discourteous sneers which I occasionally see, the recognition of this power in our system on the part of its most determined opponents. It is for us to use the power, to avail ourselves to the fullest extent our intellect will allow us of the guiding conceptions given us in the judgment of past policy, in the advice we may venture to offer on future action. This character of system, irritating, as I am sorry to see it is, to many of our opponents, whom it drives into the oddest statements, it is essential to adhere to as to the source of whatever strength we possess. Connecting this remark with what has been said, in all our judgments, whether for the past or future, we must keep before us the synthetic conception of Humanity, utter them in her name, and with more or less explicit reference to her undivided service. Slowly the force of such systematic invocation of a Being, whose existence is

incontrovertible, will make itself felt, and will operate as a calming influence after it has had its effect as a source of light and direction. Our interference in the political, social, and religious discussions of the day should, as far as possible, be based on historical considerations, and appeal to general motives. The mere patchwork in Church and State we may leave to others. The spiritual power of Positivism must know no partial views. This may weaken, in some cases, our immediate influence; but we can afford to wait, and count on the greater soundness of the ultimate result. If, with this firm reliance on the advantages of systematic action and expression, we combine fair energy and readiness to seize such occasions as present themselves, and the courage to speak freely, we shall, I conceive, have done our duty in our generation, and, I doubt not, succeeded in handing on to others, with additions, what we received. Owing to circumstances, our opportunities are rare; or, rather, the means of availing ourselves of the opportunities which occur are often wanting. It is from a sense of this, and a wish to instance by example, and so, if I may, make more useful the preceding general remarks, that I proceed, in the rest of this address, to express some judgments on past and current events—some counsels, if I may use the term, for our consideration in reference to our future action.

The past year offers much matter for comment; but I shall be very brief, for it is but too rarely that the judgments to be expressed can be pleasant or favourable. I will not, then, dwell on the criminal blunder of the Abyssinian war, nor on the deplorable termination of the Jamaica prosecutions; I should prefer, had I time, to linger on the more agreeable consideration of English public opinion in regard to the Irish Church, the direction of which evidences the national conviction—a conviction in which all sides seem, in a degree, to share—that we owe reparation for the past, and that we are prepared to act on this conviction. But even on this point I must be brief, as also on the last one which I single out for mention, the renewal of our difficulties with China; the occasion being, not as in former wars, directly mercantile or diplomatic, but religious; due, that is, to the pernicious action of our Protestant missionaries. All I need say on this point is, that

missionaries should be left to themselves, and not be suffered to rely on the power of the country from which they come. If they have a sufficient confidence in their doctrines to think that they will make way in China, let them try the experiment fairly and suffer for its failure if it fail, be rewarded if it succeed, by the failure or the success, without involving any evil consequences to others who are irresponsible for,[1] and often opposed to, their attempt.

I need not say much of the past year from the directly Positivist point of view. There has been no course of lectures in London. Mr. Barton's exertions in lecturing in or near Birmingham have not been rewarded with the success they deserved. It is in the capital that we must begin our efforts as a rule. There the ground is best prepared. If other openings present themselves, it is our duty, when we can, to profit by them ; but it is here, in London, that we must seek to create a sphere of action as a centre for England.

In America, Mr. Edger has given a course of lectures, which has been well attended, and has led to the formation of a society. In the present instability of purposes and convictions —an instability which appears to be fully as great, if not greater, in America than in England—the formation cannot be considered equivalent to persistent action ; silently, however, all such efforts tell, and the knowledge of our doctrines and aims is spread. Apart from Mr. Edger's action, there has also been announced a Positivist Society in New York. Its absurdly heterogeneous character takes from it all value.

In India there is a certain attention being paid to our movement. In papers which circulate among the native population the subject is discussed, with what results remains to be seen. On the whole, there is no ground for discontent with our progress.

From the past year I turn to the points which I have chosen as important in reference to our future action. They are five ; one more general, the others more special ; and bearing each an important relation to one of the great branches of human action, international, national, social, and moral. The first is more general, as it relates directly to the most fundamental of all human questions—the constitution of the

[1] The action of our Government seems judicious on this head (Jan. 1870).

spiritual power, on the right constitution and action of which power it depends whether society is or is not soundly organized.

This general question embodies all others, and is common to all Western Europe, without being confined to it. It is the question of the mutual relations and independence of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal; in its shortest, most definite expression, the separation of Church and State. In one particular form it has been the prominent point in the recent elections, the issue raised on which was, as you are well aware, the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, or the withdrawal of all State support from the Protestant religion in that country. It has been—whether wisely or not it is for them to consider—the policy of the clergy of the Church of England, generally speaking, to present their Church as threatened by the same danger. And, however little this may be in the contemplation of statesmen, who naturally look to the point actually in hand, the English clergy are, I imagine, right in thinking their establishment more or less involved; but it is so rather as a consequence of the general movement in that direction, than as an immediate result of the particular measure which has excited their alarm. The 'free Church in the free State' of the Italian statesman is a vivid embodiment of the general conclusions to which the Western world is coming. And it is our part as Positivists to lend all possible assistance to the movement; to further, by all the means in our power, the independence of the spiritual power, to place all its elements on the same footing of non-support by the temporal. This is the cardinal point in our policy, so far as it is directed to remove the obstructions we have inherited from the past; just as it is the one greatest object of our constructive policy to constitute a new spiritual power capable of replacing the old. I have no doubt that what some members of the Episcopal clergy view with alarm whilst others are prepared to welcome, though not imminent, is ultimately certain, and that the union between Church and State will be dissolved in England as in Ireland. But we must remember that if the dissolution of that union is all that is secured, we are yet far from the complete attainment of our end if we acquiesce in, or have forced upon us, the old evil in a new shape. If the

State were to create and maintain in connection with itself a powerful educational machinery, it would have retained the really vital part of the Church, and might well consent to part with the less important. For the perfect separation of the two powers, the abstention of the State from the function of instruction is an indispensable condition. This statement will be seen hereafter to allow of one qualification, but, for the present, I state it in its broadest form. The State never can nor will give a perfectly free instruction. It must make its teaching subordinate to its own conservation; and if the teaching is not free, the teachers cannot be so either. Their whole position is gone; they are not a moral influence independent of and counterbalancing the temporal power, but they are its instruments, as the Christian Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, has too long been. I know the outcry that such a doctrine raises; I know the indignant protest that will be raised in the name of liberty. But liberty is not secured by the subjugation and silencing of the spiritual power. What is secured is the absence of any check on the abusive use of the various forces of society, whether such forces are intellectual or material.

On international questions, as was natural, the opinions we entertain are well known, as the expression of them has from time to time been very distinct. We are in general sympathy with the prevailing current. Peace on earth, which for centuries was the prayer of Christendom, whilst the constant existence of war was a glaring contradiction to its aspiration, and a testimony to the insufficiency of its doctrines, is still, as ever, the wish of all good men, and, under the action of the purely human movement, which we call Industry, is on the eve of becoming more and more a reality. But it is not merely peace that we desire and preach. Our object is the concert of all the component branches of the great human family—their conscious co-operation under the guidance of a common faith. This implies ultimately, and with the necessary qualifications introduced by actual differences of present state and past history, some action on the part of all, and it implies also an acknowledgment that the common interest, the republic of nations, is a prior consideration to the interest of any individual nation, of any single member of that republic. It

implies, then, in the simplest words, that no country is to be guided solely by its own interest, and that no country is ultimately justified in isolating itself on the ground that such isolation is for its interest and dignity. It may abstain for a time, and with justice, from entering the councils of nations. It is to be allowed in all cases, in the East as in the West, to be the judge of its own inaction and its own action. But it is responsible before Humanity for its judgment. It has a duty, which it is free, so far as external power is in question, to perform or not perform, but for the right discharge of which it must in the end answer. You may have seen much in opposition to this doctrine—many sneers at it. I content myself with restating it.

In the present complicated state of Western relations, and in the difficulties in the relations of the Western States with others outside them, the doctrine has a special application to the conduct of our own nation. Her whole influence, and it is great, should be for peace; but there may be occasions when, in the general interest, she may have to support that influence by action—by war, by war in the cause of peace. Rightly and firmly exerted, and exerted with the express statement that in a well-defined case she was prepared to go to war in its support, it is my conviction that England's influence might secure the peace of Europe. Two great dangers threaten it. The policy of England in regard to the first danger—that arising from the mutual attitude of France and Prussia—is, in my judgment, clear. With no sympathy for, keeping clear of the retrograde ambition equally of the Bonapartes or the Hohenzollerns, and looking solely to the great social interests of the two countries, in concurrence, as I firmly believe, with the more enlightened in both countries, certainly in concurrence with all that is most valuable in France, she might make felt, as perhaps she has done, her impartial disapprobation of any breach of the peace, and her determination to act against the side on which the responsibility lay of such breach. It is a most unfortunate circumstance, it seems to me—one which enfeebles the position of England, and makes her actions a source of anxiety—that the general feeling of her governing classes, and the language of the cautious and peaceful young statesman who was, till

the late changes, her mouthpiece, have committed her in the eyes of Europe to the formal approval of Count Bismarck's violent and evil policy—that she is thought to approve and wish for the union of all Germany under the oppressive military centralization of Prussia. Under the influence of various motives, too prominent among which was traditional jealousy of France as distinct from the justifiable suspicion and dislike of the actual French Government, public opinion in England loudly applauded a change fraught with the elements of further disturbance, tending to the re-establishment of war as the normal state of Europe, to the revival of great military monarchies, to a forced, unnatural, and unhealthy concentration, when all sound political considerations point in the opposite direction. But this error of judgment is not irreversible, and a reconsideration of her policy in a less partial spirit towards Prussian ambition, and more in the true interests of Germany, would still be of great efficacy in Europe. Such reconsideration involves no action—no interference with Germany in herself. It only goes to the removal of all partisanship from ourselves, and to the strengthening, therefore, of our European influence in the interest of peace.

The second danger is in the East—more immediately in the Turco-Greek question, but not limited to that. Here we come in contact with an obstacle arising from the intrusion into the purely human domain of international politics of a theological consideration. The Greeks are Christians—the Turks Mahometans; and, with many, in opposition to the course of our policy for several centuries, that is thought to settle the question. To us, as Positivists, the point offers no difficulty. Respecting, nay venerating, the true Christian tradition, the Latin Christianity of the West, we can have no hesitation in preferring to the bastard Byzantine Monotheism the nobler creed of Mahomet—the judgment between which Europe has long acknowledged as final. We have only to hope that our statesmen will listen to no such motives, but will act in consistency with our past history, and will resist all interference from without with the internal affairs of the Turkish empire. We may hope this with the more confidence that among the numerous evils entailed on us by our dominion in India, it has a compensation in reference to this particular

question in the presence of the large Mahometan element in the Indian population. They will be careful how they afford that population any additional cause for discontent.

To sum up, in popular language, our foreign policy, as I conceive it, it is non-intervention in the internal affairs of any nation or aggregate of nations—non-intervention for ourselves, and the enforcement on others of the same policy by energetic action, if they seem disposed to violate it. Such is the duty which her past history and present power imposes on England.

With reference to England's own political future, I single out one great point from many which might arrest attention. I choose it as a strong exemplification of what I mean, when I speak of a deliberate and well-prepared policy. It may seem to some of you not of immediate interest; yet it has great interest, and one more immediate than at first sight appears; it does not, in fact, want actuality. It is the question of the future form of government in England—the question of the Republic. No thinker, whether practical or theoretical, statesman or philosopher, can conceive the present form of government as the ultimate one; and the change will be, by the confession of all, in the Republican direction. A very near day may see a Republic established in Spain, in default, as we may say, of monarchy; as the result of the natural decay of the earlier institution and of any capable asserter of its interests. No one can say as yet that this will be the issue, but it is recognized, I believe, as not an improbable event. And any day may see the same result attained in Italy. The Southern nations kindle one another, the discredit of the existing Government is considerable, and the chiefs of the Republican movement are powerful. More certain than either, though the date is equally uncertain, is the re-establishment of a Republic in France. That great country, through its length and breadth, is vibrating to the old sounds, recognizing the imperfection of all other solutions, the necessity of clinging through danger and difficulty to the form under which she was purest and greatest. She may catch the signal from Spain, or, in case of Spain's failure, she may move first in this direction, and render it easy for Spain and Italy to follow. The exact course of events it is impossible to predict in detail,

but the general tendency may be confidently relied upon. West of us the world is sown with Republics. Under such conditions we may be sure that at a period not to be fixed, but certain to come, England will resume her noblest tradition—re-enter the path indicated by Cromwell, by Milton, and the younger Sidney, join her copartners of the Western world, and place herself as a Republic, or a union of Republics, on a level with and in sympathy with them. Nor will Germany fail to share in the movement. The present State may have raised difficulties in her path, for a monarchy based on the army is a formidable opponent; but with Republican institutions all around her, or with France alone duly organized as a Republic, the factitious creation will be found out of keeping with the true national interests, and will, with more or less ease, disappear. Be this as it may, it is wise at any rate for us who are Republicans—and, with the profoundest respect for order, Positivists should be Republicans—it is wise for us to influence, so far as we may, opinion in that direction. We insist on no immediate necessity for a change; we deprecate any violent change; but in the interest of the peaceful modification of the existing order into the new one, rendered ultimately necessary by the altered conditions of society, we should, with due attention to time and place, urge forward the considerate discussion of this question, and promote the growth, already considerable, of Republican feeling. It is not that we attach any undue importance to this or that form of government in the abstract, but on the special ground of positive advantages we are in favour of, and avow ourselves in favour of, Republican government, rightly understood. The very word itself is valuable, from its intrinsic meaning and its associations in the past, especially valuable to us here. Without any injustice, our Government may be said to be a Government of interests. Recollect, as one single and striking evidence of this, Mr. Lowe's last great speech, in accordance with the prevalent tone of the House of Commons—the speech against the acquiescence in the extension of the suffrage. The doctrine was nakedly put. You, the gentlemen of England, have had great advantages—all our social system has been arranged in your favour—will you resign this? Such was the purport of his language. It appeals not to the sense of a public interest

overriding all private interests whether of individuals or classes, but to a great class interest overriding that of the nation. And though the change he deprecated has been introduced, there is no solid reason to think that its effects will be eventually to modify this characteristic of our Government. To revive the sense of the common weal, to rise above this constant and lowering conflict of minor interests, should be the great object of all Positivist political action; and, as its symbol, we advocate a Republic in England, and in all its Western coequals. One other advantage attaches to the Republic. We reject, we abhor, the military organization of society,—we look with aversion on the great States up to their lips in bayonets and debt,—we brand as disgraceful the policy of 'blood and iron,'—we consider that the necessary condition of its extinction is the substitution, for the overgrown aggregates which yet nurture the ideas of that policy, of smaller industrial communities in which the genuine State feeling may again revive, in which 'men may dwell with their people.' Such smaller communities would evidently not be monarchies. The very conception of monarchy would die out in such an atmosphere. Republics they must be by all sound political considerations. As early, then, as it is possible to do so without violent infringement of the existing order, it is desirable to introduce the Republican form into our Government; and, as a preparation, we seek to spread the opinions and feelings favourable to its introduction.

More difficult, as more complex and belonging to a higher order of subjects, is the next point on which I offer you considerations. I select from social questions the most arduous, and, at the same time, the most urgent; that on which opinion on both sides threatens to rise, if it has not already risen, to a white heat. It is the question of the relations between capital and labour, between employer and employed, master and workman, or the capitalist class and the working classes, with its central difficulty of Unionism. No question demands more attention, more caution, more impartial study on the part of the disciples of Positivism; all of us who have leisure, and other means, should give it such study. I hardly venture to hope that even within the limits of the small body which can in any special sense be called Positivist, what I shall

say will meet with assent. Outside, it is very possible that, if read, it would excite almost equal odium, though on different grounds, from the two contending parties.

We accept—I speak in full conviction of representing on this point correctly our doctrine—we accept, in principle, the present division of the industrial class into employer and employed. We accept it not with mere acquiescence, but as a precious acquisition of the race, to be carefully guarded and acted upon. We are opposed to the co-operative system, or the system of collective capitalists, as tending to remove responsibility from the master, and confer no real boon on the workman ; whereas we wish to increase the responsibility of the master, increasing, at the same time, his power of meeting it ; and we wish to free the workman from that particular responsibility, leaving him free for the right performance of his special and most honourable social functions. From this acceptance of the inherited organization of industry,—in its principle, that is, and subject to all the modifications and changes which its abuses require,—from this acceptance, I repeat, as our standing-point, we face the question of Unionism. Its existence as a doctrine and as a fact implies that the working-men who uphold the system agree in the accepting, with us, the organization above given. The Unions are formed as a permanent protection to the workmen against the action of the present system. They do not aim at superseding it. The masters dislike this protection, and wish to get rid of it in their own interest. It is avowedly, on both sides, a simple question of interest ; the interest of each side being assumed to be immediately antagonistic to that of the other. On this antagonism I cannot now enter. It will have ultimately to be sifted, with the view of showing in what degree it must always temporarily exist, and in what degree it may, by other considerations, be made to recede into the background.

Taking the practical expression of the antagonism, the Union, as a permanent institution, as an element of the real organization of industry, it is not defensible ; apart from their reasons, often hypocritical, generally erroneous, and in the mouths of their recognized exponents too universally selfish, the masters are right in their dislike of the Union, and the

classes in society which, not immediately interested in the conflict, yet sympathize with the capitalists, have real grounds for their sympathy. A standing machinery for the expression of distrust and opposition can never be accepted as one of the inevitable conditions of industrial action. And yet, relatively to the existing state of their relations with the employers, and as a temporary guarantee of themselves against the oppressive action of capital, which acknowledges no social obligations, but moves on in its naked selfishness, the men are right in maintaining their Unions; and the spiritual power of the nation, be it vested in whom it may, should most largely sympathize with them, and lend them such aid as it may in the struggle; above all should it exert itself to avert all legislative interference in the dispute, save in so far as it may be directed to secure perfect freedom to both parties. The State may, and should, insist on order and the abandonment of all violence; but to make itself the instrument of the wealthier classes, because it is they who wield its power, would be an evil of the first magnitude. We must appeal to all who can take a dispassionate view, above all to the more temperate statesmen connected with the territorial aristocracy, to aid in averting this evil.

Freedom to combine on both sides, temperate discussion of differences, the maintenance of the Unions, and their protection as palliatives and temporary remedies—such would seem all that is required for the immediate treatment of this question. Its thorough treatment lies deeper, and requires a complete survey of the whole subject of industrial organization. To give industry, and the elements of industry, a truly social character in the place of the merely personal and individual character which almost exclusively prevails at present —such is the problem, and a problem difficult of solution practically, however easy it may seem to indicate the solution. On both sides there must be many who would be glad to be freed from the unpleasantness of the actual state, who are alive to its lowering influences; alive, also, to the amount of suffering it occasions. Here as elsewhere, a sense of duties to be performed, of a social function to be discharged, must exclude, or, at any rate, prevail over, the mere feeling of personal interests to be consulted, or of fortunes to be made.

Till there come an alteration in this direction in the spirit of the capitalist class, no check on the liberty of their workmen to combine should be tolerated ; and when the alteration has come, no check will be needed. It were the height of folly to lend the power of the State to men who are so insensible to the true bearing of their action as the present capitalists. They have had power far beyond their wisdom to manage; so much beyond that they have adopted the convenient theory that their true wisdom lies in the unfettered pursuit of their own private gain, and the result is what we see around us, that with wealth in almost untold amount, and in spite of passing checks constantly on the increase, we have on our hands—a scandal at once and an embarrassment—an amount almost equally enormous of misery in the uncared-for industrial masses, such as East London offers to our astonishment and shame.

Last of these more special questions I take one from the order of moral questions, and make a few remarks on our attitude as Positivists in reference to education. All is confusion on this subject ; and the conclusions come to scarcely agree on any point, except in the need of doing something. I have already touched on one aspect of the question, on State education, in its most general aspect. I proceed now to state, in broad outline, the conviction which, I think, we should endeavour to spread. As a temporary measure, and seeing the absolute impossibility of the true course being adopted at present, we should welcome the action of the State if it will offer to its poorest citizens, with liberal hand, the means for attaining that elementary instruction which is commonly known as primary education. As a temporary measure I say, because even this is ultimately exclusively within the competence of the Family ; but, under present conditions, the Family cannot give it. The mothers of the poor have neither the requisite leisure nor education which it should be an object of society to secure for them. This being the limit of State interference, all the rest should be left to private action ; to the Family wherever there is a just sense of the duties of the Family ; to the substitute the Family provides where, from inability or neglect or wrong theory on the subject, the Family does not discharge this function. All aid from the public

funds should be firmly refused, equally whether the object be general, or what is called technical education. The one great truth on this subject to bring home to all is this, that education, in any proper sense of the term, is the business of the Family, and in the Family more particularly of the mother. Everything that tends to obscure this truth we must, to the best of our ability, endeavour to remove. Such instruction as the young of both sexes need to enable them properly to discharge their duties in life is but a part of education, and in all cases equally must be given in due subordination to, and not in exclusion of, the Family influences. Practical difficulties must be allowed for, but not allowed to set aside the validity of this conclusion. If we hold fast by it we shall gradually find the whole subject grow clearer before us, clearer in theory, and leading us to greater clearness in action. Universities, colleges and schools, endowments and scholarships and prizes, all the whole machinery of corruption which has gradually accumulated and which is vitiating at its spring the national life and destroying the first element of all sound social union, the right constitution and legitimate influence of the Family, all cease to retain their hold on our reason, and we see them in their true light, as having done a work in the absence of better agencies, but destined to give place, however slowly, to those better agencies when they can be brought to bear. We avail ourselves, then, of such institutions as have a use, but we endeavour to avoid the creation of any new one on principles which we deem erroneous, and we aim at the gradual disappearance of those already established. Such help as we can give in forwarding the mental progress of those around us, we should give freely and unsparingly, but in a way consistent with the principle above stated, careful to avoid raising any barrier to its fuller adoption.

Such are the points I have selected for our consideration to-day; such the remarks I have to offer upon them. I invite you to give them your attention, and, if you agree with them as legitimate expressions of our doctrine, in your own way, and at such opportunities as you have, to spread them. If you differ with me as to their being not fairly deducible from our doctrine, or rather, I should say, as not being a correct rendering of it, I should be extremely glad to hear the

grounds for such difference. With other disagreement—the disagreement, that is, of strangers to Positivism—I have nothing to do. It will probably be complete and decided on most points. If any such strangers wish for explanations, however, I should feel bound, and not reluctant, to give them.

I have, I trust, spoken throughout in the spirit which I wished to preside over this meeting, with a due sense constantly before me of the obligations of the religion I profess, as in some sense, however imperfectly, a priest of Humanity. Where I have expressed any judgment on events, it has been my endeavour to base it on those obligations ; where I have stated what I think should be our guiding principles, it has, in all cases, been with reference to the direction of human affairs on purely human principles, to the exclusion of all theology, and in the interest of man's future.

Of the imperfection in the mode of treating the subjects I am fully sensible. I have been obliged to content myself with attention to the substance, and with the endeavour to carry out my main purpose, that of indicating the direction of our action, and the systematic character it should present. If I have succeeded so far, the essential point is gained. What we want for success is not merely courage to express the convictions we have formed, that will come generally with the convictions ; for the great source of the prevalent weakness is the absence of conviction. But we want another and rather rare courage, that which enables us to face the real intellectual effort required for the formation of Positivist convictions. As a rule such courage will be found to have one origin—the sense, slowly borne in upon some, more rapidly on others, that there is a power in the religion of Humanity, or that there may prove to be, on examination, such a power, to deal, as no other coexistent faith can deal, with the difficult social and religious problems of our day, with the misery and disorganization and waste in the midst of which we live. To act on this sense, indeed to have it at all, implies a human sympathy with the evils we would remedy and with the sufferers from those evils. It is, in one word, the social instinct to which we appeal. Without it, intellect will run riot, and plunge deeper and deeper in degradation ; without it, our active energies will but make us more competent to profit personally at the expense

of our kind. With it, whether our religion be Christian or human, we may serve the cause of our race, with equal moral value in the one case as in the other, with the more intelligent and rational and consistent service where no conflicting claims interfere to disturb our vision.

Festival of Humanity, in the year 81 since the opening of the French Revolution (January 1, 1869).

EDUCATION.

LET me remind you that I assume hearers in sympathy with the religious object of this meeting, and that my language is coloured by this assumption. It is enough for me to know that it is warranted in some cases; how far it is so in others I am ignorant. In some it is but too probably unwarranted.

On the Festival of Humanity, as the most sympathetic, as well as the most synthetic, of all our festivals, we naturally begin with the expression of our sympathies. And as on all similar occasions, so now, the first object of those sympathies is evidently the whole number of our Positivist body; all those who, as we, are avowed believers in the Religion of Humanity, avowed servants of the Power we ourselves seek to serve; all who collectively, or in isolation, unite with us this day in grateful commemoration of the manifold blessings which we derive from Humanity. The central body at Paris, the American branch, the scattered members of our faith wheresoever found, in the West or in the East, none but have a just claim upon us.

But whilst we necessarily feel most in sympathy with those who are in thorough communion with us and engaged as we are in the heat of the struggle, encountering the same opposition, sharers in the same hopes and fears for the progress of the same cause, we were but little in keeping with the true significance of to-day's Festival if we limited our sympathies to them. They may and should range with freedom over a far wider sphere. No narrow exclusiveness is consistent with our faith as Positivists; where such exclusiveness exists it is an imperfection, not a legitimate consequence of our views. I have, so far as I can recollect, whenever I have spoken on similar occasions, insisted on this tendency in Positivism; but

I return to it now because, in the face of a hostile and uncandid society, such as that which surrounds us, it is desirable not to leave, by our own neglect, any side unguarded; and there is, I think, a strong disposition in many quarters to suspect us of this exclusive spirit. Be this as it may, as Positivists we sympathize with all the older faiths of Humanity and with their disciples; and, first of all, with the belief which, in various forms, is held by the nations of Western Europe, and especially with the most powerful of those forms, the organization of the Roman Catholic Church, but not to the exclusion of such other constituents of Christendom as in this and other countries offer more or less of a rallying point for the opinions and actions of man. We sympathize outside of Christendom with the faith which is complementary of Christendom, bound up with it in its aspiration alike and its failure, with Islamism; as also with the Polytheistic beliefs of the East, and the Fetishism of China and Africa. Nor should we hesitate to comprehend in our sympathy those whom the progress of thought has left outside of the organized and active beliefs, the increasing number of those who either despair of any useful organization and therefore do not strive for it, or who do not wish it. Alien as they are to us in the view they take of the evils and wants of our race, they are often in real sympathy with us on the one great point of the wish and effort to serve the race. There is and can be but one state with which we can have no sympathy, and that is the state of pure acknowledged selfishness; for this, in common with all that is great in all ages, we can have but contempt—a contempt tempered, however, by the sense of our own weakness in this respect, and the right estimate of the imperfection of human nature. Nor have I yet touched the limit of our sympathies as Positivists. We must include all the beings which lend us so large a help in the maintaining and perfecting our daily life, the voluntary and involuntary assistants of man, not merely the organic races which he has domesticated, and so associated with him in his task, but also the inorganic powers, directly or indirectly beneficial to man, whether they serve for his material wants, or aid him in the cultivation of his intellectual and moral nature. Humanity is the mediator between the world and man.

Lastly, it is incumbent on us as Positivists to keep constantly in mind that it is not with the present alone that we are in sympathy, but with the past and the future. Herein lies the most characteristic feature of our religion. None other has so appealed to the power which lies in this twofold relation; no other has so insisted on the value and necessity of continuity for man; and hither we, its disciples, must come for strength. We claim, be it remembered, no mysterious sanction, no commission from any power external to Humanity; it is simply in the name of the past, in the interest of the future, that we claim to guide the present. All our powers of sympathy may find a beneficial exercise in the contemplation of that past, in the imagination of the future, and will be by such exercise kindled and strengthened for their proper action in respect to our more immediate environment.

Union with our fellow-men and with the world outside man through the power of sympathy; union with the race or continuity through the same power; such are the ideas on which I have been dwelling. Be it allowed me, as shortly as possible, in the simplest language, to touch on that which we are always too prone to forget, that which is the basis of both, our own personal union, the union that is within us of the constituents of our individual nature, to be attained, this too, through the same power. It is by sympathy, by the due training and encouragement of the sympathetic instincts, that man attains victory over his selfish personality and constitutes his inward unity in the only way in which it is reconcilable with the service of others. And I believe that the older faith of our earlier years was right in thinking that this internal unity was unattainable except in submission, in the recognition of some external power, some power outside and above the individual, that it was with reason that the love of God was made the first and great commandment. We change the language, but keep the truth it embodied. The power outside and above the individual is, for us, Humanity; and in the love and service of Humanity must we find that motor force which can secure the triumph of our altruistic over our self-regarding nature. In its most condensed expression, the object of all Positivist efforts, the aim of all Positivist prayer, should be the

attainment, in as complete a degree as possible, of these three —unity, union, continuity.

From these considerations of a more purely religious character, I pass—without, I hope, passing from the influence of their spirit—to the treatment of the special subject of to-day's address, that of Education. Rightly viewed, it is in closest connection with what has been said, as education is the great means by which we spread sympathy. I touched on it briefly last year, and in a somewhat different connection. It was then introduced partly in reference to the separation of Church and State, partly on its own merits, as an instance of the moral order of questions which the systematic conception of social and political actions naturally included. But I now take it more directly in itself, and would beg your patient attention if, at some length, I give what I conceive should be the principles of Positivist action in regard to it. I need not insist on the importance, the difficulty, nor the urgency of the subject. We are all, I doubt not, agreed so far as that; and in the last of the three I sometimes think we are disposed to exaggerate. My aim is to present a clear conception of the Positivist doctrine on the point, and then, as a matter of practical utility, to consider, first, our attitude in reference to the numerous projects which are now circulating, and then our own independent action in the matter. I conclude with some general remarks on the position and conduct of Positivism.

What, then, is education? I use the word in its ordinary, special, and limited sense; limited, that is, in point of time, to one period of life. In this sense education may be defined to be the preparation of the human being during the period of minority for the duties and position which majority brings with it. It is the complete training of the whole nature, physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral; in other words, of the affections, intelligence, and character, so far as such training can be given before the being trained enters on active life. The term is capable of wider application (and in any systematic treatment of the whole question such capability would receive recognition), but at present I wish to confine myself to this its narrower use. The exact form of the definition here given is of no importance; but substantially, I think,

all who have paid attention to the subject would accept it, though they might state it very differently.

It will be seen at once, that if we accept this definition, it implies that we only tolerate, because of its general prevalence, the sense of the word in which it is at present used, that the cry for education now so loudly raised is really not for education as a whole, but for a part of it, for a greater or less amount of instruction, of intellectual training, that is. The objection to this statement, which might be urged by those who loudly oppose secular, and insist on the necessity of religious, education, has, I own, in my eyes but little weight. I am too familiar with the educational institutions of England, with their processes and results, in which this point of religious education has received full attention, not to know that all that is meant is that one given branch of instruction should not be omitted; that place should be found in the circle of studies for some theological teaching.

We cannot too clearly keep before us that instruction is not education, but a part of it; an important, and in the present day, a necessary part, but still a part, not the whole, nor the most important part. Its value and importance are, however, such as to explain, without justifying, the encroachment by which, in popular phraseology, it has secured for itself exclusive possession of the term Education.

It is a second and more important consequence from our definition, that the period above named as the educational period should be set apart for that, its proper object; that the first twenty-one years of life should be sacred to the education of the human being; the time of preparation for certain duties be kept distinct from the discharge of those duties; the training for active life not to be interfered with by the practice of active life; and this to hold good for both sexes, and for all classes of society, for the poorest as for the wealthiest, for the humblest as for the highest.

The great difference between the most ancient and the most recent theories of education is not one that concerns the definition of the word or the scope of the education, but rather the area over which it is to be spread and the application to be made of it. The freeman or citizen was the object of ancient or medieval education; in later times the higher classes, with a

gradual introduction of the middle; whereas we consider it the appanage of man universally.

I wish to make myself quite clear on this point. You will see that it comes into destructive collision with the framework of actual society, that it involves changes of vast magnitude in the social order. To throw light upon the statement, I would take the actual state of education in England, which is essentially, I believe, that of the other Western nations, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned. We may divide the population into three great classes; one, in which the condition above given is observed, fully as to the time, if imperfectly as to the method; another, at the opposite extreme, in which the condition, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say, is wholly neglected; an intermediate class, in which it is partially observed. Take the first class, the favoured class, the class for which our whole society works together, and trace the ordinary course of an education of the higher kind in England. The daughters of this class are, from their birth to their majority, sheltered from all active exertion—this is enough for my present purpose—and they are, as a rule, sheltered within their families. A foolish haste may precipitate their entrance into social life, and shorten unduly their period of preparation; but it is so easy, so entirely in the power of this class to remedy this evil, that we may pass lightly over it. The sons of the class under consideration, as a rule, go through a different course. At an early age they leave their families for school and college; but they continue their preparation, and do not enter on active life till the time indicated, or even later. They, too, are sheltered from the pressure of the actual work of life; they have leisure and full opportunities given them for training themselves for their future position. Such deficiency as there is in their preparation does not touch the time allotted to it. There is ample recognition for them of the desirability of a long and careful discipline, however misdirected may be the discipline they actually undergo.

In broad contradistinction, in this as in other Western countries, if in different degrees in each, stands the condition of the large majority of the younger population. A very early age sees their period of preparation close—of preparation as distinct from work. They are not long sheltered, for the pur-

poses of training, from the pressure of work. There is but slight, if any, recognition of the desirability of such training. The social conditions hurry them, as soon as they are capable of earning anything, however small, into the bustle of existence. Their minority ceases with their first period of childhood in many cases, before the second period is over with all; that is, at the age of seven many are contributing to the common stock of the family; by the age of fourteen, all. And under the conditions of modern industry, an increasing proportion of the young children are giving this their contribution by labour apart from and uncontrolled by their family. In England this is more the case than in other nations of the West because of the arrangement of agricultural industry, but it is too true of all the coequals of England.

The position of the third great class is easily understood. Its children have not the full shelter of the first—they are not exposed to the full pressure of the last. A longer time and greater care are devoted to their preparation than to that of the poor, but they begin life earlier than the rich, or the professional classes. You will easily supply such qualifications as these statements require. They do so in many, perhaps in most cases, from necessity. Schooling with our large English families is too costly to be continued for all their members as long as might seem desirable to many parents, and they are consequently obliged to push their children, against their own better judgment, into actual work. But it is also in many cases on principle that this is done. It has long been a maxim—one which I believe to be as erroneous as it is noxious—that a boy cannot too soon set to his actual business. This opinion is, I have reason to think, losing some of its power, but as yet it is the prevalent one. The greatest distinction between this class and the last seems to me to affect the daughters. For the poor the pressure is equal; boy and girl alike must face the struggle at the earliest possible date. In the intermediate class a larger allowance of protection is given to the girl. Theory and practice are alike combining to do away with this distinction; but as yet it seems to me a real one, and in a measure, even in spite of present influences, likely to continue so.

Now, on the principles I have advocated, this description

should cease to be true—all such distinctions should be done away. For all alike, without any allowance for sex or class, we claim the shelter which one class alone now can command. For all the children of Humanity those who speak in her name claim this one great equality—that all alike shall have their common nature duly cultivated and trained during their childhood and their adolescence—that they shall not be called upon during that period for anything which may not fairly be considered part of such cultivation and training; and the test of its being such part may be taken as this, that it is exacted of rich and poor alike. Without attempting any explanation in detail of this last point, I may clear up my meaning by pointing out that any practical training in that which is to be the business of after years must be introduced only in such degree as does not in any way trench on the one object we have in view—the preparation of the man or woman, as distinct from any special function of their later life. A certain admixture of common practical skill, for instance, would be a useful constituent in the instruction given, but it would be so for all classes equally; or, if there is any difference, most useful for the rich, as is well drawn out in 'Sandford and Merton.' But the introduction of such an element leaves untouched the principle which I can hardly repeat too often, that the child of either sex and of every class is during its minority, its first twenty-one years, exempt from the obligation of maintaining or helping to maintain himself and family—that he is devoted to the task of preparation. He is *Sacer Humanitati.*

That it is utterly impractical, inconsistent with the very conditions of our social state, will be the judgment passed on such a conception, I make no doubt. True; but our social state will have to be altered, and most essentially altered. Without concerning myself with a defence of my position, I may say that we of the new faith accept for ourselves and call on others to join us in the task of so modifying opinion and society, that this community, this equality of education, with all that it involves, cease to be inconsistent with, rather become the characteristic of, a right social organization. Wherever this end is wholly unattained, much more wherever it is not recognized as desirable, there is a flawed and degraded society; there exist differences which are evil and removable; there

exist human beings who are not citizens of the State—not participants in the social benefits—not inheritors of the bounty of Humanity. Consequently there exists an element of discord and danger; or, what is more to the point, there exists a body which is a disgrace to all who are more favoured, and which it is their duty and their interest to raise to the same level, in this respect, as themselves. For, in regard to the spiritual advantages of human society, there is place for all —a share for all, without any one, even by the largest participation, encroaching on the share of others. Such spiritual advantages should be, like the common light and air, open to all in the full measure of their wants, without any restriction imposed from without.

Such, then, is our definition—such our aim. Then arises the important question, What are the means of attaining this education? Where is the power that can give it?

Of the three forms of human society—the Family, the State, and the Church—the State may be set aside. So far as education is concerned, it has not the power, nor has it the wish, to give it, in the sense affixed to the term in these remarks. I say it has not the wish—for the wish would involve the setting aside the Family; and this I believe no statesman of modern times ever aims at. There remain the Family and the Church. The two in combination are sufficient for the object. But so predominant is the importance of the first, that it were wise for us almost to speak of the Family as alone competent to educate, the Church lending its aid to give, in due subordination to the Family, the intellectual part of education, the instruction which the Family cannot give. In their after life, those who have been educated by the two in combination during their period of minority belong to the State, and the Church and the Family become in a measure subordinate; but in their earlier life they belong to it and not to them; the two other organisms occupy for them a completely secondary position. It is on the Family, rightly organized, that devolves the task of forming the man—of training the whole nature, but more particularly the affections and the character. The Family, too, controls and checks the influence of the intellectual training when it tends to evil, as it does in respect of the affections as a rule, and as it does too

often in respect to the character. I said more particularly the affections and character, but with no exclusion of the intellect. On the contrary, in this respect also the Family is of great influence—the influence of the Church scarcely the greater. When we consider the complex process of human reasoning, we cannot hesitate to admit the power there lies in the direction early given, in the training of the child's mind from the very beginning to sound methods and in right affections. Again, as it approaches the more purely intellectual division of its education, we attach high value to the right management of its faculties of observation, and the right development and direction of its power of imagination; and in all this stage it is still within the Family circle—it is not amenable to other than Family influences. In fact, when it passes into the hands of those who are judged competent to give the higher instruction, or at least the more difficult and more abstract instruction, it should bring with it an accumulation of just method, an aptitude for appreciation, if well-trained, compared with which the additions of knowledge made in the new period may not, even intellectually considered, have so great a relative value as is generally thought. In other words, the child may have, and should have, received the primary intellectual training which is the most valuable of all, through the instrumentality of the Family, before it becomes subjected to the action of the Church.

To avoid misconception, I may say that the instruction given through the Church is absolutely common to both sexes and all classes in kind as in degree. What that instruction is in the Positivist conception all may easily know, all here probably know. I content myself with pointing out that its exclusively scientific character is so far not at variance with the theories commonly received amongst us, as that it assumes a certain considerable amount of attention to have been previously given to language and the cultivation of the æsthetic faculties, before the entrance on the course of abstract study. Our plan differs from the received theories in adjourning the learned languages to a late period of the course, when, with their sense of historical continuity quickened by the whole character of the teaching, the pains required to master Greek and Latin may be justified in the eyes of those who take them,

and their desire to possess them stimulated. It differs also in the importance it attaches to those languages, and in the method of their acquisition. With this agreement and this difference, it differs wholly from any known scheme in insisting on the necessity—on moral, social, and religious, far more than on intellectual, grounds—of a mastery of the whole range of abstract science, so far as the great principles of each science are concerned, as alone affording a secure basis of conviction for our subsequent action in life; the object being, that is, not to secure great men of science, much less to supersede subsequent scientific study, but to form complete human beings with a sufficient knowledge of themselves and their relations to the external world, both of nature and of man.

I need hardly add that this common instruction, made accessible to all, will not be taken in an equal degree by all. Intellectual capacities differ widely, moral energy differs widely, the power of the affective stimulus will differ widely. There will then be inequalities, but none based on class or sex.

In dwelling so much on the paramount importance of the Family, I come in contact with another practical objection, that the Family is incompetent, and therefore it is of no use insisting on its functions. I feel the force of this objection, I allow its truth; and, further, that it is an objection which does not apply only here, but generally in the nations of the Western world. Whatever deductions might be made on a judicious examination of facts, its general applicability must be admitted and must largely influence our immediate practice. On this point, as on the previous one of community of education, we have a heavy task before us, most especially in the Anglo-Saxon branches of the West, that of reorganizing the Family so that it may regain or acquire the desired competence. The present state is one which no good man, whatever his belief, can accept as satisfactory. The first condition for the right performance of this task of reconstitution is a change in our conception, our common conception, of the Family. We must not limit it to the married pair and the children, but our idea of the human family should, in all cases, comprehend the three generations—the representatives of the Past, Present, and Future, the elements of continuity. The practical bearing of this on the subject of education

is immediately seen. For the great majority of mankind the work of life must ever be, in a measure, too absorbing to allow them to give close attention to the education of their children. They may contribute, and largely, but there will be interruptions and deficiencies. The defective action of the father and the mother of the Family, more especially of the father, but temporarily also of the mother, may be supplemented by the action of the grand-parents, in possession of more leisure, and bringing to the work the healthy influences of age and affection.

The changes from the present state, the economical and social changes, which the reorganizing of the Family involves, so as to give it back its competence for education, are, as you will see, very great. There is no reason, however, to doubt their practicability. On them I have no call to enter at present; enough if I remark that the essential first step, here again, is a change in our point of view. The whole stress of modern energy is directed on production, the production of material wealth; with what results all are, in some degree, aware. The true object of human society is the production of men, not human animals as the implements of material production, but of men in the true, proper sense, formed and fashioned and disciplined agents, men adequately equipped for the right conduct and true enjoyment of life. I use the term men in the generic sense, for brevity's sake. This is a far more difficult aim to set before us than the present one, but there is no impossibility in the case. The powers inherent in human society are evidently great; experience teaches this; and there is not, sober our judgment as we may, the least reason to think that they have ever been drawn upon fully, that when apparently, as at some great crisis, they have been strained, there has been no reserve power left. Nor, again, is there reason to think that the present and succeeding generations inherit an exhausted nature. Many causes have combined to give an air of weakness and lassitude to the action of the last and actual generation; but we are not warranted in assuming that it is more than temporary. The present evils are pressing so heavily on the best interests and hopes of society, that we may feel confident that with each day almost more and more are asking themselves the question,

'Is our present direction right; is there no new faith on which man may enter with a better prospect before him?' And in the universal cry for education, I see an indication that, however vaguely and dimly, men recognize that the true social aim is a moral and spiritual one, not an exclusively material and industrial one.

Such changes, then, as our theory of education involves in regard to the Family, we are prepared to accept and forward, undeterred by any charge of impracticability. In fact, I would urge on your consideration, whether it is not one great want of our time that we, in thought and discussion, refuse to be any longer affected by this bugbear; that we insist on greater freedom, larger ideas, on more adequate conceptions. It is an interesting question historically to trace how it has come about that the English mind is generally thought, and in some measure with truth, inaccessible to more general conceptions; incapable, to borrow a popular expression, of being affected by an idea. Neither general grounds nor the special history of our country warrant this conclusion, except for a particular time and state. No one of the Western nations is, I imagine, radically different from the others; deficient, that is, in any of the primary powers. And specially in England the great names to which we can point are a guarantee that in all the faculties of the mind we are, as a nation, provided. I have little doubt that of the many factors which a careful inquiry would detect in this product, one, and not the least, would be the peculiar action, since the cessation of the Puritan movement, the peculiar conjoint action of the powers in Church and State to check all more ideal tendencies. Be the answer, however, what it may, it is time for us to remedy the defect, and give all our speculations a larger and freer course. That this new turn of thought will act on existing institutions with a fusing power is as certain as it is desirable.

But whilst refusing to be bound by the fetters of a narrow and immediate practicality, or to dwarf our conceptions to the feasibilities of the present hour, we would yet give due attention to the pressing practical questions which force themselves on us, to the needs of the urgent immediate necessities. I have no wish to shirk them either in discussion or action. The views of the nature and aim and source of education,

which I have given, appear to me to facilitate our meeting them, by pointing out what we can accept, what reject, in the measures now proposed. There is, as all see, a real movement, in some sense or other, in favour of education. Examined carefully, it is almost exclusively in favour of that branch of education which we mean by instruction. More general, more widely diffused at once, and more comprehensive instruction, is one of the loudest demands of the day; and to secure the demand a hearing, or even to attain the object of the demand directly, organizations are being formed throughout the country.

I must beg your indulgence if in reference to the present propositions at first I appear somewhat too critical, almost negative, in my remarks. The positive side will come later. Looking at the history of this question of the diffusion of popular instruction, it is difficult to resist some misgiving as to the movement, its motives and tendencies—a misgiving strengthened in my mind by a quiet review of the real wants of our social state. Nor, I am bound to confess, am I convinced of the great urgency of this instructional movement, especially when I consider the extreme moderation, to say the least, of its aims, as regards the majority; when I consider, also, the whole intellectual and moral condition of the people in the broadest sense; that is, of the nation. To condense my doubts to the closest, I ask myself whether there is not a tendency in the movement to force itself forward as a substitute for other sounder changes, but changes more adverse to actual social arrangements; whether there is not, secondly, a tendency to direct it to the support of the actual economical doctrines; lastly, whether there is any sufficient account taken of the difficulties which will arise, uncompensated by corresponding advantages, if by a vast effort you rapidly secure an instructed, and yet ill-educated, population.

These, however, are general difficulties. There are more particular points which are open to criticism in the movement. Firstly, it is deeply stamped with the spirit of class distinctions; it does not, so far as I have been able to follow it, aim at forming a common national education. This may be a practical necessity, but it cannot be necessary to avoid the recognition of such a defect, and in a one-sided way to represent as a great and magnificent work of National Education

what is, from practical exigencies, a really poor effort to make amends for long accumulation of neglect. What is being done may be good, but it hardly warrants anything but a very modest self-assertion. If I am right in thinking that this class spirit is tacitly sanctioned by it, it follows that so far real sympathy with it is out of the question with one who entertains my views. The great modifier of the inevitable social distinction is Education, and you destroy its power in that direction. The one most conspicuous and peculiar evil of England is its separation of classes, and this you leave untouched by the very process which, rightly directed, has most power to touch it. You are bent on a great effort, and you are wasting that effort.

A second point is, that, so far as I can see, the movement, in accordance with prevalent theories, rejects gratuitous education on principle. It would give it freely where it must, but it would look on it as so given as an act of charity, and would rather encourage the spirit which revolts from accepting it freely—which insists on paying for it. The doctrine is that men only value what they pay for, and accordingly they would wish the poor to pay for it. I should wish the opposite principle recognized, and that for all. Rich and poor alike, all should unhesitatingly form themselves to the acceptance of instruction gratuitously, as they accept gratuitously all the rest of their education. This is but one other condition of the perfect equality in respect to the spiritual accumulations of Humanity which I have before advocated.

In close connection with these two points, I would call attention (I speak under correction) to one recent half-completed legislative measure, the remainder of which will be proposed next session. I mean Mr. Forster's Endowed Schools Bill. If I understand aright the object of that measure, it is to reinvigorate the endowed schools of this country in the interest mainly of the middle classes. I am, as I have said, adverse to all endowments for educational purposes; but if they are to exist and be used, as seems at present certain, then, in sound policy and justice, they should be used mainly and primarily for the poor—for the benefit of those who have no means of getting instruction, not for those who have. I much doubt, also, whether this is not the express destination of the

vast majority of the endowments in question, which are being turned to the advantage of another class. I question whether this bill is not a fresh application of the text which is so legibly written on the institutions of our country:—'To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.'

Even if the schools in question were originally meant for the middle classes, I should say, under existing circumstances, let them be applied to the use of the poor primarily; and if in our social state such application excluded the others, that is an evil for which the pride of the others is responsible—an evil which we must accept at present. But it seems to me monstrous to invert this process, if I am right as to their original destination, and I am sure I am in some cases. The true policy I conceive to be, to make them available for the poor, with full permission and faculties for all others, but insisting on it that the poor have the first benefits; because these are, as experience has shown, the most likely to be extruded. It is lamentable, so divided are we nationally, that where the poor go, the others will not go—just as where the rich go, the poor cannot and will not. In some cases this evil is not even left to its natural development; but, as in some recent foundations for the benefit of the upper classes, express restrictions are introduced to prevent any adventurous intruder from a lower rank from gaining the advantages they offer. This is in painful contrast with the different conduct of our fathers, and a terrible comment on the effect of our Protestant Christianity as compared with the more liberal notions of founders less clear of the traditions of Catholicism.

A third point in the present movement is the local character which it wears. It in some instances advocates the system of local rates, and the administration by boards similar to the present Board of Guardians. It seems incredible, but this is what I see stated. As a disbeliever, under present conditions, in the value of what is called local self-government, though by no means disposed to question its utility in some departments of action and in altered social circumstances, I do not see with pleasure the stress laid on the principle in the instructional movement. But I do not insist on this, as I

am confident that the course of events is rapidly bearing us to a modification of the received doctrines on this point, and that the illusion of self-government is wearing out, however slow the process.

A fourth deficiency in all schemes of National Education, which means for me the instruction of the majority of the people—the instruction of the poor—not touching the upper classes, is to me, and I should think to all who would attend to it, the limit of the time within which it is to be given; it is to begin at six, and to end at fourteen—too early, at once in its beginning and in its ending, it is little calculated to inspire any enthusiasm.

Lastly, there is the difficulty as to compulsory instruction, the doctrine which is being more and more largely accepted. I regret this acceptance. Even as an avowedly transitional measure, to compensate for omissions, I should hesitate to accept it, were it, that is, to be proposed, say, for ten years. I do not, I am glad to say, believe it is feasible. It may become a law, but all laws are not found executable; and I do not think this would. But, supposing it practicable, I yet would plead for a freer system. If the case is so urgent as you say, bend your energies to meet it freely. There are ample means to bring within the reach of all the elements of knowledge, the instruction in the simple rudimentary branches. If the upper and middle classes really believe in the necessity of this instruction being at once imparted to all English children, they can secure it without compulsion. But they will not, it will be said—it can hardly be expected of them. Some State support of private energies is necessary to give them consistency and secure their continuance. There is and must be much force in this view, from the way in which it spreads and the men who accept it. Probably numbers do so. I must at present be brief on the subject. But here are my objections for your consideration, summarily stated.

(1.) It is unnecessary; a wise action on public opinion will be adequate to secure the result aimed at.

(2.) It involves the introduction of a machinery for which we shall pay dearly in the sequel.

(3.) It has in it something of an insulting character, as implying that, if wisely offered to them, the poor will reject

knowledge. Neither for our own, any more than the poor of other countries, do I believe this.

(4.) It rests on an exaggeration of the value of that which it offers—instruction in the mere elements of intellectual knowledge. With the food you offer at present for the powers you would give, this is a consideration of great force.

(5.) The more natural, simple means, have not yet been fully tried; good instruction has not yet been freely offered to all.

(6.) It is a class regulation. I read that 'no board would venture to interfere with anyone who was what was called respectable.' It is, then, solely to press on the poor, the power you would have given, and not on what are called the respectable classes. I hope the poor will take note of this, and, whilst firmly claiming the means of instruction, insist that in their use of them they shall be as free as others.

Lastly, I deprecate *in toto* the intrusion of the State into this question beyond the limit which is proved absolutely necessary; on this, however, I need not return.

It will be clear, I think, from all I have said, what is the measure of public instruction which we, as Positivists, should wish given; given, that is, through the agency of the State, directing existing institutions or promoting new ones. May I formulate dogmatically its limits? The action of the State should be limited to primary instruction, gratuitously given to the poor, but open to all who wished for such primary instruction, adult or minor, poor or comparatively well off. Such primary instruction consists, by common consent, in those elements of knowledge which are the keys to all future acquisitions—reading, writing, and arithmetic. To these should, I think, be added, for many solid reasons, a State provision for the teaching of the two great arts, music—singing, that is—and drawing. More strictly educational than the other three even, these two arts require more aid to provide competent instruction, and the means of profiting by such instruction, than any other of the elements of instruction, and even considerable exertions on the part of the State to forward their universal cultivation would be open to no objection. In no direction, I conceive, could efforts be made, looking to

the question of primary education, more calculated to obviate the deplorably brutalizing influences of our actual social order, more cut off than any other social order of any time or country which I know of, from all that refines and humanizes life. I speak, of course, of the majority of the nation, its artisan and its agricultural population. It is the sense of this fact which should make all who are in earnest on this question of popular instruction combine to bear down the opposition offered by the various religious bodies to the opening of museums and galleries on the Sunday. It is but a narrow view of instruction which limits itself to the more direct appeal to the reasoning faculties, and leaves out of its consideration the powerful influences of the above-named and similar institutions.

To return from this digression. The gratuitous instruction within these limits offered to all by the State, would have a natural limit assigned to it, and would cease when it had reached that limit. The Family, reconstituted and become competent to exercise its educational functions integrally, would supersede, by a natural process, the State, whose action would no longer be required, or be in abeyance, or, at most, supplement any deficiency which might still remain.

Such being the degree in which, under English conditions, the State can wisely and usefully interfere, and in which, in the absence of a truer system, it is called on by urgent motives to interfere, it need not draw largely on the public revenue. The funds set apart for educational purposes are disposable for this primary instruction, and are very large. After all the discussion on the subject, after the misappropriation which has been shown to exist, it might, without misgiving, apply the superfluity of one place to the want of another. If, as I believe, it will be sound policy ultimately to divert the whole of such funds to other purposes, there can be no difficulty in exercising the freest discretion as to their distribution whilst confined to the special purpose to which they were originally assigned ; and, after the legislation of the last few years, more particularly and prominently of last year, the competence of the temporal Government to deal, at its discretion, with any such funds is no longer open to question.

If in my remarks I seem to some too critical and negative,

too averse also to the adoption of immediate remedies for an evil which I acknowledge as they do, it must be remembered that I am speaking as a Positivist to Positivists, and with constant reference to one practical question for Positivists, viz. how far should we mix, for active co-operation in the present agitation, in the various schemes proposed; how far is it wise or not to join the bodies that are now organized for action? I think we cannot keep too clear of them, cannot too completely stand aloof and be spectators merely of their actions, cannot too firmly refuse to appear as pledged to any inadequate and partial solution of a problem for which we have an adequate and complete solution. Where there is union for the purpose of discussion of the question, or for the more definite object of urging on the Government of the empire the desirability of action, mature and deliberate action in this direction, then it might be well for us to take our share, so far as we are allowed. But the present organizations aim at more; and nothing that I have yet seen of their plans or principles is of a nature to make me wish to see the members of our body in England actively taking part with them.

But this attitude of abstention in no way requires inactivity, in no way precludes our lending our aid to the carrying out of any schemes that are proposed, so far as they are useful; in no way precludes our devoting time and energy to the cause of popular instruction, even as at present conceived, and under either of its two forms, the simple primary, or the higher instruction, such as is now being commonly given by lecturers on different subjects. Wherever, without direct contradiction of our general principles, we can co-operate, we should. Many of us here have received, in the most liberal way, the advantages of the past; we have been admitted ungrudgingly to share in all that former generations have accumulated; we have been allowed to drink, as deeply as our capacities and energy admitted, at the springs of human knowledge; there has been no barrier, no stint. We may see error in our training, but we cannot see illiberality, or anything, indeed, but the purest wish that all that was good for us intellectually might be placed at our free disposal. Neither Family, nor State, nor Church, have sinned in intention against us; on the contrary, to most they have afforded, with open hand, shelter and nurture. On

none, therefore, rests a stronger obligation to impart, with open hand, to others that which we have so received; to hand down enlarged, and, where necessary, freed from the mistakes which clung to it, the tradition of the liberal measure accorded to ourselves—so far as in us lies to make all fully participant of our advantages. It is, then, but a question as to the particular form of activity in the cause of instruction which separates us, so far as we keep aloof from them, from others. We, as fully as they, recognize the duty of some action or other.

Putting aside primary instruction as that which only in exceptional cases concerns most here, though not refusing to lend our aid in this if occasion should offer, we may ask ourselves what form our action should take, so far as it is one of co-operation with the present movement or actual methods of instruction. The answer to this is, I believe, that as much as possible we should act with discretion in the prevailing direction—the direction, viz., of lectures given to hearers whose attendance is free, and implies no breaking with their family life. I put in the words 'with discretion' for this reason, that I think nothing is so wasted at present as the lecturing system. There is no attention to the choice of subjects, and one follows another in a way which is fatal to mental improvement; and there is constantly a disposition to give single lectures and not courses. Both for the teacher and learner it is essential, mentally, that this loose, crude lecture system should be scouted. It is, I believe, an unmixed evil. And in its place, it is for us, who are disposed to do our best in the lecturing way, to do it seriously and consecutively, not as the idle amusement of an idle hour, but as a real mental exercise for ourselves and our hearers—a mental exercise, with the object of imparting and gaining a consecutive knowledge of the subject we have chosen. And we should be rigid in our choice, as rigid as possible. If hearers will not come, that is not for us to care for, but no mere attractiveness of a subject should induce us to choose it; rather in choosing we should be guided by some rational view of the place our subject holds in reference to other knowledge and of its social utility. We, of all people, are not without guidance on this head. I cannot too often repeat, that in my judgment one subject above all others, in the present state of English thought and social conditions, requires the attention of

Positivists, and that is, the teaching of history. Nor do I wish here to point to the teaching of this subject on purely Positivist principles, but rather to the teaching aright and comprehensively the history already taught in our schools and universities, only taught on too fragmentary and detailed a method—the tracing down, that is, from the earliest historical times, the plain sequence of events which has issued in the formation of the actual political and social order of Western Europe. In our respective spheres most of us who are here present either are already, or might be, without more exertion than we ought to be willing to make, competent to aid others in attaining this knowledge. And its absence is, I believe, the most sensible, from a social point of view, of the intellectual wants of our time. Remember, too, it is one which, outside of us or of those who more or less loosely sympathize with us, no one will give. Nothing is more certain than that there is an instinctive aversion to historical teaching of this kind, not merely in the teachers of other religious bodies, but also in the scientific instructors of the people. Its social and political issues are not attractive to any of the existing bodies, with here and there an exception. Without any disparagement of the value of either class, with the amplest recognition of the value of much of the scientific teaching which is becoming increasingly spread, without also any encroachment upon it, we may profitably turn our attention to this department which is neglected by them.

Turning from the criticism of others, and our co-operation with others, I come back upon our own independent attitude and action; and I begin by restating what I have often stated before—my conviction that, for the full meeting of the difficulties, for the satisfactory accomplishment of the work of education in all its complexity, there is no other power but religion to which we can profitably appeal; that for the instruction of this and other nations we must rely on a religious organization; on the organization, that is, of a body of men animated by the same religious convictions, undertaking the task in the same spirit as a religious duty, and making its performance the ground of their whole existence and action, —the justification of their being an organization. In other words, none but a Priesthood can be qualified to instruct—

none but a Priesthood can duly guide society to the right conception of education, to the right conception of its more peculiar organ,the Family,and of its own action in subordination to that organ. Then arises the question, Is there such a body? There exist Priesthoods around us of more or less power and cohesion. But there is not one which would claim to answer to the description given. No clergy of Christendom—and with Christendom we may content ourselves—claims as its principal function the work of Education, in the sense in which I have used the term, or again, the work of instruction. I need not insist on this. None here would for a moment recognize the justice of their claim, if they were bold enough to make it. They have in spirit a noble function, but it is not the strictly instructional function.

The new Priesthood of Humanity, now in the slow process of formation, enters, then, on ground not previously occupied when it claims for itself the province of higher instruction as its peculiar work—its *raison d'être*—the great primary object of its existence and action, that on which all its other functions are seen to rest. It is as yet, as I said, but in the process of formation ; it needs long and vigorous efforts from all the servants of Humanity to aid it in its constitution; but, whilst recognizing these facts, we who, by the force of circumstances and the exigencies of our position, are, however imperfectly, members of this nascent organization, must not shrink from claiming for it that which is to be its appropriate province. It, and it alone, if worthy of its place, and so far as it is worthy, can instruct the children of Humanity with the complete instruction which they need for the purposes of their being. It is enough that others serve another power, and cannot therefore be consequent servants of Humanity. They might, and they will to a great extent, and most usefully, give the same knowledge ; but they cannot give it with the same logical consistency as we do. They may help us, but we finally supersede them.

Those who recognize the insufficiency of other educational schemes, the incompetence of other clergies, the necessity of some organized body for the performance of this peculiar function of instructing all gratuitously and completely—to all such I appeal for aid in forwarding the formation of the new Priest-

hood. I cannot say how urgent I think this question—how important is a steady, unintermittent effort to base on a solid foundation the fund for the Priesthood of the human faith. I say unintermittent, because if not so, there is no solid basis to rely upon—there is in fact no guarantee for the existence of the Priesthood. Immediately, this only concerns one, but that one is of the highest importance. To form a fund sufficient, both in amount and certainty, to dispense with the great pressure upon our director's energies; that is the most immediate object we can set before us. I may do what he would not do—urge this on all Positivists, and, indeed, on all who sympathize with us from outside. In one case, I have the pleasure of acknowledging a noble contribution to this purpose.

In general, then, our best co-operation towards the work of education would be the organizing of the body competent to expound its conditions, and take on itself the important duty of imparting its intellectual portion. But we need not rest in the general. Even now there is much that we can do, and to give preciseness to this remark I specify three objects for our exertions.

Firstly. Direct Positivist teaching. This may be entered on immediately by any one who is competent and willing—direct teaching of three subjects in the true Positivist spirit. The three are, Mathematics, Biology, and Sociology; or substitute for these last the more generally received terms of Physiology and History. They have a less formidable sound. I have a strong feeling that it would be wise at present—when we have, as is necessarily the case here in England, to deal exclusively with adults—to limit our efforts by a limitation of the subjects, and these three are representative subjects in point of method, and stand pre-eminent in regard to the importance of their doctrines. I urge, then, upon those who are willing to act with me the acceptance of this programme in our present state. And even in this limited programme I think our interest coincides with our qualifications, in giving especial prominence to the last of the three subjects—the more so, as we shall then be most in keeping with our Parisian centre. With this last we get clear of the heterogeneous mass of subjects which we too often see unrolled before us, and we have a very distinct field for work.

Secondly. I think we should keep before us the question of acquiring some room or rooms where lectures might be given, where even more elementary teaching might be given, if wanted—a Positive school, or institute, as it might be called. This is a point which already has struck some of our body; I can only beg of them not to lose sight of it, but to see how far and when it is realizable. One of the greatest public wants, quite apart from our views or interests, is rooms where teachers might meet their audiences. There should be such in all quarters of London; but at present, if this want were met, it would probably not be met for us; we should be kept out if possible. So it remains essential for us, in any case, to see whether we can provide ourselves with a 'local habitation'—a seat of Positivism.

Thirdly. I commend to your notice and thought the formation of a Positivist library, open to all Positivists, and indeed to others who might under fair guarantees wish to use it—a free lending library, with the view of giving effect to one of the most social institutions of our system; for such is the Positivist library, as formed by Auguste Comte. In Paris there is one already at work, and a branch in one of the suburbs, Puteaux; and there is really no reason why we here, who are so familiar with that kind of thing, should not place before ourselves for more or less speedy realization this project. It would be a small library, strictly confined to the list as at present given. In the future, modifications may be introduced, but at present we should strictly limit it to the works named. So we might to a constantly-increasing circle offer for their study the great works of the past—its poets, its scientific writers, its historians, its religious and moral authors, in sufficient and unexclusive variety. The most peculiar social value of the institution lies in this, that, by making us all acquainted with the same writers, it places our minds in relation one with the other, while the present system of undirected, discursive reading has the contrary effect. Such are the three practical aims which, in connection with our subject of Education, I suggest to the English Positivists, and which are, in fact, the only practical aims over and above the maintenance and spread of our body.

It is an easy transition from what we have to do to what

has been done. The retrospect of the past year, as it affects Positivism, is much as usual for England; there has been little distinct progress, almost less than usual; yet there has been progress, and occasional intimations have reached me of interest in our cause in quarters where I had not expected it. There has been some discussion of Positivist questions, and plain proof given of the hostility to our movement which animates the educated and scientific classes. But the movement is happily not confined to England—it is an Occidental movement; and in America and in France the account is better. There are signs in the former country of real attention to Positivism. One remarkable sign is the establishment of a chair of Positive Philosophy in Harvard College. And there has been also increasing co-operation in our practical objects. Nor in connection with the Anglo-Saxon branch of our Church should I omit to mention the existence of sympathies, in some cases resting on real knowledge, among the Hindu population of India; sympathies not in all cases, though in some, traceable to direct action on the part of English Positivists. In France the retrospect is still more favourable. Never has the movement there been so hopeful as it has been last year. The most satisfactory feature is the increasing number of adherents amongst the working classes. In Paris and at Puteaux there is a group of considerable importance; and the cause has made progress in the south also —at Bordeaux.

Outside of our own body there are, in the events of the past year, several which interest us as bearing on the progress of disruption of the older order, one necessary condition of the establishment of the new. The legislation on the Irish Church is a step towards the object of which I spoke last year, the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers—a movement common to all Western nations, and, as such, sure ultimately to reach England. There have been other similar signs. I may instance the change of legislation as to oaths, which allows of a man's binding himself without any theological sanction; the movement in the Universities for the complete abolition of all religious tests; various occurrences within the English Church, the decorous and cramped machinery of which cannot indefinitely sustain the irregular action to which

it is being subjected. The ablest of its bishops, I mean Dr. Thirlwall, predicts, I am told, in common with many other observers, a breach within itself; and, even at present, its members are leaving it for one faith or another. Apart from the English Church, three other bodies, claiming to be in some sense churches, have, I am told, entered on active existence this year. All these are evidences of the disorganization of religious opinion, all show us that some new construction is needed; lastly, all constitute for us the troubled and difficult environment through which we have to reach our end. We accept cheerfully the conditions of the struggle. We claim for others equally as for ourselves the most unlimited freedom.

In the statement of general principles, in the remarks on our practical action, not less than in the review of our present position, it is a comfort to think that I do not speak as the organ of a merely English movement; that I belong to a body which is independent of national differences, and which is in character strictly Western, if from circumstances mainly French. I would wish to accentuate, as strongly as possible, the intimate connection between English Positivism, so far as I have to do with it, and that of France. We are not an isolated, a national Church; we think the epithets fatal to the very idea of a Church. We would repudiate the narrow tradition of the national Protestantism. We cannot, as Positivists, over-estimate the importance of a constant recognition of our connection with a European movement. And it is the sense of this close connection which often enables me to use language from which I should shrink as exaggerated, if I only spoke in the name of our own English body. But, taking all the constituents of the new Priesthood into consideration, I do not hesitate to claim for them and their action a great and increasing utility. This claim I feel to be justified, though I acknowledge the smallness of their numbers and the weakness of their position. But the system of Positive religion, as that of any other religion, can only become a living reality by the action of men upon men; and, insignificant as the results may appear to the eye of the spectator from without, if the future progress of the cause be, as I assume that it will be, the establishment of a universal faith, then the earliest links in the chain of action by which that great end has been wrought

out will be seen to have had an eminent value. Nor can I doubt that even now it is no weak boast to say that the combined action of the few disciples of the cause has powerfully nfluenced opinion in this and other Western countries. We, who have given ourselves fully to that cause, should soberly estimate our efforts and their results, and use—we have ample means of doing so—for this purpose the tests supplied by friend and foe alike. But, when we have exercised our soberest judgment, we need not end with a sense of discouragement; we may be quite certain that our action is of value; we may, without arrogance, assume that the ever-increasing attention and interest manifested in our movement is in a perceptible degree traceable to our own instrumentality.

This leads me to another question—the manner in which our religion is to be spread. We to whom it came at a comparatively late period of life—at a period when we had lost the 'first spring in the pursuing'—whose defective education had left us marred for its appreciation, and bound to expose ourselves to the exhausting influence of its difficult assimilation—we who, in spite of all these obstacles, have yet accepted it with profoundest conviction as the guide of all our thought and action, the satisfaction of all our feelings—we, I say, cannot be expected to entertain the idea that a complete intellectual mastering of all its scientific bases is a necessary condition for its acceptance. It were against our own experience to do so. We believe that where men have drifted away from their earlier beliefs, or where they have never had a belief but yet are not averse to one, they are justified in accepting the new faith we offer, if it approve itself to their feelings as a scheme of life and action; and that not only are they justified, but that it will be by this process that in the present and immediately succeeding generations men will largely become disciples of the new Religion. And their conduct would be strictly rational, for of the three constituents of logic, they would be but obeying the logic of the feelings, which is a more powerful, and often a surer, guide than the mere intellect. We may depend upon it, that if we stand conspicuous by the offer of a system of great comprehensiveness and consistency, adherents will flock to that system without waiting to inquire whether in all points it is justifiable

by the strictly reasoning faculties. Still more will this be the case if that system appeal powerfully to the other important factor in human reasoning, if it be competent to meet the demands of the imagination. The penalty to be paid for such confessedly incomplete adhesions will be their instability. It is my belief that for all of either sex there is now, when not preoccupied, ample justification for adhesion, and that there are full means within their reach for arriving at a sound decision whether they will adhere or not; that, to be quite definite, to all English readers, the 'Catechism' and the 'General View of Positivism,' but more especially the 'Catechism,' offer a sufficient exposition of the subject for them to make up their minds whether the system is one which satisfies them or not. In many cases even this amount of labour would be superfluous, for their keen interest in social well-being, acting in conjunction with distrust and dislike of existing beliefs, will lead them into the support of our cause. They would not waste their life in inaction; what they believed has become distasteful to them; the great idea of Humanity, of a common human interest, attracts them, and they do not hesitate to follow the impulse.

In the views I have throughout expressed, there is evidently in greater or less degree an antagonism to existing institutions. This is a necessity of our position. We must be aggressive, offensive, in both senses, I fear, of the term. We cannot bring forward a new faith without aggression on the old. However constructive we may be, from one point of view we must necessarily be revolutionary. True, that where men have a belief, and are satisfied with that belief, we do not seek to disturb them; true, that we pay regard to times and seasons; true, that we respect and value all organizations that have power in them, so far as they have power; but all this in no way invalidates my original assertion that we are aggressive. We avail ourselves of all reasonable opportunities of spreading our faith; we push forward solutions of actual difficulties which are averse to all the prevalent doctrines; we praise and we blame freely, and in praise and blame alike we differ from the majority of those around us. We cannot be simply defensive; it were suicidal to be so. I have never been an advocate of a cautious policy or of a defensive attitude. Less

than ever do I feel inclined to it now, when that to which we are opposed is yielding in all directions and affording constant opportunities for skilful attack. All we have to regret is that our small forces do not enable us to avail ourselves, to the full, of the opportunities so offered ; that the constant victorious advance of our cause is much slower than it need be from the want of a sufficient number of adherents.

Language like this may seem, at first sight, opposed to that with which I began this address ; it is not so in reality. The large sympathy which I there advocated must be reconciled with the antagonism which all see to exist. It must preside over the struggle in which we are engaged, not put an end to it. In ordinary war it has ever been thought an essential mitigation that the contending parties should courteously recognize each other's honourable claims. It is so in the war of philosophers and faiths. They all have one common object with our own—the attainment of such theoretic and practical truth as may guide man more wisely in the conduct of his existence. So in the particular question which has been treated we all have a common object; we differ, perhaps, very widely as to our means. Nothing that I have said in opposition to the conclusions of others is meant to obscure the agreement which, I think, we have with them in the end they propose to themselves, if not explicitly, yet implicitly—such end being the good of their fellow-countrymen, as they conceive it.

I have spoken, as I ever wish to speak, with freedom, with the full liberty which should characterize the utterances of the new Priesthood, the claims of which, and the position of which, in the presence of the old, I wish to uphold to the full.

And in my particular subject of to-day I have wished to place prominently before you the broad human view of Education, cleared of all sectarian or other distinctions. In the degree in which I may have succeeded shall I have answered the religious purpose of my address—evoked and stimulated your larger human sympathies.

Festival of Humanity in the year 82 since the opening of the French Revolution, January 1, 1870.

RELIGION OF HUMANITY.

I NEED hardly ask you this year to turn your thoughts on Paris and our Positivist brethren there. Naturally, your sympathy with them must be keener than ever it has been. We cannot but feel for their anxiety and danger as individuals; and, more than this, we cannot but feel how much is involved, quite apart from their individual selves, in their passing safely through that anxiety and danger. May they meet to-day in fair hope and cheerfulness, prepared for either issue, and confident in their power, so far as they survive it, to turn either to good results! The latest account I have had, probably about December 18, was favourable in general, quite favourable of the strictly Positivist body, though it spoke of the alarming illness of one of those who have sympathized, and, to a considerable extent, gone along with its action, the accomplished and agreeable M. Janet, well known for his various publications—amongst others, for his publication of 'St. Bernard on the Love of God,' one of the books in the Positivist Library, and presented by him to our collection here. With this exception, all were well, in all the senses of the word.

After Paris, we should call up before us the other centres of our faith or its isolated members; centres, as in Bordeaux, Marseilles, and America; isolated members elsewhere, in India, in Ireland, or in our own country. On this day none should be absent from our recollection—none of the avowed servants of Humanity.

The interruption of our communication with France has prevented our receiving the annual circular. This is partly my doing. To avoid mistakes in regard to our action here I had asked for a proof, and this led to some slight delay. Still,

as I received it on August 15, and returned it the same day, there was time for it to have reached us before the investment of Paris. But we cannot wonder if, during the excitement of that time, this matter escaped notice, or was impossible. Its absence is to be regretted on all accounts, more especially as the paper contained the necessary information as to the lawsuit between the executors of M. Comte and Madame Comte. The issue of that suit, I may here state, was decidedly in favour of the executors, who, with some slight restrictions, were placed in full possession of the papers of M. Comte, which had been under sequestration since 1857. And there is now no appeal open from this judgment. The proceedings, in full, were announced for publication, and will doubtless be published if the war do not interfere ; but in that respect, as in so many others, we are exposed to great risks. The circular also spoke, if I remember right, of the formation of Positivist centres in the two great French cities I have mentioned, Marseilles and Bordeaux. That at Lyons, which existed some years ago, has disappeared with the death of its energetic leader—another instance of the importance of a given individual. As soon as communications are reopened, which must at latest be now not very far off, whatever the event of the siege, M. Laffitte will, I have no doubt, transmit us the document.

In America the past year has seen, by a combination of circumstances, a certain change in our action ; and the Positivist centre, so far as there is one, is at present, by common consent, in New York. The Positivists, more or less complete, resident in or near that city, have united for joint action, and have, on more than one occasion, spoken their opinion on the course of events. I am in correspondence with the president, whom they all agree to accept as worthy of their confidence, and I hope that the correspondence may lead to useful concert on both sides. But there will be need of caution, as more than one of our American co-religionists announces to me that the form Positivism will take in America will be different from that which it takes in France and England—an announcement which naturally excites anxiety. And therefore, whilst desirous of co-operating with all who are in any degree sympathetic with our doctrines, I feel it incumbent on me to state, at this early period of our connection with this

modified American centre, that we in England are not and cannot be responsible for any differences in statement or in the conduct of our cause which may appear in America. In speaking of differences, I do not mean to insist on possible or actual divergence in regard to this or that concrete question; as, for instance, on the late conduct of Russia, which, not unnaturally, under all the circumstances, receives a different judgment, I am told, in America from that which has been accepted here. Such divergences in our present state will occur, and must be allowed for.

Leaving such cases out of the question, I own that I find it hard to understand what the differences can be in the general presentation of Positivism in this or that *milieu*. I find it hard, in consequence of the unity and coherence of the doctrine—hard also when I consider the essential agreement between the two countries. Both are Western nations; both have attained nearly the same stage of development; and, under all the essential aspects of life, both offer the same problems for solution, the same evils to be remedied, and would therefore seem tolerant of the same remedy. There are superficial differences, but none which penetrate sufficiently deep to interfere with the correctness of the above estimate. And I will express my hope that, as the conceptions and doctrines of Auguste Comte are more thoroughly weighed and assimilated by those who agree with us in America, they will see that the interpretation of them, and their application as adopted by M. Comte's European disciples, are legitimately deduced; and, as being legitimately deduced, are as suitable to the phenomena of American life as they are to those of European life. It is earnestly desired that there may be no wide difference in our mode of action, no difference which may not be accounted for by the superficial distinctions I have recognized. And as, whatever else may be said, we here in Europe have for a long time, and under great difficulties, acted on a definite plan, and, if with great caution, yet still with firmness and without finding any necessity for change, adopted a certain direction, and found that direction at once adequate to our needs and susceptible of growth, we may fairly call upon the American Positivists to hesitate before, under the apparent peculiarities of their case, they swerve from that direction and enter upon another course. We here have ever held that all

means are not good; that immediate success is not our object; that one essential point in our action is that it be not over-hasty; that, in addressing others with a view of spreading our religious convictions, we adopt no measures which are inconsistent with our own self-respect, and with the respect we owe to those others; that we are not of those who would proselytize in season and out of season; but that, having a great cause, we advocate it with calmness and with dignity, leaving to others the responsibility of its acceptance or rejection.

I make these remarks because I think that there is a tendency common to us and to the Americans, possibly somewhat stronger in them than in us, to overvalue immediate results; and I offer these considerations against that tendency to those who are naturally anxious for the success of the cause they have espoused. It would be desirable, I think, if it be not asking too much, that, where they differ, they should adjourn the point for further consideration. There is often no urgent necessity for insisting on a certain thing; other things may be done, and the disputable measure may stand over. In carrying out a comprehensive scheme of political and social reorganization, concession on minor points will be occasionally necessary on the part of all; the more so, as few of us are really so thoroughly masters of the scheme in all its entirety as not to feel distrustful of our own judgment when it runs counter to this or that detail, and, as distrustful, ready to waive it. Such, as I conceive it, is the true attitude of disciples; and it is to the disciples of Auguste Comte that I am now addressing myself—to those, that is, who accept in full his religious construction.

I would say a word or two upon the position of our cause in India. It is evident that in that country two widely different elements have to be taken into account. The Positivist movement in India, so far as it concerns the Europeans resident there, is a different thing from the same movement as it concerns the natives of Hindustan. In the first case it is similar to, and a prolongation of, our own movement in Europe, and its interest—and the interest which attaches to it is great—arises not from any dissimilarity in itself, but from the difference of external circumstances. It affects, that is to say, those who by their position are in their varying degree the

governors, and in a certain sense the guides, of the vast population amongst which their lot is cast. It were difficult to overrate the good that might result, supposing that a large or sensible proportion of the English rulers of India were indoctrinated with, or modified by, the religion of Humanity. Whilst it conferred upon them the benefit of sympathy with the creeds and practices and social order which they saw around them, it would strengthen their intellectual grasp of the difficult problem which the government of that country presents, and it would stimulate them to a temperate but unrelaxing exertion in the modification of that government. The English Positivist in India has a great field before him, both in his direct action there, and in his indirect action upon opinion at home.

There remains the other movement—the movement, that is to say, amongst the native population—a real movement, and one also equally of great interest. So far as Positivism is adopted by the native mind, it seems in the larger degree to be what I am accustomed to call the incomplete form that prevails. It is Positivism as presented by Mr. Mill or Mr. Lewes—Positivism under its philosophical or even scientific aspect which is the most generally prevalent—the method, not the religion. This is the conclusion I have formed from the information given me; and, whatever the ulterior results may be, the more immediate fruits of this movement are not satisfactory. The old belief is shaken off, but the consequent disturbance issues in no real substitute, and the mental and moral state suffers from the negation. But, side by side with this, there is a much more limited movement in the direction of complete or religious Positivism. One complete and thoughtful adhesion on the part of a cultivated Indian gentleman I have received this year; and I have reason to know that others are following his example,—that others with him are anxious to reap the full benefits which the religion of Humanity offers to its converts. These native adherents, this first ingathering into the fold of Humanity from the Oriental nations, have, no less than their European brethren, a large field of usefulness before them. Intellectually, they start with the advantage over them of a more thorough sympathy with those among whom they are to work—a great

advantage in their use of the power given them by their new faith. In the light of the Positivist synthesis that is, they may avail themselves of their already firmer hold on the past history and present condition of their race, both to understand more completely and to guide with more prescience its future development. Morally, they are relieved from the natural impatience of the domination of foreign rulers, and are placed in the frame of mind best adapted to secure such benefits as, mingled with its many evils, that domination confers; whilst they look forward with confident hope to the inevitable if distant cessation of the foreign rule, and can direct their own and others' action to the attainment of that end.

I have hitherto considered the two movements separately; but there is no reason why they should not combine—in fact, there is every reason why they should. One great evil of the English position in India is the wide chasm which separates the haughty foreign race from its native subjects. Naturally the strongest ground for the existence of this separation lies in the diversity of religious faith. We may take it for granted—I know no observations which run counter to this remark—that in Western Christianity there lies no power to bridge over the chasm that, whether by the direct influence of missionary teaching, or by the indirect agency of our revolutionary education, it is equally beyond hope that the Hindu, any more than the Chinese or Japanese, will accept the religion which in the first case his conqueror offers. But in the faith which we proclaim—a faith based simply upon common human facts; a faith which sympathizes with and seeks to develop the religion of his fathers, instead of condemning it; a faith which comes to him with no associations of conquest or degradation, but from those who acknowledge with regret the wrongs done him, and announce it as one of their great objects to obliterate all traces of dependence; —in that faith, when he comes to share it with the Western world, the Hindu may feel that there is a power capable of reuniting those whom circumstances have so parted. The English Positivist, on the other hand, by virtue of the same faith, will be able to act in concert with the native disciples of his own religion. The bond may be complete and fruitful, and to establish it is all the easier, as there already exist

intermediate links—Englishmen, that is, who mix more with their own countrymen—and are therefore admirably calculated to interpret each to the other. From every point of view there is a great satisfaction in our Positivist connection with India. Few things could show more strikingly the universal applicability of our doctrine, the capacity for union of the most discordant elements of the race which is inherent in the Human Catholicism of the Future.

If in our review we pass to the three kingdoms of which the United Kingdom is composed, in Ireland we find no numerical increase of the Positivist body. There have been indications in the newspapers of attention being directed to the subject; but, so far as any direct communication is concerned, either with us here in London or our common centre in Paris, the case is as I have stated it. We have still the encouragement derived from the warm sympathy of the few who there believe in our doctrine; and we have, in Mr. Hutton's case, the most valuable co-operation in the common object. I again recur to the subject of his publications on the present war, especially to the last, which in every respect all who have read it feel to be most admirable. His other publications upon matters more immediately concerning Ireland ought, I should have thought, to have drawn his countrymen's attention to a system which shows itself through them so qualified to deal with their national difficulties. Be this as it may, it is clear that at present the Irish hold aloof from us, and do not recognize the assistance which we offer them.

In Scotland we have hitherto, so far as I know, had no footing. Both in the Press, and from other sources, there are indeed signs of interest in our teaching and action; but there the matter ends, and no definite adherents come to us from Scotland proper. This may be accounted for partly by the strong hold which Presbyterian Protestantism has upon the nation, still more in all probability by the peculiar mental and moral attitude of the upper and middle classes. The strength of Protestantism in Scotland may be estimated by the fact which I have mentioned before, that it has determined the sympathies of the nation in the present European struggle. The mental and moral attitude of the upper and middle classes is, I conceive, peculiarly unfavourable to our views,

from the intensity of its national and local feeling, and the strong prudential character, the unhesitating adhesion to the theory of enlightened self-interest, which, so far as I can judge, is extremely prevalent in Scotland—the secret of their success as compared with other nations, and the source of much national pride. In time, no doubt, these opposing causes will lose their power, the nobler side of the Scotch character will assert itself, and the decay of belief, even now sufficiently general in Scotland, together with the crying social evils which fester there, as much, to say the least, as in any part of the United Kingdom—the evils of its agricultural and manufacturing system—will combine to force attention to what we offer in the way of remedy. But at present there is but little prospect of any movement there, unless it be among the working classes of the large towns. I say this, because I have noticed that there are meetings at which some parts of M. Comte's works are read ; I do not know which parts, nor do I know what is the character of the meetings ; but, so far as it goes, it is an evidence of a favourable disposition towards the subject.

In England, during the past year, we have made a great advance. When on the last anniversary of this festival I mentioned certain objects as desirable, I had little expectation that we should, by the next anniversary, have got so far towards their attainment. We have been now for nine months in possession of this room, and the gain to our cause has been, and will be, undoubtedly great. It gives us a centre of action, a place where those who wish to hear more of our teaching may come, as well as a rallying point for ourselves ; and it gives us, moreover, what is on all grounds so valuable to us, a sense of permanence. It gives us the unity of place in exchange for the unpleasant but necessary changes to which we were previously driven. It enables our associations to fix themselves, and to gain the strength which fixity gives. It is in the highest degree calculated to promote our sense of Order. There is good reason, I think, to hope that it will give a very strong impulse to our Progress. Nor is it the mere room we have, but in the collection of the busts of the calendar which ornaments our walls, together with the pictures which, as the room becomes dryer, may be added in increasing number, we

see not merely with gratitude the liberality of our members, but the evidence of that worship of the dead which is characteristic of Positivism, and the beginnings of that artistic development which it sets before it as one of its great ends. None can enter the room and give the most passing attention to that series of busts, without being struck with the historical character which attaches to our religion. They should be, and will be, a valuable impression for all, and the Positivist cause is much indebted to those who have placed them there. Time alone can show how much.

A second object, which I mentioned last year, has also been in no inconsiderable degree realized. A good beginning has been made of the Positivist Library, which is meant for the gratuitous use of all Positivists, and of those who, without being Positivists, may wish to avail themselves of it—if they give sufficient guarantees. It is far from complete ; but the progress made is satisfactory, and I have little doubt will continue to be so. It is, I think, to the historical branch of it that we should now more immediately turn our attention. I mention this on account of the great immediate importance which attaches to the spread of historical knowledge. But each will give as his means or his taste dispose him. I need only add that, so far as it extends, it is now open for use.

The third and greatest object of which I spoke last year, and to which, as the greatest, I then assigned the first place, was the institution of some direct teaching. This, too, has been in a degree realized. In one form or other, this room has seen various efforts for direct education. Those efforts have chiefly borne on one of the three subjects enumerated ; on Sociology, that is. Mr. Beesly's Sunday evening lectures take the historical side ; my own, on Sunday mornings, take the more practical and religious side of this subject. In the same direction have tended the various meetings which have been held in the room. They were educational, only more indirectly so. What has been done is, however, but the beginning, though all such beginnings are proverbially the most difficult point. We hope gradually to add to our teaching, till by necessarily slow steps, and after a long time, it culminate in the full Positivist conception of the intellectual training of

the adolescents of both sexes. The goal seems distant, but we doubt not we shall reach it.

Education, as you are aware, is to us a question of the Family; and we should refuse the name to any such training as that for which we have now, with much hubbub, got a State machinery established. From that system of primary instruction, with all that there is objectionable in its principles and details, we should persistently hold aloof. We may watch it with more or less of curiosity and interest, but we may not mingle with it. We recognize, however, as fully as any, the want which in its odd way it seeks to supply. We recognize, that is, that owing to the defective social arrangements of this country, the children of its poor are left without the means for that training of their faculties, whether of conception or expression, which is requisite as the basis for higher intellectual advance. We recognize that their families are unable to give them this; and that, till such time as they are able, we are not exempt from the duty of helping them. It is therefore incumbent on us, I conceive, to set before ourselves the question, what means we have at our disposal, and what are the requisites for our offering, to the measure of our ability, some contribution to this work of primary instruction. One material requisite I see to be necessary under the present condition of things, but I do not see my way to its attainment; and I therefore simply state it as an object to be kept before us when time and opportunity offer, so that we may have a precise conception of what we want. It is a room, clean and well ventilated, and fitted for a school-room for the class we aim at teaching. But, without this, there are amongst us probably some of either sex who will be willing and anxious to co-operate in this work of primary instruction; and who possibly, if they keep their attention upon it, may find the means of giving effect to their wishes. My immediate object in these remarks is to guard against any misconception of us as indifferent to the want of such instruction, and to the movement which engrosses the attention of so many. I have no wish to try and goad you into any immediate action. Full consideration should be given to each step we take, its difficulties must be fully examined, the probabilities of its being maintained also must be carefully weighed; for, as much as possible, we should aim

rather at not receding than at a rapid advance. When we move forward, in these educational matters especially, which touch the most proper as well as the most permanent function of the Positivist Priesthood, we should take all precautions against having to abandon our position. Often, then, it will be advisable to mention a given object as desirable, even when we are quite certain, on a sober judgment of our means, that it will be a long time before it is attainable. It will not unfrequently happen, I hope, that this time may be shortened in consequence of our attention being directed on the object and on the means of its attainment.

I have been more explicit than usual on the state and prospects of the Positivist movement, for this reason, that, in the absence of communication with Paris, our organization here has more responsibility laid upon it. My remarks have been limited, as you will see, to that movement in its own proper sphere; and from this point of view they will be complete, if I add, that during the past year, and especially during the latter part of the year, I have received a larger number of complete adhesions than in any former year. The test I take is that which I have always taken, the recognition of the duty of subscribing—the amount of the subscription is unimportant—but subscribing regularly and permanently to the central sacerdotal fund. The number of these fresh subscribers is still but small, the progress made is apparently unimportant; but we have always been aware that our advance in this respect must be slow, and therefore any decided improvement is a real encouragement.

Over and above this more immediate Positivist sphere, the past year has given occasion to more prominent political action on the part of our body. The urgency of the need has demanded great effort, and the effort has been made. For many years past—in fact, from the earliest rise of any organization in England—one or other of us has spoken on all the great questions which have arisen. We have felt it incumbent on us to let no important occasion pass without a temperate statement of the mode in which our system would deal with the difficulty. But in the present year more has been done; we have spoken and acted with more insistence and frequency. At other times we have aimed at modifying opinion in the direc-

tion of some conclusion which there was no prospect of seeing adopted, except after a long period; or we have put forward general principles of policy which might almost insensibly act upon men's reflections, and their actions therefrom resulting; or we have given utterance to strong but well-considered protests against existing political errors or crimes. But in the last few months the condition of things was different, and we altered our action accordingly. It seemed our duty, whilst we indulged no hope of immediate success, to use our utmost endeavours to stimulate the apathetic public opinion of this country, and through it to act upon our timid, improvident, and impolitic Government, so as to awaken both to a sense of what Mr. Hutton rightly terms Europe's Need and England's Duty. We have spoken as citizens of England in favour of a well-defined and vigorous course of action, but we have never lost sight of the due control to be exercised by the idea of Humanity, and by that of its more immediate organ, the Western European State-system. We have, if our utterances are candidly viewed, spoken, that is, as Western Europeans, and not simply as Englishmen. Our language has been in favour of France, it is true, but it has been so in no partizan spirit. We wished for, and we welcomed, the early defeats provoked by the unwise and incompetent action of the French Government. We did so, though aware that, ill-judged as that action was, there was both in the ideas that have hitherto governed Europe, and in the existing condition of her relations, much of palliation if not of excuse. We were aware, that is, that in the feeling and organization, both political and military, of her Prussian rival, there lay—again taking the actual ideas for our groundwork, I cannot insist too much on this qualification—a real danger for France. And therefore it is, that from the very beginning we have not hesitated to consider the greater guilt, the heavier responsibility, in this European disorder, as resting on the Court of Prussia. But whilst speaking, to a superficial judgment, merely in favour of France, it has been, I repeat, in no partizan spirit. We have not held her to be by any peculiar law exempt from the consequences of her mistakes; we have attached no peculiar sacredness to her political greatness, or the integrity of her soil. But whilst never failing to recognize her pre-eminence, the outcome of past European history,

a pre-eminence which no German conquest can shake, we have spoken quite as much in the interest of Germany as in that of France. We have viewed both equally as constituent members of one great body politic, and have wished equally the peace and happiness of both. In the policy we have advocated as the right one for this country to pursue, we have had as our object the setting a limit—the repression, if I may use the term—of the Prussian spirit of aggrandizement, a spirit fatal to all Western Europe, and in the first instance fatal to the best interests of Germany. It is a pleasure to think that in all our language on this great question there has been, wherever the strictly Positivist body has spoken, a complete and recognized convergence. Guided by the clear teachings of our system, we have, however widely separated, in the East and in the West alike, without previous concert, arrived at the same conclusions, allowing for such necessary differences in point of time, or on other minor points, as will always exist where considerable numbers are concerned. This unity of sentiment and action is a source of comfort to us within and of influence without. It has, as I said, been generally recognized, in spite of occasional misinterpretations. And it is the more remarkable, because it has had the character I have attributed to it—of freedom, that is, from any exclusive partizanship, the recognition of the true interests of both the contending parties. For it is far easier to combine men in a blind partizan cry than in a deliberate and well-weighed judgment of conflicting claims. I speak, of course, of the general spirit of our expression and action, not of this or that particular phrase which might be quoted against us.

Two great ideas run through the whole of what we have said and done—the obligations of Western citizenship, and the duty of upholding them even at great sacrifice. We may, I think, with just pride, contrast our language and action in its plainness and essential agreement with that of any other religious organization as at present existing in this country. We are entitled to ask, why it is that on this as on similar questions, all those organizations, in most cases tacitly, in some explicitly, renounce all guidance, contenting themselves too often with mere silence; and when they speak, uttering but a feeble wail over the sufferings of the combatants, or explaining, in a

Pharisaic spirit of self-congratulation, what they are pleased to call the action of retributive Providence for the sins of the weaker nation. Nor if we turn to the attitude of our statesmen need there be any change of feeling. They have forgotten the statesman in the preacher, and dealt largely in moral lessons and unauthorized interpretations of the action of that Power with which they claim so great a familiarity; and, instead of bending their efforts to avert the dangers which the blindest now see to be impendent over Europe, they have taken refuge in unpractical considerations as to what amount of punishment is due to certain defects of national character and action. 'You cannot indict a nation,' said Burke; and any one calling himself a statesman ought to have been aware that to punish a nation is not a question for human policy to deal with. The language is but one of the many symptoms of the enfeebling influence introduced into all our thoughts by the idea of an extrahuman Power, of which all are in an equal degree competent or incompetent interpreters, and which affords so easy a resource when men shrink from the labour of foresight and determination.

But there has been a considerable change within the last few weeks, and opinion has set with some strength in the direction which we have taken. This has been due to various causes. The superior craft by which the Prussian leaders threw on the French Government the odium of aggression was for a time successful, but has lost its effect. The skill with which they availed themselves of the bad as well as the good feelings of Prussia and of Germany; of the rancorous hatred and contempt cherished against France by the Prussian upper and middle classes; of the ambition common to those classes throughout Germany; of their craving, to use their own language, to have the first word in Europe, as well as of the honourable desire to be secure in the settlement of their internal difficulties, and of the legitimate feeling of self-defence—this skill has told, and has ceased in a great measure to tell any longer. Watching the course of the war and the tone of the German leaders, men have come to see that it was a war deliberately planned by Prussian ambition, as a means to an end; that the suffering inflicted upon the two nations, and the long train of evil memories which it must leave, were incurred with full prevision

of the consequences, in view of an ulterior object, and that one of purely German interest; that the fabric of German unity is to be cemented by the blood and destruction of France, reminding one of that African city, for whose foundation a given number of fresh human skulls was considered indispensable. This obstinate persistence in a war of conquest, this insolent military revel, this anachronism of an imperial construction, all tend to enlighten the judgment, and definitively to guide the opinion of Europe to a reprobation of the policy which leads to such results.

On the various questions which the struggle has suggested, on the points of interest which it has presented, I have spoken on different occasions. I do not wish to return upon them now, but rather to dwell on this one general consideration—on the adoption, namely, in the present circumstances of the world, by any state or states, of war as a means. For the present policy of Prussia challenges this issue: Is it justifiable in the eye of public morality, is it consistent with any sound idea of statesmanship, to renounce the attempt to solve, by peaceful methods, such political difficulties as indisputably exist, and to return to the method allowed in former times by the conscience of mankind—the method of pure force? I use the word 'political' consciously in its limited sense, and to the exclusion of those social difficulties to which I shall subsequently draw your attention. The issue thus raised admits, I believe, in the conscience of all Western nations, but of one answer—that there exists no evil of such urgent necessity as to justify recourse to arms for its removal; that there is in the quiet growth of public opinion, and in the intellectual and moral advance of mankind, a sufficient power peaceably to meet the political needs of the Western nations. If this be so, if this be the answer we return, then any state which adopts the opposite course, and bases its existence and its policy upon undisguised militarism, that state necessarily stands condemned by the opinion of its contemporaries, and the condemnation will be ratified by the judgment of succeeding generations.

I am speaking, you will observe, distinctly of war under certain conditions, not of war absolutely. Defensive war, in the strictest sense, is allowed by all but an imperceptible

minority—meaning by defensive war the forcible resistance by a nation to an armed attack upon it. Nor am I speaking against defensive war in a larger and less proper sense—war, that is, made by one unit or independent member of a system in defence of another unit or independent member of the same system whose existence is threatened. Nor, again, am I speaking of war waged as a measure of repressive police, when one or more states think it advisable to exert their power to restrain some other state or states from unnecessary disturbance of the peace of the world, as in the familiar instance of the Crimean war, so far as it was kept within due limits. I may even go farther, and, allowing for the actual facts of European relations, I may say that the language I have used does not apply to a form of war which is deeply to be blamed, deeply to be regretted, but which the present feelings and convictions of mankind in some degree excuse—war, namely, between two or more states caused by mutual jealousy or occasional provocations; a war in which, in common language, the honour of both parties is concerned. From our relative point of view, looking at the antecedents of Europe and its traditional morality, even this form must not be spoken too harshly of. We are, it is greatly to be hoped, advancing towards a time when that morality will have so far improved that all such wars will be unreservedly condemned. But we have not as yet reached that point; and we are compelled, therefore, to make allowance, though our judgment be on the whole most adverse. But there exists a case distinct from all these; the case I have before spoken of when I used the expression of war chosen as a means; the case where a Government, aiming at certain political advantages to which it attaches a high value—it matters little whether justly or not—with no fear for its own existence, with no danger threatening it from without, deliberately chooses force as the method for obtaining those advantages, and moulds its whole policy on that assumption. The advantages it may have in view may be aggressive in relation to neighbouring nations, or they may be advantages which relate only to the population of which it forms a part. The point of essential importance lies not in this distinction, but in the circumstance that the whole framework of the national existence is permeated

by this idea, that the ultimate method on which it relies in its policy is the method of war. This case has been rare in mediæval and modern times. The first French empire under the elder Napoleon was an instance of it, and as such is now universally reprobated. In the present time it seems to me that the Prussian monarchy, and through it the German nation, offer a second instance, the more reprehensible because of the universal reprobation of the former. Of no other nation of Western Europe can it be said that its whole existence is calculated for war—modified by war so entirely that the citizen and the soldier are convertible terms. In no other nation of Western Europe could the ruling power in the person of its king set itself deliberately, from the beginning of his reign, to the exclusion of all interference of his people, to form, as the great object of his government, his army—in his own braggart language, his invincible army—for the attainment of a higher political status. In no other nation of Western Europe, I well believe, could the powerful intellect which guides that king's will have ventured to proclaim that his policy was avowedly one of force; and the result has been no mere proclamation of this evil policy, but on more than one occasion the distinct giving effect to it in act. It is war in this sense, then, which I think we may unreservedly condemn, and the national existence based upon such war. Tolerant as we may seem of other forms, indisposed to judge too harshly even forms of which we strongly disapprove, we need not hesitate when this last form is in question. It concerns the whole human race to stigmatize, with just abhorrence, the reintroduction into the human order, much more the reintroduction into the peaceful European system, of the military life. It is incumbent upon us as disciples of peaceful progress, and not upon us only, but upon all civilized men, to raise our voice against the re-establishment of so great an evil. The nation which acquiesces in it, nay, which feels pride in it, should be regarded and spoken of by all right-judging thinkers as out of the pale of true civilization; as constituting itself, whatever its professions may be, the enemy of the human race.

Outside of Western Europe, if we range in thought over the whole surface of the habitable globe, so far as it is known

to us, there is but one other Government whose habitual attitude is warlike, and that is Russia. The distinction between the Government and the nation is, in my belief, more easily drawn in Russia than in Prussia; and the blame, if blame it is which rests on this warlike attitude, must be fixed much more exclusively on the Russian Government than on the Russian people. A moment's consideration of the different constitution of the two nations would account for this difference. But the attitude of the Government is unquestioned. It may in later years have been more pacific towards its neighbours in the West, but its recent action is scarcely calculated to reassure us as to the grounds of this apparent peaceableness. In Asia, however, its permanent policy is one of encroachment and war. Nor so long as it is in contact with the unorganized nomad tribes of Central Asia, is there any ground for a strong condemnation of such a policy. To incorporate any remaining nomads into a higher civilization, and enforce upon them the obligations of sedentary existence, would seem, even at the present day, a legitimate object. But here should be the limit, I think; and any aggression of Russia upon the Mussulman states of Asia, any attempt of hers to interfere with anything that can fairly be called a political organization, should meet with the joint disapprobation of the Western nations, and, if need were, with their active opposition. For the world is sufficiently known to us to relieve us from any fear of any fresh inroad of barbarism upon aggregate civilization; and, in the absence of such fear, all states that have attained a more or less compact and ordered existence should now be left to work out their own progress, partly under the guidance of their past history, partly under the influence, judiciously exercised, of those powers which have attained a higher level. There would be no justification for the most highly civilized nation of the earth if it attempted the conquest of any lower civilization, much less can there be any justification for one of the lowest of civilized nations to enter on such a design.

With these two exceptions of Prussia and Russia, there is no nation, whatever its stage of advance, which can be said to be in principle warlike. More than one, our own for instance, is but too ready to recur to war if certain occasions offer; but

the general direction of men's minds is assuredly peaceful, and the hypothesis on which we build our social state is that of peace.

This adverse judgment of the attitude assumed by the two Governments which I have named, suggests the question, What is the attitude demanded of those who would claim the name of statesmen, by the instincts of Humanity, and by rational statesmanship? Evidently the two should be in agreement; and within the limits of what may be called, in one sense or other, civilized society, war is alien to the instincts of Humanity, peaceful industry is the universal aspiration. It is the part, then, of any true statesmanship to use every effort, with a reasonable allowance for contingencies, to promote the attainment of this aspiration, and to repress all that runs counter to it. Such efforts of statesmanship in Europe are of the simplest kind. They consist in maintaining the order as established—in refusing, that is, to allow of any violent disruption of that order—whilst admitting such changes as the course of time necessitates in an order confessedly full of imperfections. But true statesmanship would aim at something more than this; it would, that is, aim at anticipating, with a view to the avoidance of concussions, such changes as I have alluded to. Look back upon the period of unbroken peace in Europe, the period that elapsed between 1815 and 1848, and it is evident to all that, had that halcyon time been wisely used, the subsequent dangers might have been avoided. Nor is this all. It is incumbent upon statesmen not merely to repress disturbance, not merely to further inevitable changes, but to foster all the peaceful tendencies of the nations they govern. Now, one prevailing tendency may be traced by any one who attentively considers the course of European thought, during the second generation since the French Revolution of 1789. It is the tendency which was so manifest in the third revolutionary movement of 1848, the tendency to substitute social questions for political; to throw the latter into the background, to bring the former into prominence. And it was the duty of all statesmen to accept this fact, to bend themselves, if they would really justify their claim to the name, to the peaceful settlement through absolutely free discussion of those social questions. It will be the condemnation

with posterity of the great majority of the governors of Europe, that they have either not accepted it from blindness, or, if awake to it, they have deliberately set themselves to struggle with it. They have withheld the means of settlement; they have crushed free discussion; they have, in the short-sighted policy of securing their own power, fostered all the elements of opposition to this tendency, and but too often combated it by the falsest appeals to the interests which disliked it. It is but simple justice to allow that, whatever their faults may have been, our own leading men have been comparatively free from this spirit of blindness; that they have, to some extent, been almost too exclusively preoccupied with these questions. Not only, then, is the policy of war an evil by its direct consequences, but not less so by its indirect. It diverts men from the true path which they should pursue, as well as launches them upon a false one. It is certain that this diversion was one of the main objects of the late unhappy Government of France, and that its recognized failure was one of the most powerful stimuli to the rash act by which it extinguished itself. It is to my mind equally certain—and time will only make this point clearer—that the same object of diverting men's attention from social questions is a powerful factor in the policy of the Prussian Government, that, over and above schemes of home aggrandisement, it is animated by political hostility to the Republican form of government in France, and still more by social hostility to that of which that Republic is at once the symbol and the guarantee—the concentration of the intellectual and social energy of mankind upon the really important social arrangements. In presence of that crowd of princes and nobles which is met at Versailles to enjoy the triumph over France, there rises in the midst of defeat and suffering a power before which they tremble in their victory, and I much doubt whether the idle scheme which flatters their ambitious dreams is felt by them to have any substantial hold upon the future of mankind. They feel that in the French Republic centre all the hopes and wishes of many of the best minds in Europe, all the aspirations of its several peoples, and therefore it is not Imperial or Royal France that they are met to conquer, but Republican France; therefore it is that they feel that their triumph has, in one

sense, been too complete, and that they would gladly restore, no matter at what sacrifice of honour or principle, the Imperial power which alone they professed to consider their enemy. It is a social war against France, and through France against Germany, for which they are perverting the instincts of Germany, and remorselessly using the military strength which it places at their disposal. No immediate success can make such men legitimate rulers of mankind ; no skill in war, no craft in policy, can give them any claim to the name of statesmen; they are stronger and more unscrupulous than others who hold power in Europe, and, as such, the unscrupulous or the weak may admire them, but they have no real title to admiration. All noble minds should shrink from them in their ambition and bloodguiltiness. It needs no power of prophecy to be sure of their ultimate failure, for never yet in the history of the world has a retrograde movement eventually succeeded. They are striving against the whole current of European history, and they are doing so at a time when the conscious observation of the real set of that current is more widely spread than it ever was before. They are doing this at a time when that observation is being slowly, but with perfect certainty, enlightened and guided by a rational doctrine, embracing at once the interpretation of the past, and the conception of the future. They have to meet, that is to say, not merely the instinctive aversion of their own and other peoples, as evidenced by the language of the International, nor, again, simply the enlightened aversion of large numbers of the educated throughout Europe, but they have to meet both these forces concentrated, and directed by a new power—the power inherent in the religion of Humanity.

In any case, however, the immediate future offers no pleasing prospect. The disturbance of European relations which results from the Prussian policy does not seem likely soon to pass away. I have unshaken confidence in the ultimate success of the French resistance in the breaking of the military power of Germany. But the struggle may end differently, and Germany may realize the aspirations of Mr. Carlyle, and establish herself as Queen of the Continent; she may, that is, for a time triumph, and become the object of the just suspicion and hatred of all. In either case, thanks largely

to the incapacity of our own statesmen, the political atmosphere of Europe will be full of the elements of discord and evil. All will suffer, ourselves not the least. We shall suffer politically and socially, in all probability, by the diversion of our thoughts from the true objects which should occupy them, and the substitution of more or less of a military tendency for the peaceful tendencies which had been gaining the upper hand. Evidently this will be the case for all the Continental nations. For the vision attributed by one of the many German professors who are seeking to poison the mind of England—the hitherto respected Dr. Pauli—the vision, I say, attributed by him to Count Moltke, of Germany exercising a dictatorial control over Europe, and free to make that control what it likes at its own pleasure, is the vision of a madman. No nation of Europe but will arm to its full powers, for none will consent to hold all that it holds dear at the mercy of the Hohenzollern dynasty. And almost inevitably this new revival of a Napoleonic dream will end in the same failure in which its prototype ended. And we shall all suffer morally, for the state of jealous antagonism and distrust and hatred is, however necessitated, a great evil; and yet such a state is the natural outcome of this Prussian domination. I doubt not, relying upon the convictions which the religion of Humanity inspires, that this evil state, if established, would end, and that shortly. I doubt not that Germany herself, the first and worst sufferer in the case, would be led by the opinion of the civilized world to repent of her present blindness to the higher tendencies of the time, of the outrage she is actually committing upon the better instincts of Humanity; I doubt not that her nobler spirits who are now borne down, who have suffered, and are still to suffer, the pain of seeing themselves compressed and ignored, if not ill-treated, will gradually assert their just influence, and be recognized by their nation as having been throughout higher and truer than the prevailing tone. Men who have had the courage to speak, as some Germans have spoken, within the limits and in the face of Germany, against the predominant ambition, will ultimately reap their reward. But for the present they are overborne, and their nation will proceed on its course, undeterred by any scruples, uninfluenced by any warnings, acknowledging no international responsibility, but bent solely on its own aggran-

dizement, hypocritically veiled under the plea of security ; and the statesmen of Europe look on, and, as in our own case, are mad enough to welcome its present success. Lord Granville lends the sanction of England to this insensate dream of Empire—prostitutes his country's fair name on the altar of Prussian success.

For us, our course remains clear. We have to persist in the direction which we have hitherto followed upon these great questions of European interest. And, to give precision to this statement, I would indicate three points on which this our persistence should bear. In the first place we have to awaken, so far as we may, the public opinion of this country from its state of apathy on all matters of foreign policy, and, in conjunction with the many speakers and writers who have come from other causes to the same conclusions as ourselves, we have to try and enforce the adoption of a well-considered course of action. We have to combat the immoral inertia which our insular position is too apt to encourage, and to proclaim our conviction that that position is a national evil if it leads us to a dereliction of our duty, and to hug ourselves in satisfaction at our immunity from the danger to which others are exposed. No such thought of isolation is compatible with the religion of which we profess ourselves disciples. There may be a truth in the expression now popular, 'Securus judicat orbis terrarum.' It is no part of my business at present to say what amount of truth there is in it ; but, when nearly one-tenth of the world's inhabitants are engaged in deadly struggle, we may feel a natural impatience of the statesmanship which takes refuge in this adage. We do not hold the doctrine that all that is is for the best, and therefore can have no recourse to this modern salve—an improvement on the old in so far as it touches more directly upon earth—the feeble equivalent for the old theological expression, 'The Lord sitteth between the cherubim, be the earth never so unquiet.' Rejecting all optimistic views, we think the State, as the individual, bound to take its share in the political and social difficulties which beset its neighbours and equals ; and we shrink with shame from the position in which the denial of this obligation places us. At the same time, we do our best to root out the spirit which leads to that denial, and to the utmost of our ability we preach a policy

which is a practical refutation of it. We persist in counselling immediate action, in vindication of the peaceful settlement of Europe.

But, in the second place, whilst doing this—whilst not shrinking even from war, we who value peace as much as any —we must do all that lies in us to make it clear that the action we counsel has nothing of self-assertion in it, is not tainted by the spirit of national interest. We must try to bring home to our countrymen the superior nobleness of a policy of conciliation, nay, even of renunciation. We hold that for the State, equally as for the individual, it is not good, nor a sign of strength, to be dwelling on its own rights and honour; but that, on the contrary, for both equally, it is true that the preference of the claims of others, the absence of all insistence on self-interest, is the dictate of true morality. We must, in a word, continue to keep our opinions and statements at the level above indicated. The policy we advocate must, that is, be clearly Western, not English; human, not national; and the greatness we seek for our country must be the greatness conferred by moderation and service, not the vulgar greatness of an Imperial position.

The third point is one for more immediate practical exertion. It follows from much that has been said that on one great question we shall have to make a very firm stand. From many quarters—it is pleasant to think that there are exceptions—a loud cry is being raised in favour of a total change in our military system, and there is a real danger lest some more or less complete imitation of the Prussian system should be urged upon our rulers, and acquiesced in by public opinion, so far as it is represented by the upper and middle classes. The aim, in one word, will be to make us a military nation, and this aim is one which must be resisted by all possible means. We, I believe, are quite clear upon this point; we are quite clear that it is an evil thing to pass all citizens, according to the language of the day, through the military drill; and being clear upon it, it will behove us, each in his several sphere, and by such means as we can jointly use, to arouse throughout the nation a well-grounded opposition to any such plan. If seriously endeavoured to be put into execution, it will become necessary, however strong our attachment

to order, to exert all means in our power to defeat it, even by the open refusal of obedience to the Government. It is a point of vital importance. I cannot now enter into a detailed treatment of it. I will only take one aspect of the question, because it is intimately connected with previous remarks. Our difficulties are, in the main, social; there at least lies the stress—social in the widest sense, including the industrial problem under the term. The proper method of treating them is by free discussion to elaborate a healthy moral feeling and opinion upon them in the most peaceful manner. Some of them are calculated to produce the greatest bitterness on both sides, and it is most important that such bitterness should not express itself by violence. Arm and drill the whole nation, and you increase indefinitely the chances of violence, of a forcible solution of the question at issue, not of a peaceful one. I leave it to the judgment of the parties most concerned to say what are their prospects in such a case. The other hypothesis, on which only the upper portion of the nation should be armed and drilled, I leave to the judgment of the lower.

Such are the three points—our general policy, the spirit in which it should be put forward, and the military organization of the country. I have but little more to add. You will see that in both directions, whether in our more immediate Positivist action, or in our capacity as citizens, there is no want of objects for our exertions. It is to no single effort or isolated exertion that I call you; but to the unremitting devotion of your life's energies to the cause in which you have engaged. Others may let one subject engross them, larger or smaller as the case may be; we are bound to embrace all the subjects of real utility. This is the justification of our ignoring all others. This is the meaning of a systematic policy, that it faces all the aspects of our complicated human existence. We know as well as others can tell us where our weakness lies. We do not claim to be better than others; but we do claim to have a wider and higher aim before us, and to be in possession of an instrument of greater power. Let us see that we justify such claim, so far as we can, by superior strength of will in pursuit of that aim, by the evidence of the greater courage which the consciousness of our advantages gives us, and by most careful discipline of our moral and intellectual natures to make us

worthy of those advantages. Our religion is a religion of courage and action, but it is also one of humility in the true sense of the word, and it is one emphatically of discipline—discipline of feeling, discipline of intellect as the minister of feeling, discipline of activity as the expression of the concert of the two, discipline of the whole man that he may be more complete as the servant of Humanity. In her name, I urge you to the free and glad acceptance of this noble obligation.[1]

[1] Address delivered at the Positivist School, 19 Chapel Street, Bedford Row, on the Festival of Humanity, 83, Sunday, January 1, 1871.

MORAL AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.

IN the name of Humanity! With all centres of our Faith, more especially with our common centre in Paris; with all its scattered disciples; with the members of all other religious organizations or beliefs, Monotheist, Polytheist, or Fetishist—all lesser distinctions being absorbed in the one bond of our common Humanity—with the whole human race, with man, that is, wherever found and in whatever condition; and with the animal races, who, during the long effort of man to raise himself, have been, as they are still, his companions and his helpers, we on this occasion, this Festival of Humanity, would be in conscious sympathy.

Nor with our contemporaries alone are we in sympathy, but with the larger portion of the race which occupies the past. We gratefully commemorate the services of all the generations whose labours we inherit and wish to hand down with increase to our successors. We gratefully commemorate also the services of our common mother, the Earth, the planet which is our home, and the orbs which with her form the solar system.

We may not separate from this last commemoration that of the *milieu* in which that system moves—the Space which has ever been of such great service to man, and whose services we so distinctly wish to recognize and use.

From the Present and the Past we extend our sympathies to the Future, to the unborn generations which with happier lot shall follow us on this earth, the thought of whom should be constantly present to our minds in order to complete the conception of Humanity as revealed to man by the Founder of our religion. The memory of her greatest servant finds a fitting place on this her greatest festival. May it, as all other

great if not equal memories, be duly cherished by us for guidance and encouragement!

We meet this year under more pleasant conditions than we met last year. In asking you to carry your thoughts and sympathies to those who in other countries, or in other parts of our own country, are sharers in our faith, I have not now to refer with great anxiety to the most important constituent of our body. Our brethren in Paris, as in France generally, have in the main passed safely through the danger and the misery of the past year, and can assemble to-day in peace and hope. We can think of them as having resumed their normal attitude and work, acting by influence and advice and by the propagation of our doctrine and our faith on their troubled *milieu*. Their task remains most difficult; their position both as Positivists and as citizens is one which requires the calmest, soberest judgment. Still the consciousness of having passed great dangers is in itself a certain source of strength for the future. Another may be found in the closer sympathy between the nucleus here and the French centre which has been established by the events of the past year. All here have contributed to this result, and I am bound to give on behalf of all our French co-religionists a distinct acknowledgment of this contribution. To some of us it has already been expressed by Dr. Robinet during his visit to this country, but I repeat it as a special commission on this occasion. The formal document in which it is consigned will remain a part of our English archives. Dr. Robinet's visit was itself at once a consequence, a proof, and a stimulus of this closer union. It will not, I hope, stand alone. I count on a visit from M. Laffitte in the spring or early summer, and I have good reason to hope that others will follow his example. A free intercourse between the two most organized portions of the Positivist Church is in the highest degree desirable.

We must not forget the other members of our body, in Ireland, in India, in North and even in South America. The same language is true of them all so far, that the events of the past year have tended to draw closer their union with the common centre and with one another, and to stimulate them to greater energy in action. I mention South America, for

latterly there has been a renewal of the intercourse with our Brazilian *confrères*, which had seemed unaccountably to have lapsed. One only loss is there to record, the cessation for the present of all Positivist connection with Holland—a connection so fruitful of good in the past, but which practically died with M. de Constant-Rebecque. On the other hand I learnt, during my visit to Italy in the spring of last year, that there was a certain Positivist movement in that country. I met with a work by a Professor of Bologna which was conclusive evidence of the fact that the philosophic thought of Italy was moving in the Positive direction. For the object of the writer is to counteract such movement and call back the energies of his countrymen from such a course, wishing rather to lead them to connect their intellectual efforts with the tradition of Vico as a genuine Italian tradition, not with the newer doctrines traceable to Auguste Comte. In any event, however, it seemed clear that it was solely as a philosophic movement that it at present attracted attention. There is not in the work alluded to, so far as I am aware, any reference to the political and social constructions of Positivism, much less any recognition of the Religion of Humanity. Such knowledge of the system as appears, seems derived more from the writings of M.M. Littré and Mill than directly from the original source. Still it is interesting to trace in whatever form the gradual spread in the countries of Western Europe of the doctrine of Positivism, such propagation naturally tending to prepare the way for more practical teaching.

Following the same order as last year, only in this part of my address with greater brevity, you have had this year two circulars, the one for 1869, to which I alluded last year, and the other for 1870, which has just reached us. The lawsuit which is treated of in the first will be, I hope, ultimately published in full. Those who may be interested in it will find it at great length in the May number for 1870 of M. Littré's organ, the 'Philosophie Positive.' But it is not complete there, the reply of our advocate, M. Allou, being wanting; and it will be desirable to have it in its complete form, with the documents on which the statements on our side rested. On the last circular I need make no further comment than to say that it does not show any diminution of our several centres of

action in France. In fact there has been an increase, in the acquisition of a new centre at Havre.

Taking next the groups of Positivists in America and India, there has been, owing to health, but slight communication with the former. Latterly, however, it has been renewed. From a longer personal connection the intercourse with India has been less broken. In both countries those who are associated with us have been active, in India especially so; and, though there has been but one fresh convert from the natives to our faith, the questions of social and religious regeneration from the human point of view have been constantly kept before our eyes by the energy of Mr. Lobb and his coadjutor. Standing as they do in great isolation, and in Mr. Lobb's case having to contend with most depressing physical health, I cannot speak too highly of their courage and self-devotion. I infer from what they say that we must look for very slow progress indeed, so far as the Hindus are concerned; for better results—in the direction, however, of useful modification rather than of conversion—in the case of our own countrymen. We have had also active proofs of sympathy from the American Positivists, both in New York and elsewhere. For though the New York Positivists have organized themselves under a particular President, their action does not exclude others; we still have the active co-operation and sympathy of Mr. Edger, and others with whom he is in more immediate connection.

It was not without a purpose that I have spoken of America and India in close juxtaposition; for, in one respect, their action has been similar. From both, in the course of this year, there has issued a short summary of Positivism—a work of a kind which I have always steadily objected to in this country. The two publications indicated differ considerably in form, but both have the same object, viz., to give a more accessible representation of the system contained in M. Comte's works. On the details and execution of these two works I shall offer no word of criticism. Whilst I did not wish either published, I can quite cordially hope that both may do good. There was in my judgment more opening for the Indian work than for the American—more opening for an effort of accommodation to the Eastern mind, than for a similar effort in the case of a people of purely Western origin

and traditions, and amply qualified, therefore, for the apprehension of the works already available. This distinction stated, I go on to give the reasons why I have been adverse to such publications here, and why I think them undesirable elsewhere. For my own action, and for those who adopt the same attitude as I do, it is enough that M. Comte himself formally expressed his wish that summaries of his doctrine should not appear. He judged the 'Catechism' a sufficiently short systematic work for the purpose of propagation; always, however, with the reservation for a more æsthetic presentation of the system by a female pen, when some woman qualified for the task should appear. The spread of the 'Catechism,' then, was what he looked to, as far as books were concerned, where there was not the requisite leisure or previous training for the full study of his larger works. And as the subsidiary means of propagation, there were, first, oral statements, the explanation, teaching, and preaching of Positivism; and secondly, without undue frequency, publications on isolated points of more or less general interest, in which publications the solution offered by Positivism of the particular question treated should be stated and worked out, and thus the attention of men be drawn to a study of the system which offered such a solution.

On such a practical detail I think it the true, the wisest course, to accept his judgment as final, at any rate for some time; and, I repeat, I should do so were my own opinion different in any degree. But there are, I conceive, solid reasons over and above the one given—over and above, that is, the simple acceptance of the disciple—for acquiescing in the decision of our master. In the first place, the multiplication of small manuals tends to break the unity of impression—the community, I might rather say, of impressions—received by the several students of this system. Each manual necessarily is stamped with somewhat of a different character from the others, and presents the system under a different point of view, besides tending to mix up with it the elements of heterogeneous origin. Consequently, those who have gained their knowledge of the system from one popular abstract are in imperfect relation with those who derive it from another, and, in so far as this is the case, the great object we aim at—the complete unity of sentiments and convictions—is missed. This result

is already traceable amongst ourselves, owing to a discrepancy which exists among us, and which I regret. There is a tendency even here to put aside the 'Catechism,' not to accept the judgment of M. Comte on it, as the work best adapted for propagation, '*l'opuscule propagateur*,' and there is, as a consequence of this attitude, a considerable difference in our judgments. Doubtless this in time will disappear, but meantime it hampers our progress much more than most of us are aware of, and leads to a disunion in sentiment; although, thanks to the noble character of our *milieu*, it does not happily lead at present to a disunion in action. If, as I think, such diversity of feeling results when only two such works as the 'General View' and the 'Catechism' are in a certain sense in competition, what is likely to follow if each separate body, as it constitutes itself, publishes a manual impregnated naturally with the peculiar influences which act on that body?

Secondly, we are bound by all our principles of action to discountenance as much as possible the intellectual evil of needlessly multiplying books, of abuse of the printing press, and to resist the moral evil of impatience. The two in this case are in intimate connection. To reprint and spread the text-books is the true object at present, so far as the first is concerned; to rely with calmness on the gradual operation of what has been already done, is the true course in regard to the second; and no Positivist who has really studied the two shorter works, in which M. Comte has embodied in the one his leading conceptions, in the other those conceptions and the practical constructions based on them, can, I think, find just ground for a distrust of the soundness of the work, or its adequacy to the object he had in view, if allowed time and fair attention.

My third and last ground of opposition to such publications may here be introduced by stating a very common objection. The works mentioned are allowed to have undoubted merit; but they are hard, and people want something easier—a readier means of forming a conception of the system. Allow this to be true to the fullest amount that any one would wish, and I answer, I have not the slightest wish to gratify this popular demand. I think it an evil if we succeed in gratifying it. I can but briefly indicate my reasons for this conclu-

sion. We do not care for a mere popular judgment on our system. We preach a new Religion ; that is, we advocate a serious modification of the thoughts, the actions, in a word, of the whole life of men. They who would approach such a subject in the spirit which all religious minds, of whatever religion they may be the disciples, would allow to be the true spirit, must come prepared to make some exertion in appreciating the new doctrine which is offered, some readiness to make sacrifices in appropriating the new guide for their whole conduct, of which they are presumably in search. If such are not the dispositions the students of the religious construction of Positivism bring with them, there is but small hope of their being valuable ; and if such are their dispositions, then I feel sure that the works at present offered will present no insurmountable difficulty. Merely to facilitate the gratification of an idle curiosity about us and our doings and thoughts is no part of our scheme. We have no time for such occupations. We are open to the world—its criticism, its ridicule, its misrepresentation ; but we need not busy ourselves in furnishing it with the means for indulgence of this form of the destructive instinct.

But there is a deeper and more positive objection to the policy I am discussing—more positive, that is, in the highest sense of the term, a sense of which I lament the omission in the American work—a more *sympathetic*, more moral, objection. We seek to substitute a new religious faith for those already in existence. Our work is, in one sense, as that of every new religion has been, destructive and revolutionary. But we cannot have, nor ought we to have, any wish to destroy when there is but slight, if any, chance of substitution, to revolutionize without any prospect of organization. Less than any previous proclaimers of a new system of life and conduct can we acquiesce in mere disturbance, in a purely negative result. And yet such will be, almost infallibly, the consequence in a large number of cases of familiarizing men with superficial and brief statements of the Positive doctrine. We cannot, any more than our Christian predecessors, avoid the indirect evils of a great change, but we can adopt such a course as may acquit us of the responsibility of increasing them.

And those indirect evils are not limited to the unsettling of men's thoughts and principles. There is another and a graver evil which we should do all that may be to avoid. Many will assent intellectually to the new scheme which is placed before them—they may be drawn on by such and such statements of it to a large acquiescence, till they find themselves confronted by the question, Shall we accept it in full? You all know that in many cases the answer, and that on quite other grounds than intellectual disagreement, will be a rejection. For acceptance requires a certain moral strength as well as an assent of the intellect. And those who, under these circumstances and in the mental condition described, reject, are the worse for their rejection. They have failed from moral weakness, and the consciousness of such failure leaves them weaker and with less self-respect. They have not been perfectly true to themselves, and they can never recover the sense of truth. I am but in other words repeating a lesson familiar to the Christian teacher, a principle strongly impressed on the earlier Christian documents.

And for ourselves, in reference to the true interests of the new Church we are forming, we seek strong, well-grounded convictions in those who join it. We can hardly feel much hope of such convictions in those who are unprepared to face the theory and life in its most definite, most systematic form, and such is the form it wears in the 'Catechism.' We appeal to the strong whilst we act in behalf of the weak. In our time, and for some considerable time after us, real adhesions must involve real sacrifices, and for such the basis of conviction must be solidly laid. Such are the considerations I offer on this important point of our action, and in defence of the line I have always adopted. They amount to this, that I think the requiring some sensible amount of effort in appreciating our system a thing to be valued in itself under present circumstances. Later, I have no doubt, simpler works for the benefit of the young will spring up, but not so much so as in other systems. Oral teaching is our great characteristic, not indiscriminate recourse to books as at present.

Turning to our movement at home, the retrospect of the past year is in a large measure satisfactory, so far as Positivism is concerned. It is not wholly so. For with unmistakable

evidences of a more widely-spread interest and of an increase of agreement with us in the world outside, there has been a diminution in the rate of definite adhesions to our body. And it is to these I look as the soundest test of our advance. We may value a general agreement, an intellectual assent, but we cannot be content with it. There will, as we advance, be plenty of it; but it will hardly avail us much, or further our cause, if it rest there. Allowing for the above unfavourable symptoms, I have no other fault to find with our progress. Some of the events of the year are of a nature, when judged from the Positive point of view, and with entire abstraction from, complete suppression of, the personal, to afford the greatest pleasure in the review of our proceedings. In the first place, there have been the two series of Sunday morning lectures which, on the failure of my health, various members of the body have combined to give, thus securing, as far as could be under the conditions, a continuity in our action and in the use of this room. For this collective effort, in the name of our cause, I may express my gratitude. Its immediate value I estimate very highly. The guarantee it offers that in any case, so far as we can be certain of anything, we may be certain of the continuance of a centre of teaching and union here, I value still more highly. I have not been able to hear the lectures given, but I can testify to the impressions of pleasure and usefulness which they have left on others. One only calls for our especial notice. The last, delivered by one of our French brethren, offers a peculiar interest as a sign of the spiritual reuniting of the Western world, which is one of our most cherished objects. His presence among us and co-operation are but the most marked example of our multiplied points of contact with the French nation owing to recent events —a contact which, however we may regret its origin, ought to be made profitable in increasing the sense of union between the two great Western nations, in whose real sympathy, if established, might be found the best guarantee for the more distant union of the West.

Besides this effort there has been, through the greater part of the year, and only so far broken as was absolutely inevitable, a course of teaching on Sunday evenings given by two of our body, Mr. Beesly and Dr. Bridges: Mr. Beesly's series of his-

torical lectures occupying the earlier months of the year, Dr. Bridges' biological course the latter. The audience has, I believe, presented this satisfactory feature, the most satisfactory an audience can present, that it has been composed of a considerable nucleus of constant attendants. A few of this class are worth any number of mere casual lookers-in, with the object of finding some way of passing an evening.

It is most important, if we can, to maintain this effort of Sunday evening courses freely open to all. The attention to courses of lectures cannot but be beneficial to those who pay it, and the knowledge that, month after month and year after year, men are found willing, with small audiences and without any condition, to deliver gratuitous instruction of the highest kind; for I speak with good grounds for what I say when I say that no higher teaching is offered in London or any other part of England than what has been offered on Sunday evenings in this school—this knowledge, I say, must inevitably result in the spread of our Faith. For the question must arise, Whence is it and from what motives that such an effort originates? And here we stand on vantage ground as compared with the teachers who exert their energies in behalf of the older beliefs. I would not, for a moment, depreciate those teachers—much less deprecate the unusual and remarkable display which we are witnessing now within the limits of the Episcopal Church—a movement which I feel sure, indeed it appears in their language, is not irrespective of us. Under what impulse is it, I may ask, that in the Cathedral Church of London the question of the distribution of wealth, a purely human question, is treated of to a large audience by a dignitary of that Church. Be this as it may, we are on vantage ground—we have no personal interest, we have no corporate interest to defend, no ancient institution to maintain, no possible motive of this kind to stimulate our action. Our freedom from all social and political trammels is a source of real strength.

The course of lectures already given will be continued from next Sunday in a course by Mr. Harrison, to be followed, I hope, by others; the essential point being that we must have courses, not single lectures.

The meetings for discussion have also been continued during the greater part of the year, with more or less success.

It is possible, I think, that the right moment may be come for a modification of this part of our action, for a concentration of all our efforts of this kind on the direct development of the Positivist Society in its strictest form. Should we adopt this course, due notice will be given, and I think it highly probable we shall do so at no distant date.

From lectures and meetings, I turn to another peculiar feature of this year. The celebration of the Positivist sacraments has been inaugurated in this room, and the event is one of great importance. Virtually, and in spirit, we have had two Positivist marriages in the year, and one in the fullest completeness attainable in our present state, when all things are in a nascent condition. I take the later and less complete case first. It is one of great interest in various ways. Mr. Hutton wished, while recognizing the just demands of the State by a civil marriage, and the religious convictions of his wife by the Roman Catholic ceremony, to satisfy his own religious aspirations as a disciple of the Religion of Humanity by a Positivist marriage; and in this course he had the full concurrence of Mrs. Hutton. Ultimately, however, owing to the action of the Roman Catholic clergy, the policy of which seems to me as unwise, as suicidal as possible, both religious ceremonies had to be renounced, and the marriage was, to their great regret, a purely civil one. I cannot respect the grudging attitude towards the civil power taken up by the Roman Catholic Priesthood. It is, at any rate, entirely different from the full recognition of the legitimacy of the State's interference, which we accord. I cannot understand the object, in a Protestant country like this, of the absolute resistance to mixed marriages, which is involved in the refusal to sanction any conjoint action even of the two most prominent Churches. I could have understood some exceptional opposition to ourselves from the theological standpoint. But, as far as I know, we are not treated differently from the Protestant Episcopal Church. But as there was this resistance, Mr. Hutton was willing, and rightly willing, by virtue of the greater relativity of our religion, to give his wife the satisfaction of her religious ceremonial, whilst he waived his own. Unsatisfied with this concession, unsatisfied also with the distinct doctrine of our system, that the

mother's influence is to be recognized by the father as predominant in education, thus leaving the children of either sex equally open to the mother's teaching, the Roman Catholic Priesthood insisted on written agreements in reference to this point.[1] In his resistance to this importunity Mr. Hutton was supported by his wife, and hence the result above indicated —a purely civil marriage. He would not press for the religious consecration which would have gratified his own feelings when the lady was denied that which would have gratified hers. And in this equally noble and delicate conduct I entirely agreed with him. As, however, whilst adhering firmly to her own religious convictions, Mrs. Hutton warmly sympathized with him in the general Positivist view of marriage, and did not shrink from any of its more specific obligations, such sanction of their union as, without the slightest approach to any marriage ceremonial it was open to me to give, I was most glad to give ; and therefore, on the eve of their marriage, we had a very quiet meeting here for the purpose of simply setting forth and explaining the leading Positivist conceptions, thus bringing the union as far as might be under the circumstances into direct connection with our Church. You are now able to see in what degree I was justified in speaking of this marriage as virtually and in spirit a Positivist one. And, on a review of the whole case, I can look back on it as a fortunate event for our cause, and one which, in all its incidents, is calculated to excite a favourable impression of the capacity of our religion to deal with the difficulties thrown in our way by the peculiar social complications of our time, and the opposition of other religious organizations. The Roman Catholic Priest more directly concerned had little to object to in the formulas of our ceremonial, and could not honestly, I think, refuse to allow that, whilst we acted with firmness, there was no absence of a spirit of conciliation.

With the reservation of one point on which I shall insist at length later, the second marriage, as a Positivist question and again with the entire suppression of all personal feelings, was an event on which we may look with unqualified satisfaction. There was a ' full completeness ' in the union which

[1] See Appendix, Note A.

received in this school its sacramental consecration. All the usual obligations of our religious marriage were accepted without qualification, and in the spirit of complete acquiescence in and sympathy with them, and that by both parties. It had no other element mixed with it. I regard it, looking at our whole social *milieu*, as an act of courageous self-devotion worthy of high honour, and as fraught with very beneficial results to our cause. One of those results ought certainly to be the facilitating to others a like course in the same circumstances, and the giving a stimulus to others to see that the other and less prominent sacraments of our religion are, as occasion offers, not unsought for or unvalued. I should be wanting if I did not say that it seems to me that there are such occasions now open, and that I hope to see them used. I allude more especially to the sacrament of presentation, which I urge on those whom it may concern to seek. But this is not the only result. It was a proof patent to all—and, if I may judge from certain symptoms, a proof as unwelcome as it was patent—that there exist those to whom the Religion of Humanity is not a mere doctrine, but a framework of life into which they are ready to fit their whole action. It was a most decisive event in our progress—the practical acceptance and deliberate ratification, on the part of two perfectly competent minds and hearts, of our whole organization. The initiative in so great a matter is never to be forgotten. And I have every reason for thinking that such will be the judgment of all our Positivist brethren in our own and in subsequent times. We attach the greatest value to the individual initiative.

In reference to this, as to all the other events of which I have spoken, I must again say how great an advantage we derive from the possession of this school. The gain it is to us is incalculable, giving permanence to all we do, and enabling us to secure due publicity where it is required.

Such are the remarks I have to offer in regard to our action in the past year. I abstain on this occasion from all comment on our action in home or in foreign matters, though in both there are many points worthy of attention. But the former can wait, as they are not likely to diminish in interest, or to pass away from our field of observation; on the latter I expect, from the last circular, that M. Laffitte will speak at some

length in his next number, and economy of effort is to be carefully studied where so much effort is called for.

I do not enter either on the prospective efforts which are desirable. What I said last year holds good for this year in regard to our action. The completion of our library, the extension of our teaching so as to comprise an elementary school, its extension also, if possible, in other parts of London under the same forms as here; it is sufficient if I simply indicate these as objects to be kept in sight, and carried out when due occasion offers.

For my special subject to-day, I return on the reservation I made in regard to the second and complete marriage. The difficult point in that marriage, as a question of Positivism, is its relation to the problem of our Indian empire; and the considerations, many and important, which are connected with this problem, will form the topic of the rest of this address. I shall speak with all freedom, and to the exclusion, as much as possible, of personal considerations.

I might well, if the gravity of the matter were a justification, enter at length on the general question of that Indian empire, interwoven as it is with our whole Imperial policy. But I must limit myself in some degree on the present occasion, and find another opportunity for some of the larger issues. I shall confine myself, then, to some brief indications on them, and pass on to the more personal issues: certain domestic, social, and moral aspects of our tenure of India—treating them in the light, so far as I can, of the general Positivist judgment of our connection with that country.

Thus limiting myself, I need but remind you, historically, of the long record of shame which our strictly secular domination has entailed on this country. I would not exaggerate anything; but this will be, I conceive, the ultimate judgment when the moral sense of the nation has been awakened by adequate knowledge, and after all allowance shall have been made for what our conquest may have had in it of a redeeming character. Nor is that record, I fear, yet closed, so far even as strictly aggressive conquest is concerned. The eye of the plunderer has fixed its covetous glance on territories which would round off our possessions, and a further iniquitous spoliation of Burmah is openly advocated.

Neither to this audience need I dwell on the evils which our possession of India entails on us in the present. You are aware that it involves us, year after year, in conduct from which all our better nature should recoil; now leading us to occasional atrocities, such as the murder of the Abyssinian king—an act in direct contradiction, as far as I can see, with all the professions of our Government, and in gratification of the purposes of one of our Indian chiefs—now acting as a permanent element of disturbance in all our relations with the great nations of the extreme East. It is the question of Indian revenue which vitiates all our intercourse with China. You are aware, also, directing our looks westward, that it acts as an oppressive weight on all our European policy, our political leaders telling us that we are an Eastern, not a Western power; urging, that is, the abandonment of all the union with our European compeers, which has been the great outcome of centuries of labour and instinctive effort; breaking off England from her noblest sphere of action, and renouncing the wholesome influences exercised upon her by her intercourse with other coequal nations—nations, that is, on a level with herself by virtue of their common associations and equal attainments—and throwing her on the evil influences of mixing, as a quasi dictator, with nations materially weaker, and in no way participating in her past. Nor has this teaching remained a mere theory. In the present European struggle, one of the most weighty motives for our refusal to adopt the policy of honour and duty which the inroad on the European concert should have enforced upon us, was, I make no doubt, the consciousness of the Indian difficulty, the pressure of its burden on our military and financial power. You are aware that, from another point of view, it interferes to prevent the logical development of the policy of absolute abstinence from European complications, which is so seductive to the governing classes of this country; that it takes from that policy its only opportunity of shedding a faint gleam of nobleness over it, by showing that it can induce not mere abstention from motives of direct self-interest, but, where it is open to us, definite self-renunciation. It is, I believe, India which warps the views of many, and controls the action of our Government in regard to Gibraltar. Its morally indefensible retention is

justified, as so much else, by the necessities of our Indian dominion.

Nor, again, need I do more than just mention the truth, that in all this sacrifice of higher objects we are in all probability incurring a permanent loss for a temporary gain, abandoning a position which all circumstances indicate to be our proper and definite one, for a position which equally all circumstances alike indicate to be a passing and an improper one. Dream of it who may, no thoughtful forecast of the future can warrant us in thinking our Eastern position a secure possession of this kingdom. We may say that the stars in their courses fight against us. To a careful examination, no one characteristic of permanence is impressed upon it. We have held it a hundred years, it is true; but what are a hundred years in the scale of human history, and have those hundred years led to any results which justify increase of confidence? I may unhesitatingly answer, No. Financial and other difficulties are increasing upon us. From many quarters danger threatens. For our popularity is on the wane, whilst our expenses are on the increase. Our garrison is yearly becoming more difficult to recruit; our efforts more unprofitable; our amalgamation with the conquered is not more hopeless than it was—that it could not be—but its perfect hopelessness is more recognized. No one justification of our military dominion is assignable.

Our tenure, I assume, is uncertain in duration, absolutely certain to end in ultimate failure, unless—and this is but too unlikely—we obviate failure by wise retirement. Meanwhile it is a fertile source of moral degradation. Consider our language about all our own history and development, our value for self-determined growth at whatever cost, our pride in our national independence and self-government, our abhorrence absolutely for all which we call despotic government, and contrast it with our practice in India, and our defence of that practice. Recall the nauseous constitutionalism with which we are afflicted in political discussions, all that is said about the necessary voice in taxation as the characteristic of freemen, the condition of a tolerable existence. False and futile as the jargon is, it is shamelessly thrown aside in reference to India, where a poor and conquered community is ground down by a heavy taxation on which it has no voice either

for assessment or distribution. We shrink in horror, for ourselves, from a government by the sword, and we maintain a pure government of the sword in India. We claim to be freest of the nations with a freedom our undoubted right and ancient privilege (I am using popular language, and am quite aware of the hollowness of it), and we, without misgivings, impose on others the contrary condition. All this, and the still worse and more demoralizing defence of this, on which, not content with the indecent adoption of the theory, as it suits our interest, of a beneficent despotism, we condone our own misconduct in the past, and see in our crimes the manifest finger of God. Such reasoning cannot but act prejudicially on our national sense of morality; and it would require but a very superficial sifting of the language and conduct of our public men to show convincingly that it does act prejudicially on us. I instance but one point—the recent utterances of some of the foremost of those public men on the question of our opium trade with China.

On all grounds, then, theoretical and practical, which come within the ken either of the farsighted statesman or the logical moralist, we, as Positivists, have valid reasons for the judgment which our system formulates on this head—a judgment of unqualified disapprobation of our retention of India. There is, to my mind, no hesitation possible so far. The only question for us, as for many of those who widely differ from us, is how to retire from the position; how to renounce our empire with the least evil to those on whom we have forced it, and whose self-growth we have, by our interference, materially hampered. This is not a question I shall attempt to answer here. I prefer to restrict myself to its statement and the clear enunciation of the judgment above given; and, on the basis of that judgment, to proceed to lay before you various considerations of a more directly moral kind, bearing, that is, on our personal conduct as Positivists.

And, first, of the individual Positivist, under this point of view, as taking a direct personal share in the administration of the Indian empire. And I treat solely of those who, whether in the military or civil administration, are voluntary agents in the government of India. This excludes several classes; for instance, it excludes the bulk of the English soldiers there.

It is an incident of the soldier's life that he may be called to service in India, but he has no choice in the matter. It is an incident of his service, just as it is his liability to be stationed at the Bermudas. It is not a special career. It excludes, again, the teaching class, whether missionary in the ordinary sense, or purely teachers. Their function, apart from the question of how they discharge it or what they teach, is in itself legitimate, and might—nay, should—continue, in one form or other, if we withdraw from the government. For English merchants or engineers, again, there is no inherent objection to their settling in India; their action comes under a subsequent head, that of a colonial existence generally. It is with the direct instruments of government, then, that I am more immediately concerned—with the men who go there on their own impulse, or under family pressure choose that as their career in life. The choice is made at an age, generally speaking, when the family or surrounding circumstances are of most weight in the matter, the unripe judgment of the individual not being competent to weigh such a matter with all the care it requires. It is not one of the least forcible of the numerous objections to the position, that it is entered upon at so early an age—an objection equally strong, whether we consider those over whom such very immature governors are set, or whether we consider these governors themselves. They are committed too early, just as the members of the ministry of the English Church, and the result may be in both cases the same—a lasting regret when the eyes open to a different view of the situation. That situation, however, as viewed by the immense majority, is (I need fear no contradiction of the statement) looked on as a good opening, an immediate provision, an honourable career, with adequate pay in the present, with profitable outlook in the future—a career in which a man's early manhood may be spent, and from which he may hope to retire with a competence soon after the attainment of his maturity, or at any rate when there yet is left the prospect of many years of that maturity and subsequent old age to be passed in his native country. Accessorily there is, I have little doubt, in varying proportion as the individual varies, a sense of duty and responsibility, an appreciation of the higher side of the function to be exercised. But the general

statement remains true, that whatever the amount of this accessory judgment, Indian officials, as a rule, look on their function as temporary, as a career from which they retire as soon as they can. And this mode of looking at the subject gains ground. Such study as I have given to recent publications justifies me in asserting that the feeling of impatience of their position, of anxious looking forward to the time when they can resign with decency, is on the increase; that European officials are less at home in India than they were some years ago. Their sojourn in that country bears more the character of an exile, and the exile sighs for home. Such, in brief, is the position. Its evil consequences are manifest. I need but mention those which concern the governed. Few worse governments can be devised than one in which the governors are launched into their office at an immature age, and, when years and practice have refined their judgment and qualified them for their task, they make way for others to renew the same process—make their mistakes, learn wisdom, and spend the wisdom acquired in an idle and objectless existence in another sphere; or, in the best contingency, not in the service of those at whose expense they have acquired it. This constant change of governors and their unripeness are ever recurring topics of remark in the discussions on our government; and I find the judgment of an acute and not unfriendly native statesman to the effect that in the inability to settle in India lies the most insuperable objection to our rule.

He thought (Sir Salar Jung), speaking of the great animosity against us, that the answer might partly be found in this—viz., that none of our predecessors ever were so utterly foreign to the country as we are; that with all their faults they settled among and amalgamated themselves with the people, which we, with all our virtues, could never do. This, he seems to think, is the most insuperable of all the objections against our rule ('East India Systems of Government,' p. 73).

'The climate requires that men should go out young. That part of the difficulty seems practically irremoveable, and consequently the choice of this particular career remains mainly a question for the family to consider, allowing always in our anarchical constitution of the family for the self-willed energy

of individuals in certain cases. But, irrespective of this point, I think we must face this question, Should this career be one chosen by the Positivist? Is it one open to those who accept our religion? It seems to me clearly not open, and that no other decision is reconcileable with our judgment as above given on our dominion in India. I put out of the question for the present those already engaged in it, and speak only of the way in which conscious Positivists should regard the question.

It is of little avail, in my judgment, to plead the good that may be done. Such a plea opens a door for endless sophisms, and we shall never get rid of certain evils but by the resolute, straightforward cutting ourselves loose from them. In the present case what we wish, what we aim at, is to bring to a close peaceably, and in the best possible way, the to us acknowledged evil of our supremacy over another country, equally with ourselves entitled to its national independence. The average public opinion of the governing classes at any rate clings to that supremacy; and I do not see any signs that our public leaders have the foresight to appreciate the desirability, not to say the necessity, of abandoning it, or the vigour which would enable them to give effect to that foresight if they had it. Far from this, the evil is rapidly gaining strength owing to certain recent changes, which are calculated to stimulate us to more vigorous opposition to the whole system. For in former times the Indian service was confined to a very limited area, and as a consequence direct interest in the retention of India was also confined. Now, by the introduction of this competitive system, the area is largely extended, and the double evil results that the direct interest is felt by a very much more numerous body, and at the same time we at home are more likely to lose the more energetic and able of our young men—the material, in fact, we can least spare. It is for those who share the views stated to work patiently towards a change in this state of opinion; and they must, if they would do this effectually, themselves stand aloof from participation in the evil. They must give full effect to their convictions. It is only under very exceptional conditions that men can go into the service with the conscious aim of ending the evil, of bearing actively in the production of the desired result—its entire cessation. It would be for most men very

difficult when in to keep their purpose, and remain free from the *esprit de corps* which is so powerful over the generality of minds. It is most probable they would not adhere to their resolution, and they would suffer from their failure. We know, too, what is expected of them. We are indebted to the Under-Secretary for India for the official interpretation of their position, and what is required of the servants of administration. I wonder he did not see the effect of his statement, or the value it makes us attach to all favourable opinions given by officials on the merits and popularity of our sway.

I can, I allow, see but one condition on which a Positivist could rightly select the Indian service as his career in life. I shall best express my meaning, perhaps, by saying that it would be if he chose it deliberately in a missionary spirit—as his permanent and lifelong calling—leaving his own country and friends, cutting himself absolutely loose from them, and resolving to devote his energies entirely under a sense of duty to a country to which we owe so much, to adopt it as his own for life and death. Such a resolve evidently could not be desired or expected at an early age—at the age at which most of our boy rulers leave for India. It should be the mature result of the whole education, and should not be adopted before that educational process is complete.

In fact I may now best sum up my observations on this head by bringing the case into direct connection with the fourth sacrament of the Religion of Humanity—the sacrament of destination. This whole question is a peculiarly English one, and I may speak with full freedom upon it. You will see then that our system would naturally discourage a decision at twenty-one or twenty-two, which is to be in a certain sense final. It is evidently a t variance with so premature a settlement of a man's career. Under present conditions no Positivist could be destined for the Indian service, as he enters it too young. But put the case, that at the proper age he, being in that service, apply for this particular sacrament; ask, in fact, for our consecration of his special calling. A moment's reflection will show that such consecration could not be given to the calling as at present regarded. For to what would he be destined? to no permanent function, to no function to which his thirty-five years of full vigour were to be given, with the further

advantage of his ripest wisdom, after his more active days were past. He would receive consecration for a temporary episode of his life—for the process of during some twenty years of his most immature manhood accumulating sufficient wealth on which to live without any definite function, although open possibly to such work as might fall to his lot. The sacrament of destination has no place in such a scheme.

But if he came before us on the other ground, and as one who had adopted a new country, then it seems to me unquestionable that if his general judgment of the position were in accordance with the Positivist conclusion—if, that is, he looked on himself as an instrument in the work of transition and not in that of retention—the sacrament should be conferred, and conferred with the full sense of the worthiness of the object and of the honour due to the recipient. But I may add that such a course will be only possible on the groundwork of very strong religious convictions, in combination probably with certain special tastes and aptitudes.

To those who accept our religion in its integrity and full logical development—and I address myself always on these occasions to such—I submit these considerations. They involve us in many practical difficulties it may be; but they are, I think, a legitimate consequence of our position, and they have the advantage of clearing our judgment and defining our action. They may, if adopted and followed out, serve us for real guidance.

So far for the purely individual point of view. But these remarks, as you are aware, were not suggested by the consideration of the individual. They take their origin in the Family—in the foundation of a new family by marriage. It will, I think, tend to the better treatment of this still more arduous question if I first discuss it in the same line of reasoning which I have hitherto followed; with reference, that is, to the supposed case of one receiving the sacrament of destination to the Indian service on the conditions already enumerated. I conceive such an one as precluded from marriage with one of his own countrywomen. He has adopted a new country, and should found a family in the only way in which, under climatic conditions, it can be founded in India by an Englishman; by intermarriage, that is, with the natives.

Such a statement brings us, you will perceive, at once in contact with one of the many fatal defects in our position in India. We, the conquerors, who, to justify our conquest, should be able to amalgamate with the conquered, are, from our antecedents, physical and moral, incapable of such amalgamation. Intermarriage is a degradation, and in most cases would be so equally to both parties, there being no equal and open sympathy attainable. Nothing more condemnatory of our tenure can be stated. I cannot learn that one who should be entirely removed from all ideas of contempt, from all haughty assumption of European superiority, would yet find it practicable to take a wife of the daughters of the country, so completely is Hindu society fenced in against us by all its strong organization.

But why should such an one be excluded from marriage with his own countrywomen? For this reason. By our hypothesis he has adopted a new country in which he is to live and die. If so, we are in presence of this difficulty—his children cannot be reared in India. At an early period, then, they and their mother—for they cannot be thrown off by both parents, least of all by the mother—must separate from him, and the family bond is broken, if not for ever in all cases, yet for a very large portion of life for the mother, and for the children often for ever. I do not dwell, you will observe, on the difficulty there might be, would be very often, in an Indian marriage if it involved for both parties the absolute final abandonment of their native country. For it is the hope of return that often makes such unions possible. I insist rather on the impossibility of true family life under the actual conditions, the unalterable conditions, of climate. We are all of us probably familiar, and by familiarity we have become somewhat dead to the evil, with cases in which this rupture of the family tie has taken place. It is the general rule in Indian life, and it too often takes the worst and most immoral form—the form in which children are produced without stint, and all the duty of their management and education is thrown off by both parents. In the conflict of duties the pleasanter duty prevails, and the children are sacrificed in the interest of their parents' comfort. We cannot, as Positivists, too explicitly condemn this proceeding.

I have been speaking, observe, exclusively of the case of a genuine Positivist adoption of the Indian career. But the truth is, if we have solved this case, we are clear on this question of marriage as a principle. For if we should refuse the sacrament of destination to one who adopted this career under the other form—that, viz., of a temporary state of life—we should, I think, find ourselves driven to the conclusion that we should also refuse the sacrament of marriage. Condemning the position on principle, we cannot sanction the indirect acquiescence in it by the Positivist woman. Nay, more, the more strongly we insist on the moral reprobation of our Indian empire apart from all other considerations, the more ground have we for hoping that women, as peculiarly qualified for moral views, will unreservedly lend us their support in enforcing our judgment.

Enough has been said to show my opinion on the question reserved in our Positivist marriage. On this only point I felt a difficulty as a Positivist; on all others, speaking still as a Positivist, I had no objections to offer, and there was, I repeat, ample ground for satisfaction. Why, then, with these sentiments, did I obtain authority to consecrate their union in the name of Humanity on the following grounds. It is true that the objections to India had been stated, and the unfavourable judgment which Positivism pronounces made sufficiently clear; but these personal and moral consequences on which I have been touching had not been so drawn out as to strike with their due force those more immediately concerned. They were, I think, implicitly involved in prior utterances, but not so explicitly stated as they should have been—so explicitly as to make it evident that they must be either accepted or ground shown for setting them aside. You will, I think, in candour allow that there is force in this distinction.

I feel the force of it most strongly myself, as I allow that I had never fully drawn out these consequences even in my own mind. It was only when reflection was forced upon me by this actual contingency, and I had to ask myself all the questions relating to the sacrament of marriage which I had now to confer for the first time, that I was driven to a thorough examination, from this new point of view, of the Indian pro-

blem in its more immediately personal bearings. I had not then guarded against any such difficulty. It was not in the nature of things that others should be more on their guard; and when I came to the conclusions I have laid before you, it was, so far as I could see, not desirable to make them apply to the existing facts—not desirable to give them a sort of retrospective action; whilst it was desirable that they should be fully stated as a provision in future cases. We had, as it were, drifted into a position which, I believe, all here will allow, looking at the nature of our system, admitted in fairness of the more favourable treatment; and, on the conviction that this was the right course, I stated in my application to M. Laffitte that whilst I thought the general rule of our action as a Priesthood would be adverse to the consecration of such marriages, in the special case before us I saw no reason for refusing such consecration. I wish to guard as far as possible against any misunderstanding of my conduct in this matter.

By a special clause in the ceremonial I guarded against the evil I have above alluded to in reference to the children—a clause on which in ordinary circumstances I should not have insisted as expressing what is so simple a deduction from our whole doctrine of the Family.

With one more remark I leave this delicate subject. If there is blame anywhere, it must fall at least in equal degree to my share. But regret and dissatisfaction are different from blame; and it is quite possible to feel both and yet hold all parties to have acted in a way that does not incur any positive blame. Such a large allowance is necessary for antecedents and circumstances in all human action.

I have drawn out, it may perhaps seem even too stringently, our conclusions as to the Indian service. Let it be remembered, however, that hitherto I have been really speaking of cases in which the entering or not entering it is yet an open question, and when it is therefore fair to urge all the considerations involved in it in their full force. Some few words are necessary in reference to those already engaged, and who may have become alien to it, not from the mere sense of distaste which seems general enough and natural enough—nay, even as good in it in so far as it arises from a right feeling, the

exile's regret at separation from his own country and all its better associations and influences, his consciousness that, however necessary, it is a disagreeable mode of gaining a competence. What I have to say is in reference rather to those who have become alien to it on conviction, who have since they entered become Positivist, and by virtue of this change see the whole thing in a different light. Such may ask themselves what is their duty. It seems to me that no abrupt breaking with their past is to be urged on such men. Under other influences and convictions they were committed to a certain career. Their whole life has been compromised by that committal—has been ordered hitherto in reference to it. In perfect good faith they launched themselves on a course; their change cannot in the eye of reason necessitate an abrupt return upon that course. The alteration in their judgment will undoubtedly affect their conduct, as it will affect their opinion of the course they have adopted; but where the calling is not in itself a demoralizing or immoral one—and, strong as are my objections to it, experience shows that this at least may be allowed, that personally men may pass through it uninjured or even raised—it is for each one on his own moral responsibility to estimate with care his own peculiar circumstances, test his judgment of them by the light of the doctrine he accepts, and determine what course of action is on the whole the right one for him to follow. For such men I have no real qualification to make on what I said last year, though it would have been wise at that time to have qualified the statement. There is good and noble work for them to do in India, and quietly and unobtrusively they may aid in that which is the great aim of all Positivist policy—the smoothing the transition from subjection to independence. Such other consequences or modifications of their action as the principles I have stated involve, they will, if they read my remarks, either acquiesce in or reject after due examination, and on their own full responsibilty, which it is one object of our system to leave as free as possible.

I have recurred more than once to the question of permanence, to the evils of a constant change in the Indian administration. This is a point which opens wider issues, and leads to more general reflections on one feature in our national

existence. In other words, the Indian problem is but a special case of a much larger one. Of all the nations of Western Europe, that which inhabits Great Britain is most given to wander abroad—to displace itself and settle upon others. The Irish I exclude. Their emigration, large and fraught with evil as it is, is the result of our misgovernment and our incapacity to apply the proper remedies for that misgovernment. It is scarcely a spontaneous act on the part of the Irish people. They leave Ireland with undying regret, under strong compulsion, often to avoid starvation. But in England and Scotland the emigrating disposition has been, and is still, strong, and is recognized by our ordinary theories as a good. That is, it is proclaimed, not merely as a remedy for unquestioned social evils, but as a desirable thing in itself. If a good at all, it is most certainly not an unmixed one. Its evils are sufficiently patent, and are daily forcing themselves on all thoughtful observers of our disturbing action. It is only one form of those evils which I shall touch on at present—the too frequent absence of permanence even in this migration. It is the perpetual coming and going—the consequent perpetual troubling of the two societies, the one originally left, and the one of which they form only for a time part—which is the objectionable feature on which I insist at present. Men emigrate, but it is not to form a new state, a settled society with its hopes and advantages, and with such improving influences as the purpose would naturally carry with it ; but it is to draw what advantage they can from the particular scene they have chosen, and to return with their gains to their original home. I cannot think that either society profits by this disturbance, this absolutely unsocial method of colonization. And just as for the Indian administrator, or settler, so for the ordinary colonist, a true social spirit, a true and just sense of our obligations to Humanity, would dictate, if change of domicile is either necessitated or self-chosen, the observance of one of the most elementary conditions of good in this our complex state—the condition of persistence.

Apart from its numerous incidental evils—evils incidental to it under the Anglo-Saxon form at any rate—I cannot think that the Religion of Humanity, or the doctrines of Positivism, sanction either the conduct now too generally pursued, or the

tendency to displacement, which is so characteristic of us; the tendency, I mean, so belauded by the rich and the comfortable, to permanent emigration. Relatively to our times, and in the present state of the world, the movement of population with the object of peopling other countries, and as distinct from the limited requirements of fair commerce, is not one either imperiously demanded or accompanied with such manifest advantages as to compensate for its inherent disadvantages. Even the great migrations of the past were fertile in evils under the form they actually took. We can trace, it is true, beneficial results to them, and that in a measure overbalancing their evils. But not the less is it true, that the evils might have been avoided by human forethought and care. There were, however, motives for them which cannot be pleaded for a migratory disposition now. Confining myself to the most favourable aspect of this movement—to its aspect in relation to the country whence it takes place, and in whose supposed interest it takes place—a close inspection will lead to an adverse judgment. Its most direct result is to obviate the necessity of changes which are in themselves most desirable, to give a longer tenure to modes of government and institutions which, as outworn, are pressing on the nation's vitality. This, as a political result, has been in the past, and is still, traceable to the movement of emigration. Had there been no American outlet, the Church and Land questions of Ireland would not have waited so long for a half-hearted settlement.

No remedy for political and social evils seems to me so fallacious, so short-lived, so immoral, as that of emigration, so long as we regard the country quitted. I see no reason in our recent experience to rejoice in the rapid immigration, as to its effect on the country sought, of the poor, the wretched, much less of the thirsty adventurers who leave us in large numbers. But I gladly pass out of the merely political aspects, and on this occasion, on this great festival, take the broadest human view, the real doctrine of the Religion of Humanity, in exclusion, though not in forgetfulness, of its relative application. The greatest change which human society has experienced was the change from the nomad to the sedentary form of existence. Indissolubly connected with that change in each country where it has successively taken place,

are all the higher results of progress. The intellectual advance of our race, whether æsthetic, scientific, or philosophic, the great constructions which connect with human activity man's polities and his religions, all are linked to this indispensable transition. So, too, is all industrial development. Recorded history deals only in a secondary degree with any other state—no interest attaching to any other but as explanatory of the new form into which it merged. But, like other great changes in common with the other constructive movements of Humanity, this also is incomplete. The strictly nomad tribes may be few and unimportant, and the eye may hardly be able on the whole of our planet to trace any large aggregate of men which is not sedentary. It remains true, however, that the change has not yet sufficiently penetrated the thought and action of man. Long as the period seems to us during which we have in Western Europe been sedentary, there are yet traceable in us vestiges of the previous condition, vestiges of the primitive tendencies to the nomad life—tendencies which need discipline, and in the main discouragement. The pressure of settled social existence is not without its disadvantages, but it is, as a rule, indispensable for man's nature, and, when it is thrown off carelessly or impatiently, the rejection of it is generally noxious. All that is best in the influences of human life, all fixity of habits, all permanence of the purer affections, all we are nationally apt to disregard in the keen competition for wealth. No nation upon earth sits so loose to the family tie as the English and Scotch and their direct descendants. They break loose from it with scarcely a struggle on any glimpse of a prospect of material advantage. There is much to account for this, but to a right estimate of the great primary bonds of human society there is little to justify it. We need a revisal of the popular language and opinions on this question. In the most general form I can give my view, we need the reconstruction of the Family and the State. For these in their higher forms require, as an indispensable condition, permanence in all the relations of life.

To such an extent is restlessness characteristic of our present state, that opposition to it may seem useless. And for a time it will be so. Yet I am much mistaken if there is

not working in the minds of many a misgiving that some reaction against the received views is desirable, if there is not slowly forming a conviction that we sacrifice too much, not merely to the hope of material improvement, but too much also to the vision of an Imperial position; that our expansive tendencies under these impulses are an evil to others and still more to ourselves; that there is no adequate motive for our aiming at constant outward growth and extension, but that it were wiser for us, as well as nobler, to restrict ourselves to the right management of ourselves within ourselves, and the due performance of our duties to others under this limitation. At present we seem quite willing to abandon the duties to others whilst we press for expansion, thus combining as much evil as we can to the world in general in our scheme of policy. I cannot adequately express my abhorrence of this degrading combination.

When the Western world, in its entirety, shall have woven this conception into the whole contexture of its thoughts, it will have become completely, and on mature conviction, sedentary, and by virtue of its thorough adoption of this mode of life, it will cease to disturb by emigration and to act oppressively upon others, whilst in no sense renouncing the function committed to it by its past of aiding and guiding those others. The moralized action which will inevitably result from this great change will be the most powerful leaven ever introduced into the sum of human activities. Advance in all good will be possible under its influence.

I have spoken quite generally and in the abstract. You will supply the necessary qualifications, the inevitable practical modifications. It is the principle on which I wished to insist. I may seem to have wandered far from the more mere Indian question; but I have not ever lost it from my sight. It is, you will see, as I said, but a special point in a whole series of larger considerations, and to be ultimately settled on principles common to the series. And all these considerations resolve themselves into one—into the consideration of the Power we serve and the obligations Humanity imposes upon her more immediate organs, the several States, that is, which conjointly occupy the planet. Purely in reference to her are their mutual relations determined. As yet they act without

any such reference consciously, each more or less openly avowing but too shamelessly that its own interest is its only determining motive. We, the disciples of Humanity, have ample scope for all our energy in awakening a sense of better things—in implanting the conviction that for nations, as for individuals, self-devotion to the good of others is the only reasonable, as it is the only noble, principle. And on none of the disciples of Humanity is the call for effort in this direction likely to be so great as on us. For it is not out of season that I have spoken at this length on the question of India and its cognate questions. Had I had no special occasion to touch on them I should, if not to-day, at some early period have asked your attention to the subject. For India is the real centre of our disturbing action as a government, the real object kept in view in all our national policy as regards extra-European complications. To modify that policy in the sense above indicated must be our constant aim, and no effectual modification will be introduced into it but as the indirect or direct result of the Religion of Humanity. The others are silent, if not active, accomplices in the evils we deprecate. To put forward the doctrines of that Religion on this important point in all their most logical coherence and development, will be the surest mode of attaining our end, the surest mode of inducing that change of opinion and conviction which alone can be relied on for any permanent result. Other and more occasional action may be indispensable, and from that we shall not shrink, as we have not shrunk in the past—witness Dr. Bridges' protest about China—but the most useful and most beneficial action, both for ourselves and others, must ever remain our being ourselves penetrated and penetrating others with the idea of Humanity in all its comprehensiveness and in all its consequences.

APPENDIX.

I INSERT, with Mr. Hutton's permission, a copy of the engagements required of him. It will be seen from it that the statement in my address requires a certain qualification, but not one in favour of the moderation of the requirements:—

Henricus Eduardus
Dei et Apostolicæ Sedis gratiâ
Archiepiscopus Westmonasteriensis.

Utentes facultatibus nobis a SSmo. Domino nostro, Pio Div. Prov. P P ix. die 24 Sept., 1871, ad biennium benigne concessis, attentis expositis, dispensationem ab impedimento *mixtæ religionis* in Domino concedimus, ita ut eodem non obstante, ... Catholic . . . . . cum . . . . . acatholic . . . . . matrimonium licitè contrahere possit, prævià promissione ritè obtentâ (*Sacerdotes omnes monemus præsentem dispensationem eâ conditione concedi ut* NULLA *prorsus sit antequam triplex supradicta promissio modo a nobis prescripto obtineatur,*) præscribimus autem ut 1a et 2a *promissio partium nominibus* in paginâ sequente subscriptis 3a *vero saltem vivâ voce fiat,* 1°, tam a parte catholicâ, quam a parte acatholicâ, de educanda prole utriusque sexûs in Catholicæ religionis sanctitate, necnon, 2°, a parte acatholicâ de libero exercitio religionis parti Catholicæ permittendo, 3° a parte vero Catholicâ conversione compartis acatholicæ pro viribus curandâ; omissis solemnitatibus et benedictione nuptiali, servatisque omnibus quæ in matrimoniis mixtis servari debent et præsertim tenore Instructionis Sædiei 17 Febr. 1864, de non comparendo coram ministro hæretico.

Datum Westmonasterii die,
cum dispensatione super proclamationibus bannorum.

Ego infrascriptus facio matrimonium inter . . . et . . . virtute hujus dispensationis in ecclesiâ . . . . . triplice supradictâ promissione ritè obtentâ et servatis omnibus servandis hac die fuisse celebratum.

(Promises to be signed before the marriage.)
To be signed by both parties.

We, the undersigned, do hereby, each of us, solemnly promise and engage that all the children of both sexes who may be born of our marriage shall be baptized in the Catholic Church, and shall be carefully brought up in the knowledge and practice of the Catholic religion.

Signatures {

Date,

(To be signed by the non-Catholic party.)

I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly promise and engage that I will not interfere with the religious belief of [1] my future [2] , and that I will allow [3] full and perfect liberty to fulfil all [4] duties as a member of the Catholic religion.

This paper is to be returned without delay after the marriage to the Archbishop's house.

[1] Insert name. [2] Wife or husband. [3] Her or him. [4] Her religious.

L'UNION DES PROLÉTARIATS FRANÇAIS ET ANGLAIS.

L'Amour pour principe : L'Ordre pour base : Le Progrès pour but.
Vivre pour autrui. Vivre au grand jour.

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,—Commençons par un moment de recueillement sympathique afin de reporter notre pensée sur nos confrères dans la nouvelle foi, les membres épars de notre Église naissante, qui de leur part tous, si éloignés et si diversement situés qu'ils soient, auront leur esprit tourné sur cette réunion centrale faite en l'honneur de la grande mémoire.

Lorsque, il y a dix ans, je prenais la parole ici pour la première fois, nous étions au fort de l'orage, éprouvés comme Positivistes par une série de grands désastres. Nous avions à lutter sérieusement pour la simple existence. Aujourd'hui nous n'en sommes plus là. Nous avons, il est vrai, perdu tout récemment un de nos plus estimables confrères, un des plus anciens membres de la Société Positiviste, un des plus convaincus croyants de la Religion de l'Humanité, le vénérable M. Piéton. Mais il est mort à un âge très-avancé, au-delà de la limite ordinaire de la vie humaine. Rien d'incomplet dans cette existence honorable. Nous nous séparons avec douleur, car la mort est toujours triste, mais avec la pensée satisfaite. Il n'y a rien qui nous rappelle les événemens de 1862. Devant la tombe qu'il a fait élever si près de celle de son maître, nous nous sentons touchés sans être attristés.

À part cette perte les dix années écoulées ont assez épargné le corps Positiviste. Non pas que nous ayons échappé aux souffrances intimes. Il s'en faut beaucoup ; il y en a de nous qui ont été touchés au vif et qui s'en ressentiront pour toujours. Mais c'est beaucoup de pouvoir dire, surtout quand nous pensons à tout ce qui s'est passé dans ces derniers

temps, que la réunion actuelle est ou pourrait être à peu près la même quant à sa composition d'hommes adultes que celle à laquelle je la compare. Elle en diffère heureusement par de nouvelles adjonctions, mais en général les anciens, les disciples de la première heure restent encore debout. Ceci soit dit sans oublier les vides qui se sont faits dans nos rangs ; pour nous surtout les morts vivent.

Quant à la situation de notre cause, et spécialement de l'organisation qui la soutient et la propage, elle est aussi bien meilleure qu'elle ne l'était alors. Je ne me dissimule pas le côté faible de la chose. J'y reviendrai plus tard ; mais en somme nous avons vécu et marché, et ce sont les premières années qui sont les difficiles pour toute religion, pour tout changement notable aux idées qui dirigent l'espèce. L'effort préliminaire que demande l'adhésion se fait presque à l'insu des premiers propagateurs et selon les apparences en dehors d'eux. Ils peuvent être utiles—puissamment utiles—mais l'œuvre de la propagation ne se borne jamais à leur influence directe et constatée. Et c'est le mouvement extérieur, indirect, qui en un temps donné vient s'ajouter à leur action immédiate et lui imprimer une force irrésistible. L'histoire de notre dévancier, le Catholicisme, nous offre la confirmation de cette remarque. D'après la différence de doctrine et d'antécédents le Positivisme ne commence pas par le travail souterrain qui occupe les premiers siècles du Catholicisme. Il se place tout d'abord à la tête du mouvement humain et réclame hautement la direction des affaires terrestres, et il justifie sa réclamation. Pourtant, quant à sa constitution intérieure, il subit à un certain degré la même loi que son prédécesseur, et nous devons nous attendre à une lenteur d'accroissement qui n'a de fâcheux pour nous que la part pour laquelle y contribue notre propre défaillance.

Car c'est là la question vraiment utile pour nous tous—Cette lenteur que nous regrettons, y sommes-nous pour quelque chose ? Je pose cette question, et ma réponse ne fera que l'effleurer. Qui regarderait de près l'action Positiviste ne pourrait nier que nous ne lassions à désirer, que notre énergie ne soit au-dessous de nos besoins. Je me borne aux plus grandes généralités en laissant à chacun l'application personnelle. Mais tout en reconnaissant ce qu'il y a de fort et de

dévoué chez nous, il y a, si je ne me trompe, un défaut du sentiment pleinement religieux, ce qui fait que notre Positivisme reste trop accessoire, ne constitue pas, s'il m'est permis de m'exprimer ainsi, notre vie entière, mais n'en est qu'une partie plus ou moins considérable. Je ne parle pas, bien entendu, de l'intervalle qui chez tout homme sépare sa théorie de sa conduite morale, lieu-commun de tous les prédicateurs ; je parle plutôt de la faiblesse de l'inspiration Positiviste, de notre imparfaite possession de la croyance que nous professons. Cette faiblesse, cette imperfection, font l'effet sur le public d'un manque de conviction, et produisent en nous une action hésitante et peu conséquente. Évidemment dans ces limites nous sommes responsables de la lenteur que, quelle qu'en soit la cause, nous constatons tous comme un fait dans la croissance de notre foi.

Mais en somme il y a eu progrès—progrès dans les deux pays de l'Europe occidentale où l'on professe ouvertement la Religion de l'Humanité ; progrès en Amérique, où le noyau de New-York se constitue plus solidement de l'aveu de ceux même qui lui sont opposés ; et même un certain commencement d'adhésion parmi les orientaux. Et notre milieu a plus sensiblement qu'auparavant subi notre influence. Ceci est incontestable pour tout observateur sérieux sans que nous en exagérions la portée. En définitive je crois notre base d'action plus assurée qu'elle ne l'était, et par suite nous pouvons compter sur une marche plus conforme à nos vœux et aux besoins de la société qui nous entoure. Nos derniers malheurs—je parle en occidental—ont contribué à ce résultat en fortifiant l'union des deux principaux noyaux, poussés par la crise à sentir plus intimement cette union et à combiner de plus en plus leur action. Les liens personnels se sont resserrés par des contacts familiers des plus agréables, et l'utilité d'une organisation qui pûisse servir de centre à nos efforts communs a pénétré, plus profondément qu'auparavant, le corps Positiviste. Répandre cette conviction et la vivifier par l'affection personnelle, c'est évidemment assurer notre base de la manière la plus solide.

Et il est grandement temps que nous nous sentions à l'aise pour notre existence. Car les besoins de la société deviennent de plus en plus urgents, et la nécessité d'une puissante impul

sion plus évidente. L'époque n'est pas loin où l'on pouvait être tenté de ne pas trop presser le pas, de laisser aller les choses. Ce temps de calme relatif et de paisible espoir n'est plus. Toute illusion a disparu ; le trouble est partout et il est impossible d'éviter une lutte constante et formidable. L'incapacité politique des hommes d'état occidentaux n'a pas su garantir—ce qui cependant était bien possible—la grande paix qui pendant quarante ans à peu près avait régné en Europe, et par suite de cette imprévoyance, de secousse en secousse, nous en sommes venus à la rupture, passagère du reste, de toute concorde entre les nations—à la désorganisation provisoire d'un équilibre qui avait coûté tant d'efforts à établir. Son rétablissement nous en coûtera bien d'autres. Et cependant c'est la tâche qui nous incombe, et j'entends par nous les disciples de la Religion de l'Humanité que nous représentons ici. C'est à ce rétablissement que je vais consacrer les quelques réflexions que je vous soumets aujourd'hui.

La question se rattache à ce que je viens de dire plus haut, et qui paraissait n'avoir trait qu'à la petite famille Positiviste, si insignifiante en fait de nombre et de puissance actuelle. La constitution de cette famille est une combinaison de deux éléments seulement de l'occident, les éléments français et anglo-saxon. C'est là l'expression générale assez exacte de la réalité. Surtout en donnant au second terme sa plus grande expansion, en y comprenant tous ceux qui parlent anglais, cette constitution annonce et garantit à la fois l'intime combinaison, dans l'intérêt général de l'occident, des deux peuples que dirigera à une date pas trop reculée, d'abord une politique inspirée par nous, ensuite un pouvoir spirituel émané de nous. Tout porte à croire que les malheurs qu'a éprouvés l'occident, et qui ne sont nullement particuliers à la France, ont hâté l'avènement de cette union. Et cela de plusieurs manières. D'abord la création du nouvel Empire germanique, avec son esprit militaire et sa grande puissance matérielle, tend à rapprocher les deux nations occidentales par le sentiment d'un commun intérêt de défense, par le sentiment aussi, sans se cacher leur faiblesse et leurs défauts, de la grande supériorité de leur commune constitution sociale, pacifique, et industrielle—de leur civilisation enfin—sur l'organisation féodale et militaire qui domine et comprime

l'Allemagne. En second lieu les sympathies populaires, si fortes au commencement de la grande Révolution, ont été ravivées par les souffrances et la terminaison de la dernière crise. Je crois que l'élite du peuple anglais est profondément sympathique à la France républicaine, et qu'elle tend elle-même lentement, mais sans hésitation, vers l'adoption de cette forme de gouvernement, quoiqu'en disent les organes des classes dirigeantes et quelle que soit la prudence que le peuple y mette. Dans tous les cas il est certain qu'il ne serait plus possible de le faire revenir sur la politique d'hostilité systématique pratiquée au siècle dernier par l'oligarchie anglaise pour empêcher l'effet naturel de notre mouvement. Et ce contact des deux peuples s'opérant librement, il y aura une tendance à équilibrer le progrès de part et d'autre.

Tout cela cependant n'est qu'accessoire, et n'a son importance qu'en ce qu'il facilite une action plus systématique ; il ne peut nullement y suppléer. Aussi est-il facile de s'exagérer la valeur de pareilles considérations, de ne faire assez la part des obstacles. Mais il y a un autre ordre de considérations, plus exempt des éléments de perturbation, et qui offre par suite un fondement plus sûr pour nos espérances, sans rentrer cependant dans la question de notre action Positiviste. C'est dans l'histoire des deux pays et de leurs relations mutuelles que l'on peut trouver des motifs à l'appui de notre conviction. Si nous passons en revue l'histoire des deux peuples, nous serons frappés de la constante intimité de leurs relations, de la continuité de leur action mutuelle. Unis par leur commune incorporation au grand Empire romain, ils ont, il est vrai, subi un sort différent pendant la première période du moyen âge. Cette différence devient moindre dans la seconde période, car, exposés tous les deux aux attaques des Scandinaves, ils ont contribué l'un et l'autre a maintenir les résultats de la politique de Charlemagne. De plus en plus rapprochés pendant la troisième période, surtout depuis la conquête normande, ils tendaient même à une excessive concentration d'après la prépondérance territoriale des ducs-rois de l'Angleterre. L'absorption de la Normandie par Philippe-Auguste mit fin à ce danger, qui reparut bientôt cependant sous une autre forme, quand les barons anglais, ligués contre leur roi et vaincus par lui, n'hésitèrent pas à s'adresser à la

maison royale de France, et à lui offrir la couronne anglaise—indice évident du rapprochement entre les deux nationalités, car ce qui plus tard eût été blâmé comme la plus indigne trahison ne choquait nullement le sentiment de ce temps, et, chose curieuse, a peu excité l'indignation de la postérité. Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur la commune participation aux croisades ni sur les signes multiples d'une communauté de mœurs et de sympathies. Tout se résume dans un seul fait, la communauté du langage pour les classes gouvernantes, si bien notée par Walter Scott. 'Je parle toujours français, la langue du roi Richard et de ses nobles,' dit le Templier dans 'Ivanhoe.' Même dans la lutte séculaire des XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles, si regrettable pour les deux peuples, si blâmable de la part des rois anglais, on sent toujours une certaine sympathie dominant l'antagonisme.

Pendant la première période de la révolution systématique les relations des deux pays ont été déterminées par des considérations religieuses plutôt que politiques ou nationales, et en présence du commun ennemi, l'Espagne catholique, l'union des grands princes a été étroite et cordiale. Cet état a duré essentiellement jusqu'à la mort de Cromwell. En lutte antagonistique par suite de l'ambition menaçante de Louis XIV, la longue paix due à la sagesse de Walpole et de Fleury a encore rapproché les deux peuples. Plus tard la lutte a recommencé par des motifs commerciaux et coloniaux, mais à sa fin et malgré les nombreuses causes d'opposition les deux gouvernements tendaient à se rapprocher, et encore davantage les deux peuples. La grande Révolution les a trouvés plus sympathiques l'un à l'autre que l'on ne l'attendait, et c'est précisément là la vrai cause de l'hostilité plus envenimée qui marque la période de la guerre révolutionnaire, car il ne faut pas oublier que, à part les prétextes officiels, c'était surtout pour empêcher la propagande française et l'entrée des principes français que l'aristocratie anglaise a engagé cette guerre. En suivant attentivement les documents du temps on est étonné de voir à quel danger elle s'est sentie exposée. Nous avons subi une compression très-sévère, et nous avons eu aussi notre terreur. Le ministre Pitt a eu à un instant l'intention d'envoyer prisonnier à la Tour de Londres le chef de l'opposition parlementaire, son rival Fox. Cet incident en dit

beaucoup. Je ne cite ces faits que pour donner une mesure des sentiments de sympathie qui animaient une grande partie de la population anglaise en faveur de la France. Je crois que personne ici ne blâmera la résistance prolongée que l'Angleterre a opposée à l'ambition dangereuse et rétrograde du premier Bonaparte. De graves fautes politiques ont pu être commises, mais en principe l'effort était légitime, et à la fin de la guerre on a voulu faire un arrangement aussi peu blessant que possible pour la nation vaincue, qui pût servir de base à une paix honnête et durable, de manière a ramener au plus vite l'accord interrompu. C'était là le sentiment dominant, et jusqu'à un certain point on a réussi. Envisagée dans sa totalité, l'Europe à pu jouir d'un long repos.

Je ne crois pas manquer à la stricte vérité historique en disant que parmi les influences auxquelles ce résultat est dû l'Angleterre est pour une grande part, que son attitude vis-à-vis de la France depuis la grande guerre a été, prise en général, bien inspirée. Elle semblait avoir pris à cœur l'enseignement qui résulte de tout le passé moderne que c'est dans l'entente des deux pays que consiste la meilleure garantie de la paix provisoire en occident. Divisés, il y a toujours eu quelqu'un qui tâchât de profiter de la division. La guerre de Crimée, l'oppression du Danemarc, n'eurent pas d'autre explication. Je me borne aux faits ; je n'entre pas dans l'appréciation morale. La même chose se reproduit au commencement de la dernière lutte ; on a été peu délicat sur le choix des moyens : l'essentiel était de semer la discorde, et on y est parvenu. Et que l'on ne s'y trompe pas ; c'était apparemment à la France qu'on en voulait ; mais bien sûr la politique allemande, appuyée par la Russie, s'adressait tout autant à l'Angleterre. C'était le contre-coup de la guerre de Crimée. Désunir et humilier les deux puissances de l'occident, voilà en somme le but immédiat. Reste à voir ce que nous prépare l'avenir. Il sera paisible ou le contraire pour l'Europe selon le degré de rapprochement qui s'effectuera d'une manière ou d'une autre entre ces deux puissances. Ceci soit dit en passant. Je reviens à mon objet propre. Je voulais par un retour sur l'histoire indiquer les principaux points de contact entre nos deux pays, et, on le voit à ce rapide résumé, ces points ont été nombreux. C'est, à vrai

dire, une série presque ininterrompue de relations que nous avons sous les yeux ; relations, il faut le dire, trop souvent hostiles, mais loin de l'être exclusivement ; peut-être, le tout bien pesé, plutôt amicales qu'hostiles. Mais hostiles ou amicales, on le voit, les relations ont été constantes et intimes, et les causes de l'hostilité une fois écartées, la conscience de cette continuité de mutuelle action amène spontanément un sentiment favorable. Or c'est ce qui se trouve accompli maintenant. La religion n'entre guère comme élément perturbateur dans la politique des deux peuples. Le commerce, source jadis d'une rivalité si intense, a cessé de l'être. Les colonies de même, car elles tendent à se séparer de la métropole, ou du moins à rester indépendantes dans une union presque nominale. Le progrès des idées républicaines et industrielles ne peut qu'augmenter les sympathies. Il ne reste aucune raison valable de séparation ou d'antagonisme. Et pourtant telle est la nature humaine que cette conclusion négative par elle-même n'aboutirait à rien. Il faut bien autre chose pour rallier les hommes que la non-existence de causes légitimes de se quereller. Seulement à la longue cette absence agit utilement sur les combattans, et la raison en profite pour imposer une certaine modération aux instincts moins sociables.

En terminant cette rapide revue du passé, je ne puis m'abstenir de dire un mot sur la ligne de conduite adoptée par l'Angleterre pendant votre dernière crise. Du point de vue occidental je la trouve honteusement indigne de son passé, et je la considère comme une lâche renonciation à un devoir des plus évidents. Cela me mènerait trop loin si je me laissais aller à expliquer la politique de notre gouvernement, et à vous exposer les justifications, à mes yeux insuffisantes, que l'on avance. Pour simplifier la question j'admettrai l'impuissance militaire. Je n'y crois pas, mais je l'admets : on ne pouvait pas faire la guerre ; soit, n'y avait-il pas autre chose à faire ? N'y avait-il pas lieu pour tout gouvernement à la hauteur des obligations qu'impose un passé comme le nôtre, au nom de l'intérêt commun de l'Europe occidentale, de se placer à la tête des puissances neutres au lieu de peser sur elles dans le sens contraire, et d'un commun accord avec ces puissances exprimer librement et à haute voix l'opinion

publique de l'Europe, qui condamne les conditions de paix imposées à la France comme étant la source d'un danger permanent ? On a beau dire que c'eût été inutile, que la supériorité allemande était trop grande. L'expression formelle d'une désapprobation commune quant à l'annexion de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine eût pu nous épargner une perspective aussi menaçante que celle qui existe actuellement. En tout cas elle eût eu un grand poids moral. L'Angleterre est intervenue, il est vrai ; elle a parlé au dernier moment et elle a été éconduite sans trop de façons. Elle s'attendait à être pour quelque chose. J'ai entendu M. Gladstone exprimer sa confiance à cet égard. Elle n'a fait qu'assister impuissante au triste dénoûement, ce que je ne regretterais nullement, car elle a bien mérité ce traitement, n'était-ce que ce dénoûement équivaut à la rupture de tout concert européen. C'est un sentiment assez généralement répandu en Angleterre que la conscience d'avoir manqué à un devoir national—de n'avoir pas été au niveau de nos responsabilités. Mais dans notre situation actuelle on ne voit pas le moyen d'y remédier. Il ne serait pas difficile, certes, de tracer la ligne que devrait suivre notre gouvernement s'il voulait sérieusement se mettre à l'œuvre pour réparer le mal. Mais nous en sommes bien loin. L'allure franche et loyale d'une politique de sage prévoyance, rien dans le langage ou l'action de nos hommes d'état, quelle que soit du reste leur nuance, ne nous autorise à nous attendre à cela. Au fond je crois que leur conviction, aussi bien que celle du public en général, est que les véritables intérêts de l'occident demandent une union étroite avec la France, que c'est là le nœud de tout sain équilibre européen. L'Allemagne et ses prétentions déplacées ne nous imposent guère. On ne s'en occupe même pas assez. Par exemple, je ne m'explique pas facilement le silence de nos journaux à l'égard du nouvel Empire. Quoiqu'il en soit, le sentiment dominant, ordinairement d'ailleurs à l'état instinctif, le sentiment populaire est, je le répète, que l'Angleterre en tant que puissance européenne est principalement liée à la France. Il n'y a que les pédants et les littérateurs qui préconisent l'alliance naturelle entre les deux peuples teutons, en dépit de tout le passé, qui ne peut être ainsi négligé. C'est surtout à propos d'une pareille question que l'on

sent combien il est vrai que les morts gouvernent les vivants.

Naturellement je me borne à l'appréciation de la politique anglaise. Les circonstances m'interdisent un examen de l'action française. Vous y suppléerez facilement. Il me sera permis cependant de remarquer que selon toute apparence les hommes qui dirigent les divers gouvernements européens sont tous trop engagés dans les vieilles ornières pour que l'on puisse fonder sur eux quelques espérances. Ils n'ont pas pu éviter les embarras dans lesquels nous nous trouvons ; comment croire qu'ils sauront nous en tirer ? Si grande donc que pourrait être l'utilité d'une sage politique immédiate, et elle aurait le jeu large et pas trop difficile, il faut se résigner à y renoncer. Il faut en prendre son parti et chercher ailleurs la solution de nos difficultés, suppléer au défaut d'initiative qui caractérise les gouvernements actuels en organisant auss vite que possible une initiative en dehors d'eux, et dont ils sentiraient la pression.

Où la trouver cette impulsion nouvelle ? Voilà la question à laquelle je m'efforcerai de répondre tant bien que mal. Si j'ai insisté sur les affinités spontanées, développées dans le cours des événements, si j'ai insisté sur la levée des barrières qui entravaient autrefois les rapprochements indispensables, si en dernier lieu j'ai insisté sur les considérations historiques, ce n'est nullement que je les crois suffisantes comme base d'une organisation nouvelle soit séparément, soit en les combinant. Sans en exagérer la valeur il est bon cependant de les constater. Il faut tirer parti de tout, et en suivant ces indications du passé on se rassure et se fortifie dans la conviction que le but que nous nous proposons n'est pas une pure chimère de notre imagination. Notre œuvre n'est pas une œuvre de création, mais de systématisation avec développement d'éléments préexistants. L'examen de ces éléments était la première chose à faire. Je l'ai fait très-rapidement et très-imparfaitement, mais peut-être suffisamment pour vous exprimer ma pensée. Reste à voir ce qu'il nous faut au-delà pour atteindre notre but, pour effectuer le ralliement de l'occident.

La seule solution complète et radicale est pour nous la solution religieuse, l'union de l'occident par une commune foi. Dans une réunion comme celle-ci je n'ai pas besoin d'insister

là-dessus. Encore une fois, pour nous cette foi commune ne peut être autre que la Religion de l'Humanité. Libre aux autres de croire à la possibilité d'un rajeunissement des anciennes croyances et d'y travailler de leur mieux. Pour nous la question est jugée et nous nous adressons ailleurs. La difficulté est de faire pénétrer chez les autres les convictions que nous avons adoptées, et de rendre universelle la foi qui anime aujourd'hui notre cercle si restreint. Tout en reconnaissant cependant l'immensité de notre tâche nous ne devons pas nous décourager. Sans parler du puissant secours que le passé nous lègue, de toute la préparation dont nous héritons, sans parler de la situation actuelle qui nous amène de plus en plus les esprits, il faut bien se dire que l'universalité d'une cr yance est comme toutes les autres une expression relative. Les croyances fétichiques ont pu être strictement universelles, car elles sont la logique instinctive de l'homme primitif. Les croyances positives sont aussi à un certain degré universelles, car elles aussi répondent aux nécessités pratiques de l'homme, quel que soit son état et à toute époque. Mais il n'en est plus de même quand nous arrivons à la Religion de l'Humanité, c'est à dire à un ensemble de croyances basé sur une série de grandes conceptions scientifiques. Elle tend à devenir universelle dans le plus large sens du mot ; elle tend, c'est à dire, à s'emparer de l'homme tout entier, de l'homme sentant, pensant, agissant ; mais c'est une tendance qui demande bien du temps pour se traduire en fait. En vertu de sa réalité notre religion arrivera à l'universalité, à une universalité aussi complète et plus solide que celle du Fétichisme qu'elle s'incorpore. Mais pour longtemps encore elle restera ce qu'est toujours resté le Théologisme sous toutes ses formes quelconques, une force prépondérante, mais nullement exclusive ; car ni le polythéisme ni le monothéisme ne sont jamais parvenus, même à la période de leur plus grande splendeur, à posséder entièrement le terrain qu'ils revendiquaient. Ils dominaient, il est vrai, surtout le polythéisme, mais ils voyaient toujours leur échapper par certains côtés l'entendement humain, et par suite l'action humaine. Le Catholicisme n'a jamais en tant que dogme, pour le culte c'est différent, pu pénétrer assez l'intelligence populaire. Il s'est contenté d'être cru sur parole, visant, et avec le succès que nous lui reconnaissons, au réglement des

consciences et des actes. Il est ainsi parvenu à modifier à un haut degré son milieu, à se constituer en directeur de tout le mouvement humain. Tout se faisait par lui et d'après ses conseils. Il en sera de même pour nous. La direction doit nous échoir longtemps avant que l'adhésion mentale soit complète. Cette adhésion sera et plus rapide et plus stable à cause de la coïncidence des doctrines positives avec les conclusions universelles. L'harmonie logique qui caractérise ces doctrines nous assure la convergence définitive des esprits ; mais en attendant que cette convergence intellectuelle devienne de conviction, et en y poussant de toutes manières, sans trop se préoccuper de son absence, notre influence doit se faire universellement sentir, de manière à se substituer comme gouvernement pratique de l'Humanité à nos derniers prédécesseurs théologiques, et à obtenir cette plénitude de direction qui satisfasse à la fois aux besoins de l'espèce et à l'idée d'universalité relative.

Ceci revient à dire qu'il s'agit d'organiser un pouvoir modérateur à côté des pouvoirs actuels ; que renonçant à tout espoir d'aide direct de la part des classes officielles, et nous repliant sur nous-mêmes, nous avons à chercher un appui solide pour notre influence. Cet appui, ce n'est que dans les deux prolétariats français et anglais que nous pouvons le trouver. Le monde commercial ne nous offre aucune prise. Admettant que la concurrence entre les commerçants des deux pays n'ait rien d'hostile, il est certain néanmoins qu'ils ne se prêtent qu'à contrecœur à ce que nous désirons. Pendant la dernière guerre l'inaction du gouvernement anglais a trouvé son plus ferme soutien dans les dispositions de la bourgeoisie, sacrifiant tout à ses intérêts immédiats et s'applaudissant de sa prudence excessive. Ce n'est donc qu'au prolétariat que nous pouvons avoir recours. Ici encore nous nous trouvons sur la trace d'une tendance à l'union préexistante, et cela à un degré très-prononcé. *L'Internationale* en est l'expression. En parlant de cette société je n'entends nullement l'attaquer. Je ne partage pas les sentiments qu'elle inspire ordinairement, je ne comprends pas la terreur et la haine qu'elle soulève. Mais d'un autre côté, tout en respectant sa pleine liberté, et croyant utile la discussion qu'elle provoque et protège, nous n'acceptons pas les

jugements qu'elle porte, et encore moins croyons-nous à l'efficacité des remèdes qu'elle propose. Notre manière d'envisager le problème social est bien autre que la sienne, la réorganisation que nous voulons introduire bien plus fondamentale, car elle est à la fois plus synthétique et plus sympathique, et au fond, sinon immédiatement, plus synergique. L'utilité de l'Internationale se borne à poser la question et à servir d'organe provisoire aux rapprochements populaires. C'est surtout à ce titre que je l'ai introduite ici, comme signe manifeste de l'opportunité de ces rapprochements.

Je conclus donc à la nécessité d'établir sur la base la plus inébranlable, c'est à dire sur une foi commune, l'union des deux puissances maritimes de l'occident. Et dans ce but il est urgent de lier de part et d'autre les pouvoirs spirituels et les grandes forces populaires. La concentration du pouvoir spirituel, nous la possédons, en principe du moins, et à un degré satisfaisant, sinon complet. Tout ce qui se passe autour de nous dans le monde politique et social est de nature à nous faire sentir intimement la nécessité de cette concentration, l'urgence du ralliement au centre commun. Il existe des difficultés, mais une à une elles disparaissent et tous obéiront au devoir commun. Je n'ai aucune crainte à cet égard. Il n'y a qu'à persister dans la route que nous suivons depuis nos premiers jours, en imprimant toujours plus d'énergie au mouvement de centralisation. C'est de ce point de vue comme moyen de ralliement que j'attends le plus du dernier effort des Positivistes français, de la 'Revue Occidentale.' C'est là, je veux dire, le résultat le plus immédiat. Non pas que je dispute son utilité comme propagande. Plus on ira et plus son importance sous cet aspect grandira, je l'espère. Mais j'apprécie hautement son action directe sur le noyau des disciples, noyau d'un caractère trop peu compacte, d'après la dispersion actuelle des occidentaux. Elle servira à nous relier tous par une parole bi-mensuelle, qui stimulera sans doute nos faibles convictions et apportera aux disciples isolés la conscience de l'existence d'un foyer central et la communication de sa pensée. Sans faire tort à notre action générale, elle pourra accroître nos relations de sympathie personnelle.

Le principe de la concentration admis, ce qui manque au

pouvoir spirituel de la religion nouvelle, nous le voyons tous, c'est qu'il augmente de nombre et de puissance, de manière à ce qu'il devienne, je ne dis pas une véritable force sociale, car il l'est déjà, j'en suis convaincu, mais une grande force, au niveau de ses devoirs et des besoins sociaux, une force directrice et consultative avec laquelle les autres éléments de l'organisme humain soient obligés de compter. J'ai indiqué le but suprême de notre organisation, vers lequel tous nos efforts doivent converger comme le résumé de notre co-opération. Les obstacles à la suffisante constitution de ce pouvoir sont très-grands, mais je n'entends pas les examiner, il me suffit de ces quelques mots sur ce sujet.

Car notre attention principale, je voudrais, Messieurs, qu'elle se dirigeât sur une autre considération, celle de l'union des deux prolétariats, et par leur intermédiaire des autres prolétariats de l'occident. Car aucune idée d'exclusion n'entre dans ma pensée. Seulement il est évident que dans les conditions actuelles de l'Europe il faut commencer par l'union ci-dessus indiquée, qui, une fois suffisamment organisée, entraînerait rapidement les autres. Formée sur des bases justes et sages, et cimentée par la communauté d'opinions et de convictions sociales et religieuses, elle entraînerait bien d'autres conséquences, faciles à prévoir, et sur lesquelles je n'insiste pas.

Son importance en effet sera reconnue de tous. Il s'agit plutôt d'examiner les moyens dont nous pouvons disposer pour l'effectuer. Auguste Comte parle d'une nouvelle diplomatie à inaugurer, diplomatie de peuple à peuple, modifiant, c'est à dire, conformément aux exigences de la situation moderne, l'institution provisoire de la période révolutionnaire, et reprenant la tradition de votre grande convention si mal comprise, si perversément interprétée au siècle dernier. L'effet d'une pareille initiative prise sagement par la France serait grand et utile. Mais pour le moment je veux me tenir complètement en dehors de toute action officielle, même à ce degré de modification. C'est un autre genre d'action que j'ai en vue, une action individuelle poussée par l'inspiration sociale.

Des deux prolétariats en question, le plus avancé sans contestation possible, c'est le prolétariat français dans son

élite, le prolétariat des grands centres. Par son émancipation, par son instinct social, par son instruction, enfin par tout ce qui s'entend par le mot civilisation, il est supérieur au nôtre. Je laisse de côté la comparaison de la précédence technique et des résultats effectifs ; en admettant que je me trompe, le prolétariat français reste pour nous supérieur en ce sens que seul encore il s'est laissé aborder par la nouvelle doctrine. Le nôtre ne nous a donné jusqu'ici aucune adhésion complète, ou tout au plus une seule. Je regrette d'avoir à constater ce fait, mais il est essentiel au but que je me propose.

Je ne voudrais pas être injuste envers les prolétaires anglais. J'ai vu de près pendant la guerre la population ouvrière de Londres, et je dois rendre témoignage à ses grandes qualités. Elle était presque unanime à acclamer la République française et insistait toujours pour que le ministère la reconnût sans tarder. Mais quand il s'est agi de la guerre, la division était très-prononcée ; on reculait devant cette perspective et cette division a été fatale à toute influence sérieuse sur la politique générale du pays. D'ailleurs Londres a été la seule ville vraiment émue, à l'exception près de Newcastle. Mais en dehors de cette mesure extrême ses sympathies étaient vivement excitées. J'ai beaucoup fréquenté leurs réunions, soit aux cabarets, soit au grand air. Elles se faisaient la nuit généralement, au sortir des ateliers. C'était surtout la classe la moins heureuse qui y assistait. Ils arrivaient de loin par un temps décourageant, et quand la réunion se faisait le dimanche ils venaient en famille, les femmes et les enfants, ayant fait à pied leurs deux lieues de marche. Il ne leur manquait pas la générosité des sentiments. C'était vraiment touchant de les entendre ; le contraste avec le silence et l'inertie méprisable des autres classes avait quelque chose de très-noble. Je tenais à le constater, sans que cela infirme le jugement déjà formulé.

Je me demande donc si cette supériorité du prolétariat français n'implique pas une obligation, et pour ne pas laisser indéterminée ma conception, je me demande et je vous demande s'il n'y aurait pas lieu d'instituer une propagande des plus utiles et des plus sérieuses, en organisant une espèce de mission chez les prolétaires de Londres—au centre reconnu du prolétariat anglais. J'entends par là tout simplement le

déplacement, soit permanent, soit provisoire, de quelques Positivistes français prolétaires, qui transporteraient dans un but social leur industrie à Londres, qui, vivant au milieu de nos ouvriers, et se familiarisant avec leurs habitudes et leur manière de voir, agiraient par leur contact sur leur entourage. Il est à regretter que le hasard ne nous ait pas amené à la suite de vos convulsions des prolétaires positivistes, qui se seraient ainsi trouvés spontanément engagés dans la voie que j'indique. Du moins je n'en connais aucun.

Mais nous surtout, les croyants d'une religion démontrable, nous ne devons pas nous en rapporter au hasard. La prévoyance nous incombe. C'est évidemment une affaire qui demanderait de la réflexion sérieuse, qui, engageant toute une vie ou plusieurs vies, ne pourrait pas être entamée à la légère. Mais le moment ne serait pas mal choisi, parce que par suite des événements récents il y a déjà eu beaucoup de déplacements dans ce sens, et qu'il n'y aurait rien d'étonnant si quelques uns en plus venaient s'y ajouter. Et il serait bon de donner autant que possible une caractère de spontanéité au mouvement, sans aucun artifice déloyal. Notre grande difficulté à nous, les disciples anglais, c'est de nous faire écouter, et surtout accepter par notre prolétariat. Je ne crois pas que nous soyons vus d'un mauvais œil. L'on est au contraire assez favorablement disposé pour nous personnellement, mais la longue opposition traditionnelle qui sépare les diverses couches sociales nous crée un obstacle qu'on aura bien de la peine à surmonter. Un instinct de soupçon, pour ainsi dire, nous ferme presque involontairement l'accès au peuple. Que l'on tienne compte ensuite de la nature de nos doctrines, si opposées aux idées généralement admises même par les prolétaires, aux idées économiques et politiques dominantes. N'oublions pas non plus la perspective nouvelle ouverte aux ouvriers d'entrer eux aussi au parlement, de faire partie par conséquent de la machine gouvernementale, et de se mettre en concurrence politique directe avec les classes jusqu'ici dirigeantes, et l'extrême lenteur de notre marche vis-à-vis du prolétariat anglais n'aura rien qui doive nous surprendre. Le Positivisme est représenté pour lui par des hommes appartenant à une autre classe ; cela suffit pour qu'il

n'y fasse pas attention d'abord, et si par hasard il l'étudie quelque peu il se heurte à des idées qui lui semblent contraires à son avènement et trop favorables aux arrangements actuels.

Il en serait tout autrement si tout cela lui venait d'une source moins suspecte, s'il voyait la Religion de l'Humanité à l'œuvre dans son propre milieu, admise et pratiquée par des hommes vivants de sa vie, ayant les mêmes intérêts que lui, exposés à la même pression sociale. Je n'insiste pas, je ne fais qu'émettre une idée, en en laissant aux autres l'appréciation. Je crois fermement qu'il y a là une grande et belle chose à faire et qui peut-être se fera. Ce qui est certain, c'est que, vu les contacts très-étendus du prolétariat anglais et la puissance dont il dispose même dans ses conditions actuelles, mais qui est susceptible d'un accroissement énorme dès qu'il en aura pris la conscience, il y a peu de choses aussi urgentes que de pénétrer à temps auprès de lui, pour l'empêcher de dévier et le pousser à employer sa force au service de l'Humanité. S'il était uni et instruit toute la politique de notre pays dépendrait de lui. Je n'exagère pas. C'est une conviction qui a été formulée à plus d'une reprise par nos hommes publics: L'union et l'instruction lui viennent, mais il s'agit de savoir quelle union et quelle instruction. Cela pourrait bien être une union égoïste de la plus haute intensité, et une instruction adaptée à servir de moyen à cet égoïsme. C'est là l'écueil vers lequel le poussent la plupart des influences qu'il subit actuellement. C'est là le sens général de notre mouvement industriel. Arriverons-nous à temps pour l'en dégager? Réussirons-nous à lui imprimer une évidence plus sociale? Voilà la question qui revient, et elle est des plus graves.

Nous avons encore un moyen d'action, j'entends dire un moyen jusqu'ici inappliqué, et qui peut-être dans un avenir assez prochain trouvera son application. D'après ce que j'ai dit de la séparation des classes, il aurait sa plus grande utilité dans la Grande-Bretagne, tout en restant général. Du reste l'idée en est déjà venue à d'autres que moi, et même à des personnes auxquelles les conceptions positivistes étaient étrangères, sinon inconnues. Ce moyen c'est l'adoption volontaire de l'état prolétaire par des jeunes gens nés et élevés dans une autre position sociale. Ce serait un déclasse-

ment en sens inverse, un déclassement systématique de la part d'un homme, par exemple, parfaitement apte à rester où il était né, ne provenant d'autre cause quelconque que du désir de lever la barrière qui nous divise tant, et d'asseoir solidement la sympathie avec les prolétaires en partageant complètement leur existence. Un tel homme se ferait prolétaire et resterait prolétaire. Nous en arriverons là, je n'en doute pas, non pas du jour au lendemain, mais sans y mettre un temps indéfini. Tout me porte à le croire. Une pareille action est si conforme à l'esprit général de notre système qu'elle ne pourra manquer de se produire. Il ne faudrait pas confondre cependant cette action extraordinaire adaptée à l'époque de transition avec celle qui semblerait lui être identique dans l'état normal. Les conditions des travailleurs seront alors bien meilleures ; leur vie, réglée sous l'inspiration de la Religion de l'Humanité, offrira un attrait assez puissant pour que le fait d'y participer ne constitue pas alors le sacrifice qu'il impliquerait aujourd'hui, sacrifice qui ne serait pas sans ses compensations, mais qui n'en reste pas moins un sacrifice. La distinction est nette et facile à saisir.

Ce qui manque évidemment à ce dernier moyen, c'est l'avantage de rallier directement les deux prolétariats. Il se présente plutôt comme lien sympathique entre les classes d'un même pays. J'ai cru devoir toutefois le signaler parce que notre doctrine est telle qu'une fois acceptée elle tend nécessairement à produire ce ralliement aux autres peuples et au centre commun. L'essentiel est donc de la faire accepter, et il n'est pas inutile d'énumérer nos divers moyens. L'Humanité domine tout, et l'union de ses organes, soit dans le passé, soit dans le présent et l'avenir, devient la matière de nos pensées et le but de nos actions. L'atteindre le plus rapidement possible, lui poser les bases les mieux assurées, devient notre principale préoccupation. Tout ce que je viens de dire ne regarde que l'une des faces de ce grand sujet.

Toute politique large, sensée et suivie est à ce prix : la formation dans la grande masse populaire de l'Europe occidentale d'une saine opinion publique ; en d'autres termes, la direction intelligente de la puissance modératrice qu'exerce déjà cette masse en vertu de son existence même, et qui s'accroit de jour en jour. Cette direction on

ne la trouve nulle part encore à un degré satisfaisant. Et l'opinion publique partout étant flottante et instable ne saurait avoir une action utile sur le cours général des événements. Au contraire elle se laisse dévier avec la plus grande facilité et de la manière la plus déplorable. Elle ne dirige pas, elle suit. Malheureusement il n'y a en général rien qui la remplace, ou du moins qui la remplace utilement. Et sous peine de rester trop dans le vague la constitution de cette direction doit commencer quelque part ; l'ensemble du passé me semble manifester avec une parfaite clarté par où ce commencement doit avoir lieu.

Il y a encore une autre considération en faveur de l'action du prolétariat qui ne manque pas de valeur ; on peut dire que c'est la seule classe sérieuse dans les deux pays. J'accentue le mot *classe*. Dans les autres pays c'est différent ; mais la France et l'Angleterre sont évidemment pleinement entrées dans le régime industriel, ont abandonné, c'est à dire, le régime militaire en principe du moins, quoique forcées provisoirement à s'en occuper malgré elles. Mais des deux classes industrielles, et l'analyse qui suit concerne essentiellement l'Angleterre, le prolétariat à mes yeux est le seul sérieux politiquement parlant. Dans l'état actuel l'autre, la bourgeoisie industrielle, se laisse aller tout entière au commerce, à la recherche du gain ; elle est sérieuse quant à cela, mais elle ne s'occupe pas de politique, ou en tant qu'elle s'en occupe c'est du point de vue purement commercial. En dehors du commerce c'est aux distractions, à la jouissance, qu'elle vise. Elle n'a aucun sentiment de devoir ou de responsabilité sociale. Je parle, bien entendu, de la tendance générale, en faisant une large part aux exceptions. Les questions sociales ne la touchent qu'à l'heure des crises, tandis que pour le prolétariat ces mêmes questions sont toujours d'une urgence immédiate, le touchent à toute heure. Quant à la bourgeoisie professionnelle, elle aussi est beaucoup trop au point de vue purement personnel. Elle détourne très-volontiers les yeux de toutes les considérations politiques, surtout de toutes les grandes questions qui regardent les autres peuples. Reste l'aristocratie ou la classe aristocratique. Sauf les exceptions elle aussi s'intéresse peu à la politique, si ce n'est par intervalles, quand il s'agit de défendre une position devenue

l'objet de l'attaque populaire. Elle se rallie alors vigoureusement pour le maintien de son intérêt menacé, mais en temps ordinaire le politique n'est pour elle qu'une distraction de plus et c'est d'un ton moqueur qu'elle s'en mêle. Rien de plus désespérant pour nous que cette attitude si faible à l'égard de tout ce qui ne touche pas directement aux intérêts et aux jouissances. Il faut qu'elle cesse. C'est la condition de tout vrai progrès. Et l'un des moyens les plus puissants c'est évidemment le contrôle effectif et reconnu de l'opinion de la seule classe pour qui les nécessités de la vie, non pas les jouissances, entrent en première ligne, vis-à-vis de qui l'existence que mènent les autres est l'insulte en permanence.

En parlant du prolétariat et de l'importance de l'union des deux prolétariats il sera peut-être utile, par surcroît de précaution, de me garantir contre toute interprétation fâcheuse dans le sens démocratique. Il n'est nullement question pour nous les Positivistes de ce qu'on entend par la démocratie. Ce que nous nous proposons c'est d'abord l'incorporation du prolétariat dans la société actuelle, son admission au plein partage des bienfaits sociaux, c'est ensuite sa constitution en pouvoir modérateur permanent, comme représentant les intérêts les plus fondamentaux, les plus universels de l'Humanité. Si par moments un autre rôle lui échoit, ce n'est qu'accessoirement. Mais contrôler l'action des autres pouvoirs sociaux, les stimuler, les rappeler à leur devoir s'ils s'en écartent, et tout cela par la force d'une opinion générale bien dirigée, en renonçant à l'emploi de la force proprement dite ou de la violence, tel est son rôle nécessaire et continu, un rôle qui n'est en définitive que l'expression de sa véritable existence sociale, comme la partie la plus nombreuse de la société co-existante, et par suite la plus intéressée à ce que cette société soit bien gérée. Il n'y a là, vous le voyez, aucune ouverture aux idées démocratiques, comme on les entend ordinairement. Que ce soit une idée sociocratique—et par sociocratie nous entendons l'emploi rationnel de toutes les forces sociales, le service de tous sans exception, dans un même but, l'amélioration de la constitution humaine, individuelle, domestique et civile, dans le sens le plus étendu que l'on puisse donner au terme—non pas démocratique, encore moins aristocratique—je le veux bien. Parler de sociocratie c'est parler

aristocratiquement pour les démocrates, démocratiquement pour les aristocrates, je ne le sens que trop ; mais au fond les idées des trois systèmes sont profondément diverses et ne prêtent pas à la confusion pour quiconque n'est pas trop engagé dans l'un ou l'autre des systèmes que je rejette. Et c'est au point de vue sociocratique qu'en tout je me suis efforcé de rester, quoique usant d'une pleine liberté quand il m'est arrivé de toucher par un côté quelconque aux théories où à la pratique antagoniste.

J'espère que vous aurez saisi le fond de ma pensée, si imparfaitement exposée. Ce qui nous préoccupe tous c'est le rétablissement de la grande unité occidentale, et dans ce but le principal c'est de rattacher entre elles le mieux possible les deux nations auxquelles nous appartenons sinon tous, au moins pour la plus grande partie. Et pour assurer cette union il faut qu'elle soit essentiellement de peuple à peuple. Nous n'excluons nullement l'action gouvernementale propre, mais il y a plutôt à désirer qu'à compter sur elle, tant sont puissantes les habitudes antérieures; nous n'excluons pas non plus l'action sagement calculée d'une nouvelle diplomatie à organiser; mais nous nous reposons en dernière analyse sur des influences extra-gouvernementales, l'influence spirituelle d'abord exercée par le nouveau pouvoir spirituel commun déjà aux deux pays, qui n'est pas à créer, mais qui demande de grands efforts pour son développement, ensuite sur l'influence temporelle, issue du rapprochement systématiquement institué entre les deux prolétariats. Celle-ci il s'agit de la créer et de la développer. Elle n'existe qu'à l'état le plus rudimentaire. Et afin de donner de la précision à ma pensée j'ai indiqué un certain moyen de propagande, sans exclure pour elle les autres moyens quelconques qu'on pourrait proposer. Si je ne me trompe l'idée est conforme aux exigences de l'époque industrielle, et se rapporte directement aux besoins de paix, d'ordre et de progrès que nous sentons tous si intimement.

Nous sommes au commencement de la dernière demi-génération qui précédera l'anniversaire de '89. Que de choses à faire, et de belles choses aussi, pour que ceux d'entre nous qui verront cet anniversaire puissent constater l'avènement d'un ordre pacifique bien assuré, sur des bases scientifiques et religieuses pleinement consenties.

Je termine par quelques paroles d'affection et de reconnaissance. Liés depuis quinze ans par la communauté de foi et d'action, les événements des dernières années ont resserré nos liens. Il n'en pouvait être autrement. La souffrance matérielle retombait sur vous, les souffrances morales étaient communes à tous les Positivistes. Mais il y a une autre considération que je tiens à faire ressortir. Si pendant la guerre les Positivistes anglais, partout où ils se trouvaient, isolés ou faisant corps, ont tenu le même langage et agi dans le même sens, s'ils ont su se rallier à un certain degré les sympathies populaires et servir de centre d'action, si seuls dès le commencement ils ont eu une politique—et j'entends par politique une action générale tracée d'avance, avec des moyens et un but nettement indiqués, d'après des principes réels et dans les limites du possible—si dans un milieu timide et vacillant et en face de l'opposition persévérante et égoïste de tous les intérêts ils ont réveillé des sentiments plus fermes, si sans se laisser décourager ils n'ont cessé de combattre que lorsque le combat devenait inutile aux yeux de tous, à quoi attribuer cette haute distinction que, si faible qu'en ait été le résultat, je revendique pour mes confrères ? Eh bien, disons-le franchement, et acquittons-nous d'une dette sacrée. C'est à la possession de la grande doctrine d'Auguste Comte que tout revient, c'est à son inspiration que nous avons puisé, c'est sous son influence que nous avons agi. Partout et toujours nous avons avoué la source de nos convictions, nous avons arboré le drapeau de l'Humanité, nous avons proclamé le nom de son révélateur. Sans craindre le moindre dissentiment de leur part j'ose exprimer au nom de tous notre commune reconnaissance envers celui dont nous honorons aujourd'hui la mémoire, pour les grands services qu'il nous a rendus, les profondes satisfactions qu'il nous a léguées. Vous concevez, Messieurs, quelle profonde affection nous relie à la France, fille aînée de l'Église Humaine comme elle l'a été dans le temps de l'Église Romaine.

10 RUE MONSIEUR LE PRINCE, PARIS :
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THE COMBINATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

WITH all centres of our Faith, more especially with our common centre in Paris; with all its scattered disciples; with the members of all other religious organizations or beliefs, Monotheist, Polytheist, or Fetichist,—all lesser distinctions being absorbed in the one bond of our common humanity; with the whole human race, with man, that is, wherever found and in whatever conditions; and with the animal races, who, during the long effort of man to raise himself, have been, as they are still, his companions and his helpers, we on this occasion, on this Festival of Humanity, would be in conscious sympathy.

Nor with our contemporaries alone are we in sympathy, but with the larger portion of the race which occupies the Past. We gratefully commemorate the services of all the generations whose labours we inherit and wish to hand down with increase to our successors. We gratefully commemorate also the services of our common mother, the Earth, the planet which is our home, and the orbs which with her form the solar system.

We may not separate from this last commemoration that of the milieu in which that system moves, the Space, which has ever been of such great service to man, and whose services we so distinctly wish to recognize and use.

From the Present and the Past we extend our sympathies to the Future, to the unborn generations which with happier lot shall follow us on this Earth, the thought of whom should be constantly present to our minds in order to complete the conception of Humanity as revealed to man by the Founder of our religion. The memory of her greatest servant, Auguste Comte, finds a fitting place on this her greatest Festival. May it as

all other great if not equal memories be duly cherished by us for guidance and encouragement.

It is but natural that on this occasion the thoughts of some of us should turn with more than usual interest to the other members of our body, those who away from us share in our belief and in our hope. For there are some not with us to-day who have never before been absent from this annual celebration of the Festival of Humanity. None will be more present with us in spirit, nor with any of the absent will those here, I feel sure, more sympathize, whilst freely extending their sympathies to all our co-religionists, Western or Eastern, whether standing alone or forming a more or less compact group, whether resting, that is, solely on the strength of their convictions, or enjoying the advantage of others' support.

Our connection with our Paris centre has stood out this year in more than usual relief. We cannot but go back with pleasure to the visit of M. Laffitte in the spring, with all its social enjoyment, and the great interest of his public utterances in this School. These were, over and above their intrinsic value as a summary exposition of the 'First Philosophy,' a striking evidence of the unity of our action—a foretaste of the spiritual reunion of the West, as in mediæval times it was united by the action of Catholicism. It is the same character which gives importance to the two other instances of co-operation between the French and English Positivists. I allude first to the incidents of our September meeting in Paris, the second occasion on which I delivered the annual address on the anniversary of Auguste Comte's death. But the mutual intercourse of the two bodies was not limited to that, but comprised a warm recognition on the part of the Parisian proletaires, members of our faith, of the sympathy we had shown them in their trials. I allude secondly to Mr. Beesly's subsequent visit, a most effective expression of the same sympathy with France in its republican associations and aspirations. All such action tends one way, to the re-forming, where it is most needed, that union between the nations which the course of the European Revolution since the Middle Ages, both before and after the Protestant Reformation, has broken, and broken with such disastrous consequences to the common welfare of the Race.

Apart from these personal communications there is another subject to which I wish on all proper opportunities, and the present is one, to call attention. It is the effort initiated by the French Positivists to rally all our adherents and to stimulate new adhesions, as well as to carry our doctrines and their practical conclusions amongst those who possibly may never formally adhere, but who yet may derive advantage for their action from the knowledge so conveyed. Such is the object of the 'Politique Positive' or 'Revue Occidentale,' the numbers of which have been regularly issued since the month of April in last year. If not the form we should in quiet times have chosen for our propaganda, it is, under exceptional pressure, and with the due recognition of its exceptional character, a mode of action calculated to have great usefulness, and for which I would enlist all possible support, whether of active contribution to its pages, so as to make the effort a common one, or by increasing, so far as we can, its circulation. It is most desirable that it should have as Western a character as possible. Just for the moment, no doubt, the interest of French questions—questions of the immediate political future of France—predominates, and that quite naturally, as they concern all Europe most intimately. In fact, no marked movement in any European country can be limited in its effect to that country; only as the historical centre of all Western civilization France touches all the others somewhat more closely, and as this is so, we naturally perhaps wish to hear how the actual struggle in that country is viewed by those of us who are in the midst of it, and to whom its issue is of such immediate moment. But I venture to express the hope that some among us will exert themselves, as one has already done, to contribute to its pages. Few exertions are likely to be more useful to our cause, for nothing stimulates attention more than the reciprocal action of the French and the Anglo-Saxon Positivists, by the impression it gives of concert on a basis of common doctrine, where disunion hitherto has been so conspicuous. Nor must we forget that our body is so limited in numbers as to make it imperative on us to multiply ourselves by our energy as much as possible. The pressure is very great, I feel, but I think we may meet it.

Of the actual prospects of the Review it is not easy to

speak with confidence. It requires time to give the required impetus for any such publication. The number of subscribers, I am told, increases, whilst the sale of separate numbers decreases. The former are the more valuable purchasers evidently, and the later numbers, with their very direct applications to the political crisis which still continues so intense, seem calculated to promote the circulation of the work. They are clear and most courageous utterances, and, I fear, at great personal risk. Such utterances constitute an obligation on all who believe them both warranted and needed, to support those who make them in such ways as are open. I have dwelt the longer on this Review because all may not be aware of its existence and its object.

It is the extreme urgency of the times which tempts us to impatience at our slow advance. Were the material and moral disorder less, we might more easily acquiesce in the not unnatural hesitation which prevails to accept what we offer. We might acquiesce also were there any other doctrine in the field besides those which have been tried and found wanting for the direction of the world. Especially is this the case in France, where the evils of non-direction, to say nothing of those of misdirection, are so palpable. Without impatience let us do what we can to second any useful attempt at a sound guidance.

In France generally the situation so far as we are concerned is, I believe, much the same as it was last year. I must not omit to mention the warm sympathy which I found in the group which is presided over by Dr. Audiffrent at Marseilles for the body here. As its representative nothing could be more cordial than my reception; no attitude could be more friendly towards their English brethren.

I have every reason to believe that in America our movement continues and is gradually being consolidated, though I have had no very recent communication with the New York body. From India I have received quite lately some new Hindoo adhesions, which are most welcome. There is no change in respect to the English adherents in India. Their service may be counted on, I feel sure, and cannot be without its effect in modifying the opinion of their countrymen, the more so as the course of things is ever bringing new confirma-

tion of the correctness of their estimate of the actual, whatever may be thought of their prognosis of the future condition of that country.

Turning our eyes homewards, what is the nature of our retrospect, and first, what has been done in the past year? Beginning with our lectures, the direct teaching we offer, they have been as continuous on the Sunday mornings as it was fairly possible that they should be, about thirty-five out of the fifty-two Sundays having been occupied. The Sunday evenings have hardly been interrupted, thanks to the exertions of Mr. Harrison, Dr. Bridges, and Mr. Beesly. I need not repeat what I said last year on this point. The advantages of such continuous action must strike all.

The meetings of the Positivist Society again have practically been uninterrupted. As I hinted last year was probable, any other meetings have been merged in this. It is, I think, a real object to meet with unbroken regularity, and the development of the full usefulness of such social gatherings is dependent on that condition. Much remains to be done in many directions, so far is undeniable, before that full usefulness is attained, but there is no reason to doubt our reaching the desired result.

Thirdly, the elementary school, for which I have at previous meetings on this day more than once expressed a wish, has been begun, and has been for three months in full operation, thanks to the persevering energy of some of our members. The attendance has been more numerous than I expected. All the branches, except singing, of strictly elementary instruction are attended to, and the attainments of many of those who come are such as to lead to the question whether something more may not be added, some instruction, not of a Positivist kind, which may be a source of interest and mental improvement to the more advanced. It is a question requiring some thought, but the mention of it shows that there is in the school an aptitude for further movement. Leaving any such addition out of the question for the present, there is room in the opinion of those who teach the school, for an increase in the amount of the existing instruction. It would be, they think, better, especially for the girls, who are at once the most backward and have most difficulties at home, if we could give them two evenings a week instead of one—add the Monday evening, say, to

the Thursday. We give two hours—from seven to nine—on the Thursday at present. I mention this because it is just possible that there may be some who either themselves might be willing to aid in a work which has no distinctly Positivist character attaching to it, or might know those who would. We have two such assistants already who, in no sense Positivists, bring a zealous, unremitting assistance to us in our undertaking, and for such assistance we are very much indebted to them. It is quite impossible that our existing staff should, most of them at any rate, give more time than they do already, and I do not appeal to the older members of our body, for with most of them I well know how difficult it would be for them to find the time required. But the stating of such a want sometimes leads to its being supplied. I will only add that the teaching given is entirely gratuitous and strictly secular. No religious teaching, theological or Positivist, is admitted. This negative condition it is perhaps important to re-state. For the rest it is one which we seem in a fair way to see universally adopted, the opposition to everything which mars the pure secularity of the instruction given by the State having great prospect of success. In that case the entire gratuitousness of what we offer, and its being offered to those who are not contemplated by the State scheme, viz. to those who are past the age of thirteen, and without any higher limitation, will remain the only distinctive features of our teaching—our elementary teaching —in this night school. These two features we all, I believe, think important. None are more welcome to us than those who having in early life not had or not used opportunities of such instruction, come now to avail themselves of our offer.

Lastly, in the cardinal point of our directly religious action, in the development of our cultus or worship, the year has been satisfactory. We have had, that is, four instances of the first sacrament, that of Presentation; one of the second, the Initiation. This is a most pleasant feature in the past year. For none can mistake the sincerity of the adhesion when parents bring their children to be received into the Church of Humanity, more especially when the world around us is so averse to any such action. The presentations were all fully public, in this room. The initiation was not restricted to the mere family circle, but yet for sufficient reasons was in my

own house. As great publicity as possible is desirable, but in our present state there are certain limitations which it is not inconsistent with our doctrine to observe.

I said this acceptance of the sacraments is a most pleasant feature. For I share to the full the growing conviction of all our body, I believe, here and elsewhere, that it is in the religion and as the heart of the religion—as that which most powerfully appeals to and acts upon the feelings—in the worship, that lies our greatest strength, our best hope of influencing those around us whom it is most to be wished that we should influence, viz. the minds of a religious stamp which have ceased to find satisfaction in the older organizations. Nor is this all; not solely nor even principally as a means of influencing others, but as giving to ourselves strength of conviction and the consequent consistency of action, is the direct practice of our religion most necessary, and it is in the sacraments that such practice finds its most definite expression under existing circumstances.

From a more general point of view our progress continues to be slow. It is true the number of avowed adhesions has been greater than the average, and this exclusive of the Hindoo additions. It is true also that there is real satisfaction in the quality of the new adhesions, for some come to us from the two most valuable sources, women and the proletariate. We have, however as a set-off, some withdrawals under various motives. Still we undeniably move but slowly—more slowly than is easily intelligible even when the fullest allowance is made for our peculiar social milieu, which is as unfavourable as it well could be. It is not easily intelligible when we consider the whole state of things around us and the urgent need which is so generally recognized for some guidance. When we add further the large amount of those who have ceased to look to the older faiths with hope, who are what is commonly called unattached, we may well be surprised that more do not examine the system we propound. For one reason or another it is clear men refuse to enter on such examination. We have a curious illustration of this attitude towards us in the last utterance of our expansive Premier, his discourse on modern unbelief at Liverpool. He singles out Dr. Strauss as the type of a dangerous writer. By the way it would seem that

Dr. Strauss has got into a much more hopeful position than the one he occupied as a writer of destructive theology, and is not wanting in definiteness so far as the negative side is concerned. So much may be gathered from what Mr. Gladstone's admirers see to be a very impolitic advertisement of the German author. He certainly rather stimulates curiosity as to this work on the 'Old Belief and the New'—not that it has much to offer us, but it may have an interest as an evidence of the German tendency to the adoption of our conclusions. But this is purely by the way. It was Mr. Gladstone's mode of treatment of Comte which attracted my attention. I infer—the inference is warranted—that he has not read him. He is far from the judgment of the late Dean Milman when he treats Comte's works as the mere dreams of an imaginative, high-wrought enthusiast. I do not dwell on this treatment; it were quite useless to do so. It is manifestly not meant to be uncourteous. I ask myself to what source is such a relative judgment of Strauss and Comte to be traced, assuming it to really express the feelings of him who enunciated it, and not a politic putting aside of the more formidable opponent. I can offer but the one answer that it is traceable to a difference in the relative amount of study given to the two writers. Mr. Gladstone is typical in these matters of a large class—men who remaining theological in their belief can hardly recognize as objects of attention those who have consistently abandoned all theology. They scout abroad on the confines of the theological region to find matter to attack or to use, and on these confines they meet such writers as Strauss, whose main work has been in a sense theological. But they do not care to venture farther from their basis of operations. Be this as it may, it is clear that the most common presentation of our views, such as prevailed more largely than it does now some ten years ago, is still prevalent amongst those at the stage of thought which Mr. Gladstone has reached, and by virtue of some such epithet as dreamy they think themselves exonerated from the study of the system. Other motives or mental proclivities operate with others to the same result, that of ignoring us as far as they can. Accepting this as a fact, it is our business to render this ignorance more difficult to those outside—to force ourselves and our doctrines on their attention—by a persistent exposition

of our solutions to bring home to them the necessity of producing something which may be superior to them, or of the alternative of their thoughtful consideration.

We are in no sense responsible for the slow growth of our religion so far as it is due to this attitude of others outside us. We can only be responsible so far as our own defects or inefficiency impede our advance, and, I cannot too often repeat it, it is for us individually to judge how far we are in this sense responsible, and, if we are conscious of shortcomings, to seek a remedy. We none of us, I suppose, do all we could. But if I wished to indicate the general defect under which we labour, a general ground for our not producing a greater effect than we do, I should avail myself of the words of one of our number —not used in this context, but suiting my present purpose— and say that what we want is 'a passionate devotion of the soul to a real and active power, such devotion becoming the atmosphere of general life;' or again, we want more 'transfiguring into a world of social activity under the impulse of devotion to a Supreme Power, as humanly real as it is demonstrably known.' Our religion is not enough with us, does not sufficiently characterize our lives, and this is the more to be regretted as by its nature, its purely human complexion, it is calculated more than any other to interpenetrate all our existence without any sense of incongruity. We have, then, but to realize the full sense of such language as that above quoted, and the deficiency which I have been considering would gradually disappear. A doctrine may spread by conversation or writing, by purely intellectual means that is; a religion requires moral means, either direct personal influence or the compellent contagion of great examples, or lastly the sense of shelter and support given by an organized community.

You will not think that I undervalue the exertions we have made or are making, the results we have attained. I have never been inclined to do so. But I feel that there is a certain unsatisfactoriness in our present rate of advance, and that it is unsatisfactory in some degree as a consequence of our own imperfection as promoters of a great cause, not merely from conditions over which we have no control. Weaknesses, shortcomings, there must ever be, but I am not sure that we set our standard aright. Far from agreeing with the view of some

opponents who look on us as fanatics, I should rather say that we are somewhat deficient in fanaticism ; or if present language wholly condemns this quality, and we may not insist usefully on the good element it contains, it is not so with the term Enthusiasm, which still has a mixed connotation, and which aptly assumes the meaning of the passages quoted. The strong yet tempered enthusiasm which animated the nobler Puritans for their cause, such is the spirit in which we, their successors, their legitimate heirs—it is but a change of form that has taken place—must, with clearer perceptions and more abiding success, struggle for ours.

And the mention of our Puritan ancestors suggests a point of some real interest in reference to ourselves. They were—it was a source at once of their strength and their weakness—assiduous students of the Bible: it was their guide; it coloured all their thoughts and language ; it was the centre of their existence. This great attention was not confined to them. It is clear that others who in no sense belonged to them had the same tendency to what was still a new study; all the documents of the time bear its impress; it was the popular author of the day, in everybody's mouth. But it was strongest in the Puritans, and led in them to most practical results. Those results were often most disastrous; such guidance as they got from it was most misleading. But their practice may yet have its useful lesson for us. We might find it wise—I cannot say how far many do, but I fear it is not as general a practice amongst us as it should be—to concentrate as much study and thought on the works which contain our system of life and doctrine as the Puritans did on theirs. The fifteen volumes of Auguste Comte's works should be, as the Bible was of old, and to some is still, the central subject of our reading and meditation, wherever that is, and as far as we have the leisure and previous knowledge requisite for dealing with them and appropriating them. Fifteen volumes seem a good deal, but many of us have been so trained, and have such leisure, that the mere amount cannot be a serious objection. Those who have not had the training and the leisure have in the Catechism an adequate supply for their practical wants ; for their intellectual food, if they make it the nucleus around which all their thought accretes ; and lastly, a sufficient di-

rection for their emotional nature; and between these two extremes of acquaintance with the works all other cases may range themselves. It is the constant daily study of some portion, however small, which, to be quite definite, I advocate; which we owe it to ourselves as disciples of the religion to give; which, if we do not give, we naturally fall short in our grasp of that religion. It certainly is a religion which requires active thought, if not much reading, and it is as such that it is repugnant to the intellectual laziness of the majority.

One more remark on this matter of our action here. It is most necessary that we should be preparing for the future, and that on no point more vigorously than on the constitution of a body of teachers—on the formation, in fact, of the new priesthood. It is possible that our efforts may not go farther than the formation of an atmosphere, a milieu favourable to the rise of such a priesthood. But in any case it will be patent to all that the considerations on which I have been dwelling have a close connection with this important subject. Nothing can be more desirable for the furtherance of this construction than the presence of a high degree of social and religious fervour in the body of the adherents of the Religion of Humanity. It would give the countenance and support which the young, who might feel disposed to devote themselves to the priestly vocation, would so much require. Those who can do without such external aids are rare. Most of us require them as an indispensable condition; and when I speak of fervour I need add no caution. We are none of us likely, by our training or associations, to exaggerate matters, and launch into ridiculous peculiarities. That is not our danger. We may quite safely increase the degree of our religious temperature, both as regards ourselves in our co-operation, or as regards our attitude to those with whom we mix. Later there may be danger of excess, at present there is none. And the doctrine, with all that it involves, is of such a nature that I find it difficult to conceive its ever tending to exaggeration in the direction of excess of feeling. The enthusiasm of Humanity will long be in defect, I fear; at any rate, the immediate need of the present is to stimulate it.

I may seem to some to dwell too long on this aspect of our position—on our personal obligations as avowed believers in a new religion. But it is not easy to make too much

of it. The times we live in are very difficult, the immediate outlook is rather unusually gloomy. We are in no way singular in this judgment, most observers share it, if that is we once get clear of official and Parliamentary platitudes. We, on whom devolves, as the conscious servants of Humanity, the onerous task of directing in her name the course of this world's affairs, can spare no point of vantage which is accessible to us, need as much as any have ever needed all the strength that is available. And there is no strength comparable to that of strong personal conviction, the fusion of all our powers in what is still justly to be called the saving power of faith. Or put ourselves aside, complicate the question by no personal reference, obviously what is wanted is now, as it has ever been—though the want perhaps in the revolutionary period has been only once fully recognized, that is, by the Catholic Mediæval Church—a body of disciplined adherents, instinct with one principle, united by one doctrine, consecrated to one purpose. The body so formed would differ in much from any similar body acting in a theological cause. It must admit in its members a more full individual expression than was tolerated even by the large wisdom of the older Catholicism. It will require from its members also more than has hitherto been required in the way of mental effort. The two conditions run into one another. But neither the admission nor requirement need impair its unity of action; they should but increase its adaptability. Such a body is impossible on any but a religious basis. Again the Ironsides rise before us. But the religious basis given, as we are well assured it is, the construction is possible, and I will continue to hope is, almost without our consciousness, already inchoate. The sum and substance of what I have been saying is, that we aid it to the best of our power by steady shaping of ourselves for use. I have heard it said that in these days the opportunities for the heroic are passing away, that we are subsiding to a dull level of ordinary aims and conduct—a decent mediocrity. I can see no truth in the language, if it expresses not a fact, but a necessity or even a tendency. As I view the future and the present the call will be great on all the higher energies; the pressure of social exigencies be such as by a spontaneous process to mould the nobler natures into a

correspondency with their arduous duties—the atmosphere will be tempered to heroism.

And, that I may make my meaning clear, I leave the more personal, I should rather say the more domestic part of my subject. I have never on these occasions confined myself within its limits. The very conception of the Festival of Humanity forbids it. It is intolerant of any narrow issues, however important.

And I use in support of my previous remarks one portion only of our task, yet a large one, with peculiar difficulties of its own, sufficient to task any energy we have; and yet it is, I repeat, but a part in the arc of the large circle of our exertion. I turn to the wide question of the external action of our nation and its Government, a question of ever fresh interest, and one in regard to which a constant renewal of our efforts to modify what we consider erroneous or wrong is imperatively needed. In the difficulties of its treatment I may count on your sympathy and consideration.

It is a subject on which we have little teaching from our official classes, our professional politicians. Now and then we hear something said, an ignoble remark from Mr. Disraeli, one of a better order from Lord Salisbury, but the topic is not prominent. There is a dominant insularity in our political utterances. In fact, the reticence is so marked as to have a certain significance, especially when contrasted with the action of our Government in naval and military matters, and with a certain tone of national self-assertion which has been noticeable of late, more frequently recurring than we have been accustomed to have it. It must be clear to all now that our cowardly inaction in the Franco-German war, our abdication of all our national responsibilities, for which nation and Government are equally blameable, have not decreased but increased our difficulties for the future. The doctrine of keeping to ourselves, of exclusive attention to our own interests, has lost some of its power in consequence of the practical conviction forced on us by recent events that it is an impossible one to practise. Its strength lay and still lies doubtless in the commercial world. Yet the tension and anxiety felt in that world, as a direct consequence of the treaty between France and Prussia, bring home to all the interdependence

of all civilized communities—the general and not simply commercial interdependence. This latter has never been disputed. There are many other considerations which lead to the same conclusion, that we are shaking off something of our insular self-concentration. But if I am wrong it would not be less but more desirable that we should bring an uninterrupted attention to this subject. Equally by its past and its present, England is almost more than any other nation bound up with others, with the whole of the habitable globe. I use the term England, not blind to the objection that it is a part for the whole. I use it as a synonym for the official term, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. But the truth is that our Imperial policy is mainly decided by that element in the heterogeneous mass which we call England. It is the sovereign part of the system; we scarcely bring home to ourselves how much its action is altered, and generally for the worse, by the influence of its relations to the other constituents. But, allowing for this impairment of its unity, for its consequently lowered fulfilment of its duties as a state, it is still, I must think, true that it is the most powerful, the directing unit; and we may observe that it is recognized as such by the political language of its compeers in the Western world.

England, then, with this wide range of connections, has an equally wide range of duties. I must, for convenience, break them up into heads. And they fall under three: Duties to those Western compeers whom I have just mentioned, duties to her colonies and dependencies, and duties to the Eastern nations, whether they are powerful states or communities in a less advanced condition. It will be at once clear that my object can but be to state or to re-state the most general principles which should animate English policy in reference to these three heads, even in the stating of which I have been as summary as possible, choosing representative terms rather than offering an exhaustive statement.

I content myself with an allusion merely to the great principle which colours all that I shall have to say—the principle of looking on all England's action and duties from the point of view of her membership in the Western Republic, of her subordination to the European State System; not from

that which she has too often claimed—her entire independence, her isolation from any system.

Recent events have profoundly increased the permanent disturbance of Europe, and left her in a state of repulsion which it will take long to overcome. Her concert as a system has not been destroyed ; the past is too powerful for that ; but it has for the time given way to antagonism, and for much of that which is worst in the actual state of affairs England is perhaps more than any other country responsible. I believe time will only confirm the judgment that she had it in her power to interfere with equal benefit to the common peace, and, by changing the final settlement between the two belligerents, to obviate much of the evil which now threatens Europe. The deplorable incapacity of her statesmen must bear the blame of this. They are not, of course, equally to blame with the directors of the German policy, whose extortion of money, and still worse act, the rending from their enemy a portion of territory the inhabitants of which were wholly averse to the change, thereby creating a permanent difficulty in maintaining public order in Europe, give us the measure of their comprehension of the real wants of our epoch. But to have stood by and seen this done and not openly even to protest against the outrage, much less to bring to bear any of the residuary forces in Europe to prevent it—this must be a lasting disgrace on the Government of England of the time. And there was a way open by which the worst evil might have been avoided, without requiring the stronger to yield too much of his insolent pride, and by which real service might have been done to both parties. The neutral Powers of Europe might, that is, have insisted on having their voice heard in a question which is of essential concern to all—might have insisted on being consulted on the common settlement. A firm policy initiated by England in this direction could not have been set aside ; and when their voice was heard, the advice given and maintained might have eased all subsequent relations.

The opportunity was lost ; but there is no reason why the evil which, by losing it, we permitted should not be repaired. In such matters there is nothing irrevocable, and the settlements of Europe, as we well know, acknowledge no finality.

The policy which would have been wise at the end of the war is the true one to adopt, with certain modifications, at the present moment; nor less is it certain that the policy which would have been wise during the war remains the true one now. Europe requires peace, for its own internal needs and for its general action on the other nations. It requires not merely peace, but the restoration and development of harmonious co-operation between its various members. In its present condition, and with the existing doctrines of entire separation of interests, it is difficult to see how these fundamental wants can be satisfied by a mere policy of inaction, by a mere waiting on events, by a doctrine of national isolation, resting on the 'streak of sea' basis. One portion of Europe evidently acknowledges this necessity for action. The meeting of the Emperors has no other significance. The less European elements in that assembly are quite aware that inaction cannot secure their ascendancy, peace in their sense. But no more now than in 1815 can the combination of Emperors meet the requirements of our troubled but progressive civilization. It is not around Russia that the future order of Europe can form itself. The guidance demanded cannot be found in the least advanced portions of the system which demands it, much less in a state which is alien to that system.

Now as ever, in these centuries of modern European history, it is in the close union of England and France that lies the real hope of constituting a sound nucleus for European concert; and had either country, more especially had England, a statesman worthy of the name, such a close union were, if difficult, yet, for all strictly necessary purposes, not impossible.

I will spare you all the necessary qualifications and cautions, and limitations of my statements. They can easily be supplied, and if too carefully stated, interfere with the direct expression of my meaning. In the recognized absence of such a statesman, all that each private Englishman can do, is to help so far as he can to form opinion by the free utterance of his own convictions.

Apart from all question of French interests, in the simple interest of Western Europe as a whole, England might and should make an appeal to the other states, and through them

to Germany, to revise that part of its action which concerns Alsace and Lorraine. Treating the subject in a way which would recognize the German success in the late war, the revision counselled might take some such shape as the following:—First, the restitution to France of all that is strictly French in Lorraine, including Metz, with the condition that it should not for twenty-five years be fortified, thus relieving Germany from one part of the odium which attaches to her of a fresh violation of the principle of which her writers are so fond when it suits them—that of nationality. She has too many other violations of a similar kind on her conscience. It would at the same time relieve France from the great irritation and danger of a first-rate fortress so near her centre—a permanent threat. Secondly, the neutralization of Alsace, and the dismantling of its fortresses, the territory taking rank with Belgium as a state under the guarantee of Europe, flanking and protecting Switzerland, and tending also by the simple fact of its establishment to quiet the natural alarm which Switzerland now feels. This would be a great advantage. But there is the much greater one, that it would in this interim state of Europe, in which there is so little security against collision, remove one great cause of collision, and by the intervention of a long neutral slip diminish the points of contact between the two great Continental Powers.

It seems dreaming, such is the level we have reached, to speak of any prevision of the kind to guard against contingent dangers, dangers, however, which all see to be imminent. Yet, quite soberly, there is nothing in such a policy which is impracticable, nor which would render it hopeless of attainment, if firmly and respectfully pressed upon Germany by the united voice of Europe. It would relieve her from a present embarrassment and a great odium. For this clinging to a portion of soil in defiance of the feelings of its inhabitants, and with the result of the large expatriation of the people and the almost universal discontent of those who are compelled to remain—the whole case, brave it out as she may, is a terrible stain upon German morality, and must some day, as her better conscience awakens, weigh heavily upon her. The excitement of triumph over, the hollowness of her success is apparent. She has not risen but sunk in estimation.

She has not lowered but raised her rival. She will not disgorge her iniquitous plunder, her money extortion ; but this peaceful removal of a source of quarrel, this almost irresistible incentive, as men are constituted, to another struggle, and one in which she can hardly hope to be so fortunate as in the last, might be accepted at the instance of a third party.

This action, be it observed, is quite independent of France, though of necessity in her true interest, whether separately considered or as a member of the European system, but it might be taken as well by one who was mainly in his personal sympathies German, as by one on the French side. It is European, that is, and not comparatively local. It does not therefore, except indirectly, bear on the close union which I advocate between England and France.

That involves much more, yet nothing which might not, had we a competent Government, be proclaimed on the housetop, for it is not fraught with danger or menace to any.

It might surely, avoiding at once all discourtesy and still more all empty official phrases, be made quite clear in a definite announcement that we were determined within all reasonable limits to support and act with France ; that the two countries in no sense recognized in the late events the conclusion of their natural and historical leadership of Europe, but that they were determined to assert such leadership in the maintenance of the peace of Europe—that no violent infraction of such peace would for the future find them disunited. Free from any wish to oppress others or to incorporate others, they would not see others oppressed or incorporated. All the smaller states should see in them protectors of their just and most valuable independence. I do but state the principle.

Such an attitude in relation to France carries with it the whole subject of England's external action in Europe. No question is there which is not included, either in Western or Eastern Europe. But where lies the obstacle to the assuming this attitude, which makes its statement seem almost idle? From our national point of view the obstacle lies in the uncertainty which has, since the cessation of monarchical rule in England, characterized all our foreign policy. It has at all times been subordinated to mere home questions, and to the

exigencies of party government. It is this which has led to the taunt of perfidiousness so commonly launched against it. The natural action of this peculiar feature on our institutions has been intensified of late years, not by a greater tendency to uncertainty—for in one respect there has been less, the two parties which struggle for power having acted very much in unison on foreign questions—but by another influence, that, viz. of the rapid changes in the holders of power, which seems to render any prescient statesmanship useless. They fix their attention solely on those questions which immediately may affect the constituencies or their directors, and these are inevitably home questions. I shall touch on the remedy later, as it is illustrative of what gives their force to these remarks —the extreme difficulties of our situation, and the consequent need of strength.

It cannot be justly objected to our Government, whatever our judgment on its European policy, that it is remiss in regard to the United States of America. The termination of our difficulties with that Power—I will assume that they are terminated—is a source of satisfaction, even if we are indisposed to accept all the rejoicings upon it which are current. We, in common with all others, wish for peace and goodwill between the two countries. We do not attach the same relative importance to their union which characterizes the language of some of our statesmen and writers, language which has an ill sound, as tending to a league between the two Anglo-Saxon communities which would not improbably be oppressive to the rest of the world. But, with this allowance, as I said, we value highly the friendship of America. But we cannot but remark on the conduct of our Government, and that not merely in these last cases, as pushing conciliation to the verge of truckling—a course never politic as between two great states, and which seemed at one time certain to defeat its own end. It is due, I presume, to the exaggeration of our estimate of commercial prosperity—the idea which weighs so heavily on all our nobler energies. We cringe to our largest customer. In no such spirit, but from the consciousness that as a nation, represented by its Government, we had been wrong, should an ample recognition of that wrong have been long ago tendered to America. If I comment on this spirit it is for no purposes of

mere destructive criticism. We have exhausted our vocabulary of noble terms to cover what there has been of ignoble in our action, and all official tongues are loud in their praise of our national moderation. Let all this be remembered, say when the next quarrel with China arises, an event constantly at our doors under the stimulus of our mercantile rapacity. There is too much ground for fearing that all our varnish will then disappear, and that the naked truth will stand out in its hideousness—that it is with the strong that this great nation is moderate, and that we trample without scruple, as we have heretofore trampled, on the weak.

There has been much discussion of late on the proper conduct to be pursued by England towards her colonies, and much harsh language has been used against those who advocate separation. The question is a complicated one. The colonies are not a source of strength to us, materially at least, but of weakness. This was justly remarked, if I am not mistaken, by the late Lord Derby. Then, again, our pedantic constitutionalism has made them practically independent of our control. They act as it seems good to them, and in such a manner as, if considered as an integral part of the Empire, to bring disgrace upon the whole. Look into the Coolie question, and you can hardly disguise the fact that, with a slight change of form, much of the reality of the slave-trade is revived to sully again the English name. Or take a less ambiguous matter, and examine the action of the Queensland emigrants, their treatment of the South Sea Islanders. It will be plain from such examination, I think, that if England cannot stop such action and punish such misdeeds, then on all moral considerations she should clear herself, by a total severance of the tie, from all suspicion of connivance. If maintained the connection is a source of moral weakness. I could easily swell this list, but these two instances are enough. Granting that our hand over them were firm enough to prevent such evils, I think you would agree with me in wishing the connection unbroken, not because it ministers to our Imperial pride and power, but as a point of our Imperial duties. Our past colonial history has left us with many obligations to our colonies, very strong obligations in some cases—I mean in the case of the penal settlements—but with obligations in all cases. Politically

united or independent, there is equally a permanent element in the relations between the two parties, and consequently a permanence of the duties; and a wise exertion of the influences which naturally emanate from the older social order might be most beneficial to the new. It is one matter of regret in the past that from unwisdom and impolitic direction there has been a premature separation of so many of the European settlements from their mother country, and not from England only.

So that, if I am in unison with the general sense of our body, we are not for the sudden or even proximate disruption of the colonial ties. But then the ground on which we advocate their retention is one which involves effort, money effort as well as other effort, on the part of our nation and its Government, and constitutes a fresh item in our already heavy responsibilities—another link in my argument that we want all the strength we can get from all quarters, if we are to be sufficient for the discharge of our duties. I need say no more on this question; let us turn to another.

England is more than any other Power involved in the relations of Europe with the group of great Eastern States, India, China, Japan, with Burmah and Siam. I place them all on the same footing, and for my present purpose consider them all and each as independent national existences in presence of similar existences in Europe. It is but a question of time for India, even in form; and if we are true to our own recognized obligations, our Government's solemn proclamations, the group of Indian states stands outside of us an addition to our duties, not a feeder of our strength. The burden which she is, and will be to us materially, has yet to make its full force felt. The moral weight with which she presses upon us, from the mode of her acquisition, no less than the disgraceful means by which we retain our hold, has also not as yet attained its full recognition. But the more we place India on a level with the other Eastern Powers and guide our policy to her by this principle, the lighter will our load become.

Thus grouped we have one general duty towards all, a duty common to us with the rest of Western Europe. All the members of that body alike are bound in wholesome concert with one another to act in respectful sympathy towards those

older organizations, to impart to them such results of our troubled growth as may be usefully received by them, to see whether they cannot in their turn receive something useful from them. This concert, if England were wise and rightly guided, she would strive to initiate, as the Power most intimately concerned with the question. The attitude assumed would be something of a protectorate, for our European material strength is palpably greater; but it need not be either an obtrusive or an oppressive protectorate. It might be in fact limited to the securing a renunciation on the part of all the concerting states of any forcible interference, no matter what the interest at stake. Present thought is so poor that it can hardly conceive any combined action for a noble or disinterested end. But were it not for this, it surely would be no difficult matter for the European Powers to agree on measures checking, in the first place, all piratical interference in the strict sense, and as the term is generally understood; and restricting, secondly, the oppressive tendencies of each state when it acts alone; tendencies so evil that, more especially in our own case, our action might well be qualified as a national piracy. It would be possible, in fact easy, such is the awakened state of the Eastern mind, to make this change in the attitude of Europe felt, so removing the distrust which they at present must feel, and which we can only wish to encourage, whilst things continue as they are. A formal declaration of such change would be an admissible conception to any true directors of Western policy. How visionary it seems in the present I need not say, nor need I do more than add that such a change would imply of necessity the abandonment of all governmental action in the support of missionaries. No pressure whatever on the freest moral and spiritual intercourse on our side at least could be tolerated. Each Eastern State must be allowed to be a competent judge of its own needs in this respect. On such bases as these, of outward peace and free intellectual and commercial intercourse, the future relations of the East and West might securely rest, in confident anticipation of the establishment, ultimately, of a complete and definitive harmony.

Again, for the second time, the natural course of thought leads to the same conclusion here as in reference to England's

more strictly European action. In the East as in the West, by our past history we have been mainly in contact with France, though with a less mixed character attaching to that contact. It has been, that is, more exclusively unfortunate if not evil. Unfortunate for both countries was their competition in India, least unfortunate for France, as she was freed by its issue from an Indian Empire. Evil for both countries has been their later competition or their later combination, their joint attack on China on one hypocritical pretext or another, with all its shameful incidents. But, for misfortune or for evil, the two nations have as a fact been most in juxtaposition. And in this there is a useful indication for the future. The two might draw near to one another for good, for combined action in the direction of support and protection of the Eastern States. The union of the West in this respect must begin with the more close union of some of its members, and the combination of the two maritime Powers would constitute the soundest element for a further aggregation. To attempt to shorten the process and leap at once to the union of all would be, so far as I can see, a mistake, and would only issue in vagueness and instability.

You will see that to work out these subjects would be out of my power within the limits of one address. It is the less necessary, as with most of them at any rate we are familiar. I have only to say so much on them as may in the end suffice to support the line of reasoning I have adopted, and to leave on my hearers a certain unity of impression in a particular direction.

There remains one more topic of the same order as the foregoing. It is the action of England towards what, as a short expression, I may call Africa—Africa, that is, as the representative country of the tribes or nations which are the most backward in the ascending movement of the race—the representative consequently of those portions of the race which have suffered most, wherever it was possible they should suffer, from that tumultuous and undirected movement. The expression then, in this inclusive sense, may be a useful condensation.

Here I am, within certain limits, on easier ground. If our country has led the way in the sin against those tribes,

she has not been backward relatively in the national disclaimer of her wrong. One of her latest acts is, in pursuance of her traditional policy, an intervention on behalf of the African races ; and the popular voice is against slavery. But it is not hard here also to pass the limit and come in collision with many evil designs, which evidence a very imperfect sense of our proper duty. We are gravely told by so-called Christian organs of the high mystical school, that English ruffians and Arab savages should be organized under some fit leaders for so choice a crew, to drill Africa into civilization by the bullet and the sword. I quote this passage in substance from the 'Spectator' newspaper, and it is but the brutal representative of a very prevailing opinion, which fortunately, however, our Government does not share. The great, the extravagant cost of its Abyssinian marauding was a most lucky thing in that respect. Yet its hand is so weak upon its roving citizens that it may tolerate much, and hence all vigilance is needed to oppose these bloodthirsty impulses.

One might ask, when such designs are avowed, where is the hurry—why should we be so anxious to spread our civilization over Africa? Is it anything so very perfect in its results for the great mass of the European population, that it is essential to lose no time in sweeping into its grinding-mill the African? The argument from the ancient military civilization fails us, and on this ground. The Roman conquest, to take the most perfect type, was justifiable as the necessary condition of some order upon earth, the necessary introduction of the idea that peace and not war is man's true function. It was necessary in the defence of the accumulations of man's thought and action against the threatening process of constant forcible interruption. No such reasons exist now for a renewed adoption of the military procedure ; the civilized world is too strongly organized to fear any subversion from inferior nations ; and whatever the force of evil ambition, we may, I think, on many grounds be sure that on any large scale it will not be renewed.

At any rate, it is for us to preach a different doctrine ; more distinctly, more obtrusively, though without any oppression, should what I have spoken of as a Protectorate be organized by the Western world in the interest of Africa. And

here we come upon a useful tradition, in the treaties on the slave trade which have been so frequent between the European Powers concerned in it. The germ of this idea of protection is ready to our hand. Rightly developed it would be sufficient for our purpose. The action of each several Power in relation to Africa might be restricted by this concert of all the Powers. Such concert would result or should result in a very complete abstention from all premature interference in Africa or with the populations of which it is the representative. All buccaneering enterprise would be put down (and I am not clear that the action of one of our own countrymen does not justly come under the term), as should all continuance in any form of the slave trade. Whatever peaceful intercourse was possible should be encouraged ; but if rejected the rejection must be acquiesced in, not overborne. Gradually such conduct would tell on the African tribes, and higher and more profitable communication than trade might have room to develope. There never has been any justification of the idea that these belated portions of our race are averse to the just influence of the more advanced. Quite the contrary. Their confidence has been as touching as it has been abused.

There is one feature in this protection which I must not omit, and which requires a very delicate handling in practice. It is easy to speak of. It is not Europe only which oppresses Africa. Probably at present it is not Europe even principally. The Muhammadan propaganda and cupidity combined are exerting a powerful influence for evil on those long-suffering tribes. The Arabs, whatever that vague term means, are evidently more to be dreaded than Europeans ; and were European action rightly directed, it would—it is quite able to do so—interfere with the requisite firmness for removing this source of wrong.

In all this England has a leading part to play. By her discoveries, her settlements, her conquests, she has been in a prominent degree involved in Africa ; and if some good has been done in the course of her mixed career, yet there are incidents and results of it which none can look back upon without shame. Even where she has meant well she has but too often worked marked evil. Witness the Sandwich Islands and other similar cases. The latest accounts from

the Cape are but too often revolting in their atrocity. She has in any case contracted great obligations over and above the common obligations of our humanity towards these populations, and she should exert herself to fulfil them. As in the two former cases, France and England are the European powers most immediately concerned; the former by her unfortunate and immoral conquest of Algiers, the latter by her Cape settlements, both, by their competition in Egypt, are prominent in this question. In fact, wherever you turn in modern history so far as it concerns Europe, you are sure to stumble on evidences of this closer relation existing between these two States. It is their mutual action which determines the form of modern history. It were as vain as it were unwise to wish to change the current of our mutual traditions; all should point the other way; to the adherence to them, and to their development by a more persistent friendliness for noble co-operation.

I have, I hope, said enough on this subject of England's external action to make its great difficulty clear, also, I hope, to indicate the right direction of that action. I repeat that it seems a dream even to conceive of any such direction. The one indispensable requisite, the one condition, is wanting. To state it, is to state the fundamental evil under which Europe labours—the absence, viz., of any system of convictions sufficiently prevalent to give unity to its action. Scarcely in any country do we find any body of men, in sufficient number to be taken into account, clear as to the line of advance. For purposes of standing still or retrograding there is considerable union, though an union sadly undermined by misgivings; but for orderly progress, its means and objects, men are terribly at sea. To limit ourselves to our own country, this is clearly the case; all is breaking up, but the constitution of the new social order is not as yet visible.

The requisite then for us as for others is the formation of a public opinion, an opinion resting on convictions shared by a number competent to enforce its conclusions, and in the present state of social forces such a number can be furnished only by the proletariate. Its intelligent action as controlling and supporting the other co-existent powers in society, is the only permanent political and social remedy for the evil which

afflicts our external conduct—indecision for all good objects—and in thorough keeping, you will see, with all that is gone before, I come back on the thesis which I supported at Paris in September, that the hope for a better direction of European energies lay in the cordial and intimate union of the two proletariates, the French and the English. The massive support which they, by such union, could give to what I have called orderly progress is quite essential. Governments wanting it are, with more or less consciousness of the fact, wanting in the first element of strength, a firm footing; and wanting this, as all the existing conditions of society no longer permit the blind use of the popular strength, they necessarily lapse into weakness throughout their whole policy.

This estimate of the importance of the proletariate is not peculiar to us; we differ only from others in favouring it and welcoming every just occasion for developing it, whilst they dislike and fear it. What is, if we analyse closely the opinion of the ruling powers in Europe on the International, the secret of the horror which it inspires? It is not in its errors or its evil tendencies that I think lies the worst feature of that society. Rather it is the consciousness which the existing powers—I use the term in as extensive a sense as you can give it, including much more than mere governments under it—the consciousness which they have that it is the expression in a form which need not be the true one, but still the most palpable expression of the new social power which must so entirely modify their own position and action. They have the certainty that, to some of their more material interests, that new power will bring great modifications. But they have also an instinct that their whole framework of ideas and beliefs, that mental and even moral atmosphere in which they have lain warmly cradled so long, and beyond which they can conceive nothing but what is repulsive, is also destined, if this new power triumphs, to a very radical change. Much therefore that is of the better part of man's nature, as well as much that belongs to his worst, revolts from the coming change. Hence the adhesion of so many who are good to the party which opposes it. Hence the gathering which is visible of all their forces by the friends of the order which is established. From their point of view they are right. The

actual institutions have come to be by long habit and association an end and not a means; the actual beliefs in which they have been bred are absolutely sacred; they can conceive only the most limited changes in the former, they allow of none in the latter. How should they not rally against the upward pressure of a power which must exact very large changes in both? A complete alteration of the fundamental postulate in the region of belief—such is to all who have studied the question the inevitable accompaniment of the recognition of the due claims of the proletariate, of its assumption of its proper function.

It will be in keeping again with all that has gone before if I say that in no other way can this end be attained but by the adoption of a new belief, the communication throughout the body to which we assign at once such vast power and no less extensive duties, of a religious impulse. For we cannot stop to argue on the possibility of a revival of the old—a general revival, that is, in Western Europe. Assuming then that the religion which will animate and direct them is the Religion of Humanity, we may say that religion alone can so inform and moderate this rising social power as to enable it to secure the great changes which are imperiously demanded, in its interest it is true, but not less in the interest of the whole, rightly estimated. No other impulse is of the requisite strength; no other can lead men to exert themselves on a large scale, and with combined effort, to gain the wisdom, the patience, and the firmness which will be needed, I say not for the removal of the old order—that is, comparatively speaking, an easy task—but for assisting in the substitution of the new. The mere distance of the end to be obtained, the apparent hopelessness of a return for all the labour expended, act with very fatal effects on men who are unsustained by the strongest of all forces.

So that the problem which for some time we had before us, that of the right guidance of England's external action, leads to the conclusion that the lever to be used is opinion, and that for giving a sufficiently broad basis for that opinion we require a large popular support. Lastly, that to render that support something on which we can really depend, it must in its turn rest on a religious foundation. The task,

therefore, is to lay that foundation, and in this will be found to lie the most condensed expression for all the difficulties inherent in that task. But by condensing the expression we in no way lessen the difficulties. Without illusion and without discouragement we must gain strength to face them.

The more steadily we contemplate them, the stronger will grow our conviction that it is strictly in the fulness of time that the Religion of Humanity was founded. I have dwelt on one problem; but let us for a moment extend our glance and range over the numbers which have been untouched, and which, familiar and unfamiliar—for new ones are constantly coming up—have a claim on our attention. Think of the restless heaving of our troubled European world; of the revolutionary atmosphere of its colonial offshoots; of the fermentation of the older and hitherto quieter members of the human family; of the new reactions which are daily becoming sensible of the various parts on one another; of the conflict of commercial interests; the competing claims of rival faiths; the internal disquietude of all the nations of the civilized world, their class differences, their intense jealousies threatening open war, their opposition between luxurious wealth and poverty, between cultivated leisure and the ignorance which is imposed by necessity—lastly, of the more inward unrest which accompanies all the unsettling of old beliefs, the tearing up of the moral and intellectual landmarks of the past. As the mass of difficulty surges around us I cannot wonder that some take refuge in the older form of truth, and rest in the confidence that the Lord sitteth between the Cherubim, be the earth never so unquiet. But that confidence partakes too much of an unsocial character for us to do more than understand it. We accept a less easy but a more human and a nobler position; and as the difficulties are human, so must be the remedy. It is not for the first time that the earth is unquiet. It may be said to have been her normal state for many ages, and the older belief has not been guiltless of contributing to its continuance. Turning therefore from it, we welcome the new voice, purely human though it be—*Sonat hominem*, and it is its recommendation. We wanted a faith in which men as men could share, and we have it in our possession. We wanted a system of life which could control, nay uproot, the unrea-

sonable aspirations of men, and bring them down to the common ground, whilst it could offer satisfaction for all the legitimate wants of man's nature ; and we can contribute to the establishment of such a system. We needed conceptions of our mutual relations, whatever their scale, which should take away the mistrust and bitterness which have hitherto poisoned them, and such conception we have in our common subordination to one end, our common identification in one being, the end and the being equally human. We were in need of such an explanation of our own life and nature as might remove the internal struggle between our moral wants and our intellectual conclusions, and by harmonizing the two, endow us with a true unity in ourselves, susceptible of outward expression in all our life ; and though we may but imperfectly appreciate it—so hampered are we by the past—our need in this respect is fully met. Lastly, there was a want, not so openly acknowledged, but not the less felt—the want of a true human sympathy with the generations which have preceded us, with those which are to succeed us. And this, too, has been gratified. With our simplest progenitors we are placed in more perfect sympathy than with our more immediate ancestors, thus asserting without effort our unbroken continuity hitherto, whilst in the end which our religion assigns to all the labour of the generation for the time being—the service of posterity to the remotest period of man's existence—we establish a similar continuity for all the future. So that if the difficulties or evils around us are great, not less powerful is the remedy. We can at once understand them and confront them. We have the light required for sure action. They are incidents in the growth of a highly complex organization, they as naturally cease when the growth has issued in full maturity. They have attended the institution, they will disappear in the definitive constitution of Humanity.

POSITIVIST SCHOOL, 19 CHAPEL STREET, BEDFORD ROW:
Festival of Humanity, 85 (*January* 1, 1873).

THE SETTLEMENT OF FRANCE.

WITH all centres of our faith, more especially with our common centre in Paris; with all its scattered disciples; with the members of all other religious organizations or beliefs, Monotheist, Polytheist, or Fetichist—all lesser distinctions being absorbed in the one bond of our common humanity—with the whole human race, with man, that is, wherever found and in whatever condition; and with the animal races, which, during the long effort of man to raise himself, have been, as they are still, his companions and his helpers, we, on this occasion, on this Festival of Humanity, would be in conscious sympathy.

Nor with our contemporaries alone are we in sympathy, but even more with the larger portion of the race which constitutes the Past. We gratefully commemorate the services of all the generations whose labours we inherit, and wish to hand down with increase to our successors.

We gratefully commemorate also the services of our common Mother, the Earth, the planet which is our home, and with her the orbs which form the Solar System.

We may not separate from this last commemoration that of the milieu in which that system moves, the Space which has ever been of such great service to man, and whose services we so distinctly wish to recognize and use in our intellectual and moral training.

From the Present and the Past we extend our sympathies to the Future, to the unborn generations which, with happier lot, shall follow us on this earth; the thought of whom should be constantly present to our minds in order to complete the conception of Humanity as revealed to man by the Founder of our Religion. The memory of her greatest servant, Auguste Comte, finds a fitting place on this her greatest Festival, consecrated as it is to the remembrance of all her servants, known

or nameless—to the remembrance of all the results they have achieved.

Wisest and noblest of teachers! may all of us who avow ourselves thy disciples, animated by thy example, supported by thy doctrine, guided by thy construction, face all the obstacles which indifference or hostility throw in our way, and in the midst of this revolutionary age, undebased by any hope of reward, undeterred by the ill-success of our efforts, in a spirit of submissive veneration carry forward the great work to which thy life was devoted—the work of human regeneration.

I have usually on this occasion spoken at some length of our position and prospects, reviewing the Positivist movement during the year, more especially in reference to our own country, and to all in more immediate connection with our country. This year I shall say less on this point—so much only as is necessary for the sake of continuity; and this in spite of the absence of the annual circular—an absence which on all accounts I deeply regret. The year has not been a very eventful one for us, the most marked circumstance having been the failure of the 'Revue Occidentale,' which, in my judgment, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, and especially the circumstances of France, was a failure very disastrous to our cause in the immediate future. Doubtless we shall survive this, as other discouragements, but it is a discouragement.

Our ordinary action here has been continuous, and is, we may hope, sowing good seed for the future. We must be content to wait for its results. Our teachings and our meetings have been steadily kept up, stamping our movement with the character of persistence. The same may be said of our elementary school, which has been rendered more complete by the addition, during the last months of the year, of a weekly singing class, so filling up the list of requirements for strictly elementary instruction—the object hitherto steadily kept in view in this branch of our exertions. As with all our work, so with this, the difficulties are considerable; the uncertainty, the irregularity of attendance standing first; but those who so cheerfully and so liberally aid us are not discouraged by those

difficulties, and, on the whole, the effort is one which has a good prospect. I may add that there is room for more assistance, if any are disposed to contribute their personal assistance; for the learners are at all stages, and the more we can meet each individual case, the better our teaching. There is room also for money assistance, if any are disposed to help an attempt which has no direct connection with our religious action, which is one of absolutely free secular instruction.

In so small a body it is but natural that a year should pass without the administration of any one of the Sacraments of our Religion. This is something which depends entirely on outward circumstances. In the present year it is due to accident, and in no way to a shrinking from their acceptance. The contrary tendency is in fact quite discernible. While on this point I may remark that on Saturday next, the 3rd instant, there is to be a full Positivist marriage in Paris.

In regard to publications, there is little to record this year. The only direct utterance has been my own pamphlet on the Ashantee War, which I mention as, from the complete absence till last week of any notice of it by the press, some may not be aware of its existence. I have no wish to complain of the silence of the press; it is not likely to look favourably on any of our writings; but as we all more or less depend for our knowledge upon it, and are in general content with such dependence, its silence makes any publicity very difficult. Knowing this, it may be asked why I write in the way I do. I write as an act of duty, and that I may feel that what is possible has been done; and I have no other method but the pamphlet open to me; for if I use the full freedom of expression which on religious matters is desirable, I cannot, in reason, ask the hospitality of any publication, however liberal and favourable to the general view advocated. In this, as in so much else, we must bide our time. It will come, and it will be a satisfaction to feel, when the national conscience awakens, that on most of the greater questions of European or human interest, from the earliest beginnings of our body, we have spoken in opposition to the course which, for the time triumphant, is finally condemned.

I should mention here that Dr. Robinet has recently published a small pamphlet entitled 'Le Dix Août et la Symbolique Positive,' in answer to the strictures of the 'République

Française,' but containing many valuable remarks on the general question of the direction of society. It may be obtained through Trübner.

We are printing, and they will very shortly be accessible, the four tables which, in the English translation of the Catechism, are at the end of the volume. The transitional Calendar has for some time been hung up in this room. The other three tables will be hung when ready, in a large, readable type; copies will be accessible at a small cost, either at Mr Truelove's, or at Mr. Vernon's, 40 Lamb's Conduit Street—close at hand, that is. Such separate forms are often very useful. We shall complete the series shortly by a similar impression of the Laws of the First Philosophy, a constant recurrence to which may be to all of us of essential service, clearing and methodizing our intellectual work.

Again, we seem at last drawing near to the long desired end, the publication of the translation of the 'Politique Positive.' I cannot but hope that the first six months of this year will see the accomplishment of this work, which, from various causes, has been delayed. It will be a great satisfaction to have it off our hands; a still greater satisfaction to have the principal work of Auguste Comte in an English dress, so removing every excuse from the idle or the uncandid among our opponents, giving every facility to the student of the system who has sufficient leisure. There are some material difficulties attendant on so large a publication, but I trust they may be met. They are, however, great in our present state—and I therefore say that we shall be glad if any here should be ready to help us in meeting them. There are possibly some who might be disposed to give such help without being at all inclined to lend a more intimate co-operation. It is evident that outside of us there are many who value the system as an intellectual assistance, whilst they disclaim its adoption as their guide in politics or their belief in religion. In fact, looking at the writings of the day, if all who benefited by the teaching of Comte acknowledged the claim such benefit constitutes, we should have a wide area on which to draw for assistance.

Thus far for our action. On our prospects I shall say but little. It is a time of slow, almost microscopic, advance, which draws heavily on our patience and confidence—if we would avoid a sense of oppression and gloom; and it is not

always easy to avoid this feeling. There are satisfactory points in our movement no doubt ; but, on the whole, I am more impressed with a certain character of unsteadiness of convictions, or at any rate of action—a certain ebb and flow—which has hitherto not been so evident. Occasionally a better prospect seems opened, and then some trifling accident occurs, and there is an end of the matter for the present. The going back of some, the hesitations of others, the general want of cohesion and vigour, which I cannot but feel exists throughout our body here and elsewhere, whatever the explanation of them, are worse evils than the mere slowness of growth to which we have so long been accustomed. We do not grow much—the most clear-sighted of our opponents are right in that—and I do not know that we deserve to grow much. There is no use in not seeing things as they are ; and those who are most resolute in their faith, most consistently active in its propagation, will be the least averse to language which is free from any illusive expectation. In such a state they are wisest who, without relaxing their efforts, fall back on the doctrines of their religion, and stay themselves on their strength, by constant study and meditation strengthening themselves for increased activity if the opportunity should occur. Such is the best judgment I can form of our actual state, and if unfavourable, it in no way interferes with my unshaken conviction of the goodness of our cause, nor of the certainty of its final triumph.

I said that the clearer sighted of our opponents note correctly our actual weakness ; and yet we may assert with reason that they are not consoled by this weakness, that they are in no way easy on the subject. They are aware that the existing conditions do not preclude the possibility of quite others suddenly arising, and that there is, from some cause or other which they find it difficult to explain, considering how wrong they think us and our doctrines, a latent strength in the new religion which inspires them with anxiety. They are aware that the conceptions on which it rests are slowly penetrating all around them, and undermining the supports of their own faith. Not blind to the decay of that faith from within, to its loss of power over men's minds, they naturally take most alarm at something which offers itself as a substi-

tute for it. Were there none such, there might be hope of its regaining its lost supremacy, but the existence of one indefinitely diminishes that hope. There is more satisfaction in this alarm of the more acute than in the exaggeration of our progress, which from time to time is to be heard from the less discerning.

Whatever active opposition or hostility we have encountered hitherto, we have to encounter still; it strikes me as rather embittered in tone of late, so far as I see, or hear it. It comes as usual from the votaries of art, the disciples of science, the large and mixed class which constitutes the literary world, the representatives of intellect or culture—all from various less respectable motives united against us, but finding a common and more avowable ground for their opposition in their fear of the discipline to be introduced by the Religion of Humanity. This would interfere with the great process of production now going on, and which, ill-guided and wasteful as all the better minds even among those who defend it allow it to be, is, it is hoped, leading us to some haphazard results of untold value. The hostility thus aroused must have its way, as must that which meets us from the theological world, an hostility much more legitimate, much more honourable, and which is also in its better exponents more candid and more sympathetic, though not erring by excess in these last respects. We have a worse evil to meet than any hostility; it is in fact useful to us in some proportion to its vigour, whereas we can derive no advantage from indifference, whatever its origin, and its origin is manifold.

Indifference pure I leave out of the question—the indifference I mean of the indifferent—of the great majority who care for none of these things—for none of the questions which interest the more thoughtful portion of mankind. They are an evil which afflicts equally all social movements. I leave out of the question also the indifference of those who, not inactive in their generation, would still, granting that they had full knowledge of our system, reject it as useless, or visionary, or I know not what—an instrument not available for their ends. What I regret much more than this is the indifference of those who are moving in the same direction as ourselves, who are bent on political and social im-

provement, who often show great energy in this cause, and considerable skill in using such means as they have at command, who consequently, it might be presumed, would, if they mastered our system, in many cases see its value as conducing to the ends they have in view, but who yet turn aside from it, will give it no attention on one ground or another, oftenest perhaps on the ground which they can hardly have adequately examined—viz. that it is unpractical—bringing, that is, no immediate return: or, and this is even more common, their minds are so occupied by one or other of the questions of the day, that what we offer falls on ears absolutely closed to the impression. Their particular object of interest wholly absorbs them, and to balance that and extend their view or their action over a larger field is an effort for which they have no disposition. This is the obstacle which always acts most powerfully against the growth of any such cause as ours. The immediate interests to which men have been used to attend crush out that which is apparently more distant; and in the present it acts certainly with as much force as it ever has acted. The questions of the day are, *primâ facie*, so urgent, the shifting of complications is so rapid and perplexing, that it is matter for regret, not wonder, if we find men generally unable to fix their minds on the true and permanent issue which underlies the web of the actual embroilment.

As an illustration of what I mean on a large scale, we may take the several nations of Western Europe in their present condition. Each and all of them have so much which engages their attention, that they cannot look at anything else. The Italian is absorbed in settling all the difficult problems involved in the constitution of his new unity, financial, administrative, and foreign problems. Spain is absorbed in securing its very existence as a nation. Germany has got this war between State and Church, over and above other difficulties. There is a temporary lull in France, but the strictly political struggle naturally draws to it a very large share of interest, so large as to overshadow all others. At home one question after another arises, sufficient practically to ensure the same result. Ireland has got its Home Rule, Scotland its normal and much-admired absorption in its own

interest, England its educational tangle—to choose the most prominent. Each has enough to account for the indifference of its more active inhabitants to any new question.

Returning to the more individual aspect of this matter, and addressing myself to those who, in some degree, are open to examine this point, I would ask whether there is in the immediate interests of the day any one which is of a nature justly so to occupy men's minds as that they should have no leisure or will to study the new organization of society which we press upon them in the name of a new religion. I have spent much time and thought in reviewing the many questions which are actually under discussion, and without denying their several interest, I cannot see in any one of them any satisfaction as an exclusive object of pursuit—nor in all of them combined. For, combine them all, and grant them all attained, and would any one of those who have given real thought to the subject, say that the aim he has before him in his better moments would be satisfied, even approximately, as all human aims must be content with being? Given all the perfection conceivable in our Parliamentary machinery, given all the freedoms required—many of them very desirable—freedom of land, freedom of schools, freedom of churches, the fullest freedom of association—when all this is given, we still remain, so far as I can see, a disunited and disorganized society; for we still remain a society without that unity of belief and conviction which can alone constitute true union; and so we come back on the conclusion that outside all the partial issues there stands a more comprehensive issue, claiming as its due from those, remember, who are not in principle opposed to it—not opposed to it, that is, by virtue to their adhesion to some other which asserts the same claim—a sustained and deliberate examination. I do not prejudge the result of such enquiry; all I wish is to remove the obstacle of indifference so far as it arises from an overvaluing of other interests, from the being preoccupied by minor, because more isolated, political or social issues.

The evil of such preoccupation would be less if it did not exert an influence upon ourselves, upon those I mean who are more or less convinced adherents of the Religion of Humanity. Such must, I think, have often felt how difficult it is to

abstract themselves sufficiently from the current of passing events, from an undue attention to this or that interest, not in itself unimportant, but still relatively not justifying the amount of attention we give it, to the detriment of greater objects. All of us, wherever we are, under whatever variety of circumstances, require that on which I have been insisting so much of late, a persistent concentration on the direct study of our religion, the familiarity with all its power for support and guidance which is gained by everyday meditation.

But these are personal considerations. If I urge them directly on those who hear me, and through them on all who in any degree agree with our estimate of the evils we have to meet, it is from the increasing sense of the necessity for some direction, and the increasing sense also that no direction is possible unless on this condition—the existence of a body of men with common convictions, with union, and with resolution to take that direction. The disorder which is everywhere manifest in the relations of men, on whatever scale those relations may be, is perhaps not greater than it has long been ; but it is, I think, more generally seen to be deeper-seated than within our own memory it was thought to be, and seen therefore to require other remedies than what were then deemed sufficient. None here probably hold the opinion that such remedies are beyond man's competence; none here think otherwise than that human wisdom might grapple with and modify in a high degree the evils from which man is suffering. A direction is, in short, to us a possible thing. The difficulty is to find it. This difficulty has, in the judgment of many, been met, so far as theory is concerned. All that remains is to bring others to share that judgment, and give the theory practical effect.

The troubled state in which Humanity at present exists is manifest, I said. Latent tendencies to union are working strongly—of this I have no doubt. But the more superficial aspect is one of disunion and repulsion. This, too, is beyond question. Nor is any part of contemporaneous Humanity more disordered than that in which lies its hope for guidance—the Western World, in the largest sense of the term. Outside that world it is confessed that we cannot look for an impulsion to better things; in this conclusion West and

East agree. As I enumerate the constituents of the East—all, that is, which could possibly put forward any claim—you will see the evidence of this conclusion. Turkey, Russia, Persia, China, and Japan—no sixth power is left, and the five named can none of them take the lead. We are thrown back on Europe and the European world. The idea is familiar to us. I only re-state it for the sake of clearness and connection. The disunion, then, of the West is fraught with evils to the race as well as to itself; for so long as it continues, it adjourns all chance of a wise action on those without it.

We may differ as to the amount of repulsion that exists between the various elements of Western Europe, but we cannot differ as to the fact of a strong repulsion. Nor can we differ as to this further point, that the want of union between the States is but the expression of the want of union which exists within each several State separately considered. In my address of last year I dwelt most on the former, incidentally only on the latter, and I endeavoured to show that in the conjunction of the two maritime powers, France and England, in their co-operation as a rational and well-considered policy, lay the best hope for the peace and order of Europe; that, united, they might form a sound nucleus around which the other States might gather, many of them willingly, the others gradually overcoming their reluctance.

This year it seems natural to turn to the other order of considerations, and speak of some one of the questions which concern the internal state of the countries of the West, or of some one of those countries apart from the rest. This is what I propose to do, and the choice is not difficult. There are several subjects of interest, but one is of paramount attraction by the general confession. For the others, I will say a few words on one or two which are very prominent at present.

The state of Spain is the first. We here, more than most Englishmen, watch closely the vicissitudes of that noble country, and wish for its prosperity. We regret the long struggle in which it is engaged, and are anxious on all accounts that its Republican Government come victorious out of that struggle over the two enemies which threaten it. We have ever urged the claims of Spain to a fuller recognition on the part of the rest of Europe, to a greater justice on the part of

our own country in particular. We see, I imagine, all of us, with regret and blame, the hesitation of our Government, the worse than hesitation, the refusal, to acknowledge the Spanish Republic, though proclaimed with all the circumstances that should have elicited such acknowledgment. Moreover, all of us who have given any attention to the subject are aware that the difficulties which impede a settlement in Spain lie far below the surface, and are common to it with other European nations. It is from no indifference, then, that we do not dwell on them in her particular case, but from the conviction that, as common, they will meet their primary and conclusive solution elsewhere.

The second European question which might offer material for an elaborate treatment is the conflict between the State and Church which is agitating Germany. It is justly felt to be of wider bearing, and accordingly it is exciting much discussion amongst us in some quarters, and bids fair to throw considerable light on the so-called Liberalism of our country. But for various reasons I do not treat it. As yet we are hardly in possession of the exact issue—at least I do not feel that I am—or of the requisite documents and data. Secondly, judged as we must judge it quite in the general, it is but an illogical and entangled presentation of a difficulty which meets us in all other or most other Western countries—the United States constituting the exception—the difficulty as to the relations of the spiritual and temporal powers. And it would seem —I speak with hesitation on the point—that the German Government, true to the traditions of Protestantism, and driven on by its excessive nationalization, is adopting, at the distance of nearly three centuries, the solution which the Tudors unwisely adopted for England, and which, under a change of form, was continued without any change in spirit in the victory of the Church and aristocracy in 1660: I mean the complete prostration of the spiritual before the temporal power. Historically, and guided by the experience of England, there is every reason to think this solution unsatisfactory and unstatesmanlike, and the oppressive measures as to Roman Catholicism which are its immediate fruit seem to enforce this historical conclusion. I hope that the whole subject will be sifted from the Positivist point of view, and in the same spirit

as that in which Mr. Beesly treated the Galway judgment. The Church of Rome has little sympathy with our movement, and would, if it had the power, no doubt, crush us. Its hands in this matter are so far from pure, that we cannot be dupes of its liberal professions in this country, in such flagrant contrast with its action in France. But with our eyes open, we can have no hesitation in espousing its cause in this German struggle, as essentially the cause which we wish to triumph, the cause of complete freedom of the spiritual power in juxtaposition with the temporal.

There are, it is true, one or two matters of English concern which deserve consideration, but I shall content myself with a very short allusion to them. On the most urgent, the Ashantee War, I have, as I said, written. The discussions on Public Instruction have but small interest for us. The conceptions on the subject are so poor, the execution so fraudulent, that we can but watch the whole movement from outside, welcoming the good in it, so far as there is good, and trying to counteract such evils as are necessarily involved. After all, the great advantage which it offers is its quiet disintegration of the old order, an advantage not wholly counterbalanced, owing to the general intellectual atmosphere, by the danger of the new institutions which it tends to throw up. There remains the terrible famine which threatens Bengal, which, on all accounts, personal and public, has so powerful a claim on me. We of course have no power in the matter, but we can stimulate, in the measure of our ability, enquiry as to the causes. How far is our much-vaunted Indian Government directly and indirectly responsible for such evils? What has been its attention to, or neglect of, the means for avoiding such contingencies? What relation does the heavy taxation we impose on India, in order to maintain our intrusive government, bear to the scantiness of the food supply—the permanent scantiness, be it remembered? What relation, again, does the encouragement, might I not say the enforcement, of certain artificial crops, such as opium and indigo, again in the interest of our dominion, not of the Hindoo population, bear to the same evil? Such are some of the points to which we may direct opinion.

Combine this Indian prospect with the miserable Gold

Coast affair, and bring also into the picture the various embarrassments which are constantly arising, now in Arabia, now at the Cape, now in Queensland and elsewhere, and it is but too clear that the Nemesis of our long attempt at imperial aggrandizement is coming upon us, and that a wise and timely revisal of our whole policy of extension is urgently needed. Official people and public men imbued with the traditional ideas may still use the old language and support the old system. We who have no such influences upon us may break from it altogether, and with all our power advocate that which alone can be the final issue of the whole question, however long it may be in coming, the complete withdrawal, viz., of England from all external possessions which are in any sense intrusions upon others, held, that is, in the name of our interests to the ignoring of others' just claims—the complete abandonment, in a word, of all imperial pretensions. This is the definitive settlement. All others are but adjournments. These points of general or more immediate national importance disposed of, I come to the subject I have chosen for to-day, the difficult subject of France. It is evident only from certain points of view can it be treated within the limits of such an address as this, and I must appeal to your indulgence for my method of treating it.

The shifting, uncertain state of France is that which most strikes observers. It affords ground for the objection that any union between a country with so settled a government as our own, and one which is so unsettled, is impracticable. The objection is very forcible against those who think of union between the two governments as they exist at present: it is less so against those who are thinking of the more distant union between the two nations, which, whenever it comes, will soon modify the action of their respective governments. But I had another reason for speaking at the outset of the uncertainty which involves French politics. I wished, accepting the fact, to raise the whole question of its explanation, to fix our attention on the peculiar conditions of a problem which is very generally felt to be the capital one in the present state of Europe.

As we watch the fluctuations of the French movement, it is no wonder that to many there seems but little hope of a

wise settlement. The bound and rebound are so violent. This feeling of despondency becomes stronger when we count up the years which have passed since the beginning of the unsettlement. Eighty-six years: it seems a long period to have led to so little reconstitution. We grow tired of the effort to follow the several substitutions of one temporary government for another, each substitution generally involving violence and bloodshed, and so necessitating reaction. Undoubtedly it is a long time, and a disheartening spectacle, but neither the duration nor the unprofitableness as yet warrant any feeling of despair. The disorder may be prolonged almost indefinitely, or it may cease much earlier than we could hope; but in either case alike it may be confidently asserted that it will issue in an order of a higher character than that which it replaces.

Those who wish to fortify their conviction on this head, or, as is perhaps the case, to gain a conviction of this kind, will find in the fourth volume of the 'Politique Positive' the means of so doing. For there we have the rational explanation of the phenomena we are witnessing, and the statement of the condition on which their termination depends. I limit myself rather to some historical considerations tending in the same direction.

We have had in England for nearly two centuries a settled government, threatened, it is true, more than once by subversion, but not subverted. We naturally recur to the last great change in our political order and compare the French Revolution with the English Revolution of the seventeenth century.

That lasted from 1640 to 1688, from the meeting of the Long Parliament that is, to the flight of James II. The ground heaved for some time, but there was no serious disruption after this last event. Order has been since then unbroken, at the seat of government at least. The contrast is apparently in every way disadvantageous to France. But it is not possible to rest much on such a contrast, not to speak at present of the fact that our Revolution is but suspended, that the paltry settlement of what is called the Glorious Revolution is no settlement at all of the great issues raised by the Cromwellian movement, and from one cause or another set

aside at the Restoration—that in short the two centuries since Cromwell's death have been a halt, a tolerable compromise, but in no way a definitive arrangement of our political and religious difficulties. To say nothing of all these considerations, which are reserved for another treatment, there is a difference between the French and English revolutions which renders all comparisons profitless, unless it be fully taken into account. It is the superficial character of the English as compared with the thorough change involved in the French. Political change and religious reformation both were, it is true, objects of the Puritans, and as the course of events drew out the deeper elements of the strife there were not wanting indications of a disposition to social innovations of the highest importance. It was in all probability these latter that were the determining cause of the irreconcileable opposition offered to the Protector's Government. But allowing all this, we can yet see that the two parties fought on common ground, both appealing, that is, to a common standard, differing only in their interpretation of that standard. On religious points there were differences, but there was also agreement underlying all those differences. This agreement softened the asperities of the combat, and when outward peace was restored, rendered a certain harmony possible. That it was so is seen by the simple observation of the extent to which the Church of England in its hour of triumph was modified by the opposing doctrines, and in social matters by the degree in which the forms of Puritan life gained the ascendency over their opposites, the forms of the Cavalier existence. England has since then been more Puritan than Cavalier.

As we proceed we shall see that the opposition in France between the contending parties is of a far more radical character. The same remark would be found true, if there were time to follow out the subject, of the long religious struggle which was a consequence of the Protestant Reformation. In fact, in the past history of Europe there is but one event, or series of events, which can be parallelled with this final crisis of European society in the midst of which we are living. That one is the revolution which substituted Christianity for Paganism, and even here, as I shall shortly show, the parallel is defective, and the change is less fundamental. Still it was

a very searching change that was then effected, and it took centuries to effect it, and required the disappearance of the Roman Empire of the West and its replacement by the barbarian kingdoms. It was an epoch of storm and convulsion beyond any that has been seen subsequently. Yet the transition from Polytheism to Monotheism had been long prepared, long called for, and is not in its nature so hard as that which now has to take place. Nor in the political sphere was there any modification of men's ideas comparable to the one now imminent. The Christian Church had from the outset fully recognized the Imperial constitution, and, when the Emperors ceased, was ready and eager to welcome the kings who succeeded to portions of their inheritance. It was equally ready to welcome the revival of the Imperial power and title in the person of Charlemagne. Socially, too, there was none of the discord which embitters all our actual disputes. Important as was the industrial change which accompanied the fall of Rome and the mediæval settlement, it was gradually and noiselessly brought about. Hence it is that the passage from slavery to serfdom is by no means easy to trace. Under many aspects, then, the Christian Revolution was easier than the later one, which we call the French Revolution, but which might be better judged if we termed it Western, with its most active seat in France. It is but reasonable to expect a proportion between the disturbance and the subsidence, to expect that as the whole existence of man is more completely shaken than it ever has been, so there will be a greater difficulty in the settlement, a greater alienation between the adherents of the old and those of the new society, a more complete removal, and therefore a more determined resistance to such removal, of the elements which are doomed to disappear.

The true historical appreciation of this *Western* revolution shows us that it is but the last of a series of changes which have each in their turn contributed some essential element to the ultimate form of human society. It is convenient to give it the name it bears, and it expresses so far a fact that it has more of the distinctly revolutionary character than its predecessors in that the motion quickens as we approach the end. But as we recede from it, as it passes, that is, more into the

past—and we can place ourselves by a slight exertion so as to judge it in this light—it will be seen not essentially to differ from the previous stages: it will lose its turbulent and destructive features, or they will sink into the shade, and its creative, constitutive aspects will become preponderant. We have but to compare it with the other divisions which for convenience sake we establish in the history of man's evolution, and realize to ourselves the amount of disorder which accompanied each of them, to see that this is the probable judgment of the future. But be this as it may, the six centuries to which we affix the term form one link in the chain and have an important contribution to make. They carry on unbroken the work which they inherited from the earliest establishment of social life amongst men, the work of preparing man for his real existence on the earth, the life of his maturity. Their course has been as subject to law, has been as determined as any of the earlier periods, is as explicable on a close examination; but from its lateness in the series and its greater complexity it requires more study and patience. The farther we come down the more cogent these reasons, and then there is the additional difficulty of our being so near to, so mixed up with, what we have to examine. With so much that tends to obscure our sight, it is easy to see why our judgments are so hesitating, our convictions as to the ultimate result of the movement we see and feel, so liable to a certain irresolution. There is no other remedy for it but that which we are constantly urging and never can urge too often, for we all find it difficult to apply; the habit of recurrence to the Past, of evoking by imagination the Future, so that between the two, the actual, the Present, may stand in its true light, be judged with calmness, and where possible modified. Each day brings confirmation of the necessity of this process, of the weakness and dissatisfaction and consequent practical uncertainty springing from its non-adoption.

Inheriting, then, from the whole of the Past, what has been the special task of the Western Revolution? For my purposes it has been three-fold, no exhaustive treatment being attainable nor even desirable. In no one of the three is the work completed: that need hardly be said, for were it so, from the

intimacy of the connection between them the final settlement would be reached, or at hand.

The first is commonly known, and therefore I use the term, as the organization of industry—the installation of Industrialism—the introduction into the frame-work of society of the industrial idea as a substitute for the military. It is not easy to state shortly all that is implied in this modification. It substitutes peace for war, wealth for force, it places the government of society in the hands of the capitalist, whatever his special denomination, and not in those of the soldier class, nor of the legist. But this is by no means the principal change: were it so things would be easier. There may be much repugnance in point of feeling, but there will be little substantial opposition to this transformation in the most typical case: I mean the transformation of the feudal magnate, the territorial prince, the rent-receiving landlord, into the agricultural capitalist. Much that is going on around us manifests how ripe the times are for such an alteration in the prevailing ideas, how weak will be the resistance when its desirability becomes more recognized. In short, modern Europe has long recognized the supreme power of wealth, and till within recent times has suffered its policy to be mainly governed by commercial considerations. It is not here, then, but elsewhere, that lies the knot of the difficulty. It is in the necessary introduction into the social order of new social strata, the *nouvelles couches sociales*, so unpleasant a sound to French reactionaries, the introduction of the proletariate, the free workman whether in town or country. In other words, it is the recognition, definitive, normal recognition of the power of numbers as a controlling agency upon the more easily accepted power of wealth, which startles and repels the adherents of the older order; for they scent the changes which such a recognition involves, they shrink from the complete remoulding of all their ideas, all their methods of government, all their estimate of themselves which is its inevitable accompaniment. We have seen in what spirit they have met the proved political competence of the workmen for their new position. It was the inhuman hatred of the slave-holder for the revolted slave, not the measured opposition of the political partizan, and what we have seen may enable us to estimate in some degree the task

which has lain and still lies upon modern Europe, in this first, this industrial aspect, the degree in which it stirs society to its depths and threatens it everywhere with convulsion.

The second point is more superficial at first sight, more purely political, and yet fraught with many hazards. It is the passage which our Western Revolution has to effect from Monarchy to the Republic. Unimportant this, would be the immediate judgment expressed by most of our statesmen: forms of government do not much matter; it is a mere question of theoretic politics which you prefer. But test them by their action. Does it bear out this indifference, this apparent candour? No, they know perfectly well that in the change above mentioned much more is implied, and knowing this they steadily resist everything that is favourable to it; and throughout Europe it is the same. Ill-defined and often contradictory as are the ideas conveyed by the word Republic, it yet centres in itself the hopes and aspirations of so large a portion of the more active and devoted minds, as to make it clear that they as well as their opponents feel that it is of real importance. It is undeniable that everywhere equally, all those who cling to the old order range themselves on the side of Monarchy, whilst, as a rule, those who are looking for the new are Republican. The terms are not mere names, they are symbols, they are representatives and parcels of two essentially antagonistic causes. Monarchy represents privilege, rights, the interests as it is thought of the classes more favoured hitherto, the interests of that which is called society, and which, finding itself at home in the present, has no mind to unmoor for other shores: all the remains of caste feeling, of hereditary distinctions, and such remains are numerous and strong if somewhat ruinous, gather around this conception of the past. The Republic represents the idea of paramount social duties, of the welfare of the whole superseding the more partial good; it represents the enlargement of that term Society so that it shall include all citizens, and not the few distinguished by birth and wealth. It modifies such social hierarchy as must always exist; it introduces when properly conceived a new form of heredity to supersede the old. Birth and even wealth, without disappearing take a lower place, and merit assumes its due pre-eminence. This change, again, is great and is closely con-

nected with the last, as may be seen by the little I have said, for it penetrates deep into the whole of our social arrangements and involves their remodelling : as such it is bitterly contested and a fertile source of disturbance.

There is left the third portion of the threefold task above-indicated. Its close connection with the second is pointed at in what used to be a watch-cry of great power, and on which greater stress is, I observe, being again laid than has been usual of late years—Church and King. Those who dwell so much on the connection of the two are right. They stand and fall together—I mean, of course, in the older sense of Church. The old social order was inseparably bound up with a particular faith. The new social order which replaces it is as inseparably bound up with a new faith. There are as yet but few who are conscious of this necessity. The larger part by far of those who are hastening forward the two former changes have no wish to further this last : it would be even truer, perhaps, to say that they resist it. Even those who are hostile to the older faith are unprepared and often reluctant to substitute a new one. So long as this state of things lasts, the struggle must be, for all but a few, an ill-directed and confused effort, or succession of efforts, with slight hope of any sound success. It is however clearly perceived by the thoughtful of all nations that some great change in the religious convictions of mankind, or, to be definite, of Western Europe, which is still practically Christendom, is at hand. What shape such change will take is disputed. We here represent the few who have made up their minds on its nature ; we are aware that no modification of the old can be accepted, that the substitution of a new religion is an imperious necessity. Such substitution however, we are equally aware, great as may have been the preparation for it, must bring with it a vehement antagonism. True it is that sooner or later much of the strength which is exerted in favour of the other two changes will be brought to aid this more radical one, and the three combined will move forward with more irresistible force. True it is also that its opponents are weak from the weakness of their convictions, the cultivated mind of the West being very much shaken in its adherence to theology. But no strength on the one side, no weakness on the other, can get rid of the

inherent difficulties that beset the process. No change in the history of the race has been so complete, no revolution has gone so deep. It were useless to expect that it had been accomplished without a long and passionate conflict, a conflict not necessarily involving outward violence, but absolutely inseparable from a large amount of social disruption. The barbarian invasions swept away the gods, their successor must be removed by other means. It is for the interest of all that those means should be pacific.

From these remarks it will be clear why the question raised in Germany is of secondary importance. A renewal in a manner of the old contest between Pope and Emperor, it can have but a subordinate attraction for those who are uninfluenced by the traditions which group round either name. No dispute within the limits of the old system can affect those who are bent on its quiet supercession, otherwise than as it appeals to their notions of moderation and justice as between the contending parties, and bears on the upholding of those principles which should regulate all similar discussions.

In the accomplishment of its great work the Western Revolution has moved forward unconsciously. Left without such guidance as the Papacy gave to mediæval Europe, for we date the period from the decline of Papal influence, it has had to take its course somewhat blindly. Naturally that course has been stormy and irregular, with many deviations and much waste. The retrospect of the six centuries is in this respect gloomy. It shows us that which should have been a consentaneous whole, inspired by a common purpose, torn asunder by dissensions for which there will ultimately be seen to have been no adequate justification, and for a long period tending to increased dislocation of its component parts, to greater isolation, even to more active hostility. Political and religious movements have both had this solvent character. Examine on a large scale the history of modern Europe, and the truth of this is evident. The long struggle between France and England in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; the pretensions of the Austro-Spanish power in the sixteenth to an excessive preponderance in the system, the religious wars which succeeded and connected with the resis-

tance of those pretensions ; the ambition of Louis XIV., and the wars which it occasioned ; the claims of England to maritime and colonial supremacy, and their consequences : none of these, and I purposely stop at this point, however natural and explicable, were really inevitable ; all brought with them a great loss to the common welfare, and left behind them an inheritance of evil. They interfered with the development of the elements of the future social organization, they made the actual constitution of Europe one of disorder and permanent jealousy. The responsibility for such evils rests pretty equally with all the larger powers. Italy alone can plead an exemption. The endeavours to obviate them had been incessant and increasing, and some result had undoubtedly been attained. Europe proper had, during the eighteenth century, assumed a more peaceful character, but it was from weariness, not from any satisfactory settlement. Such quiet as there was, was external ; the disorder within, the social and religious discords, the efforts to advance towards a different constitution of society, all these were continuous and only masked by the apparent calm.

For the time, however, the illusion was very strong, and the hopes of men were confident, and that throughout the whole of the system, throughout Western Europe. In a word, the confidence was as general as were the real difficulties which we now see made it a deception. I call attention to this unity of feeling and this unity of danger, which pervaded the whole, though naturally in unequal degree. For my purpose I am speaking of the system as if it were a mere collection of provinces of one empire, in which there exists unequal development from this or that easily understood condition ; as one of the more distant counties of England, for instance, may be unequal in its advance to the Metropolitan county. This is the method, I think, on which to consider European history. The inter-dependence and mutual interest of the several states which form the system should ever override all the differences. It is the Western Republic, not this or that state, which should be paramount, and all its members should sympathize one with the other, not merely in their future, but in reference to their past inter-action. I should be glad to think that it was needless to insist on this

view. I can only say that it never seems to me to have half the weight with us that it should have, and if not with us who are familiar with it in word, what is the case with those outside us?

In this complex whole, with, as I have said, parts unequally developed, the common movement would necessarily be quicker in one part than another, and as being so, would cause a jar through the whole. The common movement was a latent revolution, the greater speed at which one part moved was an open revolution. I cannot state more quietly the relation between the whole movement of the West and the movement specifically known as the French Revolution. Somewhere or other, to any but a dreamer, the impulse must be given, one state or another must take the lead, and her antecedents had determined that this state should be France, and most particularly Paris, as the brain of France. The history of our civilization is essentially identified with that of great cities. All that is characteristic of Greece centres in Athens. It was from Rome that came the force which welded into one organism permanently the states of Western Europe. When the material power with which Rome was primarily associated collapsed, the new spiritual empire which inherited its task again rested on Rome, the city, as its basis, as in its decay it still rests, clinging to it with an instinct which is quite natural, and, from its point of view, rational.

Constantine had yielded to the Pastor of the Church, the Christian Emperor, to the future Viceregent of Christ. The papal city stood in the place of the imperial. No such transmission was possible when a greater change was in preparation. The Christian Pontiff could not see the inauguration of the High Priest of Humanity, and when the Republic appeared in Rome it sheltered itself under the name of God. A fresh seat was necessary as the central point of the new order which should succeed Emperor and Pope alike, and by the common consent of the intelligence of Europe that seat has been Paris, the real focus of the larger European movement, as it has been that of the more local and national. It is to gain distinctness that I press to this innermost centre of our Western life and enumerate the series of terms which concern us; the West, its most important constituent

France, and the leading organ of France, its Capital. The great prominence of that capital explains much that has occurred in the special French Revolution, the event with which I now proceed to deal, my object hitherto having been to place it in its right connection.

I enter not into its history. We are sufficiently familiar with that, and have many of us been lately familiarized with it in Mr. Beesly's lectures. It is under the most general aspect that I consider it, as the working out in one state of the process common to all the co-equal states: as such it was desirable that it should have been conducted peacefully, without any adverse pressure from without, with the support derivable from the favourable opinion of all those co-equal states which it was but leading. Their wisdom was to encourage and to wait—to condone the errors and troubles incident to the changes in human affairs, more than ordinarily inevitable where the change was so deep, and, profiting by the experience gained, to appropriate the results of the others' labour. This had been the wise course, and it was the course adopted at first. I have already implied that there was a period, it was a short one, in which this attitude was maintained by Western Europe. But the past was too strong, both in France and out of France. The strife of classes within was responded to without. The religious convictions, the political beliefs, the social institutions of the existing order, all were felt to be assailed, and their adherents made common cause in their defence. To complicate matters the old feelings of rivalry between the states awoke, and hopes of conquest and territorial aggrandizement were revived. This was the legacy of the contest for supremacy which had so long disturbed Europe. Under the pressure thus exercised the whole movement lost all chance of a peaceful character, all chance of a gradual character. Its main efforts must be directed to the essential point of defence against domestic traitors and their foreign allies.

The defence was successful, but its success did not lead to the resumption of the work of peaceful progress. The conceptions which had governed men's minds and actions were yet too strong, and in the violence of the contest a twofold reaction had set in—an internal reaction towards the re-esta-

blishment of the old institutions under altered names, and necessarily also with an impaired consistency; a reaction in respect to other nations, with plans of imperial domination. Both in the highest degree retrograde, both therefore unsound and transient, both also by their very nature compressive, both, lastly, leaving behind them a heritage of trouble. The military reaction passed away first. The other was intensified for a time by that peculiar complication in the French revolutionary movement, the Emigration of the princes, priests, and nobles of France, the great importance of which has only lately been fully realized. Our own settlement was greatly modified by emigration, but it was modified in the direction of order if at the cost of prolonging the difficulty. The Puritans remained in the land of their adoption. The French emigrants returned to France with the bitterness of exile upon them, and the blindness to existing facts which too often accompanies it. They returned to increase the reactionary strength, and to breed up the next generation in the principles of hostility to the whole spirit of the progressive movement. The *Gouvernement de Combat* is the direct offspring of the Emigration. Under the inspiration of this returned class, the internal reaction was, I repeat, intensified, and was a second time shaken, more externally however than in its real essence, politically rather than religiously or socially. The change, therefore, effected by the shake was quite insufficient, and the social and religious questions became more prominent from the consciousness of its insufficiency. The discord between classes and beliefs grew more profound, the insecurity of all existing arrangements made itself more strongly felt, the temporary compromise disappeared, and the Revolution reappeared with all its problems. Its opponents crouched, undermined its results, and succeeded in crushing it without in any way solving any of those problems. The naked assertion of superior force was all that they had to offer in the way of guidance, the tradition of severe compression and the hope of vengeance all their contribution to the next change. They succumbed equally with those they crushed to the instrument of their victory, the object of their joint dislike, and as incapable as either of really bettering the situation, of guiding the country

which he seized through the dangerous crisis in which she was involved, or even of removing any of the causes of social antagonism, the elements of future convulsions.

The succession of disturbances, then, which I have thus rapidly given has been, it is evident, more calculated to embitter the spirit in which the threefold task above stated is to be done, than to contribute to its doing. Not that I would insinuate that no advance has been made—that the efforts and sufferings of nearly three generations have been thrown away. All I wish to insist on is that the most definite result yet attained is the clearer presentation of the difficulty to be met, rather than any satisfactory meeting of it, and that such clearer presentation has, under the influence of events, been attended with an increase and not a diminution of social disunion; the object being to account for the length at once and the unfruitfulness of the revolution. What grounds have we for thinking that it will not continue equally unfruitful in the future? We may put aside the question of its duration, on which it would be unwise to speak. On what grounds do we rest our conviction, I believe we most of us have it, that France will attain a satisfactory settlement?

There is much hope in the survey of past errors, in the exhaustion of delusive remedies, in the fact that in spite of the accompanying evils, the real problem to be solved has become visible, and the obstacles to its solution better understood. It is seen to be entirely alien to all questions of aggrandizement, wider than any mere political arrangement, more comprehensive than any industrial organization—coextensive with man's existence in all its capital aspects. Every attempt at restoration of the previous system has broken down. The hopelessness of reconciling Roman Catholicism with the modern tendencies, either in thought or action; the parallel hopelessness in the case of hereditary Monarchy; the failure of any hopes that might have been built on Imperialism, the counterfeit of monarchy; the growing conviction that no parliamentary forms offer any refuge, that an Assembly may be a worse Government than any which it supersedes; the necessity, in a word, of breaking with what has hitherto been used, and of calling new powers into existence, all this is a valuable acquisition. The fact that it is mainly negative

shows how much remains to be done, but does not destroy its use. It is much to have shown that of the two parties which stand confronting one another with such intense bitterness, one—with all power in its hands and that power in all its forms—has no competence, that every success but makes its intellectual and moral feebleness more apparent.

The other party has been, and is, perhaps, still incompetent to avail itself of its opponent's feebleness; but time works with it. It may again fail, as it has so often failed; but all seems to show that it will have gained a great step and planted firmly the Republic, thus giving expression to the deliberate will of the nation. Let so much be said without any undue confidence where all immediate progress is uncertain. It bears more on the speediness of the settlement than on the certainty.

That certainty is gained by a return on our former considerations. France is but in advance of other nations, her compeers. It is possible that her advance might not be a true one, that in some other state, or in the whole, the settlement might be attained earlier than in her. It is possible, but not easily conceivable. But wherever attained, it would in our hypothesis react upon France, and end in her reconstitution. It is not possible I mean, that such a movement as the Western Revolution should stop short of its goal, and that goal is the constitution of a new social order throughout all the nations that take part in it. The extent of the system and the multiplicity of its parts give it a corresponding immunity of failure from the failure in any one part; so again, by the mutual light they throw upon one another, we are secured from the danger of reading amiss the course and destination of the whole movement. This is the broadest ground on which our conviction can rest, and I know of nothing which makes it unsound. I may add that it is in the highest degree rational to believe that the same determining conditions which have laid the stress of the common burden on one particular nation, will ensure the prior emergence of that nation. She has met the storm first, she will be the first to look back on it.

This natural presumption must be almost infinitely strengthened to us when we reflect on that change in the conditions of the movement which we here represent. Till recently that movement has been instinctive and unexplained: there has

been no conscious guidance. Hence its disorderly character. The explanation and the guidance are now available: its direction consequently becomes possible, within given limits certain, and order may replace disorder.

I shall consider this service only under the aspect which bears on my present line of thought. Its reality and utility will be assumed. What I would insist on is the support its origin gives to the general argument I am maintaining, viz. that where the revolutionary crisis is most marked, there also will be the earliest termination. Born under the twofold stimulus of the revolution and the reaction, the philosophical, political, and religious system which we propagate is the direct outcome of the intellectual movement of the eighteenth century in both its senses, but mainly in the construction. In that intellectual movement France had unquestionably the lead; we doubt not that she has maintained that lead in the construction which has been raised in the nineteenth century. It is not reasonable to suppose that the country, the city of that construction—and Paris alone could have produced it—should not be the first to understand it and use it. I have often heard it urged as an objection to the system that it is too predominantly French in its character and exposition. I do not myself agree in this; it is one of the many objections which I think disappear on reflection and with greater knowledge. The system is Western, and therefore ultimately human. And as being so, its non-attractiveness for the peculiarly national Frenchman is intelligible. Leaving out of the question other difficulties it has for him, its grave universality jars upon his more local feelings. But the first of these contradictory judgments is here alluded to as an evidence in favour of the position taken up; what to other European adherents of the system appears adverse to its reception, with us is a warrant for its meeting its earliest appreciation in the country where it arose. If so, the whole strength of our conviction of its value as a competent guidance in the reconstruction of society in all its three forms, is here available to uphold the conclusion which I have been urging; that final sterility can in no way be the issue of French revolutions—nay, that the first definite instalment of that reconstruction is beyond all reasonable doubt the appointed portion of the country which has been

torn by those revolutions. She ill understands her disease. She is slow to use the remedy. But the acuteness of her sufferings will quicken her apprehension. Her completer breach with the past renders easier her adoption of the new conceptions. Her people is admittedly receptive and impressionable. The impulse once given, the motion once communicated—and this is being done, if too slowly—we may be confident of its acquiring the due strength, of its bearing down at once the scruples of those who are its proper supporters, and the less really formidable opposition of its avowed antagonists. An apparently small force of believers in a new doctrine has ever been an over-match for the disciples of a faith in decay.

All that I have said leads naturally to a further remark—that in the suffering, disunion, and bitterness which characterize the present condition of France, she is not merely a representative, but a vicarious agent. It is her destiny to be the leader in our Western movement; it is her destiny to suffer most; but it is her high destiny also to relieve by that suffering the sufferings of others. Instinctively this is becoming the general feeling, and its growth is aided by recent events, which, with one great drawback, have been of incalculable advantage to Europe and to France. The drawback I mean is the abuse by Germany of her victory in the plunder and dismemberment of her enemy; the advantage is the clearing of the position of France in Europe. But, apart from recent events, and apart from any growth in consequence of them, it may safely be asserted that wherever there is an intelligent attention given to the progress of human affairs, there the main force of such attention is directed on France, be it against her or for her; and putting aside Germany, where the artful stimulation of her rulers and her teachers largely overrules, without succeeding in crushing, the popular instinct; putting aside also the dominant classes in this and perhaps other Western countries whose traditions and whose instincts lead them the other way (it is one of the many signs of their irremediable decline), we may no less confidently assert that the current of national sympathy, in the true sense of the term national, has long set in her favour. Still more is this true of the non-Western nations, semi-Eastern or Eastern—at least

so it seems to me. In Turkey and Russia this is notoriously the case, and further Eastward, so far as there is interest in Europe—and there is evidently great interest, if I am not mistaken—the preponderating sentiment is French. The outlying portions of the race look to her as the natural centre and leader.

In fact, the attitude towards her which I said it would have been wise for her co-equals to assume at the beginning and throughout her movement, the attitude of encouragement and expectation, is, after much experience, the one which is now practically assumed by all. There is so far an alteration for the better, that its rather negative character is passing into one of active sympathy. There was something of this originally, but it was carefully put down and every counter-feeling sedulously cherished. It is reawakening, and the means of again crushing it are not at hand. The popular movements are gravitating to one central point, and that central point is indicated by a not unsafe guide in such cases, the blind and cruel hatred of their opponents. The gratification of that hatred in the atrocious vengeance on the Communal movement of Paris, rivets the hold of Paris on the affections of the people of Europe.

I have spoken, I think it will be allowed, in a measured way of the position and services of France, confining myself as strictly as possible to the working out of the argument. All nations are given to self-assertion, our own as much as any, nor has France been free from the fault. The time is perhaps yet distant when it shall be accepted as a truth in relation to national, what is accepted by all higher natures in individual morality, that such self-assertion is unbecoming. We have got so far only that we dislike in others what we practise ourselves. Were I a Frenchman, then I might content myself with what I have said. But members of the other Western nations should not be slow or grudging in their recognition of the eminent services of the nation which has led them and so deeply suffered for them. Those services have been obscured by many errors, but no errors can justify a denial of them. Nor have they been unconscious or unwilling services. Action or suffering, much of both has been given in a very noble spirit, in later as in earlier times. The

readiness to serve, not France only, but the whole race, was strongly expressed at the opening of the revolution, and has been most unjustly sneered at ever since by those who are incapable of rightly estimating the high nobility of its original aspirations, the true character of that illustrious generation. Borne down by the rally of all that was meaner, the sentiment has yet never been extinguished, and on each occasion of the temporary ascendency of something better it has reappeared. One signal act among many marked its reappearance in the late misfortunes: I mean the destruction of the Napoleonic column, as an insulting record of military oppression. I doubt not but that decision will finally be ratified by the deliberate judgment of the nation, whatever the immediate resolution of this assembly, and that all to which it pledges the nation which ratifies it will be consistently carried out. After many a deviation, the movement is returning to its original spirit, and vindicating the promise of its youth. Not then encouragement, not even sympathy, do we claim for France; the one might be dictated by self-interest, the second might be thought due to suffering; but we claim gratitude and honour, as a just tribute from those on whom she has conferred undoubted benefits.

Let me say a little more on the vicarious position of France as the foundation of the favour with which she is regarded and the feelings which I think her due. Some may recollect that M. Laffitte ended the lectures he gave in this school with the earnest expression of his hope and his wish that the progress of England might be an evolution, not a revolution. We all echo the wish, and even the hope, though to many it may seem but a faint one, when they weigh the elements of danger and the spirit which animates those on whom the main responsibility at present rests. Even the wish perhaps might be difficult to some, from a not unnatural impatience at the abuse of opportunities, a pardonable irritation when they see the hard contentment of the classes in possession, the grievous burden of those who have not yet entered into their inheritance. But, in echoing the wish, we may not be blind to the truth, that our strongest ground for thinking it reasonable lies in the previous passage of France through the trial which awaits us—that at the cost of all the sacrifices she has had to

make, we shall purchase immunity from the worst of the evil. One, and one only, of the constituents of the West need drink the cup of revolution to the dregs; the others may attain the same end by a milder treatment.

Nations learn slowly, it is said; but the rate of their learning is being quickened by countless influences, and there is a subtle spirit of intercommunication which is, more rapidly than public men dream of, fusing the provinces of the Western Republic. The greatest superficial obstacle fifty years ago would have been thought to lie in the opposition of England and France, and this obstacle is now incalculably less formidable than it was. The real difficulty, the non-existence of a common faith capable of rallying the two just mentioned powers, and through them the rest, has been removed; and in the service of Humanity a definite direction may be gradually given to both, so as to bring them into full accord. The beginning is small; none see that more clearly than we do; but the beginning is made, and after the long interreign of anarchy, that is the capital point—more than half the whole according to Aristotle. It is for the disciples of the new faith in the two countries to prove the power of the arms which it places at their command.

I have compressed to the utmost my remarks. I have avoided much that might have made my statements clearer—many seductive openings—and yet I have exceeded the limits which our practice sets in such matters, the almost statute hour which is too short for many subjects. A few words more and I have done.

Whatever the future may be, in the present we here have the full enjoyment of order and liberty; we can work with calm and steadiness. Our co-religionists in France are not in such a condition. Not only in Paris, but in all the great centres of French life, their position is anxious and requiring the utmost caution. At any moment it may become one of serious danger, for the doctrine they hold in common with us is felt to be the real fulcrum of the dissidence from the old belief which increases daily. The professed servants of Humanity must lead in the struggle to eliminate God; and that this is the essential element in the whole existing perplexity is forcing itself upon all. But in such a difference of

situation it is difficult for two parties to sympathize fully with one another to the extent which is desirable. All our exertions should tend to keep alive our sympathy, to understand their point of view, whilst we avail ourselves of the advantages we possess. It was for this reason among many others that I clung to the Review, as telling us how they looked on the combat in which they were engaged. Here and there a note may have been struck too strongly, but the whole effort was a valuable expression of feelings which we have so little means ordinarily of knowing, and there are many circumstances which make it hard to find a substitute. So that the two largest constituents of the small Positivist body exist side by side with deficient communication—exposed therefore to the danger of divergent action. It is useless to conceal from ourselves this danger; it has other sources besides the one just mentioned. It is its existence which has led me to enter at such length on our relations, our obligations to France, so as to bring all the power of a well-grounded conviction to the support of our adhesion to her leadership, her special as well as her general leadership. In point of direct union the initiative, as a fact, lies with us rather than with the French disciples. Their over-passive attitude must not discourage us however. It can be but for a time. It is for us to see that we do all that we can to avert from the common cause any evil consequences which might arise from such temporary deficiency.

For the cause is absolutely common, for all the servants of Humanity, each in his own measure. And their union is indispensable, if they would justify their claim to the direction of this world's affairs. Any separate national movement is subversive of the very conception of the new Religion, as it has been fatal to that of the old. Through all difficulties we must cling to this truth.

And after all, great as our difficulties undeniably are, there are sufficient motives to overcome them. The direction has lapsed, and there are none ready to take it up; we have many opponents, but most of them reject the very idea of direction, except within the narrow limits of the State, for which the astounding pretension is put forward, that it is nobler in idea than the Church. Our only possible rival is too hampered

with other-world considerations to be capable of really directing the present. The sense that we alone have the power of taking the direction may be a useful check upon impatience, but not an incentive to inaction. Delay, though not fatal to the ultimate result, prolongs existing evils, and enhances the uncertainty of their orderly settlement. All binds strongly upon us the obligations of our service. We can produce, it is true, no great immediate effect; nothing which shall strike the imagination of our contemporaries. But no unobtrusiveness in our work can lessen its value if we direct it aright, so far as it is theoretic, to the clearing up of the confused issues which are at present offered for acceptance; if in practice we form with resolute decision the nucleus around which the scattered elements of the future organization may arrange themselves. We can, in England, in France, wherever we are found, make it possible, nay necessary, for men to take their sides in the fight; and I name the two countries because they are the most deeply committed, and because for both I believe the same conduct to be equally applicable—openly and avowedly to take service in one or other of the opposing camps, to bring face to face the two beliefs, the belief of the Past, the belief in God; and the belief in the Future, the belief in Humanity, and to choose deliberately between them.

19 CHAPEL STREET, BEDFORD ROW:
Festival of Humanity, 86 (*January* 1, 1874).

To his Excellency the Japanese Ambassador.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—In common with all our countrymen, we hail with pleasure your arrival amongst us on a diplomatic mission from his Imperial Majesty of Japan, more particularly as a sign that the relations between the two countries are to be henceforth conducted on the same equal terms as the intercourse between any two countries of Western Europe; and we earnestly hope that in the more special objects such mission has in view, your Excellency may be successful in the degree which the true interests of our respective nations require. We confine ourselves to this general expression, as we have no means of knowing what are the special objects of your Excellency's visit. If one object be, as is commonly reported, to obtain a revision of the treaties at present existing as unjust and injurious to Japan, we cordially wish for your success, and shall do all in our power to further it.

For, as Englishmen, we look back with shame on the conduct of our Government and commercial classes in their dealings with your country, and would wish such reparation as is possible to be made for the abuse of our hitherto superior strength. We have the less hesitation in frankly avowing this feeling, because we have on previous occasions openly protested against the action of our Government, as may be seen by the documents which we beg your Excellency to accept. We on all accounts rejoice to think that the Great Empire which your Excellency represents, whilst wisely renouncing its exclusiveness in the past, which we do not deny to have had ample justification, and whilst with the truest and most enlightened policy it avails itself of the various material and intellectual results of our Western civilization, is yet with the greatest prudence strengthening its own defensive resources, and confronting the encroaching recklessness of Euro-

pean commerce with the formidable military power which alone can extort from that commerce, in its present unsocial condition, due moderation and respect. To be well armed and well disciplined is, we regret to say, the first requisite for an Eastern power in presence of the Western world as at present constituted.

May we venture to express the hope that, whilst appropriating what is valuable in the results obtained by Europe, the Imperial Government of Japan may preserve an attitude of dignified abstention from any encouragement to the decaying faith which the Europe of the past found useful, but which has ceased to be in the present day anything but a source of discord? The missionaries of the different Christian sects are but the pioneers, as has been seen in China, of the trader and the soldier, and therefore we cannot too urgently recommend every measure of precaution against them. We consider Europe as too much shaken in its own belief to have any claim to spread it amongst others. Such religious changes as are deemed necessary in Japan will, we hope, be in accordance with the traditions of the country, and not in the direction of an alien belief, ill adapted to an Eastern population. The Western world, we most confidently believe, is itself advancing towards a new religious development which will embrace all existing organizations as more or less perfect expressions of one true system, and in which, therefore, all those organizations will ultimately find their convergence.

To the expression of these sentiments, which, as your Excellency will perceive, are prompted by the sense of the perfect community which exists between the different members of the great Human Family, we would add yet another consideration.

Looking at the relations between Western Europe and the Eastern powers, we think it most desirable that a strong reaction against the insolent domination which Europeans are too apt to claim should be organized in the East. We wish, that is, for a common action of the leading Eastern powers for purposes of mutual protection. And it appears to us, so far as we can estimate those powers, and submitting our views to your Excellency's more intimate acquaintance with the facts, that in such common action the principal part

is, as the result of its history and actual organization, reserved for Japan. If right in such judgment, we hope that your Excellency's Government may duly estimate and act up to its position, and afford a firm rallying point to the neighbouring empires, all of which, and more especially China, are seriously threatened by European, or more properly English, ambition; for we regret to say it is England which is really the most dangerous power.

We speak, your Excellency, in the name of a small body; but the feelings we express are not limited, we fully believe, to that body, but are shared by an increasing number of our countrymen, who, with us, wish for the peaceful union of all the nations of the Earth—on just and equal terms—whatever their relative advance at the present moment may be, so that all may contribute, each in its degree, to the common progress of the Race.

With every wish for your Excellency's welfare and for the prosperity of your Excellency's country, we beg you to accept this our Address, and to thank you for the courteous reception you have granted us.

We have the honour to remain
Your Excellency's obedient Servants,

Signed by the Positivists in London and Paris,
and presented in the early part of 1873.

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